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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis is centrally concerned with regulation by the British state o f marriage 
immigration (i.e. immigration status achieved through marriage) lfom 1962 until the 
present day. It is also a study o f discretion in decision-making. It analyses decisions 
made by three institutions: the legislature, the judiciary and the entry clearance 
service. It identifies the beliefs, values and assumptions upon which decisions were 
and are predicated and finds that they were consistently held across institutions 
through much o f the period between 1962 and 1997. Since 1997, decisions appear to 
show more fluidity and ambivalence, suggesting the adoption o f more complex and 
less consistent attitudes.
The introduction to the thesis is presented in two parts. The first introduces the 
thesis, explains its structure and places it within the existing literature. The second 
provides a preliminary context by briefly considering two episodes that predate the 
main period under consideration.
1.1 Introduction to the thesis
1.1.1 Subject of the thesis
The specific subject o f study in the thesis is that part o f immigration law which, from 
1962 until the present day, has controlled the admission o f the spouses o f British 
nationals or permanent UK residents. In these cases, the entering spouse usually 
becomes a permanent resident and it is this feature that has particularly provoked 
anxiety and stringent regulation.
At the start o f the period considered here, those applying to enter were usually 
seeking family reunification.1 They were typically the spouses o f recent immigrants 
from New Commonwealth countries. As primary migration ceased and migrants’ 
families matured, there was a switch to family formation, essentially the creation o f a 
new family unit. Applicants were typically men and women engaged or married to 
those who had travelled to the UK as children or who had been bom  in the UK. The 
overwhelming focus was on applicants from the Indian sub-continent entering 
arranged marriages although other nationalities, including from the Caribbean, also
1 The terms ‘family unification’ and ‘family formation’ are used as defined in Kofman (2004).
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featured. In the recent period, the sub-continent has continued to feature strongly but 
marriage immigration has also involved larger numbers from other nationalities. 
Attention has partially switched to short-term entrants, failed asylum seekers and 
over-stayers who form relationships while in the UK. However, a growing focus on 
cultural conformity means that the South Asian arranged marriage system and its 
implications have recently come under renewed scrutiny.
All these forms o f immigration have been seen as problematic and different means 
have been used to defeat them. Those specific to marriage are described and analysed 
in detail in later chapters o f this thesis. Others, such as financial criteria, which apply 
to many types o f immigrant, are considered only so far as they specifically affect 
marriage immigration. Common reasons for refusal have evolved alongside the 
circumstances o f applicants. Absence o f formal documentation rationalised rejection 
of many claims for reunification. The infamous primary purpose rule (Sachdeva 1993) 
was used mainly against male applicants seeking to join the daughters o f first 
generation immigrants. Following abolition o f primary purpose in 1997, some o f 
these applicants were still refused on grounds that the parties did not intend to live 
together. The requirement to leave the UK to obtain entry clearance has become a 
major way to control short-term and illegal entrants who rely on marriage to found a 
claim to remain. Measures ostensibly aimed at preventing forced marriages have, 
especially more recently, been viewed as a means to reduce culturally unacceptable 
immigration. These methods o f control have been enabled, executed and supported or, 
more rarely, challenged by the institutions examined here: Parliament, the judiciary 
and the entry clearance service.
The thesis also represent^ajs^pstudy in the exercise of discretion. The perspective 
adopted here is that discretion is an inescapable part of all decision-making and that, 
while its extent and context differ widely, all discretionary decisions share some 
common features. Notably, all decisions rely eventually if  not at once upon values, 
beliefs and assumptions about the world. Where members of institutions hold broadly 
similar beliefs, values and assumptions, consistent patterns o f decision-making within 
the institution may emerge despite the absence of explicit norms. Where beliefs, 
values and assumptions are shared across different institutions, decisions made by 
these institutions will be broadly congruent with each other. The thesis suggests that 
this was the case in much o f the period between 1962 and 1997. It identifies a
consistently held set o f attitudes that determined decision-making at all levels. 
However, the picture since 1997 has been less clear-cut.
The thesis synthesises information from a wide range of sources including archived 
and other contemporary material and also relies on a brief field study. The theoretical 
approach adopted permits the analysis o f a range of institutions and is concerned not 
only with what decisions are made but also with how they have been reached.
1.1.2 The law
Regulation o f immigration is to be found primarily in the Immigration Rules made by 
the Home Secretary under S.3(2) Immigration Act 1971. Prior to the Immigration Act 
1971, entry was regulated either under the various Aliens Acts (since 1905) or under 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts 1962 and 1968, supplemented by Aliens Act 
Orders or instructions to officials. The characteristics o f the regime prior to the 1971 
Act are discussed in chapter 3.
Revisions to the Immigration Rules must be laid before Parliament and become 
law unless they are subject to negative resolution of either Chamber, a very rare 
occurrence. The current provisions affecting marriage are found in part 8 (paras. 277- 
295) o f the Immigration Rules (HC 395). These regulate the admission (or extension 
of leave) o f spouses and civil partners (who are now treated identically), unmarried 
partners and fiances. There are a number of requirements that all applicants must meet 
including:
i. The UK sponsor must be present and settled2 in the UK or being admitted for 
settlement on the same occasion (para. 281). Non-national residents have, 
since 1985, been treated identically to British nationals although, under recent 
proposals to replace indefinite leave to remain, gaining the status necessary for 
sponsorship may be delayed, possibly indefinitely, for those immigrants who 
are perceived as failing to integrate adequately (Border and Immigration 
Agency 2008a and 2008b).
ii. Only one spouse to a polygamous marriage is permitted to enter (para. 278). 
An application will usually be refused if  the other spouse has been in the UK 
other than as a visitor or illegal entrant.
2 Under para.6 HC 395, ‘settled’ means (i) free from restrictions as to the period in which the person 
may remain and (ii) ordinarily resident in the UK without having entered or remained in breach o f  the 
immigration laws or, if  so, leave to remain has been subsequently given.
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ill. Entry clearance for Commonwealth nationals seeking admission as family 
members became compulsory in 1979 and its effects are examined in chapter 
5. Applicants for entry must obtain entry clearance before arrival under paras. 
281, 290 and 295. Those seeking leave to remain in the UK without entry 
clearance for marriage must now have been given prior leave to enter as a 
fiance or for a period o f more than 6 months. The prohibition on ‘switching' is 
a recent development that is discussed in chapter 6.
iv. The parties must have met (para. 281), excluding those who married by proxy 
and have not met subsequently. The requirement applies also to fiance(e)s 
(para. 290), a requirement that has proved problematic in some arranged 
marriages. Judicial interpretation o f the requirement is discussed in chapter 5.
v. The marriage must be subsisting and the parties intend to live together (after 
the marriage, in the case of fiances); paras 281, 290 and 295A. Following the 
abolition o f the primary purpose rule in 1997, this rule is now the principal 
means o f testing that a marriage is genuine. From 1983 until 1997, parties also 
had to establish that it was not the primary purpose o f the marriage to obtain 
admission to the UK.3 The primary purpose rule was the principal means of 
preventing non-white, particularly male, marriage immigration and is 
discussed at length in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The role played by ‘intention to live 
together' is discussed mainly in chapter 6.
vi. There will be adequate accommodation for the parties and any dependants 
without recourse to public funds in accommodation which they own or occupy 
exclusively and that the parties will be able to maintain themselves and any 
dependants adequately without recourse to public funds (paras. 281, 290 and 
295A). ‘Maintenance and accommodation’ requirements apply throughout the 
immigration rules and are mostly considered only tangentially in this thesis. A 
specific issue, discussed in chapter 6, is the restriction upon third party 
assistance to couples, undermining Asian traditions o f extended family 
support. A more general point is that, while a policy o f protecting the public 
purse may be relatively uncontroversial, the requirements have the effect o f 
excluding the poorest UK residents from participation in international family
3 The final version o f  the rule was in paras. 47 and 50 HC 251.
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reunion or formation. The way in which social class interacts with race and 
culture is discussed in chapter 6.
vii. Both parties must be aged at least 18 at the time o f arrival in the UK or of 
grant or variation o f leave (para. 277). The minimum age has been raised 
progressively in the recent period and, at the time o f writing, is due to be 
raised again to 21.4 This contrasts with a minimum age for marriage in the UK 
of 16 (with parental consent). Issues o f the minimum age, forced marriage and 
the acceptability o f very early marriages are considered in chapter 6.
In recent years, in addition to the Immigration Rules, immigration has been 
increasingly controlled by statute. Relevant to marriage applications are S.24 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and Ss. 19-25 Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment o f Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. These measures govern the conduct of 
marriages involving non-EEA nationals and are discussed at length in chapter 6.
1.1.3 The literature
There is now a vast literature on migration as a subject o f study within or across a 
variety o f disciplines including anthropology, geography, politics, sociology and 
economics. This literature is not separately considered in the thesis but aspects of it 
have informed the analysis, particularly where it challenges conventional assumptions 
about the ability and moral right o f sovereign nation states to control immigration, for 
example, Van Amersfoot (1996); Carens (1987); Dummett (2001); Harris (2002); 
Joppke (1998); Juss (2004); Juss (2006); Sassen (1996); Sciortino (1991).
There exist already many detailed accounts o f the history o f immigration into the 
UK from sociological, historical or political perspectives. These include Holmes 
(1991); Layton-Henry (1992); Paul (1997); Spencer (1997); Hansen (2000); Winder 
(2004). Major textbooks deal with the law current at the time o f publication, for 
example, Macdonald and Blake (various editions); Bevan (1986); Evans (1993); 
Supperstone and O ’Dempsey (1996); Mole (1987); Clayton (2004, 2006). Early or 
out-of-date editions o f these texts often provide valuable historical insight.
4 ‘Marriage visa age raised to prevent forced marriages’, UK Border Agency Press Release 23rd July 
2008.
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There have been several texts concerned with the law in its political, social or 
historical context. Evans' (1983) early chapters contain a historical account. Bevan 
(1986) looks at the law thematically highlighting consistent trends. Juss (1993) 
similarly examines how problems o f secrecy, reactivity, accountability and 
discrimination characterise the legal framework. Dummett and Nicol (1990) put the 
law and its practice into a longer historical perspective, which permits persistent 
themes to be identified. Recently, Clayton (2004, 2006) has taken a contextual view 
o f the law.
Others have emphasised particular characteristics o f decision-making. Legomsky's 
comparative study (1987) of immigration and the judiciary drew attention to the 
consistent restraint shown by the judiciary both in the UK and the US when asked to 
review immigration decisions. Griffiths (1997) makes a similar point in his broader 
study. Desai (1996) updated Legom sky's analysis in respect o f the UK judiciary. She 
found that decision-making could still be described as conservative despite the 
significant development o f judicial review during the previous decade. Debate as to 
judicial conservatism generally has revived following the Human Rights Act (Clayton 
2004; Edwards 2002; Elliott 2001; Ewing 1999, 2004; Fredman 2006; Judge 2004). A 
critique of judicial decision-making in relation to marriage immigration is offered in 
chapters 4 and 6 o f this thesis.
There has been work concerned principally with the effect upon family life o f 
immigration controls. Sachdeva (1993) carried out a detailed investigation o f the 
operation o f the primary purpose rule, arguing that the rule was aimed at the exclusion 
o f South Asian men and the eradication o f the international arranged marriage. 
Bhabha et al (1985) and Bhabha and Shutter (1994) considered the impact of 
immigration and refugee law including the marriage laws upon women. Menski 
(1999) discusses the impact o f primary purpose upon British resident women. Cheney 
(1994) links the treatment o f women within the immigration system to the culture and 
language o f imperialism and notes how rigid administrative categories deny the 
complexity o f actual lives. The operation o f entry clearance during the 1970s and 
1980s was subject to extensive contemporary critique, notably Chowdhury (1982); 
Commission for Racial Equality (1985); Lai and Wilson (1986); Martin (1975); 
Powell (1992, 1993); Rumiymede Trust (1977) and Sondhi (1987). These are 
considered in chapter 5 while the entry clearance service in the recent period is 
discussed in chapter 6.
Juss (1997) is principally concerned with decision-making by entry clearance 
officers (ECOs), adjudicators and tribunals, particularly in relation to family 
members. He argues for the development of a ‘cultural jurisprudence' to secure 
justice and fairness in a multicultural and diverse society. He links his findings 
specifically to issues o f ‘due process' and the substantive issue o f using social science 
research as evidence in immigration cases. While he encompasses tribunals, 
adjudicators and the entry clearance service in his study, his main emphasis is upon 
ensuring that tribunals reach culturally sensitive decisions that will, in turn, affect the 
culture within entry clearance.
Gender is an inescapable sub-theme o f any discussion o f marriage. While the effect 
o f gender and family on migratory patterns and the intersection o f race and gender in 
migration were arguably under-researched for a long period (Kofman 2004:247; 
Calavita 2006), they have become a recent focus o f study (Phizacklea 1998; Kofman 
et al 2000; Kofman 2004; Piper 2005; Calavita 2006; Kofman and Meetoo 2008).5 
New conceptions o f family and migration “see them as fluid and as constantly being 
reconstituted and negotiated, adapting across spaces and through time” (Kofman 
2004:249). The literature demonstrates how assumptions about gender have infected 
policy-making, a particularly relevant point in explaining the perceived urgent 
necessity o f primary purpose (chapter 3) and the gendered assumptions about power 
and agency that have underpinned much decision-making about couples from the 
Indian sub-continent (chapters 4 and 5). The relationship between gender and race is a 
complex one. The thesis argues that, for decision-makers, the two were often mutually 
reinforcing (see chapters 4, 5 and 6).
Another strand is the study o f marriage patterns amongst the U K 's minority ethnic 
communities. There is now a substantial literature focusing largely upon the South 
Asian community and the arranged marriage (Ballard 1982, 1990, 2002, 2005, 2006; 
Bradby 1999; Brah 1978; Butler 1999; Charsley 2006). Much o f this is concerned 
with how young people negotiate and reconcile the possibly conflicting expectations 
o f their parents, their community and themselves, an important theme in this thesis 
but one that demands careful delineation given the frequent reliance upon the forced 
marriage, itself now the subject o f substantial literature (Phillips and Dustin 2004; 
Razack 2004; Samad and Eade 2002), in order to justify restrictive immigration
5 An EU funded project analysing family migration policy in 8 EU member states is also under way at 
the time o f  writing.
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controls. It is easy for debate to become framed as one of conflict between ‘modern’ 
indigenous culture and ‘backward' immigrant culture (Lewis 2005; Razack 2004). 
Critics have observed the ambiguous or negative cultural weight ascribed to the 
‘immigrant woman' (Lewis 2005; Roggeband and Verloo 2007). There is a link here 
to other recent writing about cohesion and belonging, some of which is considered in 
chapter 6 (for example, Gedalof 2007; YuvaLDavis et al 2005). Regulation of 
marriage immigration has frequently relied upon the distinction between insiders and 
those who remain at least partial outsiders.
As already indicated, the thesis is also a study o f discretion. The literature on 
discretion is vast and varied. There is a considerable empirical literature (Halliday 
2000a, 2000b; Hawkins 1984; Loveland 1994) and various analyses often concerned 
with the limited role o f law in its regulation (Adler and Asquith 1981; Allott 1980; 
Baldwin 1990, 1995; Davis 1969; Galligan 1986, 1996, 2001; Grey 1979; Hawkins 
1992, 2002; Kadish and Kadish 1973). Judicial discretion has been the subject of 
extensive theoretical debate, most particularly in relation to Dworkin’s (1977, 1985) 
critique o f Haitian positivism which has given rise to a literature too extensive to 
summarise here but which is explored in chapter 2. Out of this literature is developed 
the theoretical perspective adopted in this thesis.
The thesis draws upon the wide range o f literature discussed here to develop its 
arguments. By adopting a relatively narrow focus, it is able to make a deep 
investigation o f the multiple and complex elements that have contributed to the 
development and application o f the law and enables consistent features to be 
identified in a range o f contexts. These features reveal deeply held attitudes about the 
lineaments o f legitimate state power, about who does and does not belong in the UK 
and the shifting and contingent nature o f  that belonging particularly for some 
populations and about how, particularly for women, marriage constitutes a public 
declaration o f allegiance as well as a private commitment. The identification of 
patterns o f decision-making also permits arguments to be made about the relationship 
between institutions in the execution o f policy.
1.1.4 Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 considers the wide literature on discretion, both judicial and administrative, 
and uses it to develop the theoretical perspective used in the rest o f the thesis. This
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perspective allows an examination not only o f what decisions are made but why they 
are made in the way they are. Chapter 3 considers decisions made by the legislature 
between 1962, when immigration from the Commonwealth was first formally 
regulated, and 1997. It traces the evolution in legislative approach towards marriage 
emigration from broad permissiveness to severe restriction. In doing so, it identifies 
beliefs and assumptions about race, immigration, gender and marriage as well as 
specific institutional values o f Parliament. Chapter 4 examines judicial decision­
making during the same period in areas relevant to marriage immigration and 
identifies similar values to those in chapter 3 as well as specific judicial values. 
Chapter 5 contains a detailed investigation into the conduct o f the entry clearance 
service until 1997, a period during which it achieved notoriety for its exclusionary 
decision-making particularly on the Indian sub-continent. Chapter 6 considers the 
position since 1997. It outlines changes in perception o f older immigrant groups and 
discusses new fears about immigration, security and social cohesion. Later sub­
sections consider legislative, judicial and administrative decision-making since 1997. 
They reflect these new emphases and the contradictions contained within them. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
1.2 Context
In chapter 3, the thesis begins a detailed examination o f the period since 1962. 
Marriage immigration occurred in earlier periods but did not invoke large-scale 
controversy. Prior to 1962, Commonwealth nationals had freedom of movement 
despite attempts in the 1950s to introduce administrative curbs on Commonwealth 
emigration (Bhabha and Shutter 1994:33-4; Dummett and Nicol 1990:177-81). 
Chapter 3 discusses how, even after 1962, the admission o f Commonwealth wives and 
children remained, for a period, uncontested.
The admission o f aliens, on the other hand, had been regulated since the Aliens Act 
1905. The 1905 Act did not specifically provide for the entry o f those married to 
British nationals, being concerned with regulating the entry o f mainly Jewish refugees 
and their families. Under the Aliens Orders implemented under the Aliens Acts 1914 
and 1919, female British residents bom in the UK, “with a substantial connection” to 
or “well-established” in the UK were permitted to bring in alien husbands if  refusal 
would result in hardship, a question left to the immigration officer’s discretion. Until
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the British Nationality Act 1948, the alien wives o f British men automatically became 
British nationals on marriage and were free to enter. After the 1948 Act. they were 
still normally permitted to enter (see the discussion in Bhabha and Shutter 1994:31-2). 
The Aliens Orders also provided that the wife and children of alien male workers 
should be admitted for the same period of time as the worker provided they could be 
supported while female workers had no such corresponding right. Neither the sex 
discrimination nor the immigration rights conferred by these orders seem to have 
caused comment. Dummett and Nicol (1990:188) note that alien immigration as a 
whole remained uncontroversial even after non-white commonwealth immigration 
became the focus o f scrutiny.
The attitudes discussed in this thesis only became evident in response to the 
perceived threat o f mass non-white Commonwealth secondary immigration. Yet, 
despite the apparent preceding calm, it is submitted here that these attitudes did not 
emerge at once and fully-formed but had a latent presence in the minds o f decision­
makers. This is suggested by evidence o f aspects of them, relating particularly to 
marriage, women and family, in even earlier periods. These are discussed briefly in 
this introduction.
It has been noted that women are seen as the reproducers o f nationality and 
ethnicity, literally as mothers and figuratively in terms of embodying and reproducing 
culture (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989:6-10). In recent times, as chapter 6 notes, this 
has been observed mainly in the context of minority cultures. However, women in 
majority British society have also earned this burden. Specifically in relation to the 
concerns o f this thesis, a woman’s choice o f spouse has been considered a statement 
o f allegiance as well as o f personal preference. This is apparent from the long debate 
on married women and nationality. W omen’s role in safeguarding the moral health o f 
the nation is also suggested by aspects of the implementation o f the Aliens Act 1905 
although the focus here was on the immigration o f women married to other aliens. 
The A ct’s implementation also prefigures, in a minor way, the strong unofficial 
culture in the entry clearance service discussed in chapter 5. Both o f these episodes 
are considered briefly here by way o f context to the detailed investigation that begins 
in chapter 3.
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1.2.1 Married women’s nationality
The rule that a married woman must adopt her husband's nationality upon marriage 
was a major example o f conjugal unity. Under this principle, a wife's personality was 
incorporated into that o f the husband but "(t)he wife was not reduced to the position in 
law of, say, a dog" (Williams 1947:18); it was a question o f guardianship rather than 
ownership. Writing in 1947. Glanville Williams cites the Bible as the origin o f the 
common law concept and quotes Shakespeare and Byron to demonstrate its deep roots 
in our culture.
Conjugal unity should not be mistaken for a principled attachment to the family 
unit for the sake o f the pleasures o f married life or the security o f children. It was 
concerned primarily with reproducing patriarchy and hierarchy within the family. It 
applied to areas o f law such as taxation and domicile where it reinforced the authority 
o f a male head o f household. This was also the case as regards the nationality o f /  
married women where conjugal unity was consistently enforced by law from the mid 
1800s until 1948.6
The Naturalisation Act o f 1844 (S. 16) provided that a foreign-born woman 
automatically became British upon marriage to a British man and S. 10(1) 
Naturalisation Act 1870 stated that "a married woman shall be deemed to be a subject 
of the state of which her husband is for the time being a subject". Commentators (for 
example, Dummett and Nicol 1990:87-8; Jones 1947:72) as well as the Select 
Committee (1923) argue that the prior common law position had been that a woman's 
nationality did not change upon marriage.7
The effects o f the rule could be severe. Expatriated women were liable to 
deportation, lost their voting rights (after enfranchisement in 1928) and, until 1933, 
had to register with the police. They might become stateless.8 Women married to 
Germans were liable to have their property confiscated in the aftermath o f the First
6 As well as provision in the Naturalisation Acts, parliamentary drafters o f  the period between 1905 and 
1948 were meticulous in ensuring that the law reflected the status o f  wives as sharing the nationality o f  
their husbands. The Aliens Restriction (Change o f  Name) Order 1914, for example, prohibits aliens 
from changing their names but provides that nothing shall affect the right o f a woman who marries an 
alien from using her married name. Such a woman, even if  o f British nationality, would have become 
an alien on marriage and would otherwise have been affected by the Order.
7 Baron Parke in Countess de Conway's Case (1834) 2 Knapp 364 at p.368.
8 According to reports in the Times, this was regularly the case in the 1930s for women married to 
American citizens as America required a residence period o f one year before it permitted naturalisation.
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World War.9 Access lo increasingly important social benefits such as pensions or 
health insurance were more difficult for these women (Baldwin 2001:533).
After implementation o f the Aliens Act in 1905. the rules on nationality interacted 
with immigration law so that British-born women married to aliens had no absolute 
right to re-enter their country of birth.10 Admission would, in law, have depended 
upon ability to meet the criteria for entry. During the currency o f the Aliens Act 1905, ^  
women would have had the protection o f S. 1(3) of the Act which provided that an 
alien should not be refused for want o f means if they were born in the United 
Kingdom and their father was a British subject. There was no provision for women 
who failed on health grounds. The Aliens Restrictions Acts o f 1914 and 1919 and the 
consequent Aliens Order 1920 contained no exceptions. There do not seem to be 
reports o f women being refused entry although there must have been cases in which 
they could have failed to qualify for admission. Such women would have been 
immediately identifiable as aliens after passports became compulsory in 1920.
Refusals are likely to have received publicity given the controversial nature o f the 
issue. It is possible that the wide discretion given to immigration officers was always 
exercised in favour o f such women. Some support for this may be found in a Jewish 
Chronicle report,11 shortly after commencement o f the Aliens Act 1905, describing 
officials' surprise when they detained the wife o f a Dutchman only to find she was an 
Englishwoman. While she may have been English-born, she was no longer a British 
national although the report suggests ignorance o f the point.
However, officials were fully aware o f the legal position when "forces sweetheart’ 
Gracie Fields married an Italian film director, and thus enemy alien, in 1940.12 Her 
passport was renewed and she returned to the UK during the war to entertain troops 
and factory workers but there was official concern that “by naturalising her we may 
be naturalising a woman who has practically severed her connection with this 
country.” However, fear o f “propaganda” by “W omen’s Societies” seems to have 
prevailed.
9 Fasbender v Attorney General [1921] F 1082.
10 The same principle was adopted in other countries. US citizenship was automatically conferred on 
foreign women who married US citizens from 1855 while the Expatriation Act 1907 expatriated 
American women who married foreigners. Independent citizenship was achieved in 1934 (Calavita 
2006:114). Women automatically adopted their husband’s nationality in Holland until 1964 (de Hart 
2003).
11 21st September 1906.
12 ‘Our Gracie “lost her nationality’” BBC News l51 June 2007 (http://news.bbc.cu.uk/go/pr/fr/- 
/l/hi/englnd/manchester/6711189.stm.
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This was probably prudent given the state of public opinion. During the 1930s and 
1940s. many public figures across the political spectrum expressed sympathy for 
women forcibly deprived o f their nationality. One o f the many parliamentary bills to 
remedy the situation was introduced "amid general cheers".1'1
Yet, notwithstanding apparent popular support, the law did not change until 1948. 
Although practical problems such as ensuring consular protection to women abroad or 
statelessness were cited, the critical issue was the maintenance o f a uniform imperial 
identity (Baldwin 2001). At the outset, this was linked to the necessity o f maintaining 
good order and the role o f the family in maintaining and reproducing imperial 
hierarchy in miniature (Klug 1989:22). Writing in the nineteenth century, Cockbum 
(1869:216) said:
"By a system o f law, founded upon and giving effect to these principles 
(including the adoption by a wife o f her husband's nationality), aliens would 
be placed on the footing which a generous comity should dictate; the 
inconvenience o f a double nationality would be prevented; everyone would 
know where his allegiance was due, without being exposed to the danger of 
having conflicting claims made on it, and if in need o f protection, would know 
where to look for it; governments would not be troubled by claims for 
protection involving doubtful and embarrassing questions o f nationality".
In 1923, the Foreign Office still believed that it was “desirable that the family should 
be a unit which is all subject to the same administration and control” (Select 
Committee 1923:41-2). Baty (1936:247) found the argument o f female subordination 
so compelling that he could barely comprehend that it might ever have been 
otherwise:
"When we consider the enormous power with which a husband is invested 
over his wife by the Common Law, it seems monstrous that she could ever 
conceivably be thought to be subject to a competing control exercised by an 
alien power. Her duty to her husband and her Sovereign could never be at 
variance in so shocking a fashion ... These antimonies ... are flatly 
incompatible with the unity o f person which is the essential basis o f the 
common law view o f marriage."
Women who disrupted the normal order by allying themselves with aliens were seen 
as having excluded themselves from the imperial family. Wyndham Bewes, Secretary 
of the Nationality Committee of the International Law Association, argued that a 
woman knew the consequences o f marrying an alien and should take them into
13 Times 26lh February 1930.
account when deciding whether to marry (Select Committee 1923:paras 1301-9). At 
para 1302, he said:
"If she does not want to change her nationality and must change her 
nationality on marriage, she will not marry and I think in that case she had 
better not marry."
A Home Office official is quoted by Baldwin (2001:541) as saying, in 1925, that:
“it seems right and reasonable that a British woman who voluntarily throws 
her lot in with an alien by marrying him, ought to be prepared to assume his 
nationality as part of the transaction".
The rule was also presented, somewhat bizarrely, as being for women's own 
protection, were she tempted to marry a polygamous “Oriental” . The prospective loss 
o f her nationality was the only disincentive likely to dissuade her. If women who 
married aliens were lost to empire, men who married alien wives thereby extended it 
by maintaining the “British character” of the family (Baldwin 2001:538-9).
Feminist demands for women to be recognised as independent actors cut across
such notions o f female subordination but were not a challenge to empire (see Baldwin
2001:523-5 for a discussion o f feminist participation in the imperial identity). Quite
the reverse, feminists saw the opposition as being between automatic obedience and
allegiance freely given through personal commitment:
" ... a woman is as attached to her nationality as a man is. She considers it 
quite as important a personal right as does a man, and it is a very serious thing 
to deprive her o f a privilege o f this kind without her consent. ... It is not 
treating her with due respect and it is not treating nationality with due respect" 
(Chrystal Macmillan, Select Committee 1923:127).
However, while there was sympathy for women’s claims, it was easily subordinated 
to the more urgent need to maintain legal uniformity within an increasingly restive 
Commonwealth. Relations with the Commonwealth were seen as critical as Baldwin 
(2001) and others (for example, Hanson 2000:43-4) make clear. Women's claim to 
decide their own nationality was legitimate but relatively unimportant.
It was impossible to impose change on the Dominions, there was no agreement on 
the question and separate legislation would have meant acknowledging the crumbling 
o f the single imperial nationality (Baldwin 544-554). The Second World War 
provided further reason for delay even while the problem was exacerbated by
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marriages between British women and allied service m en.14 By the end o f the war, the 
necessity for nationality legislation in the light of Canada's intention to act unilaterally 
provided the opportunity for reform (Paul 1997:14-5) and the law was finally changed 
in the British Nationality Act 1948.
1,2.2 The Aliens Act 1905 and the entry of spouses
According to Juss (1993:32), "[t]he modern control of immigration begins with the 
Aliens Act 1905". Although it was not the first legislation to control the entry of 
aliens (see Dummett and Nicol 1990:83, 106; Stevens 2004:19-32), it initiated a 
permanent system o f control, which, although soon repealed, is the ascendant of 
modern immigration control.
The origins, structure and application of the Act have been discussed widely 
elsewhere (Dummett and. Nicol 1990; Gainer 1972; Garrard 1971; Gartner 1960; 
Landa 1911; Roche 1969; Shah 2000; Stevens 2004; Winder 2004; Wray 2006d). 
They are not considered here except so far as relevant to the argument made here that 
aspects of the application o f the Act anticipate attitudes that became far more marked 
in later eras.
Under S.l o f the Act, leave to land would be refused if  the immigration officer 
believed the immigrant to be 'undesirable' because he:
o Could not show that he had in his possession or was in a position to obtain the 
means o f decently supporting him self and his dependants (if any); 
o Was a lunatic or idiot, or owing to any disease or infirmity appeared likely to 
become a charge upon the rates or otherwise a detriment to the public; 
o Had been convicted o f certain crimes; or 
o Had an expulsion order against him.
Political and religious refugees were not to be refused for want o f  means or the 
probability o f becoming a charge on the rates. Despite this exemption, most refusals 
were on the first two grounds. Under S.2, immigrants who were refused could appeal 
to the Immigration Board.
Detailed accounts o f the A ct’s implementation appeared in the Jewish Chronicle 
from commencement in January 1906 until 1914 when war supervened. These reports 
appear comprehensive, encompassing also the minority o f cases involving non-Jewish
H Times 5th July 1933, 26th July 1938, 25,h January 1939, 1st April 1941 and 25,h March 1942.
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aliens. Refusal rates remained low throughout the period (Wray 2006d:314) and too 
much cannot be extrapolated from the relatively few refusals reported. Nonetheless, 
they do suggest the adoption, at least in some cases, of patterns of decision-making 
that will become familiar in later eras.
The A ct’s wording assumes that w ife and..,children-wo u 1 d-accompany a married 
male alien and the family would be considered as a unit. Yet husbands frequently 
came in advance o f their family and called for them only when established. These 
applicants were sometimes treated with suspicion. It was feared that they would earn 
insufficient money to support the family abroad who would then seek entry to the UK 
and become a burden. Yet there was no automatic right of entry for a spouse and 
children and, upon arrival, they had to meet the criteria in their own right. Refusals of 
lone husbands on these grounds were arguably unlawful and placed them in a 
dilemma. If they came ahead o f their families, they were disadvantaged but, if they 
came accompanied, the financial criteria were more difficult to meet.
Wives and children who followed husbands were sometimes rejected. Officials 
seemed to place little weight on claims for family reunion although, when challenged 
by immigrants' representatives, initial refusals were sometimes overturned. There 
were no reported cases o f women who had come ahead being joined later by 
husbands, although one young tailor did try to join his fiancee. Although the man had 
some funds, these had been provided by his fiancee and he was refused.15
Where families came together, the Act required the alien to be able to "decently 
support" him self and any dependants. While reasoning was often absent or sketchy, it 
seems that in a number o f refusals, officials and the Board took into account irrelevant 
factors or placed the evidential bar too high. For example, employers who gave 
evidence that they were willing to employ the alien were regularly asked whether they 
could not find an Englishman to do the work, although this was not a requirement 
under the Act. Officials also insisted that the alien should have a prior job  offer in the 
same trade as he had exercised in his home country. Guidelines suggesting how aliens 
could establish their means were rapidly transformed into rigid minimum 
requirements, which were necessary but not sufficient to establish the right to enter.16
15 Jewish Chronicle (JC) 5lh January 1906, 5th July 1907, 3rd December 1909, 23rd August 1912, 30dl 
August 1912, 26th September 1913.
16 Letter by Joseph Prag, JC 19th September 1913.
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Some officials showed little compunction in splitting families in defiance even of 
the statutory exception for refugees as some early examples demonstrate. One 
applicant fleeing the pogroms sent his wife and children ahead but stayed behind for 
two weeks to sell the family furniture. The wife and children were accepted but the 
husband was refused despite more than minimum funds. A man who arrived with his 
wife and sister was refused because he had contracted tuberculosis after hiding in 
damp cellars. The women were admitted. Providing an insight into the human 
dimension o f these accounts, the wife was granted permission to take her meals on 
board the boat on which her husband was held pending return.
One striking case involved a deaf-mute child of 9 who arrived with her parents and 
5 siblings. All except her were accepted. Her rejection was o f doubtful legality given 
that the family had fled the pogroms and wished and was able to look after her but the 
family had little option but to return the child alone. She was sent to Germany where 
the Jewish community cared for her. Her refusal was one o f the few to receive 
attention beyond the immediate Jewish community and, following a deputation to 
Parliament and other adverse publicity, she was permitted to return.17
Occasionally, officials were swayed the other way by an access o f romantic 
sensibility. A young male refugee was admitted after an initial refusal when he 
described his bravery in defiance o f orders to shoot demonstrators. A young Polish 
woman who had also been refused was permitted to stay after she announced her 
intention to marry the young hero. As a "good-natured" officer explained: "We must 
not spoil such a romance".18
Following the case of the deaf-mute child in early 1906 and other representations, 
Home Secretary Gladstone had a letter sent to the Boards, expressing his view that 
Parliament had not intended the Act to be applied with a rigidity which excluded 
consideration o f great personal hardship or suffering caused to women and children 
(Landa 1911:316). While there were perhaps fewer cases o f brutal separation in its 
immediate aftermath, by August 1906, the Jewish Chronicle was reporting that the 
recent mood o f generosity had already receded. Individual family members continued 
to be refused including, in one case, a girl o f 6 travelling with her mother and 5
17 JC 26th January 1906, 23rd February 1906, 2nd March 1906,16th March 1906.
18 JC 19th January 1906.
31
siblings, although the child was eventually admitted for treatment at the Jewish 
Shelter.19
Foreshadowing later practice, discrepancies were sometimes used to cast doubt 
upon parties' credentials, including as to whether they were really married. Under the 
Act, marriage did not have to be proved to establish dependency. It is not clear from 
the reports whether decision-makers believed that the parties had to be married to 
qualify, whether they disapproved o f their conduct in living together unmarried or 
whether they feared that the women were coming to work as prostitutes.20 The lack o f 
an obligation to give reasons means that the officials may not have articulated to 
themselves the grounds o f suspicion.
As these instances suggest, refusal seems to have been more likely where there was 
disapproval of an aspect o f the parties' conduct. A tragic example involved a family 
where the husband was drunk on arrival. As an orthodox Jew, he had not eaten for 
several days as Kosher food was not available. Overcome and faint, he had been 
persuaded to take a little "intoxicating liquor" which unsurprisingly had gone straight 
to his head. The family was refused without explanation.21 In other cases, a more 
traditional form of double standards prevailed. A 38-year-old man landed with a 
young woman described as his domestic servant. The man had considerable funds and 
explained that he had a wife and family in Russia. When the girl admitted that the 
parties were living together, she was refused while the man was accepted.22
The Boards sometimes took an active role in ensuring that proprieties were 
observed. In one case where there was doubt over the marriage, the parties were 
admitted only after the Board had enquired whether the husband would look after his 
wife "as a husband should".23 Women were admitted on condition that they married 
within a certain period or were required to live at a separate address pending the 
marriage.24
There was, throughout the whole period o f the operation o f the Aliens Act, much 
anxiety about the 'white slave trade'. Women whose situation was irregular or who 
were assessed to be "good looking" were subject to closer examination. Comments as 
to a woman's personal attractiveness were a regular feature in deliberations. Single
19 JC 17lh August 1906, 5,h February 1907, 23rd September 1910, 30llt September 1910.
20 JC 7th September 1906, 8th July 1910, 10tl1 September 1910, 28th July 1911.
21 JC 15lh March 1912.
22 JC 10th May 1907.
23 JC 7th September 1906.
24 JC 24th March 1911, 8"' August 1913.
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women were routinely detained while the respectability o f their connections was 
verified.2* As a means to prevent prostitution, these measures were ineffectual. The 
Jewish Chronicle26 pointed out that traffickers and their victims could evade detection 
by travelling first or second-class. Nor were refusals effective in protecting vulnerable 
women from exploitation. Lone women without language skills or an obvious source 
o f income might be at risk in London but returning them penniless to a hostile 
environment was not safer for them. Proposed solutions such as the setting up o f 
hostels did not materialise.
1.2.3 Discussion
f, 1
The necessarily brief account here o f the rules on married wom en's nationality and 
the implementation o f the Aliens Act suggests that some characteristics o f decision­
making that are noted later in this thesis were anticipated in these earlier episodes. 
They suggest that commitment to the unity o f the family was shallow, easily displaced 
and dependent upon the family replicating and preserving in miniature, wider social 
values.. Those perceived as deviant in some respect did not receive the same 
acknowledgement o f their family life. This would suggest that later extreme measures 
such as the pfimary^purpose rule? or the( ban on Commonwealth husbands were not an 
aberration but an exaggerated form o f a pre-existing regulatory tendency. — * trf S  ’ .
As discussion o f the Aliens Act suggests, there were observable fears about family 
immigration similar to those which dominated immigration policy from the 1960s 
onwards. As in later eras, the entry o f spouses and children may be perceived as an 
insidious form o f immigration in which humanitarian claims are pitched against deep- 
seated anxieties about labour displacement and numerical domination. However, it is \ 
not necessary to explain all restrictive measures in terms of personal animosity. In the 
case o f married wom en's nationality, there was widespread support for a change in 
the law but this was, for a considerable period, subordinated to the cause o f imperial 
unity.
In this thesis, I argue that a hierarchy o f acceptable marriages emerges from an 
overview o f decision-making. The location o f a marriage in the hierarchy depends 
upon the weight attached at a particular moment to factors such as gender, race and
23 JC 1011* January 1912, 10lh November 1911, 5,!l September 1913.
26 29th May 1914, 17ltl July 1914.
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compliance with legal and social norms, the relative priority o f these shifting 
throughout the period under discussion. Only a relatively small number o f refusals 
were made under the Aliens Act 1905, but when these are taken together with the rule 
on married women's nationality, the outlines o f an early hierarchical ordering may be 
detected.
The only claim to be absolutely protected in law was the right of a British husband 
to bring in a wife, who until the British Nationality Act 1948 was also considered to 
be British. All other claims depended upon discretion. British-born women married to 
aliens were themselves aliens and had 110 absolute right to enter but there is no 
evidence to suggest that they were liable to be refused.
Decision-making under the Aliens Act suggests that those who failed to conform to 
contemporary standards of morality were regarded less favourably even though this 
involved the importation o f standards not sanctioned by law. In the next chapter, I 
argue that discretion, including unofficial discretion, is an inescapable part of 
decision-making. In later chapters (chapters 4, 5 and 6), I suggest that this type of 
unofficial ’moral gatekeeping’ is characteristic o f the control of immigration through j 
marriage although its actual nature and extent should be carefully delineated (see also 
Wray 2006a). ]
Unsurprisingly given contemporary values, women married to aliens were treated 
differently to men in a comparable position. Later in this thesis, it is argued that, 
where women marry in unapproved ways, not only do their husbands face rejection 
but such women are perceived to have excluded themselves from national 
membership. This tendency was given concrete form by the uncompromising legal 
rule on the adoption o f a husband's nationality. While the rule does not seem, in 
practice, to have been used to prevent their admission to the UK, it did cause affected 
women other substantial difficulties.
Thus, assumptions, beliefs and values akin to those prominent in the period 
discussed in later chapters were in evidence at an earlier time. It seems that they 
represented deep-seated beliefs about the world and were not provoked only by the 
onset o f mass non-white immigration. However, they were not dominant in these 
earlier eras as, for example, the overall low refusal rates under the Aliens Act 
demonstrate. Once fear o f even small quantities o f non-white immigration became the 
predominant concern, it intertwined with and reinforced these other attitudes, with the 
dramatic consequences discussed later in this thesis.
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Chapter 2: Discretion as a framework for analysis
As well as focusing on marriage migration, this thesis critically examines the exercise 
o f discretion by the legislature, the judiciary and the entry clearance service in 
granting permission to enter or remain in the UK because of marriage. The present 
chapter investigates the meaning of discretion and its role in decision-making. 
Discretion is defined further below but, in essence, it is taken here to mean the power 
to make choices within a constraining context (see, for example, Dworkin 1977).
It is not immediately obvious that studying discretion will permit the identification 
o f a common framework for analysing organisations o f such widely different powers 
and functions. The nature, extent and even existence o f discretion within them have 
often been contested. While administrators may sometimes feel that they have no 
choice about what they decide, the literature suggests the prevalence o f wide 
‘unofficial’ discretion (Lempert 1994; Loveland 1999; Halliday 2000b). Given 
Parliament’s theoretically unfettered power, discretion, with its suggestion of 
accountability, may seem an inappropriate term. “Judicial discretion” has been seen as 
a particular case engaging specialist forms o f argument.
Nonetheless, in this chapter, I propose a common analytical framework based on 
an understanding o f discretion. This requires identifying a common feature in fields of 
study that have usually been considered separately. There is a substantial modern 
literature on legal regulation and administrative discretion (for example, Black 1997; 
Galligan 1976, 1986, 1996, 2001; Hawkins 1984, 1992, 2002). This draws largely 
upon theories derived from sociology and political science. Judicial discretion has 
generally been considered using jurisprudential and philosophical modes o f enquiry. 
This chapter proposes reliance on an essential common characteristic present in all 
discretion despite other profound differences. This is that, while decision-makers will, 
in most cases, use their powers to further what they perceive to be the purposes o f  
their institution, this perception rests upon values, beliefs and assumptions about the 
world that may be common-place and widely-shared, but which are not subject to 
logical proof.
The chapter starts from the now uncontroversial premise that discretion informs all 
types o f  decision-making (see, for example, Galligan 1986). There is a common 
pattern o f reasoning behind all discretionary decision-making despite the different
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contexts in which it arises. The discretionary element may be disguised because 
decision-makers must rely, to a greater or lesser extent, upon assumptions and beliefs 
about the world and do not consider themselves to b ^ ^ g k in g -a ^ h o ic ^ in ^ d o in g ^ . 
Where these assumptions and beliefs are held in common within a society, they may 
give rise to consistent patterns o f decision-making within and between institutions. 
Identifying these helps to explain why organisations may seem to be working towards 
the same ends despite the absence o f overt political direction.
2.1 What is discretion?
The essence o f discretion is the exercise of choice within constraints imposed 
externally by an official or unofficial grant of power. Davis (1969:4) says that a 
"public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him 
free to make a choice among possible courses o f action and inaction". Dworkin 
(1977:31) compares discretion to the hole in a doughnut. The analogy is not in all 
ways appropriate (see Galligan 1986:32) but emphasises that discretion is a generic 
term whose significance and extent is determined by its context.
Discretion implies that the decision-maker remains in some way accountable for 
the choices made (Christie 1986:754). The constraints implied by discretion must be 
linked to the power itself rather than be part o f the general conditions o f life. Dworkin 
(1977:31) draws an analogy with a house buyer. There may be many constraints upon 
a prospective purchaser (availability, price, location and so on) yet one would not say 
that one has discretion to choose a property. Discretionary power must be used to 
further the purposes for which it was endowed: "Central ... is the idea that within a 
defined area o f power the official must reflect upon its purposes, and then settle upon 
the policies and strategies for achieving them" (Galligan 1986:22).
There are differing degrees o f discretionary power. Dworkin (1977:31-3) draws a 
distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ discretion. 'Strong' discretion occurs when the 
decision-maker "is simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question" 
(Dworkin 1977:32). Dworkin uses the example of a sergeant told to pick any five men 
for patrol without further qualification. The sergeant has complete freedom to set his 
own standards as to who would be most appropriate. He contrasts this with two types 
o f  'weak' discretion. In the first place, an official is bound by standards set by a higher 
authority but "the standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but
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demand the use o f judgement" (Dworkin 1977:31). Continuing his example, if the 
sergeant were told that he should choose his five most experienced men, he would 
have ‘weak discretion' o f the first kind. The second type o f weak discretion, 
according to Dworkin (1977:32), is when "some official has final authority to make a 
decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed by another official". Dworkin draws 
upon the sorts o f decisions which sporting umpires have to make as examples.
Dworkin has been criticised for relying too heavily upon formal controls to 
determine the extent o f discretion (Galligan 1986:14-20; Greenawalt 1975:363-6; 
Guest 1992:217). A formally ‘strong' power may be so hedged about by unofficial 
standards that actual discretion is very limited. The instruction to pick any five 
soldiers for patrol may be made in a context in which there are many unspoken 
understandings as to who should be chosen. On the other hand, apparently specific 
instructions may, in reality, confer wide discretion, such as an instruction to choose 
the five most experienced soldiers when all have approximately equal experience. 
Moreover, a grant o f power will always contain some standard implied by the power 
itself. A power to select soldiers for patrol requires that those chosen are identifiable 
as soldiers.
Dworkin (1977:33) acknowledges that strong discretion does not equate to license 
but sees a qualitative difference between general standards such as fairness or 
rationality and explicit standards set by the power-granting authority. Yet, either a 
standard constrains an official's exercise o f discretion or it does not. If  it does not, 
then, while we may be critical o f an irrational decision, the requirement o f rationality 
is not a constraint upon the official's exercise o f power. If  it does, then it is not 
material whether it is an express or implied requirement; the power-granting authority 
requires the decision-maker to act rationally.        _
s
It is therefore not possible to separate the constraints on an official's powers1! from 
thejnature and purpose o f the powers them selves^r to categorise discretion as purely 
‘strong’ o r ‘w eak’. The extent and nature of discretionary power cannot be detected in 
the form o f words alone but has to be understood in context. It is perhaps more 
accurate to say that it will vary in degree across a spectrum from ‘strong’ to ‘weak’ 
and that its relative strength or weakness may be detected only by looking at the 
totality o f power, express, official or otherwise (Bankowski and Nelken 1981:249; 
Grey 1979:109).
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Due to the various, often informal ways, that discretionary powers may he granted, 
it is not always easy to determine exactly how much discretion a particular decision­
maker may possess. Feldman (1994:165) notes that "[tjhe lack o f constraint may be 
more apparent than real in the organizational setting, since informal rules and norms 
are often relevant". Dworkin (1977:32) recognises that discretion may appear lesser or 
greater according to the perspective from which it is viewed, or it may even disappear 
altogether when examined in a particular light: " ... in some cases the official may 
have discretion from one stand-point though not from another" (Dworkin 1977:31). 
This chameleon-like quality suggests a critical approach is appropriate towards claims 
that there is no discretion to act in a particular matter.
Discretionary powers are thus not susceptible to easy definition and cannot easily 
be captured by formal mechanisms. They exist as part o f the overall power structure 
o f an institution. Adler and Asquith (1981:12) point out that, as a consequence, 
attempts to modify the nature o f discretionary powers must acknowledge social and 
political forces within the decision-making environment. This perspective helps to 
explain why legal standards may not have the anticipated effect if  they are competing 
with unofficial grants o f power operating to unofficial norms. Baldwin and Hawkins 
(1984) compare discretion to toothpaste; pressure at one point will simply cause it to 
emerge elsewhere. This question is pursued later in this chapter.
2.2 Discretionary decision-making
If discretion is the exercise o f choice, then the question is the type o f choices that are
available. The literature often focuses on the power that a decision-maker has to
decide which rule or standard to apply. Galligan (1986:21-2), for example, defines “a
central sense of discretionary power” as:
“powers delegated within a system o f authority to an official or set o f officials, 
where they have some significant scope for settling the reasons and standards 
according to which that power is to be exercised, and for applying them in the 
making o f specific decisions. This process of settling the reasons and 
standards must be taken to include not just the more obvious cases o f creating 
standards where none are given, but also individualising and interpreting loose 
standards, and assessing the relative importance of conflicting standards."
This emphasis upon standards is another reason why discretionary powers may not 
always be visible. It is only relatively high-level officials and courts that have much 
official power to decide which standard is to be applied, and this is usually subject to
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many other constraints. Lower level officials and adjudicators are more often 
concerned with fact-finding. This may be presented as an objective exercise not 
connected with the exercise o f discretion. The judicial discretion involved in fact 
finding may also be minimised (for example, Iglesias Vila 2001:7). Yet. as Galligan 
(1986:33) also points out. fact-finding is itself a discretionary process that may be 
“imprecise and variable". Facts must be inferred from evidence and this involves 
choices as to the significance o f that evidence. The history o f immigration control 
demonstrates how membership o f apparently straightforward factual categories such 
as spouse or child can easily be subject to doubt and controversy (chapter 5 of this 
thesis). Therefore as Galligan (1986:9) observes, discretion involves finding facts, 
setting standards and applying facts to standards.
In reality, however, given the unofficial nature of much discretionary power, 
decisions as to facts cannot be isolated from decisions as to standards. Chapter 5 
describes how, despite sometimes overwhelming evidence, entry clearance officers 
declined to acknowledge the existence o f factual situations leading to the refusal o f 
many South Asian applicants. The officer may have been drawing perverse factual 
inferences or may have adopted an unofficial rule such as a higher standard o f proof 
or that only certain applicants would be accepted. The boundaries between the 
adoption of a standard and the finding o f a fact are blurred particularly as the exercise 
o f discretion is a process rather than a moment o f decision (Galligan 1986:10).
This raises questions as to the decision-making process. Decisions are not "simple, 
discrete and unproblematic as opposed to complex, subtle and woven into a broader 
process" (Baldwin & Flawkins 1985:580). Rational models o f decision-making have 
been challenged in various ways. Rational choice theory has acknowledged the role o f 
the institution in determining individual decision-making (McCrudden 2006:642). 
While some conceptions emphasise the random nature o f decision-making (including 
the ‘garbage can model’ described by Black 1997:59 where the common thread is 
contemporaneity), others have argued that decision-making is structured but that these 
structures are not determined in the way rational models suggest. Some commentators 
(for example, Hawkins 2002: chapter 2) have argued for a naturalistic perspective that 
acknowledges the range o f non-legal rules and influences and “the processes o f sense- 
making and interpretation that lie behind a decision” (2002:31). Black (1997) 
proposes institutionalism as a way o f bringing into account the role o f the institutional 
environment, interpreted to include not only the organisational framework but also
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interpersonal relationships within the institution and between the institution and the 
individual.
Whatever conception o f decision-making is adopted, once a decision has been 
made, it implies a series o f second-order decisions even if  these are not easily 
identifiable or have been made using unofficial and unacknowledged standards and 
factual inferences. Galligan (1986:9) describes discretionary decision-making as an 
equation: "On finding facts F, and on the existence o f conditions XY, official O 
may/shall do Z [taking into account factors S2, S2, S3]." The process arguably bears 
further reduction to the syllogism: "If facts F  and standard S, then decision D shall be 
made", an argument made by MacCormick (1994: chapter 2) in relation to legal 
reasoning. This is not to minimise the complexity of decision-making but to 
acknowledge its common characteristics. It is usual to refer to ’administrative' or 
‘legal' discretion as distinct entities or to create typologies of discretion (for example, 
Shapiro 1983; Goodin 1986:235) as if  there were different types o f discretion when in 
fact all discretionary decisions share the same essential characteristics. Use o f terms 
such as 'administrative' or ‘legal' discretion is a form o f synecdoche. It is not the 
discretion itself which is 'administrative' or ‘legal' but the function o f which the 
discretion is a part (Grey 1979:112). This is not to deny the complexity and 
uncertainty of the decision-making process but to recognise how easily the 
discretionary nature o f decisions may be disguised. It is elementary reasoning that 
while a syllogism carries a sense o f inevitable logic, its validity depends on the truth 
of its premises.
That discretionary decisions are based on reasoning, however complex and diffuse, 
is supported by the development o f computer programmes which can assist in the 
making o f discretionary legal decisions in areas such as the division o f  assets upon 
marriage breakdown (Stranieri et al 2000). Every decision that is reached implies, 
even if it is not articulated, that a particular factual situation is presumed to obtain and 
a particular standard is being applied. These factual assessments and standards may be 
presented as if they were immutable and inevitable particularly in administrative 
situations. Yet they are, eventually if  not immediately, dependent on second order 
justifications which are not the product o f deductive reasoning alone but rely upon 
analogy or induction. They depend, in the final analysis, upon the decision-maker’s 
perception o f the existence and relative weight o f the factors to be taken into account. 
As MacCormick (1994:101) observes, these “second-order” justifications are present
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in legal decisions although he regards them as having a role only in the absence of 
‘"valid rules o f  law’7 or o f “ 'proven' fact". It will be argued later in this chapter that all 
decisions, legislative, judicial or administrative^ rely on assumptions and beliefs 
which may be widely held and defensible but nonetheless depend eventually upon 
something other than deductive logic.
The above account suggests that, to adopt Shapiro's typology o f administrative 
discretion, determining whether an official is making a "distributive decision", a "high 
volume, low-level decision" or a "subtle and complex assessment o f human 
characteristics" (Shapiro 1983:1500-4) has limited relevance in understanding 
discretion. The extent of and constraints upon discretion will differ depending on the 
decision-making context but the discretionary process always requires, even if not 
articulated as such, a decision as to standards, a decision as to facts and the 
application o f the standard to the facts in order to reach a final decision. However, 
decision-making does not involve a single moment of decision but is a process 
involving myriad complex and often concealed choices that result in the selection of a 
single final outcome. Thus Grey (1979:107) writes: "Discretion may best be defined 
as the power to make a decision that cannot be determined to be right or wrong in any 
objective way". The decision cannot be proved to be absolutely right or wrong not 
because, from the decision-maker’s perspective, there is more than one ‘right’ answer, 
but because the thought processes involved in arriving at a solution require a myriad 
o f prior judgements about any o f which dissent is possible.
This view o f discretion is reminiscent o f Dworkin's 'right answer' thesis (see 
Dworkin 1977: chapter 4, 1985: chapter 5), discussed further below. The 'right 
answer' is not an objectively verifiable truth but describes how a decision appears to 
those who have made it. According to Dworkin, the exercise of judicial discretion will 
be consistent with the judge's own "general theory" o f law and thus appears, to him or 
her if not to others, as uniquely correct. Whether Dworkin is arguing that there is a 
single identifiable ‘best’ theory is not the point here.
This connection with Dworkin’s writings about judicial discretion brings out 
another critical point. It is not suggested that discretionary decisions are no more than 
the expression o f personal belief. The definition o f discretion is that it is the freedom 
to choose subject to constraints. Constraints will be multi-dimensional, frequently 
unofficial and represent a complex and particular combination o f personal, local and 
broader factors; see, for example, Hawkins’ (2002:47-50) typology o f surround, field
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and frame. However, the constraints will have a particular relationship with the 
institution from which the individual derives discretionary power, a characteristic 
acknowledged by perspectives such as those o f institutionalism and organisational 
culture and discussed later in this chapter. Dworkin's writings on discretion and 
interpretation are concerned, in part, with the relationship between individual beliefs 
and other, particularly institutional, constraints that informs the exercise o f discretion 
including judicial discretion. These are considered in the next section so as to identify 
the common element underlying both jurisprudential and other forms o f analysis.
2.3 Discretion and legal theory: Austin, Hart and Dworkin
Until the challenge to classical positivism mounted by Hart in "The Concept of Law" 
(first published in 1961 although references here are to the second edition published 
in 1994), the theoretical understanding o f law in British jurisprudence was dominated 
by _Austinian concepts o f positive law^and sovereignty. Austin supposedly (see 
Morrison 1997:6 for a critique o f this view) viewed law as a phenomenon clearly 
distinguishable from other social phenomena such as morality or social custom. It is a 
species o f command, non-compliance with which may be punished. Legal commands 
are given by a sovereign institution (whether represented by an individual or a body 
such as a legislature) to members o f the society subject to that sovereign who, by 
definition, cannot be subject to legal limitation (Cotterrell 1989:57-72). Such a 
conception o f law marginalises discretion. The diffusion o f power suggested by 
discretion is inconsistent with the absolute power of a sovereign. If subordinate bodies 
do gain discretionary power, then this must be as a form of delegation that may be 
withdrawn or amended at any time by legal command.
Moreover, the substance o f law and thus of discretionary power is only to be found 
within the content o f the law itself, the "plain fact view of law" (Dworkin 1986:33) or 
“the view that law is only a matter o f what competent legal institutions -  legislatures, 
city councils, administrative agencies, and courts — have decided in the past” 
(Wasserstrom 1986:205). It is possible to extract from positivism a simplistic 
conception o f law as a closed~sy^Bri'T)T* deductive logic, a view which Hart 
(1994:129) described as the "vice known to legal theory as formalism or 
conceptualism". It assumes that judges are required only to apply pre-existing 
objectively determinable legal rules to factual situations. Austin him self rejected such
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a simplistic reduction (see Morrison 1997:241-2) and it is quite obviously highly 
unrealistic. While this conception is a distortion o f most thinking about formalism 
(see, for example, Forsyth 2007), it arguably had a long grip on lawyers' psychology 
as a kind o f ideal model, confirming both the supremacy of law and its rationality.
This model views those who apply legal rules as the passive agents of sovereign 
authority. It does not deny the existence of discretion, but sees it as peripheral to the 
central workings of law. It has an existence only to the extent that the sovereign 
power has either expressly granted discretionary power or has inadvertently created it 
through, for example, defective or incomplete legislative drafting. From this 
perspective, if the sovereign wishes to eliminate discretion from law, there is no 
reason, in principle at any rate, why this should not happen (Himma 1999). Thus, for 
example, Ormerod (1987:123) describes discretionary powers as “all deliberately 
created by parliament and bestowed upon, often unenthusiastic, recipients".
While this account o f law does not exclude discretion, it is marginalised. Yet a
credible explanation o f law must take account o f the role o f discretion. Hart, in his
desire to revitalise the positivist enterprise, had to confront the discretionary nature o f
law if  he was to construct a persuasive argument for positivism. Hart (1994:128) saw
discretion as arising from the inevitable "open texture" of legal rules and noted:
"In every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exercise 
o f discretion by courts and other officials in rendering initially vague 
standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties o f statutes or in 
developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by authoritative 
precedents." (Hart 1994:136)
Flart does this in the context o f his rejection o f the apparent simplicity o f a command 
theory o f law (1994: chapter IV). This allows him to view legal rules as having effect 
not just because they are backed by coercion but because we accept and internalise 
tlieirjvalidity. His focus is upon how individuals and law enforcers perceive law, upon 
the "internal point o f view" (Hart 1994:98). Law does not take effect simply as a 
result o f external authority but because people, for the most part, accept that there is 
an obligation to obey the law and are critical o f those who do not.
Hart (1994:v) described his work as “an essay in descriptive sociology” but, while 
he was concerned with how society uses law (see Morrison 1997:352), he restricted 
the values that underlie the content o f law and thus its legitimacy in the minds of 
those who must accept it, to the "minimum purpose o f survival" (Hart 1994:193). This
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is consistent with his reluctance to examine the moral and political underpinnings o f 
legal rules (see Cotterrell 1989:104) and the marginalisation o f discretion. Hart 
(1994:128) accepted that discretion is a feature of the application o f law but saw it as 
an aberration due to human imperfection rather than as a necessary component o f law: 
" . . .  the necessity for such choice is thrust upon us because we are men, not gods".
The meaning o f rules is to be discovered by a linguistic analysis o f their content. 
On occasion, the language used may be inadequate to the task and the judge is in a 
"penumbra o f uncertainty" (Hart 1994:12). When this occurs, the judge must exercise 
discretion. Discretion thus arises principally because o f linguistic uncertainty: "In all 
fields o f experience, not only that o f rules, there is a limit, inherent in the nature of 
language, to the guidance which general language can provide" (Hart 1994:126).
This is true, but it is also the case that arguments as to the meaning of language 
may represent deep divisions upon political or moral values and, as Dworkin 
(1986:15-20) points out, arguments about the meaning of a rule may arise even when 
the linguistic sense is clear. In viewing discretion as the result solely o f linguistic 
inadequacy however universal and inevitable, Hart avoids recognising the potentially 
political nature o f discretionary decisions. Yet there is also a contradiction here. A 
well-canvassed criticism o f Hart’s positivism (see Dworkin 1977:33-4) is that it 
suggests that if a legal rule does not cover a particular situation, then that situation is 
not governed by law at all. Where law runs out, judges may act with unconstrained 
freedom. In those situations, a judge has only policy in the sense o f  political or moral 
values to guide him or her.
While Hart does not deny that policy choices have to be made, he minimises the 
possibly controversial nature o f these decisions. He talks, for example, o f "an answer 
which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting interests" (Hart 
1994:132) or o f "striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between competing 
interests which vary in weight from case to case" (Hart 1994:135). Hart seems to take 
an optimistic view o f society, assuming that consensual decision-making is generally 
achievable (see Morrison 1997:352-3 for a discussion o f Hart’s outlook).
In summary, Hart^views discretion as the result o f the inability o f language to 
 ^encompass alLpossibJe factual situations. The exercise of discretion is an abnormal 
activity separate from the usual legal practice o f applying legal rules and is governed 
by standards different to those which apply when legal rules are applied, but about 
which there is wide agreement. The view that discretion arises only in the exceptional
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and not the routine case is at odds with the account of discretionary reasoning earlier 
in this chapter, which argues that discretion is present on almost any occasion that a 
decision is made. It also implies that where discretion is exercised, it is free from the 
types o f constraint which we usually associate with the law.
Dworkin (1977: chapters 2 and 3) took up the question o f the nature o f the 
constraints upon judicial discretion. Dworkin's disagreements with Hart are part o f a 
far wider debate, but his perspective is examined here so far as it considers the role of 
discretion in legal reasoning.
Dworkin (1977:34) argues that Hart was bound by a concept o f law that only 
recognises positive legal rules. If  no binding rule applies, discretion is exercised in a 
vacuum without binding standards of any nature; in other words, the judge exercises 
"strong" discretion. He sees this as unrealistic. When judges decide cases for which 
there is no pre-existing legal rule, they do not refer only to their own inclinations and 
personal beliefs as “law is not a matter o f personal or partisan politics” (Dworkin 
1985:146). Rather they make use of principles abstracted from "the interaction o f their 
personal and institutional morality" (Dworkin 1977:87). Dworkin (1984:260) sees the 
distinction between rules and principles in the following way: “Rules bind in all-or- 
nothing fashion, while principles argue in favor of a decision but not necessarily 
conclusively, so that someone does not abandon a principle in recognising that it is 
not absolute.” Where a rule does not dictate a satisfactory answer, a judge will be 
guided by legal principles in order to reach a decision. A judge 's discretion is always 
confined and cannot be characterised as 'strong' (Dworkin 1977:69).
The confines upon a judge 's discretion are thus essentially institutional in nature. A 
judge's discretion and the confines upon that discretion are inseparable. Discretionary 
power is granted to a judge not as an individual but as a member o f an institution and 
he or she will seek to exercise that discretion in ways consistent with that institutional
S'  - ‘ ‘ '
role. This seems a plausible account. The formal constraints upon higher court judges 
are actually very few, given that they are nearly incapable o f being removed from 
office. Yet judges almost universally express themselves in ways which respect the 
limitations imposed by judicial and constitutional convention. It is possible that this is 
a mask to cover the imposition o f their personal preferences but, if so, it is remarkably 
consistently held through many hundreds of pages o f detailed legal argument. At the 
very least, at the conscious level, judges view themselves as institutionally^ bound in
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the way that they exercise their discretion, even if  their own personal beliefs will at 
times affect their perception of what the institution demands.
Dworkin's argument is an observation about the behaviour o f individuals working 
within institutions as well as an argument about judicial decision-making. The 
individual will, unless alienated from the institution o f which he or she is a member, 
seek to make decisions which reflect their own sense of what is required by that 
institution in terms o f the purpose and history o f that institution. This sense of 
institutional values will, in part, be determined by the individual's perceptions and 
preconceptions. Yet these personal beliefs, on the whole, do not translate unmediated 
into discretionary decisions but contribute along with other factors to a concept of 
institutional values.
This much is relatively uncontroversial (see, for example, MacCormick 1994:231), 
Yet Dworkin (1987:87) goes much further than that. He argues that judges are 
concerned to fit their judgements within the framework o f the law and aim for a 
"comprehensive theory o f general principles and policies that is consistent with other 
decisions also thought right". Judges, far from being free o f guiding standards, make 
their decisions within the context o f the "seamless web" (Dworkin 1977:115) o f legal 
principles. Dworkin argues that the nature o f legal argument pre-supposes that there is 
a right answer to every disputed case. Even if  this cannot be objectively proved in 
reality, a hypothetical omniscient judge would be able to show what this right answer 
should be (see Dworkin 1977: chapter 13).
The 'right answer' thesis has been the subject o f a huge amount o f debate and 
criticism. One interpretation is that there exists a determinably correct answer to every 
legal problem even if this cannot be established (see, for example, Kress 1986:374 or 
Galligan 1986:15). If  that is the case, not only does it make very particular claims for 
law o f doubtful applicability outside the field o f adjudication, but it effectively 
eliminates discretion in any meaningful sense (Kress 1986:374 although see Iglesias 
Vila 2001: chapter 1).
Others (for example, Guest 1992:138-40 or Wasserstrom 1986:272) have argued 
that Dworkin is not claiming that a 'right answer' is objectively verifiable. As a 
philosopher, he argues that it is not possible to distinguish between one’s personally 
held moral beliefs and objective moral truth. From the perspective o f the individual 
they are identical (see Dworkin 1985:171-4). A judge in a hard case applies his own 
"general theory" o f the law which includes judgements not only as to the individual
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moral rights attaching to the parties but the institutional morality o f the law as 
evidenced by its history (Dworkin 1977:105-23). By applying this general theory, a 
correct answer can, in principle, be reached according to that theory. But judges will 
not hold identical theories o f law. They may thus reach different conclusions and yet 
each will believe their conclusions to be correct if  the answer conforms to his or her 
general theory. Hercules' omniscience extends to the coherence and integrity of his 
theory rather than to its objective correctness which is improvable (see, for example, 
Dworkin 1977:126-7). Disagreement between equally skilled practitioners does not 
signal the existence o f more than one correct answer (Iglesias Vila 2001: chapter 6).
Dworkin is writing from the perspective of the participants in the decision-making 
process. His theory is about the nature of argument and reasoning rather than about 
discovering objective truths. Once we have reasoned our way to a decision, we 
consider that, on the basis o f the theory we hold, it was the only answer we could 
reach. If  we are wrong, it is because some part o f our reasoning or the values upon 
which that reasoning was based were faulty. We cannot prove the correctness of our 
answers but can only seek to persuade others by using the same sort o f arguments as 
we used in arriving at our own answer: “I have no arguments for the objectivity of 
moral judgm ents except moral arguments, no arguments for the objectivity of 
interpretive judgm ents except interpretive arguments and so on” (Dworkin 1985:171).
This understanding o f Dworkin's argument is consistent with the description of 
discretion given earlier in the chapter, i.e. that discretion is not a choice made between 
two equally goo_d,alternatives but is the result o f a reasoning process which points to a 
particular choice. It also acknowledges its essentially political character as Dworkin 
(1977:104) makes explicit. Nonetheless, Dworkin envisages an institutional politics 
which draws its authority and values from the institution which it represents rather 
than from the individual who gives it expression.
The influence o f the institution is thus the means by which discretionary decisions 
retain their political nature but represent something more than the personal beliefs of 
the individual. Recognising the prevalence o f legal discretion does not lead inexorably 
to the conclusion that decisions are arbitrary, unpredictable and reflect little more than 
the judges’ or administrators’ personal political morality. Rather, it is contained by 
something not so easily identified but nonetheless powerftil: the collective values of 
the institution o f which the official is a member and o f which articulated legal norms 
form only one part.
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^ values ibliat Dworkin identifies. Nonetheless, Dworkin was writing about judges who
operate in a particular arena. The question is whether the type o f analysis adopted by 
Dworkin can be applied to decision-makers operating in other contexts, notably, for 
the purposes o f this thesis, legislative and administrative bodies. The following 
section considers Dworkin's writings on interpretation and the critique made of them 
by other scholars. It argues that out o f this debate may be detected a basis for a 
common analytical approach to other institutions including the judiciary.
2.4 Discretion and interpretation
Interpretation is closely related to the concept of discretion. It has been already argued 
that the exercise o f discretion requires a decisiQjv-c|s to the meaning o f  a standard, the 
existence of a facUiaLsituatioii and the ^ p lic a tio n  of the standard^ to the facts. While 
deciding the meaning o f a legal rule may require interpretation as the term is usually 
understood, so arguably does the determination of facts. A fact cannot be proved 
absolutely but only inferred from evidence. If interpretation is "the imposition of 
meaning on an object" (Marmor 1992:13), then factual evidence, in the form o f texts, 
photos and other pictorial representations, verbal statements or objects, is capable of 
interpretation. Thus, while debates about interpretation usually focus around the 
meaning o f a rule, the conclusions drawn are also applicable to the other, often 
underestimated, part o f  discretion; the determination of facts.
Dworkin's account o f interpretation is principally taken here from his works “A 
Matter o f Principle” (1985) and "Law's Empire" (1986). He is seeking to establish a 
general theory o f interpretation and in his preliminary analysis takes the interpretation 
o f literary texts or o f social practices as his paradigms rather than judicial reasoning 
(for example, Dworkin 1985:149-58). In doing so, he is intending to raise the activity 
o f legal interpretation to the level o f conscious and critical analysis adopted in other 
fields o f human endeavour.
Dworkin's theory o f interpretation has been widely debated. It is intended to be o f 
wide application although W asserstrom’s (1986:217, fn 76) considers that it is more 
convincing as an account o f how social practices are understood than in interpreting 
the creative work o f an individual. It involves three stages o f analysis although these 
will not usually be consciously undertaken (Dworkin 1986:66-7). In the first place, at
the “pre-interpretive" stage, there must be a consensus as to the content of the thing 
being interpreted (Dworkin 1986:65-6). The object of interpretation must be identified 
as a discrete entity o f  a particular genre such as a novel or social practice. The actual 
interpretative process then requires two value judgements to be made. Firstly, the 
underlying purpose, “some general justification" o f the particular genre or practice in 
question must be identified. There does not need to be a complete fit with the purpose 
identified for it but it must fit well enough so that the interpreter is interpreting the 
existing genre or practice not inventing a new one. Having identified the underlying 
purpose, the interpreter will make a judgement as to how well the object of 
interpretation in question fits this purpose or whether some adaptation or extension is 
required (Dworkin 1986:66). Thus, interpretation is, in Dworkin's (1986:52) view, 
"constructive" in that it "is a matter o f imposing purpose on an object or practice in 
order to make o f it the best possible example o f  the form or genre to which it is taken 
to belong".
Dworkin sees interpretation not as an isolated individual act but as a contribution 
to a greater coherent enterprise. A 'good' interpretation is sensitive to the values and 
principles of the enterprise as a whole. The freedom to interpret is confined by the 
nature o f the enterprise. A judge, for example, must justify his interpretation o f a 
particular law according to the general purposes o f the law as identifiable in its history 
although exactly what that history requires may be contended: “A  judge 's  duty is to 
interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a better history. The dimension o f fit 
will provide some boundaries” (Dworkin 1985:160).
Thus while a judge does not have unlimited freedom to interpret as he chooses, the 
judgements which lie behind the interpretation are acknowledged. “There is, of 
course, no algorithm for deciding whether a particular interpretation sufficiently fits 
that history not to be ruled out” (Dworkin 1985:160). Each judge will have his or her 
own theory o f what the institutional history requires, although that does not mean that 
some theories may not be better than others and will produce superior decisions even 
if  this is not immediately recognised. The value o f  a particular interpretation may not 
be immediately apparent so that what, at first glance, appears to conflict with law's 
puiposes may, in reality, herald a change in the sense o f what this underlying purpose 
should be or what it requires in the way o f interpretation (Dworkin 1986:89-90).
Dworkin's view o f interpretation is consistent with his earlier account o f judicial 
discretion. He recognises that applying the law requires interpretation and discretion
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but maintains that these are confined by the greater enterprise o f law founded on the 
purposes o f morality and justice. He envisions, in law as in other social practices, that 
those who interpret it will share a broadly common but not identical view of its 
purpose. It “enables Dworkin to show when is agreement necessary and when is 
controversy possible without causing the practice to be indeterminate" (Iglesias Vila 
2001:95). There are substantial factors encouraging convergence while still allowing 
for sufficient disagreement so that the law remains dynamic (Dworkin 1986:87-8). 
Dworkin (1986:225) describes this sense of law as a coherent shared enterprise as 
“law as integrity’'.
In "Law's Empire", Dworkin (1986:chapters 4 and 5) identifies two alternative 
viewpoints to his own, characterising these as '/conventionalism" and "'pragmatism". 
His argument is that the problems o f both conventionalism and pragmatism point in 
the same direction, towards the central ground of "law as integrity" and constructive 
interpretation. By “conventionalism”, Dworkin means the view that law is understood 
as being a matter of “ [ljegal conventions ... identified by reference to the plain facts 
o f legal practice” (Honeyball and Walter 1998:52). While conventionalism may 
possess virtues such as predictability, Dworkin sees it as a conception that ignores 
law 's deeper purposes relying solely upon the fact o f conventionality for the 
justification o f a legal rule. Moreover treating as law only explicit and agreed legal 
rules would, as with H art’s positivism, leave large gaps in the law which would have 
to be filled by judges using “strong” discretion defeating conventionalism’s 
predictability. Many conventionalists respond that, as a matter o f convention, judges 
may agree that law also comprises the implicit extension o f legal rules including 
principles. At that point, says Dworkin (1986:127-8), conventionalism turns into “a 
very abstract, under-developed form o f law as integrity”, having lost its distinguishing 
virtues o f clarity and predictability. Many critics have disputed Dworkin’s dismissal 
o f conventionalism (see, for example, the discussion in Honeyball and Walter 
1998:51-4), but it is hard to deny that actual legal practice requires the type o f 
abstraction from legal rules which Dworkin attributes to “law as integrity” . Whether 
such qualities can also be accommodated within a conception o f “conventionalism” is 
not the question here.
^Pragmatism” is how Dworkin characterises theories associated with 'legal 
realism'. A pragmatic judge, says Dworkin (1986:164-75), may well behave in a way 
that appears similar to a judge undertaking “constructive interpretation”. However
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that is not because he or she believes past decisions are important in their own right 
but because taking them into account enables him or her to reach the best decision 
upon that occasion. “Law as integrity** is to be preferred because it offers a conception 
of law that is ultimately based upon principle rather than expediency.
“Law as integrity/ undoubtedly represents something o f a romantic ideal. 
Nonetheless, it does inafee central to the analysis the role that institutional history 
plays in the interpretation o f  law. For Dworkin, this is not just a question o f what 
judges do but o f what they should do. As Lord Hoffman wrote while still a High 
Court Judge: “ ... readers who want to know what judges are supposed to be doing 
will do better to buy Law 's Empire" (quoted in Honeyball and Walker 1998:104).
Dworkin's theory o f (^constructive interpretation' has been the subject o f huge 
critical comment and reflection. His writings are part o f a wider debate that took place 
between mainly US academic writers during the 1980s on interpretation and law (see, 
for example, Texas Law Review , volume 60, 1982 and Southern California Law, 
volume 58, 1985). It is impossible to do justice here to the complexity and 
sophistication o f much o f the debate. Nevertheless, the principal strands of the 
critique help to elucidate ways in which judicial interpretation partly differs from and 
partly resembles interpretation carried out within other settings.
One school o f thought (for example, Schauer 1985, M annor 1992), connected to 
H art's view o f positivism, sees interpretation as the exception not the rule. These 
arguments rely on linguistic theories associated with Wittgenstein which deny that 
interpretation is required to mediate between a rule and the actions which accord with 
that rule. The meaning o f words is to be discovered in their use. Interpretation is "an 
exception to, and parasitic on, the prior knowledge o f literal meanings, as it normally 
concerns those aspects o f communication which are under-determined by rules or 
conventions" (M annor 1992:34).
Understood in this way, interpretation becomes a marginal and unregulated 
activity. If  the meaning o f a rule is to be discovered in its application, then 
interpretation is the creation o f a new rule whose meaning will be discovered through 
its application. Interpretation seems set to go the way o f discretion in Hart's 
positivism, something which happens because o f linguistic imperfection and which is 
incidental to, if  parasitic upon, the primary activity o f the application o f  pre-existing 
rules to paradigm cases.
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Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that discretion is only absent when a decision­
maker simply processes information provided by another. Thus most decisions 
involve a degree o f discretion, and the adoption of Hart’s thesis regarding discretion 
would mean that most decisions are made using unregulated discretion. Similarly, the 
meaning of a word or situation may be so self-evident that no reflection is needed to 
know, for example, that the form on an official's desk is an application form or the 
person in front o f them is a human being. Such examples are described by Marmor 
(1992:134) as “standard examples”, i.e. one which is conventionally held to be 
applicable within the community so that failure to recognise it as coming within the 
meaning of a word indicates that one has not grasped the sense o f that word as held by 
that community. The existence o f conventional meanings cannot be denied without 
undermining the communal nature o f language (see Iglesias Vila 2001:46-50). Yet, as 
Dworkin (1986:72) points out, such paradigms may be challenged or may evolve over 
time. They may also vary between different communities or sections o f it. As the 
history o f immigration control demonstrates, the standard examples o f words such as 
’’family" may be disputed. The choices implied by discretion or interpretation may be 
disguised but are nonetheless present. And, according to Schauer (1985:436), "once 
the text and precedent have drastically narrowed the range o f permissible arguments 
and outcomes, it is hopeless to suppose that choices among these outcomes will be 
anything but political, sociological and psychological". So interpretation, when it does 
take place, is unconfined and discretion is strong. Dworkin resists such a conclusion 
but, it will be argued later, ‘constructive interpretation' cannot altogether dismiss 
reflexive decision-making.
Another challenge to Dworkin may be found in philosophical (rather than legal) 
realism. This argues that the moral virtues o f a system cannot be gauged purely 
through internal argument but must be measured against ‘reaT moral values. Moore 
(1985:376), for example, argues that "values can and should enter into the decision of 
every case and that real values, not just conventional mores, are the values that should 
be looked to by the judges". Yet he does not explain how we are to know what these 
values consist o f or how they are to be agreed. Belief in 'real values5 does not avoid 
arguments about whether a particular decision is morally correct, and moral 
arguments will include arguments about the weight to be attached to the institutional 
values o f the law.
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Yet Dworkin's views here are perhaps problematic (Rodriguez-Bianco 2001). 
Dworkinj io e s  not explajn in any detail what should happen when institutional or h 
conventional values are so obnoxious that moral judgement requires their rejection j ^  ^
altogether. Dworkin (2001) holds a belief in the internal dynamic o f the law which /V  >. 
means "the law gets better and more sophisticated as a mechanism for organising ^
human affairs" although, in the same interview, he also acknowledges that this has to 
be a "guarded claim" and matters can get worse. There is a potential tension between 
such claims o f integrity and the demands of justice which Dworkin (1986:400-7) 
acknowledges and which cannot be resolved through the internal dynamic o f law 
alone but through the philosophical vision which governs its unfolding (Dworkin
1986:407-10). It may be necessary to look beyond law itself for a moral guide.
&  . ’— —   ' '
r\ Moral realists therefore have a point when they say that 'constructive interpretation'
y S  ,a /  ' v _ i'2  ~  "
cannot offer a complete, closed system o f argument although it is not clear that this is
/ i V ' '
y  what Dworkin (see, for example, 1984:254-60) is suggesting. Yet, in actual practice, a 
judge or other decision-maker, unless already deeply alienated from the enterprise of 
which they are a part, will start from the premise that he or she should do what the 
institution's values as expressed in its rules and practices require. Only if  a decision 
appears unsatisfactory, will there be debate about what those values are or should be.
As mentioned above, Dworkin him self views flaw as integrity' as consistent with 
"'moral values^Jand assumes that there will rarely be fundamental conflict between 
institutional^ and more widely-held moral values.
Yet another challenge comes from sceptics who reject realism in the sense of a 
correspondence between words and real objects. However, they do not, for that 
reason, also reject the need for debate. Fish (1982:501) notes that "far from impeding 
the search for truth, the forceful and polemic urging o f particular points of view is the 
means, and the only means, by which the truth is established". What sceptics deny is 
that this debate can amount to more than the urging of particular points o f view 
supported, in some cases, by power structures and institutions. Thus, Levinson 
(1982:401) may believe that a "united interpretive community simply does not exist", - - '
but he accepts that "the social world consists not o f isolated individuals, but rather of 
persons acting together in some kind o f community enterprise, and that this 
community in fact constantly assesses and judges the use made o f its terms by any 
given individual" (Levinson 1985:447). Levinson (1985:452) says that we all engage 
in "conversations about the structure o f the world, including its moral aspects", but he
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does reject the belief that certain interpretations are privileged because of who makes 
them: "Interpretation is the task o f everyone, not merely o f judges." (Levinson 
1985:453).
These arguments, particularly those o f Fish (1982 and 1987), imply a criticism of 
Dworkin that has been made more explicitly by others (see, for example, Marmor 
1992:73-82 and Honeyball and Walter 1998:75-87). The point is that Dworkin sees 
interpretation as the imposition o f value upon an identified pre-existing object but 
assumes consensus as to this earlier stage o f identification. Those who do not accept 
the truth o f this earlier judgement are excluded from the interpretive community. Yet, 
unless infinite recess occurs, at some point some things must just be assumed to be 
true. Thus for Dworkin, "history in the form of a chain o f decisions has, at some level, 
the status of a brute fact" (Fish 1982:559).
The critique has force but it does not, on its own, provide a better framework for 
interpretation. It does not fundamentally challenge the view o f interpretation as a 
collective exercise. Fish (1982:552) him self acknowledges that there is inevitably 
much in common between the conclusions he draws from his more sceptical view and 
Dworkin's position. Nor is the argument universally accepted. Iglesias Vila (2001: 
chapters 4 and 5), for example, argues that complex internal coherence is the only 
way to ju d g e  jh e  truth o f any proposition. But Fish's view presupposes that all the 
elements in an argument will have been checked and compared for their compatibility 
with other beliefs, an ideal o f the same sort as law as integrity. Fish perhaps does not 
so much refute Dworkin's theory as weaken it when he argues that there will 
eventually be reliance upon presumed facts.
O f the three critical perspectives offered here, the first ^ considers ‘constructive 
interpretation' to be an ^ inaccurate descriptioiy o f decision-making in most cases as it 
exaggerates the extent o f conscious reflection. The other perspectives argue that there 
is a failure properly to acknowledge that interpretation is not a closed process of 
reasoning but must engage, at some point, with externally determined values whether 
these are real moral values, as proposed by realists, or unspoken assumptions as 
proposed by sceptics. I argue here that ^ constructive interpretation1offers a persuasive 
account o f  certain types ofdecision-m aking and that acknowledging these criticisms 
enables it to find common grouncFwith other perspectives.
The strength o f ‘constructive interpretation’ is that it places the institutional nature 
o f interpretation at its centre. Members o f institutions are concerned to resolve the
particular problem in front o f them as members of a social institution rather than as 
private citizens. This is particularly so for the judiciary. Privately-held moral or 
philosophical values may sometimes be detected, but judges do not generally regard 
the expression o f these as a their primary task. They view themselves as bound by the 
rec^rem ents c i f J h d r f l^  private beliefs are likely to be explicitly
articulated only - but not always - where there is conflict between these and the 
choices which the institution permits them to make. _ ,^rCV jo
r'  ^ I
Other theorists have also argued for the same "'middle ground" (Fiss 1985:183) as 
Dworkin occupies, whereby both complete freedom and determinism are denied in 
favour o f a focus upon "communicative and interpretive practices existing within 
social, linguistic and political communities." (Nickel 1985:486). Fiss (1982), for 
example, argues that interpretation is governed by disciplining rules recognised by the 
community as authoritative. Theories o f institutionalism also focus on the relationship 
between the individual decision and the institutional framework (Black 1997). 
Dworkin's writings are also consistent with particular strands o f broader hermeneutic 
theory. Honeyball and Walter (1998:142-57) observe, for example, that Dworkin's 
theory o f fit and justification has much in common with Gadamer’s theory o f a 
hermeneutic circle and his view o f the nature o f the interpretive process.
Dworkin’s theory is therefore representative o f an important strand o f thinking 
about decision-making and evokes some o f its complexities. However, critics 
associated with the linguistic theory have a point when they say that the theory 
exaggerates the extent o f self-conscious reflection that typically occurs.
^Constructive interpretation’ may perhaps be most plausibly applied to the
judiciary. Judges will usually be in sympathy with the values o f the legal system
because historically they themselves have been instrumental in shaping it. They tend
to be relatively socially homogeneous and will usually wish to depart only
incrementally from the values o f their predecessors and in ways which do not
01challenge shared underlying moral conceptions. A judge’s adherence to the values
o f the legal system will be, to an extent at any rate, a (natter o f conscious agreement:; ---'}
.....  ^   _
It is also the case that members o f the legislature will usually have a personal 
commitment to its institutional values as suggested through its history. This is less a
27Appellate court decisions that, at first glance, signal an abrupt breach with past values, may on closer 
examination be revealed as the culmination o f a long process o f attrition (for example R v R [1992] 1 
AC 599, concerning marital rape).
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question of the content o f new laws and more o f how they are created. Many radical 
politicians are also deeply committed parliamentarians. The same may be true for 
high-level officials engaged in policy work which requires a degree o f self-conscious 
refection about the history and values o f the institution. However, it is less clear that 
it is the case for administrative workers. Many, particularly those engaged in routine 
tasks, are likely to have recourse to assumptions which are not critically examined or 
even consciously adopted. These will be influenced by the institutional history o f the 
service just as Dworkin suggests that particular values will be rooted in the 
institutional history o f the law, but will not be subject to the self-conscious reflection 
o f the type which Dworkin suggests judges undertake.
What is described here, then, are points on a spectrum. Many decision-makers 
operate at some point midway between ‘constructive interpretation' and automatic 
reliance upon assumptions depending upon the nature o f their task, their personality 
and the pressures of their working environment. Relying upon institutional culture 
represents a less intellectually complex way o f reaching decisions which Tif with the 
point o f the institution but may be a more appropriate way o f describing the process in 
many cases. The effect o f both is similar. Individuals will tend to interpret materials 
and exercise discretion in ways which reinforce the values o f the institution as the 
individual perceives them, but the way in which they do so may not always be the 
same. Decision-makers who have the time and capacity, such as judges, may reflect 
upon the degree to which they are bound by and contribute to the dominant values of 
the institution. Others are likely to be engaged in a less self-conscious process. 
Moreover, the role o f the individual must not be discounted. Some officials will have 
better integrated institutional values while others may, for reasons o f principle or 
personal gain, actually try to subvert these. Nonetheless, in most cases, decision­
makers will try to make decisions that are congruent with their sense o f what the 
institution requires.
Earlier, I observed that the theory o f interpretation put forward by M annor and 
others, drawn from Wittgenstein's linguistic theories (described here as 'non- 
interpretation' as it denies that interpretation is usually required to understand a rule), 
was incomplete as it did not deal with what happens when interpretation does occur. 
Similarly, Dworkin's theory o f interpretation does not seem appropriate in situations 
in which conscious reflection does not take place. It is thus not a complete account 
either. Taken together, however, it can be seen that they deal with different types of
behaviour so that instead of being competing theories, each applies in particular
situations. Hershovitz (2002) returns to W ittgenstein's original text to make a similar
argument. 'Constructive interpretation' is a more accurate way to describe what
happens when a judge or official interprets a rule by reflecting upon the institutional
purposes for which he or she has been granted their powers. This is particularly likely
in adjudication given that this will involve only contested cases. 'Non-interpretation' is
a more appropriate description of how a decision-maker (either the same one in a
different situation or a different individual with different powers, responsibilities or
capabilities) will reflexively assume that a rule carries a particular meaning and will
give effect to that meaning. In those instances, an official will rely on what
Wittgenstein called the 'bedrock' (quoted in Hershovitz 2002:629), what some
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organisational theorists have described as “schemata” y * “mental models” (Whiteley
2006:65) and what Tamanaha (2001:214) describes as the "unarticulated substrate":
" ... those elements that exist and operat^ b e n e a th  awareness while 
contributing to the coordination of behaviour. In one sense, they enable 
behaviour; in another sense, they are behaviour just being carried on"(itaiics 
in the original).
Such conformity, if  it is reflected upon at all, will be seen as simple common-sense or 
as reliance upon self-evident truth and, as Tamanaha (2001:214) points out, reflects 
Wittgenstein's emphasis upon "unthinking, routine rule-following behaviour, and 
shared practices".
Having argued that the two theories are complementary rather than competing, I 
also suggest that they represent ends o f a spectrum of possible behaviours with most 
conduct falling somewhere in between. Such an observation appears to accord with 
reality. Judges do not on every occasion interpret constructively. The meaning of 
many words and phrases contained within rules is simply taken for granted. Equally, 
most administrative officials are not robots mindlessly reiterating patterns of 
behaviour without reflecting upon whether these serve the purposes o f their 
institution. Yet 'constructive interpretation' and 'non-interpretation' derive from such 
different premises that their co-mingling in this way may appear unlikely.
The question therefore is whether ‘constructive interpretation’ and ‘non- 
interpretation’ may be coherently incorporated into a spectrum o f behaviour. That it 
may is suggested by the critique o f Dworkin offered by, among others, sceptics such 
as Fish (1982, 1987) and discussed earlier in this chapter. Their point is that there is a
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circular quality to Dworkin’s argument in that an interpretation must rest either upon 
another interpretation or. either at that stage or ultimately, upon an assumption about 
the nature o f the world. The point at which something is assumed may arrive 
immediately or only after a protracted interpretive process but it will eventually 
happen. 'Constructive interpretatiorf^inay thus be carried out to a greater or lesser 
extent with a more or less profound degree of reflection. Where 'constructive 
interpretation' ends, 'non-interpretatioiVbegins. It is not inconsistent with either theory 
to suggest that decision-makers engage in differing degrees o f reflection at different 
moments and that ’constructive interpretation' and 'non-interpretation' can be found 
together not only within one official but within the same decision.
It may be objected that this approach fails to take account o f the range o f factors 
which also influence the way discretion is exercised, for example what Tamanaha 
(2001:217-8) calls "self-interested instrumental behaviour". Individuals may 
sometimes act in ways which are at odds with habitual institutional behaviour in order 
to further personal aims. I am talking about a general tendency. Where self-seeking or 
dishonest behaviour is habitual within an organisation, it is likely that the values or 
assumptions upon which such conduct is predicated have become part o f the culture 
o f the organisation.
It may also be argued that there is nothing particularly institutional in quality about 
'non-interpretation'; it is an observation o f human behaviour in general rather than 
institutional behaviour. However, it is a question o f identifying what Tamanaha 
(2001:207) calls the "social arena” from which beliefs, values and assumptions are 
drawn. Some theories o f 'new  institutionalism' (see Black 1997, Di Maggio and 
Powell 1991) argue that preferences in decision-making will be created endogenously, 
interests and actors being “constituted by institutions” resulting in reliance on 
“unreflective, routine, taken-for-granted nature of most human behaviour” (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991:14).
^Organisational culture'.- views organisations in an organic way as "miniature 
societies with unique configurations o f heroes, myths, beliefs and values" (Brown 
1998:5). An organisation may have its own well-articulated cultural values. Schein's 
hierarchy (1985:13-21), for example, identifies three levels o f culture: artefacts by 
which he means technology, art and visible and audible behaviour patterns, values 
which are the beliefs that support the activities o f the organisation and assumptions 
i.e. beliefs about the nature o f the world which are so taken for granted within a group
that its members would find behaviour based on any other premise inconceivable. 
They include assumptions about the nature o f reality and truth, the nature of human 
nature, activity and relationships (Schein 1985:86). Values may be consciously held 
and articulated and be discoverable through documentation or interview while 
assumptions may not be consciously held but may be expressed through official or 
unofficial values. Schein (1985:15-21) suggests that a value is a working hypothesis 
which is open to question whereas an assumption is accepted as universally true. 
Thus, as Brown (1998:1 1) observed, the boundary between them is porous. An 
assumption may be subject to challenge and be transmuted into a consciously held 
value or eventually discarded. Alternatively, unquestioned values may harden into 
assumptions. This is particularly likely if they coincide with the assumptions held in 
the wider society or the section o f it from which the members o f the organisation are 
predominantly drawn.
Thus it is consistent with both mainstream conceptions o f judicial reasoning and of 
political and sociological theory to argue that discretion will usually be exercised in 
ways that comply with what the decision-maker understands to be the official or 
unofficiaTpurposes o f the institution to which he belongs. The outcome may be the 
result o f conscious reflection upon the institution's purposes or a non-interpretive 
reflexive conclusion or, in most cases, a combination o f the two.
All decision-makers will rely upon beliefs, values and assumptions. Reliefs 
represent what an individual understands a factual position to be while /valuesf 
represent a moral position based on that factual position. Both o f these are arrived at 
through observation and reasoning and will involve an interpretive process however 
trimcatedyAssumptions, on the other hand, represent the substrate, the unconsciously 
held understanding o f the world from which beliefs and values emerge. An institution 
will have its own unarticulated substrate which has much in common with that o f the 
broader society but may also differ from it in a variety o f ways. Where institutions 
hold common elements in the substrate, this may lead to common patterns of 
decision-making despite the absence o f formal interaction.
It is not, in most cases, possible or necessary to distinguish precisely between 
assumptions, values and beliefs. As already indicated, the categories are porous and 
the position may differ between individuals. Taken together, they represent a valid 
way o f analysing the conduct o f decision-makers in a range o f arenas.
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2.5 Law, discretion and the conceptual framework
This thesis uses the conceptual framework just described to identify the beliefs, values 
and assumptions which informed decisions by the legislature, the judiciary and the 
entry clearance service on marriage immigration after 1962. It seeks to explain 
decisions in terms o f these underlying attitudes.
The approach cuts across the idea that legal norms are the dominant factor 
governing administrative conduct. The limitations o f legal regulation have often been 
observed empirically. Hawkins (1984:207), for example, observed that, in relation to 
pollution control, formal legal processes were employed only when supported by a 
perceived moral consensus. Loveland (1994:229) found, in his study o f homelessness 
decision-making, that external pressures meant "administrative reality bears little 
resemblance to prescriptive legality". Even where there was compliance with the law 
this was for reasons o f professional career development rather than an overriding 
respect for legal ideals. Halliday (2000b) found that judicial review failed to control 
the bureaucratic cultures o f local authority housing departments. Allott (1980: chapter 
5) argues that legal norms are ultimately persuasive in nature and have to compete 
with other types o f norm. Galligan (2001) notes ‘authoritarian* tendencies within 
organisations that may cause them to resist or subvert the infiltration o f alternative 
normative systems including legal values.
It would be wrong however to overstate the position. Legal changes do have an 
effect. To take an example central to this thesis, the abolition o f the 'primary purpose 
rule' in 1997 led to an immediate increase in the number o f successful applications, 
even though the composition and outlook o f the entry clearance service did not also 
change overnight (and although the rate o f refusal still remains relatively high for 
applicants from certain countries). Institutional values and assumptions may also 
include belief in the importance o f compliance with legal norms and individuals may 
internalise legal values (Aubert 1983).
However, as chapters 5 and 6 discuss, legal compliance may be inconsistent and 
superficial. Attitudes are complex and contradictory. ECOs I have met expressed f r , 
relief at the abolition o f the primary purpose rule. They would presumably argue that, • 
prior to its abolition, respect for legality prevented them from allowing applications 
which fell foul o f the rule. That explanation may be sincere but it does not explain 
why the rule only applied to certain applicants (Macdonald and Blake 1994:15) and
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why, as chapter 6 also demonstrates, unfavourable decisions on intention to live 
together continue to be concentrated in certain areas. Institutional culture may exert a 
very powerful force even on an official who, with their conscious mind, dislikes its 
visible consequences. A decision-maker may disapprove o f a particular outcome 
while believing it is inevitable given the assumptions, values and beliefs upon which 
they have based their reasoning. Chapter 6, for example, describes how assumptions 
may be transmitted from one generation o f official to another and result in particular 
patterns o f decision-making that appear inconsistent with the generally good 
intentions o f the decision-maker. These types o f observations are familiar to scholars 
o f ‘new institutionalism' (for example, Zucker 1991).
If the congruity in decision-making observed in this thesis cannot be explained 
only in terms of compliance with legal norms, it must be explained in another way. 
One way is to consider whether decision-makers relied on similar values, beliefs and 
assumptions, cutting across institutional differences. This, however, assumes a great 
deal. Assumptions, beliefs and values may not be universally held even within an 
institution. Dworkin recognised this possibility when he addressed the ‘coherence' 
critique in his work. Critics argue that Dworkin assumes that the different values with 
which an institution is concerned are capable o f co-existing in a way which permits 
each to be measured by the same standard or as Finnis (1987:375) expresses it, 
Dworkin relies upon the “commensurability o f basic goods”. Dworkin has him self 
acknowledged this (see, for example Dworkin 1984:272) but argues a judge 's  own 
theory o f law should allow him or her to reach a particular decision which represents 
the correct balance o f all values according to the judge’s own theory.
This does, in some respects, correspond with real judicial activity. Appellate court 
judges in particular generally seek to justify their decisions by evaluating and 
reconciling the various principles o f law which apply to the case before them. But, 
even so, coherence over a whole system is unrealisable as Dworkin (1986:245) 
acknowledges. As Raz (1998:279) points out, courts do not, in practice, reflect upon 
the whole range o f possible legal implications for their decisions. But a judge is not 
aiming at theoretical coherence alone but at a satisfactory solution to a particular 
problem, which does not conflict with the wider principles and values under 
consideration at that moment. In many cases, a judge’s horizons may be narrower 
than ‘constructive interpretation' suggests. Thus, coherence may be localised through
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whal Dworkin calls “ local priority" (1986:250) and the wider conflict not 
acknowledged.
If judicial coherence is likely to be imperfect, then this will be even more so in 
other settings where there is not the time for or tradition o f the type o f reflection and 
analysis that judges undertake. Administrative officials exercise discretion and 
interpret the law under time and resource constraints, so that while they may aim to 
make decisions consistent with the values of the institution, it is not always 
practicable for them to reflect more than approximately upon what these require. 
There may also be a conflict between a ‘local priority', for example, meeting a target 
and a stated institutional value such as delivering an individualised service. Coherence 
in administration will therefore exist, but it is likely to be at a relatively local level 
and may take a form which is not identical to and even conflicts with the stated 
purposes o f the institution. Thus Hawkins (2002: chapter 2) talks o f how the decision­
making ‘frame' may vary between different locations within an organisation despite 
the same ‘surround' and ‘field'.
While a legislature's powers may be less diffuse than, for example, an 
administrative body, irreconcilable conflict is perhaps even more probable due to the 
complexities o f the democratic mandate. Legislators may pass laws to deal with an 
immediate situation even though these may conflict with apparently fundamental 
principles.
Given local priority and the non-supremacy of law, the framework suggested here 
helps to explain why institutions may appear to act in concert. Assumptions may 
sometimes be so commonly held within a society that they permeate all institutions 
and predominate even over legal requirements or institutional values. Being 
commonly held, they become invisible, part of the atmosphere in which all o f us 
move and so do not attract comment.
On occasion however, even when there is broad agreement, values within an 
institution may become, to a degree, disconnected from those within the wider 
society. Chapter 5 describes the public outrage that greeted reports in 1979 of 
'virginity tests' on Asian women seeking entry as fiancees. This was clearly a step too 
far and suggested that the service had become detached from social consensus as to 
acceptable measures. Chapter 6 describes how the fluidity and changing environment 
o f the last ten years make it more difficult to identify a consistently held set of 
assumptions although some strands do emerge. However, the approach advocated
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here does help to explain the strong congruity between the approaches taken by the 
legislature, the judiciary and the entry clearance service during much o f the period 
under consideration here.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has set out the theoretical framework to be adopted in this thesis. It relies 
upon a range of literature incl uchng^^ I discussion^ of discretion and
interpretation to make a number o f relevant arguments to prepare the ground for later 
chapters. It starts by^aefining discretion as power granted to make choices within 
constraints and goes on to suggest that all decision-making involves an element of 
discretion. Discretionary powers exist on a spectrum from weak to strong and their 
extent and nature may only be detected through considering the purpose o f the grant 
o f power and the power structures, official and unofficial, within which the decision­
maker operates.
2 / The chapter then went on to consider wh^happens_when discretion isjexercised. It 
argues that there is a common reasoning process that occurs each time discretion is 
exercised. This process may appear to be based on deductive logic but it rests upon 
value judgements which, once accepted, point towards a particular decision. Parallels 
are drawn with D workin's Tight answer' thesis.
Jurisprudential discussion o f discretion and interpretation were then utilised to 
develop further a mode of analysis that takes into account the tendency to exercise 
discretion in ways that reflect the conception that the decision-maker holds o f the 
purposes o f the institution o f which he or she is a member. Competing theories o f 
discretion and b f interpretation were considered. A contrast was drawn between 
theories favoured by positivist thinkers who see discretion and the interpretation of 
rules as marginal and unregulated activities and Dworkin's and allied theories who 
see these as being carried out in ways that are intended to further the purposes o f the 
institution in which the decision-maker works. Dworkin, in particular, elevates
interpretation into a conscious and critical activity, described by him as ‘constructive 
interpretation’.
It is argued that, while Dworkin’s theory captures, albeit in an idealised way, the 
highest level o f reasoning, particularly judicial reasoning, it is less apt to describe the 
type o f decision-making that occurs in other contexts. In many cases, the type o f ‘non-
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interpretation' favoured by Hartian^positivists is a morejigcurate description. The two 
conceptions are arguably complementary rather than opposed. The chapter goes on to 
consider some o f the critiques made o f Dworkin's theories which suggest that it also 
relies eventually on the type o f taken-for-granted assumptions that feature in other 
types o f decision-making. There is a spectrum of interpretive behaviour ranging from 
‘constructive interpretation' at one end to what is called here ‘non-interpretation' at 
the other. Most decisions will be made using interpretation that is somewhere along 
the spectrum but all decisions rest eventually on taken-for-granted assumptions; the 
substrate or ‘bedrock'. While institutions, operating as ‘mini societies' will have their 
own substrate, this will probably have elements in common with society at large and 
with other institutions. There may therefore be congruence between patterns of 
decision-making in different institutions.
The following three chapters o f this thesis consider decision-making by the 
legislature, the judiciary and the entry clearance service respectively between 1962 
and 1997. They seek to identify the values, beliefs and assumptions held by each of 
these institutions in relation to marriage immigration and where these might be held in 
common between institutions.
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Chapter 3: Legislative decision-making between 1962 and 1997
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This chapter is specifically concealed with the legislative control o f marriage
" \
immigration from 1962 until 1997. It seeks to identify the underlying assumptions, 
values and beliefs which determined the extreme reaction to secondary immigration 
during the period. Succeeding chapters undertake a similar task in relation to the 
judiciary and the entry clearance service.
The history o f immigration control after the influx o f New Commonwealth 
immigrants in the 1950s is well documented. Historical accounts with varying 
emphases include Holmes (1991), Layton-Henry (1992), Paul (1997) and Hansen 
(2000). Dummett and Nicol (1990), Bevan (1986) and Evans (1983) have dealt 
specifically with law and policy. Mole (1987) provides a contemporary account of 
family policy at the time. Two works have been particularly important in this and 
succeeding chapters: Bhabha and Shutter's (1994) study o f women and immigration 
and Sachdeva's detailed account of the 'primary purpose rule' (1993).
The chapter relies heavily although not exclusively on parliamentary reports 
contained in Hansard. Politicians may choose to be more guarded or more provocative
in what they say in a public forum. M yjrgum ent is that, even when words are chosen
carefully, underlying assumptions are ofteii_d.eie_c.table,. A debating chamber contains a 
wide range o f views and it is tempting to rely upon extreme and unrepresentative 
statements to make an argument. In this section, the emphasis is on statements made 
by the leading representatives o f the major political parties, with a discussion o f the 
nuances and variations o f view where appropriate.
3.1 The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962
Commonwealth citizens, including many non-white citizens, retained the right of 
entry to the UK after the British Nationality Act 1948. The possibility o f immigration 
controls against non-white Commonwealth citizens was widely canvassed from the 
early 1950s onwards (Holmes 1988:256-7) and may be contrasted with the relative 
post-war enthusiasm for European immigration (Dummett and Nicol 1990:176-7; 
Bhabha and Shutter 1994:32-3). Early and unsuccessful attempts to regulate entry o f 
non-white Commonwealth nationals took the form o f pressure upon colonial and
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Commonwealth governments to restrict the issue o f passports (Layton-Henry 
1992:75-6) while other administrative measures were also canvassed (Dummett and 
Nicol 1990:177-81). The difficulty was that a "frankly admitted colour bar" (Dummett 
and Nicol 1990:178) would have been unacceptable even while it was "coloured" 
immigration that was perceived as problematic.
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 placed immigration restrictions for the 
first time upon Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKCs). The 1962 Act 
provided that only those whose CUKC passports had been issued by the British 
government or by a representative o f the government were free from controls. 
Essentially, this comprised only those who had been born in the UK or who had 
obtained their passport from the High Commissioner of an independent state. Those 
whose passports were issued by a colonial authority were now subject to controls as 
were nationals o f independent Commonwealth countries. These new provisions were 
supplemented by instructions to Immigration Officers (Cmnd 1716) and secret 
instructions and gave officials sufficient discretion to discriminate against non-white 
Commonwealth citizens (Dummett and Nicol 1990:183-4).
The Act required Commonwealth citizens subject to control to satisfy an 
immigration officer that they were entitled to enter on one o f a number o f grounds: 
that they were a returning resident or the wife or child under 16 o f a returning 
resident, that they were in possession o f an employment voucher, intended to study, or 
they had enough funds to support themselves and any dependants without working 
(for a more detailed discussion o f the Act's provisions, see Dummett and Nicol 
1990:183-5).
Many concerns were expressed during parliamentary debate including the need to 
avoid (open) race discrimination and the maintenance o f Commonwealth ties. Fears 
about secondary immigration were only occasionally expressed and then indirectly 
and by well-known anti-immigration figures. Sir Cyril Osborne, for example, made 
reference to the supposed high birth rate amongst immigrants1 and to Indian citizens, 
who arrived without proper documentation and, after regularisation, sent for their 
families.2
Within the mainstream o f political debate, there seems at first to have been a strong 
presumption in favour o f married relationships. Initially, the right o f wives and
1 HC Hansard 22nd June 1961 col. 1657.
2 HC Hansard Written Answers 11th July 1961 col. 35.
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children to enter was considered so self-evident that it was omitted from the Bill and 
was to be dealt with through instructions to immigration officers. It was argued in 
debate that, given the treatment o f aliens, Commonwealth immigrants' rights needed 
firm protection/1 Later events proved this fear to be justified.
R.A.B. Butler, the Home Secretary, moved amendments in Committee to put the 
right o f wives on a statutory basis, saying: "There has never been any doubt in our 
minds that returning residents, wives and dependent children ought to be admitted" 4 
Such a matter was so important that "it should not be left to be framed in 
administrative instructions".3 Refusal on medical grounds or because o f a criminal 
record did not apply to wives or to children under 16.
There was also a strong commitment to ensuring the admission o f unmarried 
women living in 'permanent association' with a man, so that “the rights of these 
women should be respected in the same way as if  they were already married under our 
system",6 a sentiment expressed by an opposition MP but assented to by the 
government side. However, the provisions were only to be found in instructions to 
immigration officers which provided that a woman "living in permanent association 
with a man, even if  not married to him, should be treated for this purpose as a wife" 
and, the immigration officer "should bear in mind any local custom or tradition 
tending to establish the permanence o f the association".7 Although this provision 
seems to have been conceived with Caribbean families in minds, Sachdeva (1993:48) 
points out that it had the potential to benefit South Asian families where reliable 
marriage records were often absent. This may help explain why such a stance did not 
last.8
There was some opposition to this provision on the grounds o f principle 
particularly in the Lords, Lord Milverton asking: "Are we trying to turn this Bill into a 
kind o f legitimisation o f concubinage?".9 For the most part, however, the view was, as 
Lord Silkin put it, that it was a question o f recognising the existence o f "the 
unmarried wife".10
3 HC Hansard 5th December 1961 col. 1293.
4 Ibid 6th February 1962 col. 318.
5 Id.
6lbid 6Ih February 1962 col. 322.
7 Cmnd 1716, May 1965 para. 25.
s See the remarks o f  George Brown HC Hansard Is1 November 1961 col. 169 and Zahra v Visa Officer, 
Islamabad  1979-80] 1mm AR 48 discussed in Chapter 4,
9 HL Hansard 20th March 1962 col. 484.
10 Ibid col. 488.
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This permissive treatment o f Commonwealth immigrants' families was arguably 
not based primarily upon a commitment to family life. It depended upon the close 
relationship between Commonwealth immigrants and the UK while the entry of large 
numbers o f unaccompanied males was seen as problematic.11 The presumption in 
favour o f marriage in immigration was therefore, even in its moment o f maximum 
impact, contingent.
There are also suggestions in the debate o f a hierarchy o f acceptable relationships,
a recurrent theme o f the thesis. It was implicitly expected that unmarried women
should regularise their position as soon as possible once they were in the UK as the
extract quoted above (“as if they were already married” - emphasis added) suggests.
Married Commonwealth women were immune from deportation, but a woman living
in permanent association but unmarried was not. The Lord Chancellor emphasised
that while he expected discretion to be frequently exercised in favour o f such women,
they were not accepted unconditionally:
" ... it is not right to separate people living a family life together. But it is 
different when an immigrant has been proved to have abused the hospitality o f 
this country by committing a serious offence. Any such person is prim a facie 
suitable for deportation, and exemptions must be narrowly and precisely 
drawn".12
This points to another assumption that recurs during the thesis. People are free to 
make decisions as to their personal lives, but they must accept the adverse 
consequences o f their failure to conform to dominant values. The suffering caused by 
deporting an unmarried woman living in 'permanent association' might be equal to 
that o f a married woman but, by failing to m any once exposed to British mores, such 
a woman lost the right to absolute protection.
Above all, the Act assumed that only men were primary migrants. This did not 
accord with reality, however, as Bhabha and Shutter (1994:37-9) point out and 
women MPs moved an amendment to replace the word 'wife' with 'spouse'. This was 
not selected for debate but was briefly discussed in Committee.13 It was 
acknowledged that a husband might sometimes wish to follow a 'career wife', but the 
matter should be dealt with through instructions to immigration officers and such
11 Single male immigrants were explicitly linked with rising rates o f VD; see, for example, HC Hansard 
5th December 1961 col. 1224.
12 Ibid col. 493.
13 HC Hansard 611' February 1962 cols. 326-33.
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husbands would normally be admitted. However, the Minister, Mr Renton, argued 
that:
" . . .  we have strong reasons for not treating husbands and wives in exactly the 
same way in the granting of unrestricted right o f entry. In the Bill, as in our 
nationality law, we have assumed that the husband is the head o f the family 
and that the wife acquires his domicile".14
He also maintained that a wife who had been ill treated and deserted might obtain a 
voucher, come to the UK and obtain a good job. The husband, hearing o f this, might 
"follow her to batten onto her". The comment anticipates later arguments that 
immigration restrictions are in the interests o f vulnerable women.
In the event, instructions to immigration officers provided that_the normal rule was 
to admit a Commonwealth husband coming to join a wife ordinarily resident in the 
UK even without an employment voucher, unless there were reasons to refuse on the 
grounds o f health, criminality, likely recourse to public funds or that the wife did not 
wish the husband to join her. In doubtful cases, the strength o f the wife's connections 
with the UK should be taken into account.15
This suggests another characteristic o f the hierarchy o f acceptable marriages. 
Marriages that did not confonn to the norm of male breadwinner and head of 
household were less favourably viewed but those where the wife had a strong 
connection with the UK stood somewhat higher. The hierarchy depended not just on 
the conformity o f the marriage, but the extent to which the UK-based party was a 
‘belonger’, a theme that was to become increasingly prominent.
3.2 The 1965 changes
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 had been presented as an emergency 
measure and was opposed by Labour. Its effects were not entirely as anticipated. 
Immigration from India and Pakistan increased as a result o f the employment voucher 
system (with which the present study is not concerned). New Commonwealth 
secondary immigration also increased rapidly. Many commentators see the 
restrictions in the 1962 Act as the cause o f this rise as it encouraged immigrants to 
bring over their families and entrench their rights (for example, Holmes 1988:26). 
Hansen (2000:20, fn.60) disputes this arguing that immigrants will always be
14 Ibid col. 330.
15 Cmnd 1716 May 1962 para. 29.
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disinclined to leave and that secondary immigration is an inevitable consequence of 
immigration. Regardless o f  cause and effect, the rising numbers o f dependants soon 
became a major source o f debate.
Parliamentary discussion over the period in which the first controls on secondary
immigration were put into place reveals a familiar pattern. Marginal figures strongly
opposed to immigration persistently alluded to the 'problem' o f excessive New
Commonwealth immigration. This took various forms including reference to
immigrants' birth rate,16 incidence o f sexually transmitted disease,17 polygamous
marriage habits,18 inhumane and unsafe child care practices,19 and the sheer number
20of dependants either already present or waiting to come over, described by one peer 
as a "frightful shadow".21
More moderate politicians sought to resist these insinuations but with increasing 
difficulty. While the virtues o f immigration and immigrants continued to be defended, 
the debate was shifting onto terms set by those opposed to further immigration: 
numbers, over-crowding and abuse. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act had framed 
the issue as one o f immigration, reflecting the predominant belief at the time and, as 
this became entrenched, it was inevitable that subsequent proposals would also be 
formulated in these terms. By the time o f the return of a Labour government in 1964, 
further control o f immigration was a prominent issue following the unexpected return 
o f a Conservative MP in Smethwick after a racially charged local campaign (Bevan 
1986:79). By this time, the necessity o f immigration control was taken for granted. 
Immigration had become synonymous with New Commonwealth immigration. Alien 
immigration remained subject to a more restrictive regime while immigration from 
the Old Commonwealth was barely mentioned. When it was discussed, it was seen as 
unproblematic even where there was abuse o f the rules.22 There were, in some cases, 
overt references to 'coloured' or 'Affo-Asian' immigration,23 but use o f such terms was
16 See, for example Sir C. Osborne HC Hansard Written Answers 1st April 1965 col. 268 or 31st May
1965 cols. 141-142, Lord Elton HL Hansard 6th July 1965 col. 1163 and others.
17 Sir C. Osborne HL Hansard Written Answers 18th February 1963 col. 4.
18 Captain Kerby HC Ibid 9th December 1963 col. 40.
19 Sir C. Osborne HC Hansard Oral answers 4th June 1964 col. 1226.
20 Miss Quennell HC Hansard Written Answers 16th April 1964 col. 82, Mr N. Pannell HC Hansard 
Oral Answers 9lh July 1964 col. 617 and others.
21 Lord Hawke HL Hansard 10th March 1965 col. 149.
22 See, for example, HC Hansard Oral Answers 9th July 1964 cols. 617-619, HL Hansard 23rd February 
1965 col. 681, HL Hansard 10th March 1965 col. 94.
23 See, for example, Lord Elton HL Hansard 6th July 1965 col. 1162.
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avoided by mainstream politicians who emphasised that the policy was not intended 
to operate on colour or racial lines even though that is what happened.24
In this period, there seemed to be little appetite for the draconian restrictions of 
later years. Nonetheless, the commitment to family reunion had to compete with 
unceasing arguments in favour o f further controls based on premises that almost all 
politicians now accepted. The way out o f the impasse, adopted then as in later eras, 
was to crystallise discontent around the undeserymg^case^^of /the fraudulent I 
application. Abuse had been regularly raised by those promoting further controls in  ^
the period leading up to 1965 particularly around dependants2  ^ including the apparent 
ease with which the admission o f polygamous or common law wives could be 
abused.26
In February 1965, Sir Frank Soskice, the Home Secretary, agreed that there was 
"evidence that under the existing control evasion on a considerable scale is taking 
place" including among dependants and announced that fresh instructions would be 
given to immigration officers.27 These would include, among other m easures,greater 
scrutiny o f dependants' claims, }he start o f an administrative process, discussed in 
Chapter 5 o f this thesis, that had catastrophic consequences for immigrants but from 
which politicians could distance themselves.
Early in 1965, monthly statistics started to be kept, detailing the country o f origin, 
the category and the numbers o f immigrants, a tacit admission that numbers
7 Rmattered. Shortly afterwards, Soskice agreed that there were at least 500,000
Commonwealth citizens with the right o f admission mostly from the West Indies,
Pakistan and India, although he did not know whether they intended to come to the
UK and he had no intention of removing their rights.29 Despite this measured
response, the numbers question was becoming linked to the abuse issue and genuine
dependants with a legal claim to come to the UK were beginning to lose legitimacy.
This was made explicit in a parliamentary question by M r W ingfield Digby:
" ... in view o f the sharp increase in the number o f dependants accompanying 
or joining Commonwealth citizens subject to immigration control, what steps 
he is taking to ensure that there is no abuse o f dependants?".30
24 The Prime Minister HC Hansard 8th July 1965 col. 1812,
23 See, for example, HC Hansard Written Answers 30lh July 1964 col. 377.
26 Lord Elton HL Hansard 30th June 1964 col. 504.
27 HC Hansard 4 ,h February 1965 cols. 1284-1288.
28 HC Hansard Written Answers 16th March 1965 col. 252.
29 Ibid 1st April 1965 col. 268.
30 Ibid 30th July 1964 col. 377.
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From being regarded as an occasional unfortunate by-product o f  regulation, the
prevention o f abuse rapidly became a driving motivation. Some^abuse is inevitable' _  _
under any regulatory regime, but anti-abuse measures are not solely a function o f its 
actual prevalence. Abuse may be tolerated because measures taken against it risk also 
affecting the innocent; hence, for example, the high standard o f proof in criminal 
cases. The stronger the anti-abuse measures, the less weight is implicitly awarded to 
recognising, to their fullest extent, the claims of the genuine or in n o cen t/1
While the measures taken to prevent abuse by dependants in 1965 were minor by 
later standards, they indicate that the downgrading o f dependants' claims had begun, 
rationalised by the association between numbers and fraud. New Commonwealth 
immigrants were under scrutiny simply because o f their numbers and all began to be 
tainted with suspicion. Measures that might adversely affect them became 
increasingly acceptable. From this period there were fewer statements o f unequivocal 
support in favour o f family reunion and fewer sentimental paeans to the immigrant 
contribution to health and other public services. A downward spiral had been initiated 
which later made possible restrictive measures which would have been inconceivable 
only a few years before.
After Lord Mountbatten, sent as an emissary in 1965, failed to persuade 
Commonwealth countries to introduce their own curbs on emigration, he 
recommended a variety o f further restrictions including health checks for all 
immigrants, dependants and students. The subsequent White Paper contained a 
number o f proposals for restrictions which clearly went counter to the spirit if  not the
32letter o f the 1962 Act. The government could not introduce a compulsory register of
dependants or entry certificates without repealing the absolute obligation to admit
under the 1962 Act. However, immigration officers would:
"with a view to preventing evasion, be instructed to apply strict tests o f 
eligibility, and will take into account whether the would-be entrant produces 
on arrival an entry certificate issued in the country o f origin or other
31 This has sometimes been openly acknowledged. The government’s response to the Select Committee 
on Race Relation and Immigration in 1979 said that it was “a regrettable though inevitable 
consequence o f  the need to prevent abuse that some genuine applicants suffer inconvenience” (Juss 
1997:54). In 1983, Malcolm Rifkind weighed up the competing claims o f  applicant and immigration 
control and said: “It is no fairer to allow someone in who is not entitled than to exclude anyone who 
is.” (“Fair and foul ways to bring down the immigration barrier” Guardian, 2nd March 1983. See also 
Bonham Carter (1985).
32 HMSO Cmnd 2739, August 1965.
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appropriate documents establishing his or her identity. An entry certificate will 
not be issued unless the head o f the household, whether resident in this 
country or intending to come in the future, has furnished ... particulars of his 
dependants ..." (para. 19 Cmnd. 2739).
The register o f dependants proved both burdensome and ineffective and was soon 
dropped.33 Entry certificates, however, became increasingly important and were 
presented as being in the interests of immigrants as it enabled a decision to be made in 
the country of origin rather than after departure. They remained voluntary, however, 
and take-up was low at around 20%,34 even though immigration officers were 
instructed that a holder should be assumed to be qualified for admission unless there 
was evidence to the contrary.35 However, the Wilson Committee did not recommend 
that they become compulsory on the grounds that this would align Commonwealth 
citizens too closely with those aliens who required visas.'16
3.3 The 1969 changes: The ban on husbands and compulsory entry 
certificates
After 1965, hostility towards New Commonwealth secondary immigration did not 
abate. The association betw een numbers, and; fraud continued to be made ever more 
emphatically,37 and the number o f dependants coming to the UK was described by 
one peer as "rapidly assuming alarming proportions".'18 One MP alleged that up to 
60% o f dependants had been wrongly admitted.39 As well as the usual calls for the 
cessation o f all immigration (apparently supported by 93% of the population 
according to one poll cited),40 there were calls for children over 14 to be barred.41 The 
loss to the Inland Revenue due to alleged fraudulent claims for dependants' 
allowances was raised,42 an issue that became central to administrative practice in 
relation to family admission and is discussed in Chapter 5. The wives and children of
33 Roy Jenkins HC Hansard Written Answers 2 lld August 1966 col. 91.
34 Report o f  the Committee on Immigration Appeals Cmnd 3387 p. 22.
33 Ibid p. 14.
36 Ibid p. 22.
37 See, for example, Earl o f  Albemarle HL Hansard 26th July 1967 col. 3, Sir C. Osborne and Captain 
Kerby HC Hansard 9th May 1968 Written Answers cols. 125-6.
38 Lord Ailwyn HL Hansard 25th October 1967 col. 1650.
39 Mr Anthony Buck HC Hansard 22nd January 1969 cols. 547-8.
40 HL Hansard 14,h May 1968 cols. 206-11.
41 Ibid 14th May 1968 col. 208.
42 Ibid 8th February 1968 cols. 1268-1269.
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polygamous marriages were also the subject of several parliamentary questions.47 
With the exception o f some female politicians, critics o f polygamous marriages 
confined their arguments to the number o f extra immigrant offspring likely to result as 
well as the scope for tax evasion. The standard government response was that the 
number o f such families was insignificant (although there was also a defence o f the 
international law principle o f recognising lawfully contracted marriages). The 
dominance o f the numbers debate was apparent even in such an apparently culturally 
charged issue.
The government's tone in response to pressure became more defensive. That the 
number o f dependants was problematic was common ground, so it was a question of 
demonstrating that they were competent at limiting their entry. The right o f children 
over 16 to join a single parent and o f dependant fathers over 60 was curtailed in 1968, 
the fear being that these were disguised workers. Family unity continued to be 
defended by the government on the grounds o f preventing "social problems in the 
community" and "common humanity",44 but, increasingly, only in terms o f the rights 
o f wives and children under 16.45 It is not surprising therefore that the first moves 
against spouses were against husbands whose acceptance had always been more 
conditional than that o f wives.
In a written parliamentary answer on 30th January 1969, James Callaghan, the 
Home Secretary, announced restrictions on husbands.46 Numbers o f male 
Commonwealth citizens admitted for marriage under a 'concession' had risen in 1968 
to 1,676. The rise was said to be on such a scale that marriage was being used as a 
means of entering, working and settling in the UK outside the employment voucher 
scheme.47 In future, the admission o f husbands and fiances would be limited to those 
"presenting special features" and an entry certificate must be obtained prior to 
departure. Those already present in the UK for temporary purposes would not be 
permitted to settle here following marriage save in exceptional circumstances. The 
new regime was to be implemented through revised instructions to immigration 
officers.
43 Ibid 23ld April 1968 cols. 621-2 and 2nd May 1968 cols. 1195-1200.
44 HC Hansard 7th November 1968 col. 1048.
45 See, for example Lord Stonham HL Hansard 25th October 1967 or David Ennals HC Hansard 
Written answers 5th March 1968 col. 57.
46 HC Hansard 30th January 1969 col. 367.
47 A counter-view was that rumours o f  restrictions had fuelled the rise in numbers; see ‘Guardian 
Miscellany’, the Guardian 3ld June 1974.
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The new measures severely affected non-white New Commonwealth husbands. 
They were in a worse position than alien spouses who continued to be allowed to 
enter in most cases (Dummett and Nicol 1990:206-7). Husbands o f white women 
were less severely affected as their wives were more likely to plead successfully that 
they could not relocate to places where they would be culturally isolated (Bhabha and 
Shutter 1994:57-9 and chapter 4).
Only six South Asian men were permitted entry during ..the whole, o f ,. 1973.48 
Particularly badly affected were around 400 stateless Asian husbands expelled from 
Uganda and refused entry to the UK even though their wives and children held UK 
passports. The supremacy o f the "numbers' issue is encapsulated by one proposed 
solution which involved other countries accepting some of these 400 husbands, so that 
their families who lived in the UK would leave, compensating for other new 
arrivals.49
There seems to have been little debate as to whether such drastic measures were 
justified or their effect upon the rights o f UK resident women. It was assumed that 
males were desperate to gain access to the labour market, that fraudulent applications 
were commonplace and that these had to be prevented even at a cost to some genuine 
applicants. The hierarchy o f marriages already referred to is more starkly apparent 
here. Marriages in which a husband sought to join his wife rather than the 
conventional reverse pattern lacked credibility and legitimacy.
The ban on Commonwealth husbands did not pacify those opposed to secondary 
immigration; rather, by conceding the underlying argument, it made a defence o f  such 
immigrants more difficult. Having permitted government competence to become 
associated with the control o f New Commonwealth immigration, ministers had no 
choice but to continue to play the numbers game.50
The use o f entry certificates was made compulsory for all dependants by the 
Immigration Appeals Act 1969. The justification was to protect immigrants from 
giving up homes and jobs only to be refused entry on arrival. It was also hoped to 
prevent long queues and evidential difficulties when applicants arrived at ports tired
48 Id.
49 Their position was eventually rectified by Roy Jenkins; ‘Uganda cases strike at women’s rights’, 
Guardian 11th January 1973, ‘Petition on split Asian families’ Guardian 23rd January 1973, ‘Plan for 
Asian husbands’ Guardian 31s’ January 1973, ‘Guardian Miscellany’, the Guardian, June 3rd 1974.
50 See, for example, the exchange between the anti-black immigration MP Sir Cyril Osborne, Home 
Secretary Merlyn Rees and the back-bench Labour MP Sid Bidwell HC Hansard 20lh March 1969 cols. 
721-3.
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and confused and had to establish their right to enter with inadequate and incomplete 
documentation. Immigrants, including the elderly and children, were being detained 
or returned and their treatment had been widely criticised.51 Their interests under the 
entry clearance system would be protected by the new appeals procedures. The 
administrative practice for aliens' dependants was brought into line with 
Commonwealth dependants except where agreements for visa abolition prevented 
this, meeting the objection, at least to an extent, that Commonwealth citizens were 
being treated less favourably than aliens. The less favourable general treatment o f
r-p
aliens was also maintained.
While those promoting the amendment may have sincerely hoped to avoid the 
problems o f eligibility for entry being decided at the port, there were also less noble 
motives (Juss 1997:44-5). The amendment to the Immigration Appeals Bill was 
introduced in the Lords at a late stage shortly before Committee Stage. This was 
explained as being to "reduce to a minimum the risk of a rush to enter in advance of 
the alteration o f the law",53 although an effort was later made to disassociate the 
government from this suggestion.54 Clearly, a measure that was in the best interests o f 
immigrants should not give rise to a rush o f applicants to beat it. Critical voices 
argued that compulsory entry certificates would permit bad practice to be concealed,55 
would negate the objectives o f the new appeal system,56 and that delays (already a 
problem) would inevitably increase,57 suspicions that were justified as discussed in 
chapter 5. The measure caused the resignation of the National Council o f Civil 
Liberties and the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants from the Home Office 
Committee on Immigrant Welfare on the grounds that its work had been rendered 
meaningless.58
The assumption o f fi;&ud_qnd o f the necessity of combating it was now so 
r__---
entrenched that the alternative possibility o f reducing queues by carrying out fewer 
checks was beyond realistic contemplation. Rather, the emphasis was upon ensuring
51 ‘Asians’ reception “inhumane”, welfare leader says’ Times 23ld December 1968, ‘Vetting at home 
for future immigrants’ Guardian 2nd May 1969.
52 See HC Hansard 1st May 1969 cols. 1630-6, HL Hansard 6,h May 1969 cols. 1098-1142.
33 Lord Stonham HL Hansard 6th May 1969 col. 1100.
54 Lord Gridley Ibid col. 1126.
55 Lord Gifford Ibid col. 1107.
56 Lord Foot Ibid cols. 1121-1126.
57 Lord Gifford Ibid 6lh May 1969 col. 1110.
58 ‘Give them a proper chance’ Guardian 20th May 1969, ‘Home Office funds for immigrants’ Sunday 
Telegraph 15th June 1969.
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adequate systems for advising and supporting applicants in the country of origin.59 
The desire to conceal rather than prevent the harsh treatment o f  immigrants and their 
family members introduces another recurring theme in immigration legislation, 
suggesting a strong institutional commitment to providing outwardly palatable 
answers to public anxiety.
3.4 Reversing the ban: The 1974 rule changes
The Immigration Act 1971 introduced a new framework for controlling immigration. 
Section 1(5) provided that the Immigration Rules would be formulated so as to protect 
the pre-existing rights o f  men settled in the UK prior to 1st January 1973 to bring 
spouses and minor children to the UK, fulfilling earlier pledges (Hansen 2000:230). 
All other Commonwealth citizens and their dependants were to be governed by what 
Shirley Williams described as the "weak vessel"60 o f the Immigration Rules.
The first set o f Rules61 acknowledged the advantageous position o f EEC nationals 
compared to Commonwealth citizens (other than patrials62 and those exempted under 
the then S.2(2) o f the Act) whose rights were now broadly aligned to those of aliens. 
Wives o f Commonwealth citizens were to be admitted if  the husband was already 
settled or was coming for settlement, provided he was willing and able to support and 
accommodate them without recourse to public funds.63 The position o f women "living 
in permanent association" was also maintained,64 and there were provisions for 
fiancees.65
The husbands and fiances o f Commonwealth citizens or aliens were not to be 
admitted for settlement unless the Home Secretary was satisfied there were "special 
considerations" which rendered exclusion undesirable,66 or unless, in the case o f 
Commonwealth citizens, he had a grandparent born in the UK.67 Special 
considerations included, as an example, the hardship caused to a woman forced to live
59 See, for example, Lord Brockway HL Hansard 13th May 1969 cols, 83-5 and ‘Home Office funds for 
immigrants’ Sunday Telegraph 15tl1 June 1969. However, advice services were not established until the 
mid-1970s (Lyon 1975).
60 HC Hansard 22nd November 1972 col. 1350.
61 HC 79, 80, 81 and 82 25th January 1973.
62 S. 2(1 )(a) Immigration Act 1971 (now amended).
63 HC 79 para.41, HC 81 para. 36.
64 HC 79 para. 42, HC 81 para. 37.
65 HC 79 para. 50, HC 81 para. 45.
66 HC 79 para. 47, HC 81 para. 42.
67 HC 79 para. 48.
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with her husband outside the UK.68 Both exceptions would have principally benefited 
white women. Women's continuing dependent status was reflected in the deportation 
clauses o f the after-entry Rules.69 which provided that women and children could be 
deported alongside their husbands in some circumstances.
The hierarchy of acceptable marriages, already alluded to, was now more clearly 
linked to race. Its maintenance was facilitated both by the actual law and by the 
discretionary powers o f immigration officers. Yet its sexism rendered it imperfect. 
White British men could count on being able to bring in spouses more or less as they 
chose. Black and Asian men settled here had, formally speaking, the same rights but 
were increasingly subject to discrimination through administrative practices in the 
entry clearance system. A woman who married a white male of British descent may 
have been able to take advantage o f the rules on patriality. In other cases, she could 
claim that she should not have to suffer the hardship of living in an alien environment, 
a claim which women o f New Commonwealth origin found far harder to make 
(Bhabha and Shutter 1994:57-9 and Chapter 4 below). Nonetheless, white women 
were adversely affected by the Rules,70 and the contrast with the new EEC free 
movement provisions rendered this discrimination even starker.
There were several attempts to bring the matter to the attention o f Parliament.71 On 
11th April 1974, Home Secretary Roy Jenkins announced that he was reviewing the 
wider aspects o f the question and that, in the interim, he was issuing instructions for a 
more "sympathetic and flexible" approach to be taken.72 In June 1974, Lena Jeger 
introduced a Bill into Parliament to achieve equality for women in immigration and 
citizenship; the Spouses o f UK Citizens (Equal Treatment) Bill 1974.7j Later that 
same month, Roy Jenkins announced that he would present new Rules allowing the 
admission o f husbands and fiances o f women settled in the UK.74
Almost completely absent from parliamentary debate was reference to women of 
New Commonwealth descent or origin who had been most severely affected by the 
ban on husbands. Lord Brockway, in his question to the Lords, gave only examples of
68 HC 79 para. 47-8 and HC 81 para. 43.
69 HC 80 paras. 33-48 and HC 82 paras. 40-55.
70 For example, It was reported that only 10 Australian and 6 Canadian husbands were admitted during 
1973 ( ‘Guardian Miscellany’, the Guardian 3ld June 1974).
71 See HC Written answers 21st March 1974 col. 136, HL Hansard 28th March 1974, cols. 774-95.
72 HC Hansard Written Answers 11th April 1974 cols. 260-1.
73 HC Hansard 21st June 1974 cols. 879-941.
74 HC Hansard Written Answers 27th June 1974 cols. 535-36.
hardship caused to women o f British descent married to foreign men.73 Lena Jeger. in 
moving her Private Member's Bill stated that, among the enormous postbag she had 
received on the question, only a few cases concerned Asian countries.76 Concerns 
about arranged marriages started to become explicit during these debates. Lord Harris, 
speaking for the government, asserted that the arranged marriage system made it more 
likely that women o f Asian origin would contract marriages abroad so that lifting the
77ban would lead to considerable increased immigration. Even those sympathetic to 
change viewed arranged marriages simplistically or negatively. Bryan Magee, for 
example, foresaw a particular danger o f such marriages being arranged for payment in
78order to achieve immigration. Others argued, by contrast, that young Asian people
would increasingly reject the international arranged marriage,79
\ ..A A tew MPs did see the question as one o f principle and o f race as well as o f sex
>  _ /  ,
■ v, yd i equality. Sid Bidwell spoke o f the benefit o f reform to young women o f Pakistani and
A ' ' ~~~
f Indian origin.80 Martin Flannery pointed out that regardless o f whether young Asian
women did or did not tend to marry within the UK, "they have an inalienable right to
marry men who live outside this country and be allowed to have these men come here 
81and live with them". Predominantly, however, the underlying premise was that 
reform was desirable provided it resulted in only a few Asian males coming to the 
UK. The Home Secretary Roy Jenkins' (1991:374) memoirs record that the Home 
Office estimated that a change to the law would result in 5,000 new entrants and he 
initially declined to act. In subsequent debate, however, he said: "When I first 
considered this I believe that I put too high the likely immigration consequences and 
did not fully allow for the stark and unacceptable nature o f the discrimination".82
The lifting o f the ban on husbands, while undoubtedly a progressive step, did not 
demonstrate a fundamental shift in the assumptions which by that stage underpinned 
the discussion on marriage and immigration. It represented an evolution in and 
refinement o f the hierarchy o f marriages so that the claims o f mainly white women
75 HL Hansard 28th March 1974 cols. 778-80.
76 HC Hansard 21st June 1974 col. 884. It is possible, o f course, that Asian women did not consider 
appealing to their MP as a likely source o f  relief.
77 HC Hansard 28th March 1974 col. 794.
78 Ibid 21st June 1974 col. 936.
79 See, for example, Lena Jeger and Gwyneth Dunwoody HC Hansard 21st June 1974 cols. 883 and 
933.
80 HC Hansard 21st June 1974 col. 910.
81 Ibid 21st June 1974 col. 929.
82 Ibid 27lh June 1974 cols. 535-6. See also ‘Guardian Miscellany’, the Guardian 3rd June 1974.
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were acknowledged. However, the grant o f equality depended upon a number of other 
beliefs also holding true. One was that those o f Asian descent brought up in the UK 
would be less likely to enter international arranged marriages.
A number o f other key assumptions about immigration were by now also firmly in 
place. Numbers had become the hard currency of the immigration debate. 
Immigration was seen as a one-way process, a simple accretion o f numbers posing 
problems o f labour displacement. Emigration simply did not figure in the debate. 
Immigration from the New Commonwealth was considered to be qualitatively 
different to other immigration and to be undesirable. The only means o f reducing 
these numbers, it appeared, was through ever more restrictive measures.
3,5 The defence of equality
As well as the usual series of parliamentary questions on polygamous wives, arranged 
marriages, impecunious immigrants and the never ending queue o f dependants, 
immigration was debated in the Commons in January 1975,83 May 1976,84 in the 
Lords in June 1976,85 and again in the Commons in July.86 During these debates, a 
m ajo rjucus remained the (admission o f husbands, even though between 1974 and 
1976, the number o f arrivals o f Commonwealth husbands and fiances rose from 
around 500 to around 1800 (Evans 1983:133), hardly an inundation.
Alex Lyon, the Minister for Immigration, undertook a tour o f the Indian sub­
continent during which he criticised the bureaucracy, delays and errors o f the entry 
clearance system. He also recommended that the officials adopt the civil standard of 
proof in immigration cases (unknown to Lyon, the Divisional Court had also found in 
such terms in 1972, the immigration service having apparently acted unlawfully since 
that time).87
Lyon was especially concerned with the level o f error and the hardship that 
existing procedures were causing to genuinely married couples. This, he said, had "to 
be put into the balance as well as the number o f bogus applications".88 He also 
pointed out that the entire notion o f a 'bogus' application should be treated with
S3 Ibid 23rd January 1975 cols. 1998-2020.
84 Ibid 24"* May 1976 cols. 33-104.
85 HL Hansard 24th June 1976. Spouses and dependants were discussed in cols. 529-60.
86 Ibid 5,h July 1976 cols. 964-1094.
87 R v Home Secretciiy ex p  Hussain (1972). See also Alex Lyon’s response to the Hawley Report in 
the Runnymede C ollection . / / v vAA I ' fA -f-e /  < J v /< T  (
88 HC Hansard 23ld January 1975 col. 2013. ! '
W r  '■ 
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caution. If Western levels of proof were demanded in a largely undocumented society, 
it was unsurprising that people sometimes turned to those able to furnish them with 
what was apparently needed. While this reflected the reality that many South Asian 
marriage procedures were customary and unofficial, Conservative politicians were 
aghast at the suggestion o f any relaxation. They argued that the single biggest cause 
o f delay and hardship was immigrants failing to call over their families promptly and 
that the absence o f documentation and the level of illegal immigration meant that 
robust and time-consuming checks were necessary.
Lyon also argued that there was a finite pool of dependants so that speeding up the 
process "would not be increasing the total commitment o f this country towards 
immigration from the sub-continent". Whether the 'queue' was finite was the subject 
o f much disagreement, the debate reflecting an anxiety, almost a panic, 
disproportionate to the actual rise in numbers after 1974.
In 1976, D.F. Hawley, Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, toured entry clearance posts on the sub-continent and wrote a 
series o f confidential reports that may now be viewed in the Runnymede Collection. 
The reports comprise a series o f anecdotal reports and impressions including an 
account of a former illegal entrant described as “mildly pickled”, whose 
recommendation was 5 years imprisonment for illegal entrants. Less comically, 
Hawley made allegations about the extent o f fraud, polygamy, the abuse o f marriage 
for immigration purposes (the relaxation of the rules in 1974 was described as a 
“bonanza”) and the possibility of a never-ending chain o f migration. His major thrust 
was that attempts to implement Lyon’s instructions, combined with an appeals system 
“weighted in their [applicants’] favour”, made the system too favourable to 
immigrants. Any further move in that direction would turn ECOs into “rubber 
stamps” and “the pride o f an ECO in doing a professional job would be destroyed”, a 
perspective considered further in chapter 5. He also made reference to South Asians 
being “men o f two worlds” retaining an Asian domicile, building property and 
marrying locally. He thereby articulated a further recurrent and persistent theme, 
examined further in chapters 4 and 5 below, mistrust o f immigrants who adopt their 
new residence only equivocally.
89 Ibid col. 2011.
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Despite the absence o f evidence beyond anecdote, the Hawley Report was 
welcomed by those opposed to New Commonwealth immigration. During the debate 
in May 1976, Enoch Powell referred to the Report as evidence that, far from there
Alex Lyon's confidential reply to Hawley (available in the Runnymede Collection) 
indicates the careful balancing act performed even by politicians sympathetic to the 
immigrant cause. He defended his record on overturning refusals and the imposition 
o f the balance o f probabilities. His arguments were nonetheless predicated on the 
assumption that non-white secondary immigration was problematic but would reduce 
over time. He was sympathetic to re-assessing the pool o f dependants and even to a 
quota “to contain the numbers argument'
His public response was also to reiterate that the pool was finite and that the 
international arranged marriage would inevitably decline as a source of immigration.
This argument's weakness was that it relied almost wholly on one premise of 
uncertain validity. It left intact the other premises upon which anti-immigration 
arguments were based: that numbers were the primary issue and that immigration was 
solely or principally a New Commonwealth phenomenon (although some Labour MPs 
did challenge this).91
It is true that there were finite numbers o f Commonwealth immigrants with a 
statutory right to bring in spouses and children92 and that some immigrants' children 
would marry within the UK, but patterns o f migration are complex. The modern 
literature on migration does not view it as a single discrete journey to a destination 
country but as part o f a broader and long-term pattern of transnational movement and i ( \ ,
community as well as the wider diaspora so that there will be a continuing flow of 
traffic including through marriage, involving a number of countries. It was perhaps 
unwise to place so much emphasis on the anticipated decline o f the international 
arranged marriage.
Conservative MPs were openly sceptical about the role o f the arranged marriage in 
immigration. Bhabha and Shutter (1994:62) refer to comments by Conservative
90 Ibid 24,h May 1976 col. 49.
91 See, for example Syd Bidvvell: "A certain nonsense emerges if one is thinking genuinely in terms o f  
immigration as a whole-white and black, brown, and black and white" (HC Hansard 5th July 1976 col.
being a finite pool, "we are bailing out an ocean".90
change. An immigrant community is likely to maintain links with the home
989).
92 .According to Juss ( 1997:190), this particular commitment had been fulfilled by the 1990s.
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politicians that the liberal regime on husbands was a mistaken concession to "the 
women’s lobby" and contrary to both British and Indian culture. Such explicit 
comments were made only by marginal figures, but the premises upon which they 
were based informed other more measured contributions. Thus William Whitelaw in 
opening the July debate recognised the right o f a head of household to bring in one 
wife ("We are a basically monogamous society")9"’ and children. There were renewed 
calls for a register o f dependants. Arranged marriages were viewed as being primarily 
a source o f immigration, principally because, it seems, Tory MPs could not imagine 
 ^ any other motivation for such a marriage.
j Thus, neither Tory nor Labour MPs consistently argued a principled defence o f the
'y international arranged. marriage. The difference between them was that Labour MPs
*! v - believed that the arranged marriage would disappear once families had been exposed 
' I ' 'p } / '  ’ to superior Western models, while Tory MPs believed their usefulness as a tool for 
immigration would ensure their survival.
Roy Jenkins' took a more sophisticated although less liberal approach than either o f 
these positions. He saw the truth as lying somewhere between finite pool and infinite 
ocean, thus avoiding the trap o f relying too heavily on the decline o f the arranged 
marriage. He was committed to preserving husbands' rights even if  he was not willing 
to go further and he rejected the assumption that the 'bogus marriage' was a particular 
characteristic o f South Asian immigration, pointing out that arranged marriages "can 
be just as real and longlasting as any other marriages," and "[sjuch contrivances are 
not confined to those wishing to immigrate from, or avoid removal to, the 
subcontinent".94 Equally, he declined to treat as “morally reprehensible”, the "lively 
sense o f extended family in Asian culture" even if  he was not ready to permit entry by 
extended family members. He also argued the case for going beyond the numbers 
debate:
"The basic issue here is not simply one o f numbers. We cannot avoid this 
addition to numbers unless we either keep out all husbands - which would be 
across-the-board sex discrimination - which would affect the right o f English- 
born wives to bring in an. American or Australian husband, or by keeping out 
those from the sub-continent which would be straightforward racial 
discrimination. I could not, and would not, defend either o f these two forms of 
blatant discrim ination".95
93 HC Hansard 5th July 1976 col. 969.
94 Ibid 5th July 1976 col. 984.
95 Ibid 24th May 1976 col. 104.
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Jenkins' approach rested upon the assumption that numbers mattered and that 
immigration meant New Commonwealth immigration. At that time and in that 
climate, this was almost the universal view, although MPs such as Joan Lestor and 
Syd Bidwell did point out the racially based assumptions upon which contemporary 
immigration control rested.96 Jenkins also did not acknowledge the role that 
administrative measures played in permitting hidden discrimination. Nonetheless, he 
sought to uphold a position o f principle on the admission o f husbands in the face of 
constant and unremitting pressure from both press and opposition MPs. By the end o f 
1976, neither he nor Alex Lyon, who had sought to ensure that the rules were applied 
fairly on the sub-continent, remained in post.
3.6 The birth o f prim ary purpose
The association between ab u se^ id  husbands or flanc£s'y/as now accepted as fact and 
frequently raised in Parliament, although without firm evidence as to the scale of 
deceit. Government ministers emphasised that it was not confined to New 
Commonwealth immigrants but such was the clear sub-text o f much o f the discussion. 
Conservative shadow minister William Whitelaw, for example, drew an explicit 
connection between harmonious race relations and the prevention o f abuse.97
Government competence was now inextricably linked with effective control of 
New Commonwealth immigration. Dislike o f overt sex and race discrimination meant 
that the rights o f New Commonwealth husbands had been, for a period, able to 
achieve reluctant acceptance as the price o f allowing equality to white couples. Once 
alternative means were found through the strengthening o f administrative measures, 
arranged marriages sponsored by a woman returned to their lowly position in the 
hierarchy.
Before he left the Home Office, Jenkins had established a small parliamentary 
group under Lord Franks to look into the feasibility o f a register o f dependants. Their 
report was published in February 1977 and the government concluded that such a 
register would not be desirable or practicable.98 Following rumours o f a revival o f the 
ban on husbands,99 in March 1977, the government amended the Immigration Rules, 
to prevent men being accepted for settlement through marriages o f convenience. The
96 See fn. 92 above and HC Hansard 24th May 1976 cols. 73-9.
97 HC Hansard 9th February 1977 col. 1435.
98 Ibid cols. 1433-4.
99 ‘Rees blocks aisle route into Britain’ Guardian 10th February 1977.
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new rules introduced for the first time the concept of primary purpose. However, at
that time it was linked closely to the idea o f marriages o f convenience, a concept from
which it later became separated. Thus entry or settlement would be refused:
" if  the officer to whom the application is made has reason to believe that the 
proposed marriage would be one o f convenience entered into primarily to 
obtain admission here with no intention that the parties should live together 
permanently as husband and wife” (HC 238 para. 47).
In addition, husbands were to be admitted or given leave to remain for a period of 
twelve months initially unless the marriage had taken place more than twelve months 
previously. Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth citizens were now treated alike, 
except that a Commonwealth fiance, one o f whose grandparents was born in the UK, 
would be admitted for immediate settlement, a privilege which would predominantly 
benefit white men.
The obligation to find both that the marriage was one of  convenience and that the 
parties should not intend to live permanent!^ together meant that the Rule had only 
limited impact at that stage. Evans (1983:133) suggests that the small numbers of men 
refused leave to settle after the newly introduced 12 month probationary period 
indicate that abuse was not a widespread problem at the time. Alex Lyon argued, 
during debate,100 that the measures were a panicked response to an exaggerated 
problem. It was increasingly apparent that the primary means o f controlling unwanted 
immigration would be administrative. The Select Committee Report on Race 
Relations and Immigration, despite a mostly restrictive tone, drew attention to the 
lengthy delays and sceptical attitudes o f entry clearance officials.101
A government operating in the climate o f the time and explicitly committed to the 
'numbers game', had imperatively to be seen as in control o f immigration. Yet, 
politicians did not want to confront voters with the actual consequences o f this. 
Administrative practices carried out principally abroad made controls appear more 
palatable, particularly when backed by a discourse o f ’abuse1 (see chapter 5 for a 
detailed account). By using administrative measures, governments sought to meet 
their electorate's (and perhaps their own) dual desire to limit immigration and to 
maintain a clear conscience about how this is achieved.
100 HC Hansard 24th May 1977 cols. 1336-7.
101 First Report from the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration HC 303 (HMSO 1978) 
pp. 177-87.
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The danger of this strategy is exposure o f the unattractive underbelly o f
immigration control. This happened when press reports appeared in early 1979 that
single women from the sub-continent were being subjected to 'virginity tests',
creating an explosive scandal (see chapter 5 for a full discussion). The Home
Secretary, Merlyn Rees, refused to order a departmental inquiry or support
disciplinary action against the officers involved, merely stating that action had been
\ 02  *taken to prevent a recurrence. His replies to parliamentary questions on the subject 
suggest a strong desire to distance him self from the affair with terse answers couched 
in legalistic and bureaucratic term s.103 It must have been highly embarrassing for it to 
be so clearly apparent that the government's strategy for controlling immigration 
permitted such practices. Eventually, the issue was deflected by the Yellowlees 
enquiry into medical examinations.104
Falling numbers o f primary migrants enabled the government to present the 
immigration 'problem' as being under control although some Conservative MPs 
continued to call for further measures.103 These MPs rejected any moral obligation 
towards immigrant communities to ensure family reunion and excluded them from the 
population whom they were tasked to represent, claiming that "the only moral 
commitment that matters is the interests o f the British people here as a whole".106 
Government ministers adopted a less crude view relying on the necessity for good 
race relations to justify policy: "The United Kingdom is now, and will remain, a 
multiracial society. Our overriding responsibility is to do all in our power to make it a 
harmonious one".107
3.7 Refining prim ary purpose
These differing understandings o f what constituted the ‘British people’ were 
increasingly crudely drawn after the election o f  a Conservative government in 1979. 
Margaret Thatcher was influenced by thinkers who viewed hostility to the 'alien 
wedge' as natural and morally defensible, a view represented by her famous
102 HC Hansard 9Ul February 1979 cols. 312-3.
103 See, for example, HC Hansard 9th February 1979 cols. 312-3 or 14th February 1979 col. 539.
104 ‘The Medical Examination o f Immigrants, Report o f  Chief Medical Officer’ Home Office, 
December 1980 fit) * CC-vT
105 See, for example Mr Dudley Smith HC Hansard 6th April 1978 col. 650 or Mr Budgen HC Hansard 
6th April 1978 col. 651.
105 Ivor Stanbrook HC Hansard 6th April 1978 col. 657.
507 Merlyn Rees Ibid 6th April 1978 col. 648.
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'swamping' comment in 1978 (Dummett and Nicol 1990:238-41). The Conservative 
manifesto had contained a commitment to preventing the admission o f all husbands 
and fiances. However, that would have been too crude an implement affecting white 
as well as black women and a more racially discriminatory approach was eventually 
proposed.
In November 1979, the new Home Secretary William Whitelaw announced a series 
o f new measures including several concerning the admission of husbands.108 The test 
o f primary purpose was to be separated from that of intention to live together. This 
would have consequences for the meaning attributed to 'primary purpose' in law (see 
chapter 4 for further discussion).
The proposals also required the parties, whether fiances or spouses, to have met, a 
provision clearly aimed at discouraging Asian arranged marriages. Lord Scarman 
described it to the Home Affairs Select Committee as “an^attack^on the social habits 
and custom of people who have come to this country and who are living in accord 
with the customs in which they were brought up”.109 Equally clearly targeted was the 
provision allowing entry to only one wife.
O f most immediate concern was the proposal that only the husbands or fiances of 
British citizen women bom in the UK would be eligible to apply at all. Whitelaw 
conceded that this discriminated but viewed it as necessary to prevent disguised 
primary male immigration.110 He saw the ban as "the price that we have to pay to stop 
marriage being used as a device to achieve admission to the United Kingdom."111 
Timothy Raison, Minister for Immigration, meanwhile acknowledged that the 
affected marriages “may perfectly well last as enduringly as love marriages”,112 
undermining the abuse argument.
The Home Affairs Select Committee warned that the proposals breached the 
European Convention on Human Rights.113 Opponents repeatedly drew attention to 
the tiny numbers actually suspected o f abuse and the limited effect the measure would 
have on overall immigration figures.114 Even the Times wondered if  it was “really
108 HMSO Proposals for revision o f  the Immigration Rules Cmnd 7750 November 1979.
109 ‘New immigration rules breach Convention, Lord Scarman says’ Times 18lh January 1980.
110 ‘Immigrant plan has sex bias -  Whitelaw’ Guardian 5lh November 1979.
111 HC Hansard 4 th December 1979 col. 255.
112 ‘Immigration needs rules when too many try to play at once” Daily Telegraph 4 lh December 1979.
113 House o f Commons First Report from the Home Affairs Committee 1979-80, Proposed New  
Immigration Rules and the European Convention on Human Rights HC303.
154 ‘Protest at entry bar on husbands’ Guardian 4th December 1979.
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necessary for the British Government to show itself to be in deliberate breach o f its
moral and legal international undertakings for such a puny result’' . 115 Political
opposition was nonetheless muted by acceptance o f the premise that New
Commonwealth male immigration was highly undesirable.
Reference has already been made to the hierarchy o f acceptable marriages. Fiances
and husbands o f black and Asian origin had long been placed on the bottom rung and
their interests, although given passing acknowledgement, were easily displaced by the
need to prevent even a few non-white immigrants. The refinement here was that the
colour o f the wife as well as the origin o f the husband determined the extent of the
right to decide where a couple should live. The clarity o f the racial distinction
between the privileged ‘belongers’ and those with only a partial status was apparent
from the exception eventually incorporated after much public complaint for women
born abroad to parents born in the U K .116
This implicit notion o f who did or did not 'belong1 was fluid and given added
complexity by the confused state o f  the UK's nationality law. Ivor Stanbrook, a
prominent anti-immigration MP, asked the Home Secretary to make it clear that "this
country is governed in the interests o f its inhabitants and not those o f immigrants"
suggesting that 'belongers' were a closed category which immigrants could not enter.
Tony Marlow was even more explicit, saying that brown and black families "can go
home and rejoin their families in the country o f origin".117
Senior members o f the government avoided such crude rhetoric. Whitelaw's reply
to Stanbrook was that the country was "governed in the best interests of all its 
- • 118 *citizens", a questionable assertion given that the new proposals discriminated 
between different types o f citizen. There was a lack o f congruity between Whitelaw's 
status as a "humane Tory"119 and the discrimination contained in the proposals. 
Trying to reconcile this involved asserting that 'belongers' included those of 
immigrant descent as "girls bom  in this country, o f any race, colour or creed, have
1 9 f)exactly the same rights".
There was still unease, however, at treating more recently settled communities as 
complete outsiders. This was resolved by claiming, however unconvincingly, that the
155 ‘In Breach o f  the Convention?’ Times 6th March 1980.
116 ‘New immigration rules could hit overseas appointments’ Guardian 19,h November 1979.
117 HC Hansard 14th November 1979 col. 1344.
118 Ibid col. 1337.
119 Mr Bidwell Ibid col. 1339.
120 HC Hansard ibid col. 1345.
measure was in the interests o f  those affected by it. Thus Whitelaw said during the
debate: "Many Asian girls in this country would wish to make their own choice.
Indeed, that may well happen after the change in the rules rather than at present". A
professed concern to protect women from oppressive non-British practices was
becoming a recurring theme in rationalising restriction,121 called by Timothy Raison
in support o f the new requirement for the parties to have met:
"Whatever we may think of arranged marriages, I doubt whether it is right to 
have..an. .arranged marriage when the parties haveaievcr met. In recentW eeksT  
have met large numbers o f Asian women. Many o f them, when describing 
what they regard as a satisfactory arranged marriage, agreed that the bride and 
groom should meet before the marriage".122
While the hierarchy o f marriages rested upon assumptions about gender and culture,
the fear was not the abuse of marriage alone but labour market displacement. Raison
also said, during the debate on the new rules, that the arguments as to abuse:
"do not apply with the same force to women entering the United Kingdom to 
join husbands. In the main, they join husbands who are in the position of 
having the prime responsibility for providing for their families ... Men 
entering the country to join women settled here ... are not joining the family's 
breadwinner but expect, and are expected to make, a major contribution 
themselves to the earnings o f their new family unit".123
Whether or not this was the case, it did not follow that such a marriage was not 
genuine or that the woman entered it unwillingly. Yet arguments as to abuse were 
cited too fervently to be mere pretexts for preventing unwanted economic 
immigration. Rather, the cultural assumptions and the economic ones intertwined and 
reinforced each other. Not all marriages where the wife joined the husband were 
abusive and ministers carefully avoided being led by backbenchers into making such 
generalisations.124 Yet, such a marriage was viewed as more prone to abuse both 
because it was considered culturally deviant and because it enabled male economic 
activity. This was compounded by a belief that arranged marriages could, more easily 
than other forms of marriage, be exploited for immigration purposes.
The distinction between crude discrimination and assertions o f cultural superiority 
was often employed as a defence against charges o f racism. Thus W hitelaw argued
121 See, for example, ‘Immigration needs rules when too many try to play at once’ Daily Telegraph 4th 
December 1979, ‘Help for unhappy brides’ Daily Mirror I9tu April 1980.
122 HC Hansard 4th December 1979 col. 371.
123 HC Hansard 10th March 1980 col. 1026.
124 See, for example, Timothy Raison HC Hansard 24th June 1982 col. 424.
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that the measures were not racist as women of Asian origin born in the UK would be 
able to bring in husbands.125 Fears about labour displacement and the belief that 
arranged marriages were loveless affairs and therefore mere vehicles for immigration 
should have applied to Asian women born in the UK who married men from overseas. 
The underlying assumption here was that second generation women, exposed to the 
superior marriage patterns o f the West, would resist such arranged marriages, a belief 
to which both Labour and Conservative MPs subscribed. The attack on the arranged 
marriage thus rested on a combination o f economic, cultural and gender assumptions.
3.8 The forced march back to equality
In a white paper “quietly slipped out”,126 the government 'postponed' a manifesto 
pledge for a register o f dependants,127 Although the number o f  dependants admitted 
was declining, senior politicians were unhappy that, due to second-generation 
marriages, the ‘pool’ o f secondary immigrants from the subcontinent was not proving 
to be finite.128 The White Paper adopted a rather bizarre proposal that the pattern of 
marriage o f Asian men bom in the UK should be monitored to assess future long-term 
trends in immigration,129 reflecting the reality that there was little now that the 
government could do to restrict admission further; on the contrary, pressure was 
mounting elsewhere for liberalisation. The existing law was attracting claims to the 
European Court o f Human Rights and in May 1982, the European Commission on 
Human Rights found that the UK government had a case to answer. A discriminatory 
regime was becoming untenable particularly when contrasted with the rights accorded 
to spouses under EC law (Sachdeva 1993: 83-4, 165-9).
It was also perhaps becoming less urgent. Sachdeva (1993:72-4) suggests that, 
anticipating an unfavourable result, officials were sharpening their use o f primary 
purpose as a means o f refusal, perhaps causing the reduction in numbers just alluded 
to. Certainly, the rate o f refusal o f husbands and fiances increased from 10% in 1981 
to 47% in 1982. (Bhabha et al. 1985:69). Moreover, a measure o f reform could be 
rationalised as anticipating the new law on nationality due to come into effect on 1st
125 HC Hansard 141h November 1979 col. 1337. ^
126 ‘The numbers game’ New Society 2nd December 1982. r-"'-  W # A,°
127 In fact, the proposal had been effectively discarded following recommendations from the Home 
Affairs Committee; ‘Tories shelve register plan for immigrants’ dependants’ Guardian 8th December 
1981.
128 ‘Minister rejects “finite” migration’ Times 27th April 1982.
129 ‘The numbers gam e’ New Society 2nd December 1982.
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January 1983. In December 1982. the government introduced proposals to permit all 
women who were British citizens to sponsor husbands or fiances regardless o f how 
that citizenship was acquired.lj0
The government aimed to meet objections by introducing two additional 
restrictions; a probationary period o f two years and a shift in the burden of proof to 
the applicant. The government's priority was to head off a backbench revolt by those 
who viewed immigration as purely a question of the numbers o f non-white 
immigrants and who were unable to accept even a modest rise. There was little effort 
to deny the racist underpinning o f the controls. Whitelaw admitted that the rationale 
for favouring women born in the UK was disappearing, as a new generation o f girls o f 
Asian descent born in the UK reached marriageable age.131 Relying on the assumption 
that any man coming from the subcontinent to join his wife "would be doing so 
primarily for immigration purposes" might have "awkward consequences with regard 
to people marrying Australians, Canadians, Americans and so on."lj2 The assumption 
that the arranged marriage was particularly suited to exploitation for immigration was 
explicit.lj3 Sponsoring a husband to come to the UK was a privilege that should be 
reserved only for those who truly belonged. This category could now be conveniently 
redefined as comprising British citizens, a more restricted category than the old 
CUKC.lj4 However, fear o f increased numbers and a misjudgement as to opposition
135intentions led to government defeat for the measures through an alliance o f its own 
backbenchers opposed to any liberalisation and opposition members opposed to 
further restriction.
Obliged to lay new rules before Parliament, the government responded with HC 
169, which eventually came into effect on 16th February 1983. The extension o f the 
probationary period was dropped although the critical change, the reversal o f the 
burden o f proof, remained. This, coupled with an increasingly hostile administrative 
climate, was the major factor in enabling the primary purpose rule to be used to such 
deadly effect in the coming period. Refusals on primary purpose grounds, as a 
percentage o f all refusals o f husbands and fiances, rose from 18% in 1982 to 73% in 
1983. It seems that right wing backbenchers received reassurance that primary
130 Cmnd 8683.
131 HC Hansard 15th December 1982 col. 361.
132 Ibid col. 362.
133 Timothy Raison ibid col. 431.
134 Timothy Raison ibid col. 429-30.
135 ‘Misjudgment caused immigration defeat’ Times 18th December 1982.
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purpose would prevent male Asian immigration before accepting the rule changes 
(Bhabha et al. 1985:68-9).
Debate covered similar ground as in December although the government's tone 
was now more confident. Some Conservative MPs such as Nicholas Budgen and Jill 
Knight,lj6 while defending the arranged marriage as appropriate abroad, argued that 
“it should not be a means of entering Britain". This was acceptable as "[it] cannot be 
said that the arranged marriage creates suffering if it is not allowed, because the girl 
does not know the man who may be selected for her in far away Jullunder. Such a girl 
is increasingly coming to the view that she does not wish a man to be selected for her 
in Jullunder".Ll 7
The belief was that a woman would not be an active or willing participant in an 
international arranged marriage and therefore the marriage must be made for the 
benefit o f others, principally the immigration advantage o f the man. Thus David 
Waddington, Minister o f State Justify ing  the reversal o f the burden o f proof, said that: 
"There cannot be anything wrong in principle with expecting a man who is seeking a 
major benefit to prove that he is entitled to it".138 Meanwhile, primary purpose could 
be presented as being for the protection o f female sponsors. For instance, in the wake 
o f a sensationalist press report about Asian girls being ‘sold’ by their parents to Asian 
men who followed them home from school, Waddington commented that “ [t]he so- 
called ‘primary purpose’ rule has been much attacked but these stories show that it 
can protect women against exploitation”.139
Again, assumptions reinforce each other. That o f female passivity dovetailed with 
the denial o f the rights o f women to choose the place o f marital residence. This 
absence of rights could also be justified in terms o f identifying belongers. As David 
Waddington put it, “ [i]f they do not wish to be British, why should they have the right 
to bring in their husbands?".140
This forthright tone was typical o f the Conservative government o f the time. David
Waddington, in particular, adopted an abrasive style that, over the next period, made
    -
explicit values, beliefs and assumptions which had been present but were muted or 
\ implied under previous regimes. Typical examples include crude head-counts o f
J ____________________________
136 HC Hansard 15th February 1983 cols. 213-6.
137 Ibid col. 226.
138 Ibid col. 241.
139 ‘Scandal o f  the brides for sale’ Daily Mail 5lh August 1985.
140 HC Hansard 151'1 February 1983 c o l 242.
potential (black and Asian) immigrants,141 treatment of all New Commonwealth 
fiances and husbands as primary migrants,142 unofficial designation o f "pressure to 
emigrate" countries,14'1 and a crude assertion o f the superiority o f life in the UK.144 
This confidence was matched by belief in the ability of the entry clearance service to 
do the unpleasant work o f refusal at a distance aided, in particular, by the 'primary 
purpose rule' repeatedly described by Waddington as an anti-abuse measure.14' 
Complaints about entry clearance procedures were marginalised or dismissed.146 On 
occasion, however, the reality o f these processes punctured the rarefied parliamentary 
atmosphere. One such was the debate147 on the Commission for Racial Equality report 
011 immigration procedures (CRE 1983). For the most part, however, there was a 
severe lack o f congruity between the bland assurances by Waddington and others as 
to the professionalism o f entry clearance staff,148 and the actual position as discussed 
in chapter 5 o f this thesis.
The government still had to face the challenge of the Abdidaziz149 case in the 
European Court o f Human Rights. The government's defence o f its policy in that case 
rested on labour market protection, the right to control immigration and the necessity 
o f preventing abuse (see Evans 1982:140-1 and Sachdeva 1993:92). Its arguments 
emphasised that these applicant wives remained outsiders. One was described as 
having “no strong ties with the United Kingdom, having acquired nationality merely 
through a very short-lived marriage”. In fact, this applicant had lived in the UK for
141 Ibid 23rd May 1985 col. 1172.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid 28th February 1985 cols. 454-455.
144 Ibid 23rd May 1985 col. 1173.
145 See, for example, HC Hansard 4th July 1985 col. 519. The lack o f congruity between the stated 
intention o f  preventing marriages o f convenience and the true position was occasionally made explicit. 
On one occasion, a Home Office spokesman acknowledged that it had never been the practice to allow 
a husband or fiance to enter simply because it was accepted that the marriage was genuine. (“Husband 
banned from rejoining mother-to-be”. Guardian 3ld January 1984).
146 See, for example, ‘Immigration from the Indian sub-continent’ Fifth report o f  the House o f  
Commons Home Affairs Committee Cmnd 8725 (HMSO 1982) when criticism by advisory agencies o f  
entry clearance practices was dismissed. The issue was raised again in evidence given to the Commons 
sub-committee on race relations but to little apparent effect; ‘Entrants to UK “quizzed in police 
fashion”’. Guardian 19Ih March 1985. Again in 1985, the Home Affairs Committee dismissed 
complaints about the service (Flouse o f Commons Home Affairs Committee, session 1984-5, report on 
Immigration and Nationality Department o f the Home Office). The Chair o f  the Committee, John 
Wheeler, controversially described the complaints as “ill-founded allegations and unsubstantiated 
anecdotes” ( ‘Race equality groups “do serious harm’” Daily Telegraph 27th June 1985, ‘In the cause o f
racial harmony’ Guardian 9th July 1985, ‘Liberals slam Home Office department’ Asian Times 12th
July 1985).
147 HC Hansard 23rd May 1985 cols. 1166-1206.
148 Ibid col. 1166-7.
149 Abdidaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom  judgment o f 2811' May 1985, Eur Ct HR, 
Series A, no. 94.
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seven years before marrying her applicant husband and the couple had a UK-born 
child.150
The problem for both government and applicants was that the European Court 
found only that the sex discrimination involved in the rule could not be justified. A 
change in the law was required but, in the absence o f adverse findings as to race 
discrimination or violation o f Articles 3 or 8 o f the Convention, it could be achieved 
simply by levelling down the rights o f women applicants to those o f  men.
Thus the government w as able to use the judgement as a means o f creating an 
equality o f misery for all. The outcome was that all the requirements which applied to 
Husbands and male fiances were now to be applied equally to wives and fiancees with 
additional tightening for all parties with regard to public funds, now defined to 
include family income supplement and housing benefit.
Leon Brittain, for the government, relied on the assumptions which had informed
previous debate and which do not need reiteration. The obsession with numbers was
emphasised by the explicit trade off between the reluctantly given concession and
announced intention to repeal the statutory guarantee in S. 1(5) Immigration Act 1971
of family unity for male Commonwealth citizens settled in the UK on 1st January
1973. The mechanistic and dehumanising approach belies the concern for family unity
expressed earlier in Lord Brittain’s speech:
“As a result, therefore, o f the court’s judgement and o f this change taken by 
itself, we expect that the numbers accepted for settlement each year are likely 
to rise by about 2,000 a year. However, this increase will, at least to some 
extent, be offset by the changes, which I will come to in a moment, concerning 
the admission o f wives and families” .151
The new immigration rules were initially announced only in a Commons written 
answer, a debate being conceded only after strong opposition pressure.152 The 
government’s approach caused an outcry from immigrant groups, the opposition and 
the Parliamentary Group on Race Relations,153 but protest was ineffective. After the 
new rules came into effect on 26th August 1985, both a man and a woman who were 
settled in the UK were able to sponsor a spouse or fiance(e). Entry clearance would be 
refused unless applicants had met five separate conditions. For spouses, these were:
150 “Policies for a race apart” Guardian 25th October 1982.
151 HC Hansard 23rd July 1985 cols.895-6.
152 ‘Change in immigration rules to be debated’ Daily Telegraph 1211' July 1985.
153 ‘Immigrant wives controversy grows’ Times 12th July 1985.
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o that the marriage was not entered into primarilv to obtain admission to the / ^
   ■ ! , !
United Kingdom; and y '
o that each o f the parties has the intention of living permanently with the other J  *
as his or her spouse; and _
o that the parties to the marriage had met; and
’   " I
o that there would be adequate accommodation for the parties and their / „ .
( ij
dependants without recourse to public funds in accommodation o f their own or / / ) f
f
which they would occupy themselves; and f
o that the parties would be able to maintain themselves and their dependants
adequately without recourse to public funds.154
I -  -  J  1 - f  ‘ V r *—  ^
Similar provisions applied to fiances and fiancees 55 and those seeking extension o f f /
stay (with the additional requirements that the marriage had not been terminated, there 
had been no breach o f the immigration laws and that the marriage did not take place 
after deportation or removal proceedings had commenced).156
The disposability o f the family rights o f even long-established Commonwealth 
males was emphasised by the subsequent removal under the Immigration Act 1988 of 
the statutory guarantee in S. 1(5) Immigration Act 1971, announced as the trade off for 
permitting the entry of husbands. Such summary dispatch of the longstanding family 
reunion rights o f men suggests that principled attachment to them had, for a long 
period, been superficial and provisional. While wives who joined their husbands stood 
higher in the hierarchy o f deserving unions than husbands who joined their wives, all 
were subordinate to the need to prevent even a few thousand unwanted black and 
Asian immigrants.
It was claimed that removal of S. 1(5) was an attempt to erect additional hurdles 
when it was realised that DNA testing would make it impossible, in most cases, to 
refuse on the grounds that the parties were not related (a question discussed further in 
chapter 5).157 In 19 86,158 the Rules were amended to prevent entry where the 
incoming spouse was under 16 and again in 1990159 to prevent entry when either 
spouse was under 16 (more recent rises in the minimum age are discussed in chapter
,5i' HC 503 para 46.
155 Ibid para. 41.
156 Ibid para 124.
157 ‘Home Office erects farther barriers’ New Life 23rd June 1989.
158 HC 306 para. I A.
159 HC 555 para. 3.
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6). While the advisability o f very young marriages was (and remains) a legitimate 
subject for debate, the history o f exclusion meant that this was understood only as 
further cultural discrimination. Similar sentiments were evoked by the amendment of 
the Rules to prevent the entry o f more than one wife to a polygamous m arriage,160 an 
issue which the government eventually acknowledged affected about 25 households 
per year.161 This was despite earlier and well-publicised exaggerated claims by the 
Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration. It is not clear from the reports 
whether the misleading claims 011 polygamous wives were due to misrepresentation 
by staff at the High Commission in Bangladesh or were wilfully misinterpreted by the 
anti-immigration Chairman o f the Select Committee.162
Throughout the period, the government's tone was harsh and overbearing towards
those separated by law from their spouses abroad. The implicit assumption was that
individuals had themselves rendered their claims illegitimate through marrying in
unsanctioned ways. David Waddington, for example, used his usual combative style
to reply to a question in the House about constituents separated by the Rules:
“Opinions may differ on whether parents should be encouraging children to 
marry boys abroad who have been brought up in an entirely different way 
rather than their contemporaries in British society. But the primary purpose 
rule is in the general public interest and those cases do not illustrate any defect 
in the rules, rather the refusal o f people to accept immigration requirements 
approved by a democratically elected Parliament. All too often a girl goes 
through a marriage and has a child and then the Home Office is asked to pick 
up the pieces when ... anybody with a scrap of sense could have seen before 
the marriage that the man could not qualify to come here and would have no 
p ,, -rf claim to come here”.163
r 1
qV ^ 1 In the twenty-two years between 1985 and 1997, many thousands o f genuinely
, i married couples were separated by the primary purpose rule. There was the occasionalM  | ---------- '
ty - ' 1 chink o f light prompted in part by the embarrassing liberality of European
t y  -  iCommunity law as demonstrated by the well-known case o f Surinder Singh.lM
ty L \ *
if. Following that case and in the light o f domestic case law on 'intervening devotion' 
' (see chapter 4), concessions were announced in June 1992. Applications would no
T W v -----------------------------------------
1/J-' 1 1 6 0  t i  * t/ '  V M Ibiapara. 3.
161 HC! Hansard 16th November 1988 col. 786.
162 t : ........... ootll
f/V
\V A  1 ‘inquiry into clash 011 Bangladesh w ives’ Times 28th November 1985, ‘MP in retreat on wives
v claim’ Guardian 28th November 1985, ‘MPs scale down claims on immigrant w ives’ Times 3rd
\^p\r v ! Jt.l November 1985, ‘MPs move to close immigrant loophole’ Times 27th November 1985.
/  ^  163 HC Hansard 19th February 1986 cols. 457-8.
\ 164 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Home Secretary> (Surinder Singh case) Case C-370/90,
\v ty  IJty, i 1992! ECR 1-4265.
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longer be refused on primary purpose grounds where it was accepted that the marriage 
was genuine and subsisting and the parties had been married for at least five years or 
one or more children had the right of abode in the UK. This provided at least partial 
relief even if at the cost of a lengthy separation, an unofficial waiting period (Menski 
1994:118).
In 1997, a Labour government was elected after 18 years o f Conservative rule. In 
its manifesto, the party had promised that the current immigration system would be 
reformed 'to remove the arbitrary and unfair results that can follow from the existing 
'primary purpose' ru le '.163 Actual abolition came soon after Labour came to power and 
enabled the government to establish radical credentials on a matter o f high symbolic 
importance, but which would make only a small difference to immigration totals.166 It 
thus was able to position itself as the natural party of the ethnic minority population at 
relatively little cost.
Jack Straw described the law as 'arbitrary, unfair and ineffective'.167 He also made 
reference to the disadvantage accruing to British citizens compared with other EU 
nationals resident in Britain. This must have been an important consideration for a 
government aiming to be 'new and distinctive', a 'leader in Europe'.168
Despite concerns about the effect o f abolition and support for other highly 
restrictive measures, there has been little support since then even amongst anti­
immigration groups for the return o f primary purpose.169 The rule was illogical, 
ineffectual and outmoded.
3,9 Conclusion
Although Enoch Powell had praised the contribution of immigrants to the National 
Health Service in the early 1960s, by 1964 he believed that Commonwealth 
immigration should be controlled. Nonetheless, he accepted those immigrants already 
present to be 'part o f the community' and stated that 'there is an inescapable obligation 
of humanity to permit the wives and young children of immigrants already here to
165 Labour Party Manifesto 1997 (http://www.labour-partv.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-
manifesto.shtmf).
166 House o f  Commons Hansard Written Answers for 5lh June 1997 col. 219.
167 Id.
165 Labour Party Manifesto 1997 (http://www.Iabour-partv.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-
manifesto.shtmf),
!69 See, for example, Migration Watch UK’s briefing available on 
www.migrationwatch.org/briefingpapers/other/immigration marriage.asp .
join them.' (Dummett and Nicol 1990:196). By 1967, the commitment to family
reunification could be best achieved by immigrants returning home (Dummett and
Nicol 1990:196). In 1968, his infamous 'rivers of blood' speech legitimised and gave
voice to discontent at the immigrant presence:
"We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation, to be permitting the annual 
inflow o f some 50,000 dependants who are for the most part the material o f 
the future growth o f the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a 
nation busily engaged in building up its own funeral pyre" (quoted in Layton- 
Henry 1992:80).
Powell was an atypical figure but the dramatic changes in his position represent, in 
stark terms, the wider shift in attitudes in the legislature towards the admission of 
Commonwealth spouses over the period discussed in this chapter. These attitudes 
relied upon assumptions, beliefs and values relating to race, immigration, marriage 
and the purposes o f parliamentary processes. They were often mutually reinforcing 
and intertwined. While some politicians expressed themselves more abrasively or 
acted more directly than others, consistent threads may be identified throughout the 
many changes o f policy described in this chapter.
The most obvious was the assumption that immigration policy is a matter purely to 
be decided according to the self-interest, enlightened or otherwise, o f the nation state. 
No parliamentarian proposed a different ethjcaf ba_sis„fox.detei:mining.policy. This was 
and is an assumption shared throughout most of the wider society but was particularly 
marked in parliamentary debates due to the representative nature o f the parliamentary 
process.
Nonetheless, it was differentiated by the various conceptions that politicians held 
o f who comprised, in its widest sense, their constituency, the ‘belongers’. For some, 
this was only the white population apparently under siege from ceaseless black 
immigration. Discrimination against those born outside the UK relied on a somewhat 
more refined view. For others, it was all those who were long-term residents lawfully 
present. The shifts in law over the period discussed here reflect the temporary victory 
o f one or other o f these competing conceptions.
Another universal assumption, only challenged by marginal figures, was that non­
white immigration was uniquely problematic. White immigration was not counted, 
scrutinised or even acknowledged while even small numbers o f non-white immigrants 
provoked anxiety and drastic measures. The fear seemed to be that permitting a few to
enter would open a breach through which virtual hordes might pour with dire 
consequences. In this respect, secondary immigrants, particularly men, were 
perceived as a particularly insidious threat. The public persona o f spouse or
dependant, with their humanitarian claim, concealed a less welcome identity as
economic migrant and as a link in a never-ending chain.
This fearful perspective rested on other beliefs and assumptions: that immigration 
was a single one way process, that poverty and lack of opportunity made the pool o f 
potential migrants infinite, that indigenous workers could be displaced by migrant 
labour and that the problems o f accommodating these migrants by far outweighed any 
advantages. These fears were provoked only by non-white immigration. While 
immigrants from the subcontinent undeniably brought linguistic and cultural 
challenges, hostility towards earlier immigration from the Caribbean, with its British- 
oriented culture, supports the argument that these concerns were, at least to an extent, 
an indication o f deep-rooted racial fears.
Over the period, the constant emphasis on abuse and fraud rendered the act of
asking for admission, particularly by men, to be seen as illegitimate. The main r
V  P Jexceptions to this perspective amongst senior politicians were Alex Lyon and Roy I ^
j - f W v *
Jenkins. Lyon tried to make his defence o f immigrants more acceptable by relying on
the doubtful premise that non-white secondary immigration was largely finite. Jenkins
did not challenge the underlying assumptions o f immigration control but was arguably '
more honest in acknowledging that the issue was the acceptability o f  non-white
immigration widiimBritish society rather than ‘abusive5 applications by immigrants.
For the most part however, belief in the ubiquity o f abuse was dominant. The 
unwillingness to acknowledge reports to the contrary suggest that this belief was, to 
some degree, willed in order to rationalise harsh policy 01* was so consonant with 
other beliefs that the perception was difficult to challenge.
These general beliefs and assumptions about immigration supported and reinforced 
those concerning the admission o f spouses in particular. Despite rhetoric as to the 
importance o f family life, support for the reunification o f immigrant families was 
always conditional. A hierarchy o f marriages is discernible so that some relationships 
were considered more sympathetically than others. The precise nature o f the hierarchy 
evolved over the period. M ost notably, race became a more important factor than 
gender although both played a part throughout and were intertwined. Immigration 
factors were constantly weighed against the rights o f the UK resident spouse and the
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differential treatment o f UK residents makes it clear that some were considered to 
have only a small claim to ‘belong', a claim that was itself partially undermined by 
the act o f marrying an outsider.
At the outset, it was assumed that the primary immigrant would be male and there 
was no appetite for restricting the admission o f Commonwealth immigrants5 families. 
This was the case even where the parties did not conform to British marriage norms 
although there was some expectation of eventual compliance. Marriages where the 
man accompanied or came to join his wife lacked full legitimacy and became ever 
less acceptable, particularly when the parties were not full ‘belongers5. In these 
instances, choosing the ‘w rong5 husband underscored the w ife's outsider status and 
entailed consequences that she must accept. Male secondary immigration was, from 
early on in the period, viewed as disguised primary immigration, an exploitation of 
the humanitarian impulses o f  the host state. Then, as overt and generalised gender 
discrimination became less acceptable over the period, race and cultural factors 
predominated and crystallised around the international arranged marriage.
The continuation of international arranged marriages was one reason why the 
‘pool5 o f dependants on the subcontinent did not prove to be finite and became the 
subject o f intense scrutiny. The arranged marriage thereby came to prominence as a 
source o f unwanted immigration and was always tainted by this association. It was 
only a short step from seeing it as a cause o f immigration to regarding it as an abusive 
vehicle o f immigration, a familiar elision in immigration control.
The claims of all marriages were thus, to a degree, conditional and relationships 
that conformed to preconceived norms were more sympathetically treated. The 
arranged marriage was especially vulnerable not only because it permitted unwanted 
immigration but also because it was poorly understood and was usually viewed as 
inferior to Western models. Those sympathetic to the claims o f immigrants argued 
that it would disappear as second-generation immigrants grew up. This was not 
simply an assertion o f cultural superiority; it is likely that some members o f a second- 
generation immigrant community will find spouses within the country in which they 
have been brought up, or indeed in other countries. But many MPs underestimated the 
centrality o f the arranged marriage to the maintenance of the global Asian diaspora 
and their negative beliefs about it made a principled defence o f such marriages less 
likely. It is not necessary to idealise the arranged marriage system to appreciate that
scrutinising its drawbacks in a way that did not occur with other forms o f marriage 
assisted those seeking to challenge the legitimacy of such marriages.
Those who were anti-immigrant believed that the international arranged marriage 
continued merely because it was a useful vehicle for immigration. The assumption 
was that the dominant motivation for ethnic minority conduct was to secure an 
immigration advantage and that Asian parents cared so little for their children's future 
happiness, howsoever conceived, that they would submit them to an otherwise 
undesirable marriage purely for such an advantage.
Arranged marriages where the husband moved to the UK were regarded as doubly 
illegitimate as arranged marriages that did not comply with Asian patrilocal custom. 
The sole reason for such adaptation was believed to be the immigration advantage 
thereby accruing to the husband. From this, it was a short step to believing that the 
sole reason for the marriage itself was immigration and the husband was a disguised 
primary migrant. Again, there is mutual reinforcement, non-conformity o f the 
marriage leading to assumptions about its motivation that reinforce its lack of 
legitimacy. These beliefs rested upon a view o f the Asian husband as primarily 
motivated by immigration and of the Asian wife as passive participant. To the extent 
that such a judgement was unfair, little damage resulted as there was assumed to be no 
emotional investment in the marriages by either party. Harsh exclusionary policies 
could therefore be rationalised as causing little distress to the parties involved.
It is more difficult to determine the extent to which the arranged marriage, in itself, 
created hostility towards South Asian immigration. I have cited assertions o f cultural 
superiority throughout this chapter. In most cases, these functioned as post-hoc 
rationalisations o f policy rather than as reasons for it. While a poor understanding of 
arranged marriages enabled them to be too easily understood as mere vehicles for 
immigration and while their apparent strangeness reduced sympathy for separated 
couples, the primary motivation was always the minimisation o f South Asian 
immigration.
If  the claims o f Asian spouses were regarded as weak, they nonetheless existed 
even if  they were persistently sacrificed to more urgent political imperatives. The 
effect o f the legislative measures described here was mostly concealed by the entry 
clearance system (see chapter 5) or rationalised as a reaction to abuse. This enabled 
the government to present black and Asian immigration as being under control and 
the public to avoid confronting the consequences o f these policies.
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This is unsurprising. Governments wished to meet the expectations of their largely 
white electorate and present themselves as competent in controlling immigration. 
However, it does suggest a more complex public attitude than straightforward 
hostility towards immigration and immigrant communities. It seems that there were 
limits to the visible hardship which politicians were willing to impose and which the 
public would accept. The hierarchy o f  acceptable and deserving marriages might 
place some marriages on the bottom rung, but the necessity of concealing the hardship 
involved in their rejection suggests that they had, at the least, some claim. Even under 
the full force o f primary purpose, a proportion of applications succeeded while efforts 
were made to rationalise discriminatory policies in non-discriminatory terms. 
Obligations incurred under statute such as those to wives and children under the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and S I(5) Immigration Act 1971 were slow to 
be repealed.
There was not therefore unlimited public appetite for harsh exclusionary measures 
at any cost. Rather, governments, anxious to ensure every possible political 
advantage, aimed to give the electorate what they wanted without making plain the 
price that was paid for it, upholding the illusion of pain-free immigration control.170 
Immigrant communities and their foreign spouses might be strange and sometimes 
unwelcome, but the manner in which their applications were dismissed paradoxically 
recognised the force o f their claim.
170 Politicians occasionally acknowledged this. David Waddington defended policy in 1983 by saying, 
“Everyone pays lip service to the need for immigration control. But no one likes to see the logical 
result -  individuals being refused the right to come and stay here and some as a last resort having to be 
removed”. ( ‘Discrimination against women is defended’ Oldham Evening Chronicle 28th November 
1983).
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Chapter 4: Judicial decision-making before 1997
This chapter considers judicial attitudes towards marriage and immigration before 
1997, including marriages believed to have been entered into for immigration reasons, 
often described as ‘marriages of convenience', ‘immigration m arriages’ or, more 
recently, ‘sham marriages'. It is argued here that the judiciary were largely indifferent 
to these marriages before the era o f mass non-white Commonwealth immigration. 
When cases involving New Commonwealth immigrants came before the courts, 
judicial attitudes became more complex and inconsistent. The chapter argues that 
there was, at least in the early stages, some sympathy. However, this came to be 
tempered by anxiety about non-white immigration, albeit only occasionally overtly 
expressed, and a hardening o f attitude. The courts did not check and often assisted 
government and administrators in ensuring that the ‘primary purpose" rule applied to 
marriages that were acknowledged not to be a sham.
Commentators have argued that the judiciary has shown greater deference to 
executive power in immigration than in other matters (Bevan 1986:16-22; Legomsky 
1987; Desai 1996; Griffiths 1997:182-204;). However, this has not been uniform and 
the picture is complex as these authors and others have acknowledged (see, for 
example, the discussion in Stevens 2004: chapter 8; Bevan 1987:20-1 and Thomas 
2003). There have been various explanations for the apparent oscillations in judicial 
decision-making. Stevens (2004:365) notes the consistent involvement o f particular 
judges in more liberal decisions. Thomas (2003:509-10) considers, in relation to 
asylum, that the courts have been more active and have achieved more long-tenn 
successes when intervening in matters o f good administration and procedure than in 
policy. Legomsky (1987:246) attributes judicial conservatism in immigration matters 
to political pressure prevailing during periods o f high immigration.
This thesis argues that decisions in immigration and marriage cases illuminate 
decision-makers’ values, beliefs and assumptions about immigration, marriage, the 
judicial or administrative function and other related matters, these, in turn, being 
rooted in often unarticulated assumptions about the nature o f the world. This chapter 
specifically considers judicial decision-making in this area. It argues that the beliefs 
and assumptions identified here, although not identical to, had much in common with
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those held within government and by administrators and resulted in a large degree of 
congruity in the formulation and application o f policy.
The role o f the Tribunal during this period is ambiguous. Juss (1997: chapters^ 4 
and 5) is critical o f its tendency to defer to and reinforce the wider discriminatory 
culture, a point also made by others (Harlow and Rawlings 1997:519; Grant and 
Martin 1982:355). There may have been a recent tendency towards “judicialisation” 
(Thomas 2003:484), a trend observed elsewhere and arguably an inevitable 
characteristic o f dispute resolving mechanisms (Stone Sweet 1999, 2000: chapter 1) 
but, during the period under discussion here, the Tribunal also operated as an 
administrative body deeply enmeshed with other immigration administrative 
processes. The decisions that Juss (1997) criticises are principally those in which the 
Tribunal was complicit in supporting the exclusionary culture o f the Entry Clearance 
Service and which did not, on the whole, require the Tribunal to engage in discussions 
o f legal principle. These are more appropriately discussed in chapter 5. However, in 
other respects, the Tribunal was also principally or jointly responsible for the 
development o f aspects o f legal doctrine and these decisions are discussed here 
alongside higher court decisions. In these cases, the Tribunal was not uniformly 
complicit with administrative practices.
The era was dominated by the primary purpose rule. Nonetheless, the judiciary was 
also required to decide other matters relating to immigration through marriage. These 
are analysed in detail in several sub-sections under 4.1, while 4.2 below considers 
specifically primary purpose case law.
4.1 ‘Having it both ways’: judicial attitudes in non-primary purpose 
cases
4.1.1 The marriage of convenience
The concept o f a marriage o f  convenience for reasons of immigration unsurprisingly 
predates control o f New Commonwealth immigration. Earlier case law focused on the 
validity o f the marriage rather than the immigration consequences that flowed from it. 
The usual rule was that a marriage of convenience was valid even if  entered for 
immigration purposes {Silver v Silver,171 and see also Lord Hailsham in Vervaeke v
171[ 1955] 1 W LR728.
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77?Smith), “ but the courts occasionally adopted a more flexible approach when their 
sympathies were aroused.
In H v  / / , 173 the wife, a Hungarian national, entered a marriage o f convenience with 
a French citizen in order to leave Hungary as she was in fear o f being killed or 
imprisoned by the Communist regime. In the UK, she successfully applied to have the 
marriage annulled on the grounds of duress, Kanninski J finding that the fear she was 
under negated her consent to the marriage.
* lid*H  v H  was followed in Szechter v Szechter, involving Polish dissidents. The 
husband, with his w ife's agreement, divorced her and married the petitioner to secure 
the latter's release from prison and emigration. Once in the UK, they wished to rectify 
the position. The facts o f the case are harrowing, the petitioner in Szechter was in 
more immediate danger than in H  v H  and it is evident that the judge desired to assist 
the parties.175
There was tenuous legal authority for these decisions. Duress had always 
previously been specifically directed towards forcing the petitioner to enter the 
marriage.176 Kanninski J in H  v H  cited no authority for his novel interpretation. In 
Szechter, Sir Jocelyn Simon relied on H v  H and Buckland  v BucklandJ77 in which the 
duress was again directed at ensuring that the marriage took place. It is hard not to 
suspect a willing extension o f legal principle in order to justify a desired outcome 
(Cretney et al. 2002:60, fn 60).
A further instance of relative liberality was Silver v Silver where a marriage of 
convenience took place to enable the German wife to cohabit in the UK with a 
married man. Following his death, she wished to m any someone else. Her husband 
was by now living with another woman by whom he had three children. The High 
Court refused a decree o f nullity, but exercised its discretion to grant a divorce, 
viewing this as in the interests o f not only the parties and their children but o f the 
community at large.
172 [1983] AC 145 at 152.
173 [1953] 2 All ER 1228.
,74 [1971] P 286.
175 Perhaps aware o f  the dangers, Sir Jocelyn Simon set a very high objective threshold for duress that 
proved problematic in later cases (see Singh v Singh [1971] P 226, 2 All ER 828 CA) until replaced by 
a subjective test in Hirani v Hironi (1982) 4 FLR 232. See Poulter (1986:27-32); Deech (1973:11 1); 
Bloom (2003 1/418).
176 The leading case at the time was Scott and Sebright (1886) 12 P.D. 21, 56 LJP 11 in which the 
applicant had been subjected to threats o f  violence and o f destruction o f  her reputation to ensure her 
compliance.
177 [1968] P 296.
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In contrast to these benevolent decisions stands the memorable case o f Vervaeke v
178 * * *Smith. A Belgian woman entered a marriage o f convenience to obtain British 
nationality and avoid deportation as a prostitute. The price paid to her destitute 
husband was £50 and a ticket to South Africa. She later underwent a marriage 
ceremony with a wealthy Italian national who died during the wedding party. To 
secure her inheritance as a widow, she needed to annul the first marriage. She 
obtained an annulment only to have it overturned by the High Court due to her 
perjury. She was then granted an annulment in Belgium, and sought recognition o f it 
in the UK.
The House o f Lords rejected her application on the grounds o f res judicata, which 
would have been sufficient. However, they also, by a majority, found against her on 
grounds o f public policy. Although the case was described as “a horrible and sordid
* ] 79story’', Lord Simon maintained (at p. 166) that neither her career as a prostitute nor 
her previous perjury were relevant to the decision, while the reasoning deployed was 
consistent with authority. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the court was not, as in H  v 
H, looking for a way to relieve the difficulties o f a party with whom they were in 
sympathy.
By contrast, where an undeserving applicant stood to benefit from a finding of 
validity o f marriage, the courts sought to negate that benefit. In Puttick, 180 Astrid 
Proll, a member o f a terrorist group, fled Germany after being charged with serious 
criminal offences. She entered the UK under a false identity and used that identity, as 
well as other forged documents, to marry a British man. To avoid extradition, she
i o I
sought to have the marriage declared valid so she could register as a British citizen. 
The Family Division o f the High Court declined to make such a declaration.182 The 
Divisional Court found the marriage valid but declined to direct registration as a 
British national. This required the court to extend the principle in R v C hief National
t STInsurance Com missioner, ex p. Connor,
178 [1983] AC 145.
179 Lord Hailsham quoting Ormrod J at 151.
180 R v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Office ex p. Puttick [1981] 1 QB 767.
181 Under S.6(2) o f  the British Nationality Act 1948, in force at the time, a woman who was married to 
a citizen o f the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) was entitled to be registered as a CUKC.
182 Puttick v Attorney General [1980] Fam. 1.
183 [1981] Q.B. 758. O'Connor found that statutory public duties were subject to an implied policy 
limitation to prevent those guilty o f wrongdoing. In that case, there was a conviction for homicide. In 
Puttick, perjury and forgery were admitted but there was no conviction.
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These cases are too few to permit more than tentative interpretation. However, they 
suggest that the courts sought to reach decisions congruent with their sense of justice. 
In all cases, the immigration advantage resulting from the marriage o f convenience 
was a marginal factor. In H  v H  and Szechter v Szechter, a humanitarian motive was 
clearly present as it was, to a lesser extent, in Silver v Silver. Nonetheless, there was 
no concern expressed at the use o f marriage to obtain an immigration advantage.
H  v H  and Silver v Silver pre-dated mass New Commonwealth immigration and 
involved European nationalities. Szechter came in 1971 but involved persecuted 
Polish nationals with whom the court had sympathy. Vervaeke and Puttick in 1983 
and 1981 respectively, also involved European nationalities and, despite the 
dominance o f the immigration issue at the time, the courts' disapprobation focused on 
other aspects o f their conduct. Judges in all these cases showed themselves to be 
flexible and creative in ensuring an outcome consistent with their sense o f justice in 
the case.
In contrast to these cases, non-European migrants found to have entered a marriage 
of convenience were treated with maximum severity. In Malik v SSH D ,184 the parties 
underwent a civil marriage intending to live together after the religious ceremony. 
This did not take place, however, as the appellant began a relationship with his w ife's 
sister. As the civil ceremony had taken place early due to the imminent expiry o f the 
applicant’s visitor’s visa, it was found to be a marriage o f convenience and 
deportation was justified on the grounds that his continued presence was not 
conducive to the public good. In Cheema,1*5 the court again found that the mere fact 
o f a marriage o f convenience justified deportation on the grounds that the parties’ 
continued presence was not conducive to the public good under S.3(5)(b) Immigration 
Act 1971.
These decisions were particularly harsh as there was no appeal against deportation 
on these grounds. The argument put on the applicants’ behalf was that 'public good’ 
deportations had been conceived to deal with rare instances o f extreme wrongdoing. 
That argument earned little weight until House of Lords dicta in Khawaja v SSH D 1*6
184 [1981] ImmAR 134.
185 [1982] Im mAR 124.
186 [1983] 2 WLR 321.
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made it apparent that S. 3(5) (b) was indeed not the appropriate mechanism and that 
the parties should have been removed as illegal entrants (see R v I A T  ex p. K h a n )n i
4 X ,2_P eg  rees of hardship
Between 1969 and 1974, Commonwealth husbands were permitted to enter or remain
in the UK on the basis o f marriage only if:
“refusal would be undesirable because o f the degree o f hardship which, in the
particular circumstances o f the case, would be caused if  the woman had to live
outside the United Kingdom in order to be with her husband after 
188marriage.’'
The courts rapidly became involved in the determining the kind and degree of 
hardship that would trigger the exception. As Bhabha and Shutter (1994:57-9) point 
out, criteria were adopted that were more easily met by white women o f British 
descent.
The first reported case was H ector,189 heard in the Tribunal. The couple, both
Mauritian nationals, feared harassment by the husband’s former mistress although the
evidence seemed insubstantial. Describing the danger as a “rod which the appellant
made for his own back”, the Tribunal considered that, in framing the rule, the Home
Department had in mind:
“difficulties o f a more serious and lasting nature such as, for example, might 
face a woman settling in a strange country on account o f differences in race, 
language, customs or religion or on account o f political intolerance” (at p.44).
The Tribunal here seized on factors that, with the possible exception o f political 
intolerance, would be more likely to affect women o f European descent. In the 
subsequent reported cases, the only claims that succeeded involved white women 
moving to less developed countries (Ahmet,190 Constantinides, 191 and 
Papadopoulos) ,192 By contrast, in Sadhu Singh,193 a British-born woman of Sikh 
descent was reluctant to move to India due to the rural environment, the position of 
women and her dislike o f the food and climate. Her claim was not allowed, as “there
187 [1983] Im m AR 32.
188 Cmnd 4295 para. 24. For discussion o f  the political background o f  this, see chapter 3.
189 [1972] Imm. A R 41 .
190 27th June 1972 Imm AR T H /3018/71(24).
191 21s' June 1973 Imm AR 30 TH/3043/72 (160).
192 [1974] Imm A R 46.
193 19th March 1973 Imm AR 67 T H /581/72(126).
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would be no differences in race or religion" (at p.70) and it was believed that the other 
problems could be alleviated through financial assistance from her father. The 
Tribunal quoted the adjudicator without disagreement as saying that the wife was 
looking for “the best of both worlds". She wanted to avoid the scandal that would 
ensue if  she did not fulfil the engagement in accordance with tradition, but she also 
“wanted the more free and affluent life of England and detested the idea o f becoming 
the serflike wife o f an Indian peasant smallholder".
An unreported case before the adjudicator shortly afterwards was this time decided 
in favour o f the applicant. In this instance, an Indian woman who had lived in the UK 
since the age o f 7 was described as “extremely involved in the cultural life o f the 
white-born British” with “firm views on the emancipation o f Asian women and the 
anglicised approach to the status o f women”.194 This appears to have been an 
exceptional instance and lends support to the argument, made elsewhere in this 
chapter, that the right to bring in a spouse was ‘awarded' more readily to immigrants 
who unequivocally adopted British values. In other instances, the Tribunal refused 
claims where the wife had also been brought up in the UK, suffered acute anxiety or 
faced poverty.195 Differences in race or religion were privileged over those arising 
from a low standard o f living, these being hardships to which a woman was expected 
to adjust. In Papayianni,196 for example, the Tribunal was deeply critical o f the w ife’s 
reluctance to live in a village without gas or electricity. Constable (1974) refers to a 
series o f decisions establishing that “starvation is not hardship” .
In one case reported in the press, however, a British woman who had made 
“valiant efforts” over seven years in India was permitted to return with her husband 
after the Tribunal was told of the “squalor”, health hazards, food shortages and 
economic difficulties facing the family. There is a suggestion that class was a factor, 
the wife being described as from a “respectable Gloucestershire family” . She also had 
difficulty accepting the religion and way o f life o f the region where she was “the only 
English woman living in 50 square miles o f the Indian Punjab” . The overall tone 
suggests that the court wished to rescue this plucky white middle-class adventurer 
from poverty that other women were expected to endure.197
194 ‘Asian bride wins appeal for husband to join her.’ Yorkshire Post 3rd July 1973.
l9:> ‘The “Jenkins husbands” row’ The Observer 3 1st March 1974.
196 [1974] Im mAR 1.
197 ‘Wife wins place for immigrant husband’ Guardian 11th April 1974.
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If differences in standard of living had been routinely brought into account, many 
more applications by women married to non-white men would have succeeded 
(Constable 1974). The suspicion that immigration considerations overrode every other 
is corroborated by the position of Ugandan Asian women who held British passports 
and who came to the UK with their children after expulsion (already discussed in 
chapter 3). Their non-British husbands who had also been expelled were not permitted 
to enter the UK and, now stateless, were finding it difficult to gain acceptance by 
other countries because o f their dependants. The Immigration Appeals Tribunal 
upheld Home Office decisions to refuse admission on the grounds that the hardship, 
including lack o f a settled home elsewhere, was insufficiently severe.198
4.1.3 intention to live together
Despite the later predominance o f ‘primary purpose', there was some early case law 
on intention alone. The Immigration Rules applicable after 1977199 required the 
Secretary o f State always to refuse leave to remain if the marriage was entered 
primarily to obtain settlement with no intention to live together, but only normally to 
refuse when intention was absent whatever the reason for the marriage. Thus, if  the 
marriage was genuine at inception but had later broken down, there was discretion to 
grant leave to remain. Tribunal cases on when discretion should be favourably 
exercised demonstrated sympathy for hapless husbands whose status was placed in 
jeopardy due to apparently selfish or inconstant wives.
In Subhash200 the husband was refused indefinite leave after his wife left him for 
another man shortly after the wedding. The marriage was not one o f convenience and 
the husband had given up a good job in India and was unlikely to obtain another. The 
Tribunal agreed with the adjudicator that the reason for the breakdown o f the 
marriage should be brought into consideration when deciding whether to exercise 
discretion favourably. In Anseereeganoo,201 the parties were living in the same 
household and shared domestic tasks although the wife had announced her intention 
o f eventually seeking a divorce. The husband had abandoned work-permit 
employment at the w ife’s insistence and was reliant upon his leave as a husband. The
198 ‘Uganda cases strike at women’s rights’ Guardian 11th January 1973.
199 HC 241 para 24A.
200 [1979-80] Imm. AR 97.
201 [1981] Imm AR 30.
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Tribunal agreed with the adjudicator that it was incorrect to say that the wife did not 
have “any1' intention o f living with her husband and indefinite leave should be 
granted.
However, the High Court later found202 that refusing to grant leave was the norm, 
even where the break-up was not at the instigation o f the applicant, as the purpose of 
the rule was to allow people to stay because o f marriage. The judiciary were, it 
seemed, prepared to show compassion provided the underlying purpose o f control was 
not subverted.
The amendment o f the rules in 1979 so that primary purpose became a separate test 
in all cases, made the distinction less important as primary purpose became the most 
common reason for refusal although the relationship between intention and primary 
purpose was the subject o f later case law.
4.1.4 Parties have met
The requirement to have met became part o f the Immigration Rules in 1979 and 
particularly affected fiance(e)s in arranged marriages. There was considerable 
uncertainty as to the nature and quality o f the required meeting. In Jaffer (4284), the 
parties had stayed in the same house when the sponsor was 14 and had seen each 
other from one room to another but had not spoken. They were found not to have met. 
The decision made difficult the admission o f fiance(e)s in traditional arranged 
marriages and was modified in Hashmi (4975) where the rule was taken to have been 
satisfied when the parties were brought together at a relative's house and saw each 
other but, in keeping with tradition, did not speak.
In two reported cases,2(b the Tribunal provided guidance. Given the ambiguity o f 
the term, the Tribunal were sympathetic to applicants caught by this provision but 
rejected a purely nominal interpretation that would have included parties who had met 
in early childhood but had no distinct recollection o f each other. On the other hand, 
they found that the rule did not require the parties to have met in the context o f the 
marriage arrangements nor, as argued by the Home Office, that there must be a degree 
o f personal relationship. They approved the decision in Hashmi and adopted an 
interpretation o f ‘m e f as meaning ‘made the acquaintance o f .  In this way, the Rule
202 R v Immigration A ppeal Tribunal ex p. Jarnail Singh Sandal [1981] Imm AR 95.
203 Rewal Raj v Entiy Clearance Officer, New Delhi [1985] Imm AR 151 and M ohd Meharban v Entry 
Clearance Officer, Islam abad [ 1989] Imm AR 57.
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was not treated as a meaningless formality, but there was no attempt to undermine 
fundamentally the practice of traditional arranged marriage (although it was rendered 
more expensive if  an additional meeting had to be organised).
4.1.5 Validity of the marriage
A major cause o f refusal in this period was the allegation that the parties did not have 
a valid marriage. Barriers included the absence of formalities, uncertainty as to the 
date, incapacity to enter a polygamous marriage or the invalidity o f prior divorce 
proceedings. Most of these matters were decided by entry clearance officers without 
involving the courts and are discussed in chapter 5.
The courts were called on to address certain questions, however, and these have 
been extensively discussed elsewhere (Pearl 1972; Poulter 1976; Jaffey 1978:38-43; 
Pearl 1986; Poulter 1986:11-22; Jones and Welhengama 2000:109-34; Murphy 2000a 
and 2000b; Mayss 2000; Shah 2003). They go beyond immigration questions into the 
recognition o f laws and practices o f minority communities, an issue that is outside the 
scope o f this thesis. The numbers o f polygamous marriages resulting in the admission 
of additional spouses, for example, was tiny but there is a long and complex case law 
and legislative history on the recognition o f polygamous marriages (see Poulter 1976 
and Shah 2003).
Nonetheless, in dealing with those cases that arose in an immigration context, the 
courts at times betrayed particular attitudes about their expectations o f immigrants. 
One such was the approach taken towards domicile, a question that arose repeatedly 
in deciding the validity o f earlier proceedings. Another was the ‘transnational 
divorce’. The common feature was resistance to immigrants seeking, in the words of 
the adjudicator in another context,2(W “the best o f both worlds”, to enjoy the benefits 
of life in the UK while retaining the right to rely, to their advantage, on practices in 
their country o f origin.
4.1.5.1 Domicile
Domicile was a recurrent issue as the validity o f a marriage undertaken in the country 
of origin might be questioned because it was polygamous, under-age or otherwise did 
not conform to English law. In these cases, the domicile o f the UK party at the time of
204 Sadhu Singh, 19th March 1973 Imm AR 67 TH/581/72( 126).
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the marriage was critical. Through domicile, an immigrant of many years' residence, 
and who may even have been naturalised, could retain his or her connection with the 
country o f origin including its legal system. Commentators have criticised the general 
treatment o f domicile by the courts as inconsistent (Jones and Welhengama 2000:109- 
18) and this inconsistency seems to have extended to those cases where it affected 
immigration status (see, in relation to the Tribunal, Juss 1997:125-6). Nonetheless, on 
balance, a restrictive approach was preferred.
Domicile was critical in spouse applications because, in determining the validity o f 
overseas marriages, the courts used the test of the parties' antenuptial domicile (see 
Pearl 1986:41-3). In doing so, they rejected the test o f the system o f law with which 
the marriage had a real and substantial connection (R v IAT ex p. Rafika /J//v;2(h see 
further Fentiman 1985) or the law of the intended matrimonial home (Radwcm v 
Radwan (No.2);20G Pearl 1986:42). Thus the validity of a polygamous marriage 
depended upon the parties' domicile at the time o f the marriage, a position confirmed 
by S. 11(d) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.207
Domicile o f origin was and remains very difficult to lose. There was the “strongest 
possible presumption in favour o f the continuance o f the domicile o f origin” 
(Macdonald and Blake 1995:328), a position that has been maintained (Macdonald 
and Webber 2005:595). It could be displaced in favour o f a domicile o f choice by 
evidence o f intention to continue to reside in a different place “not for a limited period 
or particular purpose, but general and indefinite in its contemplation” (Lord 
Westbury, Udny v Udny,208 quoted in Macdonald and Blake 1995:327).
Given the presumption in favour o f domicile o f origin, it was for immigration 
officers to establish that the domicile o f origin had been lost. Renunciation o f 
domicile o f origin had to be unequivocal and ascertainable through objective criteria. 
Statements as to domicile in a will, by a taxpayer on an Inland Revenue form or by an 
applicant for naturalisation or registration were not reliable according to Macdonald 
and Blake (1995:328). Juss (1997:125-6) argues that, in unreported cases, the 
Tribunal often wrongly placed the burden of proof upon the applicant to show that he 
had retained his domicile o f origin.
205 [1989] Imm AR 1. However, see Shah (2003:387-8) for an account o f  later cases where the test o f  
‘real and substantial connection’ was still applied.
206 [1973] Fam 35.
207 Although Pearl (1986:43) has argued that this approach misunderstands the effect o f  S 14(1) MCA 
1973 on the operation o f  S. 11(d).
208 (1869) LRI Sc & Dir 441.
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Domicile has an awkward relationship with immigration. Contrary to common 
perception, immigration is often not a single discrete movement from country of 
origin to country o f destination. Immigrants may initially intend only a temporary stay 
or become 'international commuters' (Gardner and Shukur, quoted in Shah 2003:381; 
Pearl 1986:8). Many immigrants from the subcontinent did not call for their families 
until their hand was forced by immigration restrictions and, in doing so, they did not 
necessarily view themselves as making a definitive choice o f residence. Immigrants 
frequently maintain property, business interests and other connections in the country 
of origin and may anticipate the possibility o f a later return, perhaps for retirement.
This ambivalence defies easy categorisation and proved problematic for 
immigrants caught between two systems. Immigrants who returned home to marry 
had to rely on their domicile o f origin to establish the validity o f their marriage if it 
would not be valid in English law. Yet, they may have been unaware o f the 
significance o f domicile when interviewed and over-stressed their commitment to the 
UK believing that this would assist their case. Nonetheless, immigration officers and 
the courts relied upon questionnaires as a means of claiming the adoption o f  a 
domicile o f choice in the UK, a proceeding that was subject to much criticism (Pearl 
1986:45; Shah 2003:382-3). Reported cases on domicile in immigration matters 
suggest that the courts were also inclined to resist finding a domicile o f origin if this 
brought the immigrant advantages unavailable under UK law.209
Two early reported cases involving the adjudicator were decided in favour of
polygamous spouses, the husband being found to have retained his domicile of
210origin. In neither o f these cases had another wife already entered the UK, the
* . ,  , 911marriage, m one case, being only potentially polygamous. In these cases there was 
a dispassionate consideration o f the law that may be contrasted with the emotive tone 
in the later Tribunal case o f Zahra v Visa Officer, Islamabad,212 where immigration
209 This attitude seems to have been shared by other government departments; see Fransman 1998:331 - 
2.
210 Mussarat v SSHD 12 January 1971 (1mm AR 45) and Ishiodu v ECO, Lagos 29th August 1974 (Imm 
AR 56).
211 At the time, even potentially polygamous marriages were void under English law (a position 
remedied by the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995). Despite the case law 
discussed here, it was reported that ECOs persisted in relying on domicile to declare potentially 
polygamous marriages void. Parties were expected to undergo a new ceremony o f  marriage in the UK 
sometimes after having regarded themselves as married for many years; ‘Home Office denies classing 
Pakistani marriages as invalid’ Times 3rd September 1975, ‘Anomalies in law on polygamy’ Times 6U 
September 1975; see also chapter 5.
212 [1979-80] Imm A R 48.
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factors seem to have been more prominent. In Zahra, the sponsor husband had already 
brought one wife to the UK with whom he had “a large number o f children, four of 
whom were born in this country’' (at p.49). However, this wife had since returned to 
Pakistan. The sponsor had made several visits to Pakistan, during one o f which he 
contracted a second marriage. He owned a house, a shop and a bank account in 
Pakistan but, relying on his answers to a domicile questionnaire, he was found to have 
adopted an English domicile and the marriage was held to be invalid.
The sponsor’s lawyer also argued that the second wife should be admitted as a
woman ‘living in permanent association with a man’, a discretionary provision in the
Immigration Rules. The Tribunal declined saying the measure had been intended to
apply only to monogamous relationships, inferring this from the reference to a woman
being admitted ‘as if  she were his wife’. It went on to say that:
“If  it were otherwise an oriental pasha with a harem of several wives might be 
entitled to bring them all to this country, even if  he were domiciled here, 
provided that he otherwise satisfied the requirements o f  this paragraph. This is 
clearly absurd” .
The assumption that the wife in a polygamous marriage barely merits description as 
such recalls the speech o f Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde (1886) quoted in Jones and 
Welhengama (2000:111-2; see also the critique in Poulter 1976). This contrasts with 
the more sympathetic position established after Hyde v Hyde (Poulter 1986:50-8) and 
arguably reflects the fear that mass immigration might result in large numbers of 
polygamous marriages. The reference to an oriental pasha places the polygamous 
marriage in the realm o f the exotic, obviating the need to take seriously the claim for 
entry. The strong impression is that the Tribunal did not wish this application to 
succeed and the unfavourable decision on domicile was part o f that process.
Case law after Zahra was inconsistent with some Tribunals adopting a more 
balanced and sympathetic approach. For example, in Rokeya and Rahly Begum  v 
Entry Clearance Officer Dhaka,213 a careful determination found that the burden o f 
proof to establish a domicile o f choice had not been discharged. This may have been a 
more dispassionate Tribunal but it is interesting that, in this case, unlike in Zahra, the 
first wife had never been in the UK.214
[1983] Im m AR 631.
214 In 1988, the immigration rules were amended to permit the entry o f  only one wife in any event (HC 
555, para. 3).
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Shah (2003:388, fn.75) notes that, in other cases, the Tribunal resisted ECOs' 
attempts to place immigrants in a Catch 22 situation, whereby their declared intention 
to live in the UK with their wife, necessary if  the spouse application was to succeed, 
counted against them on domicile. Nonetheless, despite these and other cases that 
took a more sympathetic view, Zahra remained the dominant case permitting officials 
to use domicile to deny the validity o f marriages (Shah 2003:384-5).
4.1.5.2 Divorce
In other cases, the contentious issue was whether a previous marriage had been 
satisfactorily dissolved. The rules for recognition of divorce were complex and 
changed during the period (see, for example, Pearl 1972, 1974/5 and 1986, North 
1975, Macdonald and Blake 1991:255-6) and it is not possible to recite them here. As 
with other questions o f validity, the implications went well beyond immigration 
considerations. However, one issue that does throw light on the courts' attitudes 
towards immigrants was the ‘transnational divorce’, where part o f the divorce took 
place in the UK and the other formalities required under the law o f the country of 
origin were performed in that country.
These divorces fell between two sets of legislative provision. Following Qureshi v
21 5Qureshi, ' which had recognised a talaq divorce performed entirely in the UK, albeit 
in the Pakistani High Commission, statutory law was introduced to plug that 
perceived loophole. Under S.16(1) Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, 
recognition o f divorces carried out in the UK was now confined to those instituted in 
the UK courts. Thus a talaq divorce pronounced in the UK was invalid under UK law 
regardless o f its validity under the law o f the parties’ domicile or nationality. Divorces 
carried out abroad were recognised provided either o f the parties were habitually 
resident or a national o f the country in question (S. 3 Recognition o f Divorces and 
Legal Separations Act 1971, later amended by S.46(1) Family Law Act 1986) subject 
to considerations o f policy (S.8).
Statute thus governed the situation where the parties either sought to divorce 
within the UK or divorced abroad. However, problems arose when immigrants 
pronounced the talaq in the UK and sent notice o f it to a body abroad such as the 
Union Council in Pakistan. In the Pakistani instances, unless revoked within 90 days,
215 [1972] Fam. 173.
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the divorce became effective under Pakistani law (S. 7 o f the Muslim Family Laws 
Ordinance, 1961)
The question of whether such a divorce was also valid under UK law arose in R v 
IAT and Saeda Bi and others2Xb in the Queen's Bench Division. The claim of the three 
wives to enter the UK depended upon the validity o f the husbands' prior Trans­
national' divorces. The court found that these were not recognised under UK law, a 
view upheld unanimously by the Court o f Appeal (under the name R v SSHD ex p  
Ghnlam Fatima111) and the House o f Lords.2!b Clearly, a talaq divorce performed in 
the UK lacked validity. The question was whether, on the facts, it was performed in 
Pakistan. The court reasoned that the talaq itself formed part o f the proceedings and 
so these could not be said to have taken place wholly in Pakistan. An overseas divorce 
was only recognised if  the entire proceedings took place in the overseas country as, 
under Ss.2 and 3(1) o f the Recognition o f Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, 
an overseas divorce meant a single set o f proceedings instituted in that country.
Lawyers for the applicants argued that the purpose o f that statute was to give effect 
to the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations 
which aimed to prevent ‘limping marriages5 where the divorce was recognised in one 
jurisdiction but not in another. This argument received short shrift, the courts relying 
on S. 16(1) Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973, passed as indicated 
above in order to reverse the decision in Qureshi v Q ureshi1X9 recognising a talaq 
divorce performed entirely in the UK.
The decision in Ghulam Fatima was criticised for lack o f logic (Young 1987:87- 
88; Berkovits 1988), as inconsistent with the principles o f statutory interpretation 
(Berkovits 1988:74) and as increasing the likelihood o f a ‘limping m arriage’ (Mayss 
2000:62). Its effect was principally upon the poorer immigrant as the wealthy could 
afford to circumvent it by returning to Pakistan to perform the talaq (Mayss 2000:62; 
Berkovits 1988:77). On the other hand, as Lord Ackner made explicit in his speech, 
having removed recognition o f talaq proceedings performed inside the UK through 
S I6(1) DMPA 1971, “(i)t would seem contrary to that policy to encourage the
[1983] Im m AR 82.
[1985] QB 190.
[1986] AC 527.
[1972] Fam. 173.
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obtaining of divorces essentially by post by Pakistani nationals resident in this country 
by means o f the talaq procedure".220
Two competing values are in play here; recognising divorces valid in another 
country and preventing (mainly male) British residents from using unilateral and 
relatively informal forms o f divorce to disadvantage wives. As Berkovits (1988:77- 
78) comments, the decision ‘"indicates an unenunciated presumption that the policy of 
eliminating limping marriages is less important than the policy factor o f subordinating 
all residents o f England to a uniform municipal jurisdiction'''. He goes on to point out 
that the parties here were not opportunistically forum shopping, but had a close 
connection with the country and religion under which the divorce had been sought. 
While there is not space to discuss this further here, it is a question that continues to 
be problematic outside the sphere o f immigration.221
4.1.6 Right of abode
2 2 2  m * * * *R v SSHD ex p  Phansopkar is worth considering briefly as Lord D enning’s speech
brings into strong relief attitudes that were usually more muted and nuanced. The
case, which is well known, found that wives who claimed the right o f abode in the UK
should not be required to wait in the same lengthy queue as those seeking entry
clearance. Lord Denning (at 615-7) described the right o f abode as “the most precious
right anyone can have” and commented that “Parliament made it very easy for many
an immigrant to become a patrial and get this precious right”. He acknowledges that
these immigrants’ rights and those o f their families who have “never been to England
and cannot speak a word o f English” is equal to that o f “(y)ou and I and our
fam ilies...bom  here and (who have) lived here from time immemorial” . He describes
the law as “wide and generous”. He went on to find that this right should be given
practical recognition. He did so in equally lofty terms, saying (at 621) that the
applicant “can invoke Magna Carta: ‘To none will we sell: to no one will we delay or
deny right or justice’”. Both Lawton and Scarman LJ also made reference to Magna
Carta.
220 Berkovits (1988:79); see also Pilkington (1988) who argues that the decision in Fatima was 
inadvertently over-ruled by Part II Family Law Act 1986. However, this does not seem to be the courts’ 
view; see Berkovits v Grinberg  [1995] Fam 142 and Reed (1996).
221 See the House o f Lords decision in Quazi v Qitazi (1980) AC 744 and subsequent case law, for 
example, Sulaiman v Jaffali (2002) 1 FLR479.
222 [1975] 3 All ER 497.
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The case provided a welcome relief to those who had been frustrated in the 
exercise o f a statutory right (although at a cost to other applicants; see chapter 5). 
Even given Lord Denning's predilection for a high-blown style, the emphasis on these 
applicants' ‘outsider* status, reference to residence as “a precious right" and reliance 
on the primordial sources o f the Magna Carta are suggestive. Justice, an ancient and 
fundamental judicial value, was graciously extended even to those who had been 
included almost inadvertently and undeservedly in the privileged class o f ‘belongers5.
4.1.7 Non-primary purpose case law: discussion
In some respects, there were some sympathetic decisions made within the confines set 
by the value o f respect for the legislature particularly earlier in the period (see also 
Legomsky 1987:232-3, and, in relation to the Tribunal, Juss 1997:163-8). The rule on 
‘intention to live together' was interpreted, for a period, to take account o f the 
predicament o f an immigrant whose marriage ended against his wishes. The 
requirement to have met was applied in a way that would permit traditional arranged 
marriages to continue with minimal contact between the parties prior to the marriage 
albeit with the expense o f an additional trip. This latter finding suggests that there was 
no inclination to undermine the traditional arranged marriage as such, despite the 
hostile tone of political debate reported in the previous section. In Phansopkar, the 
favourable decision was associated with historical ‘British5 values, suggesting that too 
much hostility would be incongruent with the courts5 self-perception as an instrument 
o f justice despite, in the case o f Lord Demiing, an almost self-parodying emphasis on 
the applicants’ outsider status.
In other instances, and particularly as time went on, judicial sympathy was absent 
or ambivalent. The sympathetic cases on ‘intention5 were over-ruled. The case law on 
domicile indicates that, while there was some resistance to manipulation by 
immigration officers, the courts were also reluctant to acknowledge a domicile of 
origin where it permitted a well-established immigrant to gain an advantage not 
otherwise available to him. This was more markedly so when it would have led to the 
entry o f more than one wife, even though the immigrant was relying upon well- 
established legal principles. A similar preoccupation was evident in the rejection o f 
the ‘trans-national divorce5. There was resistance to immigrants ‘having it both w ays5,
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becoming long-term residents o f the UK but also relying on their connection with the 
country o f origin to gain advantages that conflicted with British values.
This resistance was expressed overtly during discussion on what constituted the 
necessary ‘degree o f hardship' for an exception to the ban on husbands to apply. 
Criteria were adopted that were clearly likely to favour women o f British descent. 
Differences in race and culture were privileged above differences in living standards, 
difficulties to which a Tribunal expected women to adapt despite the resulting 
unaccustomed domestic labour. This may have been the result o f a calculation that, if 
differences in living standards were to be a factor, few cases would be refused.
While it was perhaps predictable that settled women were considered able to 
readapt to life in their country o f origin, the failure to apply consistently the exception 
to women o f immigrant descent suggests a conditional attitude towards their 
acceptance. By selecting a husband from the country o f origin, such women 
demonstrated a lack o f commitment to the UK and must accept the consequences, A 
similar sentiment was detectable, as discussed in chapter 1, in the earlier debate on 
married women’s nationality and, in chapter 3, during parliamentary debate. As the 
reproving remarks in Sadhu Singh (1972) suggest, such women could not reasonably 
expect to have the best o f both worlds. By contrast, where a woman had 
wholeheartedly adopted British values, sympathy was more apparent.
A trend may be discerned here. Immigrants were not treated with hostility purely 
by virtue of being immigrants or because their marriage customs were different. 
When the demands they made were perceived as reasonable, they were liable to be 
treated with a degree o f sympathy. However, sympathy was limited when immigrants5 
expectations suggested that they wished to retain the benefits o f both identities, 
retaining allegiance to ‘foreign5 or ‘alien5 values. This was so even when, as with the 
cases on domicile, immigrants were not attempting to circumvent or extend the law.
This absence o f sympathy became outright hostility when immigrants were seen as 
abusing the U K ’s hospitality. Thus, the presence o f men found to have entered 
marriages of convenience was considered to be not conducive to the public good, the 
most serious grounds for deportation. This was particularly harsh in M alik  (1981) 
where the marriage had been entered prematurely but in the expectation that it would 
endure. In the earlier cases of Vervaeke v Smith (1983) and Puttick (1980), the court 
also disapproved o f the parties5 conduct, but their abuse of immigration control was 
not the focus o f disapprobation. In the cases involving refugees from Eastern Europe,
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no moral censure was attached to a marriage o f convenience. Instead, the court 
actively sought ways to relieve their difficulties.
It seems that the immigration status o f non-white immigrants was a defining 
characteristic in a way that did not occur for other nationalities. This was certainly the 
case for Lord Denning in Phamopkar. It was not that non-white immigrants were 
necessarily unwelcome, but they were first and foremost immigrants even in the 
second generation as Sadhu Singh (1972) suggests. As tolerated guests, they had 
particular obligations, both moral and legal, not to abuse the generosity o f their hosts 
and transgression o f these brought sometimes severe retribution. Becoming a 
‘belongef required an unequivocal adoption o f host-country values.
Control o f non-white immigration was a major political priority throughout the 
period under discussion here. If judges demonstrated some limited sympathy for the 
victims of these controls, this did not, in the majority of cases, persuade them to 
challenge these controls. Instead, they relied on the value o f judicial self-restraint in 
ways that arguably sometimes sanctioned unbalanced decision-making, suggesting 
that a low priority was ascribed to protecting the family life o f sponsors and 
applicants.
The case law discussed here was decided prior to the stream of primary purpose 
cases that began with Vinod Bhatia in 1985. Commentators (Scanned 1992:3 and 
Sachdeva 1993:119-21) observed that early primary purpose case law was also 
relatively sympathetic to immigrants although, by the early 1990s, attitudes were 
starting to change. The reluctance of the judiciary to confront the misapplication of 
the primary purpose rule was a major characteristic o f case law and is considered in 
detail in the next section.
4.2 The judicial response to ‘primary purpose '
As discussed in chapter 3, from July 1985 onwards, both men and women settled in 
the UK could sponsor a spouse. Entry clearance for either party would be refused 
unless five separate conditions had been met. These included:
o that the marriage was not entered into primarily to obtain admission to the 
United Kingdom; and 
o that each o f the parties has the intention o f living permanently with the other 
as his or her spouse.
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The following years were a period o f intense judicial involvement in primary purpose. 
There was a wide body o f contemporary commentary including Griffith (1997:182- 
90), Macdonald and Blake (1991:260-5), Macdonald and Blake (1995:336-44), 
Marrington (1985), Pannick et al (1993), Sachdeva (1993: chapter 4), Scanned 
(1992), Supperstone and O 'Dempsey (1994:207-11) and Vincenzi and Marrington 
(1992). This section considers the major case law in a thematic way consistent with 
the concerns o f this thesis; to identify underlying beliefs and attitudes towards 
immigration through marriage.
4.2.1 Relationship between intention and purpose
Early Tribunal case law remained unreported but was the subject o f commentary 
(Mole 1987, Marrington 1985, Sachdeva 1993:119-27). The central issue was the 
relationship between primary purpose and intention to live together, which had 
became separate requirements in 1979. Given this, it was improbable that any court, 
however sympathetic, would have found that satisfaction o f one meant automatic 
satisfaction o f the other. The key issue was the extent to which a favourable finding 
on intention informed the decision on primary purpose.
Naresh Kumar (3278) found that that once the parties had established the 
necessary intention, the burden o f proof was reversed and it was for the Secretary o f 
State to show that the primary purpose o f the marriage was nonetheless immigration. 
This decision was followed in other Tribunal decisions, notably those chaired by 
Professor Jackson.
This sympathetic approach did not endure. The first major reported case under 
primary purpose was Vinod Bhatia in the Tribunal (unreported),223 the Queen’s Bench
* * * 224  ■ 225Division, and then in the Court o f Appeal. All agreed that a finding on intention 
did not remove the obligation upon the applicant with respect to primary purpose.
The genius o f the primary purpose rule as applied to arranged marriages was that 
the applicant had to demonstrate that the main purpose of the marriage was something 
other than immigration. It was immaterial how many other motives might be present; 
unless the applicant could demonstrate that one o f these was the primary motive, the
223 Blake (1984) says that, under pressure from the Home Office unhappy at the guidance in Naresh 
Kunwr, this Tribunal was exceptionally constituted for a special hearing before three legally qualified 
chairs.
224 [1985] 1mm A R 39.
225 [1985] Imm AR 50.
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application failed. In the High Court. Forbes J ensured this function was fulfilled by 
minimising the impact o f a favourable finding on intention. He rejected engagement 
with a “philosophical inquiry into the concept o f marriage” preferring to engage in 
selective legal and factual argument. For example, he supported his interpretation by 
reference to the rules o f statutory interpretation although these were not appropriate to 
the Immigration Rules.226 He also asserted “the fact that many marriages in the sub­
continent have been entered into whose primary purpose was. in fact, to obtain 
admission to the United Kingdom" (at p.46), a statement o f doubtful validity (see 
Sachdeva 1993:115-6) described as “a piece o f expedient political mythology” (Rees 
1989:92). Against this background, an entry clearance officer should approach his 
task with “cautious pessimism” (at p.46). It seems likely that Forbes was feeling the 
pressure o f 200 further cases on the same point awaiting his decision.227 Interestingly, 
however, he sought to distance him self from the actual consequences o f his decision, 
rejecting any evaluation o f the underlying policy o f the Rules.
The Court o f Appeal supported the essential findings in Forbes’ judgement but in a 
more nuanced fashion. In one respect, however, the Court o f Appeal went further in 
finding that the primary purpose rule presumed that the purpose o f  the marriage was 
admission to the UK. As with Forbes, however, there was also a certain distancing 
from the impact o f the rule. They noted that no criticism was made o f the parties’ 
honesty and that there was no dispute that the proposed marriage was genuine.
In Vinod Bhatia, the courts chose to facilitate rather than subvert the discriminatory 
effects o f primary purpose. They did so despite acknowledging that, as in the present 
case, parties to a genuine marriage would suffer the consequences. It seems that the 
right o f these parties to live in the UK were easily subordinated to the necessity o f 
restricting immigration. Commentators have indicated the difficulties that applicants 
faced in the period after Vinod Bhatia (Sachdeva 1993:128-30; Pearl 1986:25).
' J ' J Q
In A n m  Kumar, the Court o f Appeal took a more humane approach finding that 
the function o f primary purpose was to distinguish between “genuine” and 
“immigration” husbands and fiances (even though this was arguably not the case). 
Thus, findings on intention would “often cast a flood o f light” on primary purpose. 
Lord Donaldson distinguished between a theoretical approach based on speculation
226 Lord Roskill in Alexander v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1982] WLR 1076 at 1081.
227 O’Connor LJ [1985] 1mm AR 50 at p.50,
228 [1986] Imm AR 446.
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about possible motivation and the practical reality o f a marriage that was, on the
evidence, clearly extant:
“Again, the adjudicator was right to say that under the rules a marriage 
primarily entered into in order to obtain admission to the United Kingdom 
would still retain its non-qualifying character whatever happened afterwards 
and even if  the husband applied for entry on their Golden Wedding Day. For 
my part, I do not think that any violence would be done to this country's 
immigration policy if entry clearance officers put out o f their minds the 
theoretical possibility that a marriage which at the time o f application is, on 
the evidence, undoubtedly a very genuine and soundly based marriage could, 
at its inception some time before, have had a different character".
As Vinod Bhatia had found, primary purpose had to mean something beyond having 
an intention to live together, or it would have been otiose. However, Lord Donaldson 
awarded it the minimum content compatible with an existence independent o f 
intention.
There were a few other chinks o f sympathy, Mole (1987:32) suggesting that the 
courts took a more detached view than the Tribunal. She quotes Simon Brown J in R v
229I  A T  ex p  Singh , who referred to the “enormity" of binding oneself for life in
marriage to obtain entry to the UK and envisaged a primary purpose marriage as one 
where:
“ ... the husband had plainly gone to considerable length to find a wife who 
could secure him entry to the UK, that plainly being his essential object rather 
than entry into a lifelong union”.
Scannell (1992:3) argues that this represented the high water mark o f judicial 
sympathy. It was appealed by the Home Office and heard in the Court o f Appeal with 
another case under Immigration Appeal Tribunal v Hoque and Singh 230 The court set 
out ten well-known propositions drawn from the decisions in Bhatia and Kumar. 
Approving the passage by Lord Donaldson in Arun Kumar quoted above, it found 
that, while a favourable finding as to intention did not "suffice” to ensure satisfaction 
o f primary purpose, it meant the applicant was better placed to ensure this. 
Nonetheless, in Sachdeva’s words (1993:142), “this apparently liberal stand was 
immediately nullified by Slade LJ” when he said that: “However, in the end, it must 
be left to entry clearance officers to decide how they do their work” .
229 The Times 15,h April 1987.
230 [1988] Imm A R 216.
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In this way, the court respected the separate sphere o f authority o f the immigration 
officer, highlighting the problematic relationship between law and fact discussed in 
chapter 2 o f this thesis. The assumption that the quest for fact is a neutral process 
separate to the application o f the law may permit the application o f unofficial policy 
that the law is then powerless to challenge. Sachdeva (1993:142) argues the Court of 
Appeal’s stance in Hoque and Singh “was as far as one could go without endangering 
the policy aims o f British immigration control”. It suggests that the courts were 
reluctant to use their powers if  this would undermine government policy on 
immigration.1,1
Debate ensued as to whether a specific finding as to intention was needed before 
considering primary purpose. If so, it would prevent vague and subjective findings on 
primary purpose being made without considering the essential character of the 
marriage. Some decisions, mostly unreported, considered this in a broadly 
sympathetic way (see Bashir,232and, for commentary, Sachdeva 1993:142-4; Rees 
1989; Scannell 1989). Amongst reported cases was R v IAT e x p  Shameem Wali,2^  in 
which Farquharson J found that the applicant was entitled to be informed o f the 
court’s findings on intention. In R v  IAT e x p  Mohammed Khatab ,234 Henry J saw the 
finding on intention as “no formal technical point” but essential to ensuring adequate 
reasoning on primary purpose. These cases clearly caused some anxiety. The 
Independent235 reported that the Treasury Solicitor had written to adjudicators (and 
possibly tribunal members; the article conflates the two) advising them that High 
Court judges, and Henry J in particular, had placed “glosses” on the primary purpose 
rule which deprived them o f their force. The letter referred to an unidentified 
judgement by Henry J (presumably Khatab), saying that “it represents the high water 
mark of primary purpose ‘jurisprudence’, in the sense that I do not think anything 
more can be done to undermine the primary purpose rule than is done in this 
Judgment. In certain respects, it seems to me the Judge goes much too far”. The report 
is a rare glimpse o f the intense pressure towards a restrictive policy.
231 The Court o f Appeal, perhaps unsurprisingly, declined to find that the primary purpose rule was 
sufficiently uncertain, unclear and unfair to be ultra vires (R v Home Secretary ex p  Rajput Independent 
8th February 1989).
232 R v  IAT e x p  Bashir (DC) 15th March 1988.
233 [1989] 1mm AR 86.
234 [1989] 1mm AR 313.
235 “Judges’ decisions in immigration cases ‘too liberal’”, Independent 6th June 1989.
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Restraint was more evident in other cases. In R v IAT ex p  Naushad Amad  
Kandiya,236 Simon Brown J found that a finding on intention was not necessary as an 
applicant could fail on primary purpose regardless o f intention. The tone was 
exasperated. Provided there was implicit consideration of ‘intention', there was no 
requirement for adjudicators “to follow slavishly some pre-ordained route, let alone to 
recite routinely as an incantation certain particular assumptions or conclusions which 
could as well be implied in their decisions" (at p. 495). Roch J reached a similar 
conclusion in R v  IA T  ex p  Aurangzeb K h a n 2*1
T O O
Appeals from Kandiya and Khan were heard together in the Court o f Appeal. In 
the meantime, the same point came before the Court o f Appeal in M ohamed Niimamd 
Islam Chondhnry v Immigration Appeal Tribunal229 In both cases, the Court found 
that, despite the relevance of intention to primary purpose, no specific finding on 
intention had to be made before finding on primary purpose. This denied the close 
connection, in reality if  not in theory, between intention and purpose as acknowledged 
by Lord Donaldson in Arim Kumar and reduced the likelihood that a favourable 
finding as to intention would affect the decision on primary purpose. While a few 
judges continued to assert the link between the two (Scanned 1992b), primary 
purpose had become a subjective free-floating concept devoid o f the context provided 
by an assessment o f the reality o f the marriage.
Dillon LJ observed in Choudhury that “in an enormous number o f arranged 
marriages between girls settled here and young men coming from the Asian Sub- 
Continent, the husband wishes to live in the United Kingdom” . This public allusion to 
contemporary immigration preoccupations stands alone. Yet, legal reasoning in these 
cases was also either absent or surprisingly superficial. Thus, Taylor LJ in Kandiya 
and Khan said that, while the propositions in Hoque and Singh asserted the 
“evidential relevance” o f a finding on intention to a finding on primary purpose, they 
did not demand a “specific finding” as to intention before proceeding to consideration 
o f primary purpose. This was technically true, but it is difficult to see how a finding as 
to intention could “cast a flood o f light” on primary purpose unless evidence as to 
intention was evaluated.
[1989] Imra A R 491.
237 [1989] Im mAR 524.
238 [1990] Imm A R 377.
239 [1990] 1mm AR 211.
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This loosening o f the relationship between primary purpose and intention was 
justified, when it was rationalised at all, as enabling decision-makers to act “sensibly 
and realistically” (Taylor LJ in Kandiya and Khan at p.385), a debatable proposition. 
The courts may have feared a rash of technical challenges but that was not the only 
practical consideration. Other, more sympathetic decisions referred to “the intrinsic 
improbability" of a marriage that satisfied the requirement o f intention failing on 
primary purpose.240 Sense and realism were fickle resources.
There followed the much criticised case of Swneina Masood  v Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal241 It was acknowledged here that the parties, who were cousins, had entered 
a traditional arranged marriage but for the decision to live in the UK. The couples' 
economic prospects were far better in the UK and their decision was unsurprising. 
Despite acknowledging that this was a genuine marriage, the Court found that, as it 
was conditional upon the husband's admission, the necessary intention to live together 
was not present, a point rather surprisingly conceded by Counsel for the couple. 
Certainly, Lord Prosser believed it was “wrongly or too widely made” when he 
considered it in Raja Zafar Zia v SSHD ,242
The court then concluded that the applicant must also fail on primary purpose. In 
doing so, the Court adopted an unusual interpretation finding that, if entry was a pre­
condition o f the marriage, it was also its primary purpose. This is plainly illogical. It 
may be that a wedding will not take place before the couple have a home, but that 
does not mean that the primary purpose o f the marriage is to procure a home. There is 
a strong impression that the couple were regarded as presumptuous in assuming the 
power to decide where they should live (see also the comments in Sachdeva 1993: 
157).
The harshness o f the decision in Swneina Masood was a step too far for some 
members o f the judiciary. Schiemann J in R v IAT ex p  Iram Iqbal243 saw the 
argument as relevant only to intention and declined to follow it on primary purpose. 
In a well-known passage, he also acknowledged the logical fallacy o f assuming that 
because one common motive for marriage was absent, the only alternative explanation 
must be immigration:
21,0 Simon Brown J in R v  IAT ex p  Matwinder Singh (The Times 15lh April 1987) and Lord Prosser in 
Mohammed Saftar v SSHD  [1995] AR 1 at p. 11.
241 [1992] Im m AR 69.
242 [1993] I mm A R 405 atp.415.
243 [1993] 1mm AR 270.
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“ ... the fact that an American heiress was so keen to be a duchess that she 
was prepared to marry an Englishman whom she did not love, would not lead 
one to suppose that the primary purpose o f the marriage was for her to obtain 
admission to the United Kingdom /' (at p. 276)
In Raja Zafar Zia,244 Lord Prosser was critical o f the finding that the requirement as to
intention was not met when this was conditional on the granting o f entry clearance:
“The concept o f intention is no doubt a complex one, but it appears to me that 
one can indeed have a genuine intention, notwithstanding that the carrying out 
o f that intention is dependent on, or could be frustrated by, some extraneous 
event5' (at p. 415).
4.2.2 Intervening devotion
As already discussed, A n m  Kumar was one o f the more sympathetic cases 245 It found 
that the rules should receive a “broad common sense construction” and opened the 
way to use o f ‘intervening devotion5 i.e. correspondence, cohabitation and other 
evidence o f the post-marriage relationship that demonstrated it to have been genuine 
at inception. It thus created an arena within which couples could hope to succeed. 
While the case suggests that, in this instance, there was little desire to use primary 
purpose for the mass refusal o f arranged marriages, there was not unconditional 
acceptance. The endorsement o f ‘intervening devotion5 permitted couples whose 
marriages were self-evidently genuine to comply with primary purpose but only after 
a period o f separation.
Although A n m  Kumar brought a measure o f relief, the Tribunal did not always 
follow its spirit, although sympathy was more likely when the parties had cohabited 
overseas (Mole 1987:32). In effect, ‘intervening devotion5, as well as permitting yet 
more intrusive questioning, created an unofficial waiting period, a hurdle that became 
detached from any meaningful conception o f ‘intervening devotion5 and suggests that 
applicants were expected to prove their merit through endurance.246
244 Raja Zafar Zia v SSHD  [ 1993 [ 1mm AR 405.
245 As well as condoning ‘intervening devotion’, the court rejected the proposition that the rules 
‘presumed’ the purpose o f  a marriage to be immigration and that, because a marriage was arranged, 
immigration was a likely motive for the marriage. However, the officer could bear in mind that it was 
less difficult to achieve an ‘immigration’ marriage in an arranged marriage as the personal feelings o f  
the parties may be more easily set aside.
246 A similar observation may be made about the concessions granted to couples who had been married 
five years or had a child (see chapter 5 and Menski 1994:118).
128
Thus in the Tribunal decision in Mohammed Afzal v Visa Officer, Islamabad,241 the 
applicant had been refused as a fiance by the ECO and the adjudicator but the parties 
married before the Tribunal hearing, not unreasonably, given the two year wait. They 
then cohabited for three months in Pakistan and argued intervening devotion. The 
Tribunal took a hostile view o f the marriage, saying it could be interpreted “as an 
attempt to force the hand o f the Home Office by presenting them with a fa it accompli, 
a further suggestion that couples should defer to state power if  they wish to gain 
acceptance. The short period o f cohabitation here was compared unfavourably with 
the longer period in Kumar, even though it is arguably the fact - rather than the length 
- o f cohabitation that is the strongest indication o f the purpose and nature o f an Asian 
marriage.
4.2.3 Deception
Where parties had misled the authorities, even many years previously, this counted 
heavily against them. For example, the Court o f Appeal found against the applicant in
248Pervez Iqbal v Immigration Appeal Tribunal in part because o f a deception made 
when he was 11. In R v IAT ex p  Sukhivan Singh 249 described by Simon Brown J as 
“another application ... arising out o f the vexed primary purpose rules” , the 
application failed under primary purpose due to deceit even though the marriage was 
accepted as genuine.
There was detectable a drift away from the legal issue towards moral judgement.250 
Deceit in primary purpose cases might be so major that the parties’ statements as to 
their motives could have little credibility. However, once the relationship was 
accepted as genuine, it should have had only limited relevance as there are many 
possible reasons for deception. However, evidence o f deception was sometimes 
reason in itself to dismiss an application.
In R v IAT e x p  Girishkumar Somabhai P a te l251 the application failed on primary 
purpose despite intervening devotion including the birth o f  a child. The Tribunal 
supported the adjudicator in finding that the intervening devotion “was outweighed by
247 [1986] Imm A R 474.
248 [1988] Imm AR 469.
249 [1988] Imm AR 527.
250 This approach seems to have been a reflection o f  attitudes within the entry clearance service; see 
chapter 5.
251 [1990] Imm AR 153.
129
the deceit practised by the appellant and his wife," and an application for judicial 
review was refused.
However, the deception was not material to the motivation for the marriage. The 
applicant had entered as a visitor to attend a religious festival (described in somewhat 
dismissive terms by Farquharson J) and, while there, called the sponsor's family, 
having been previously engaged to the sponsor. After meeting, the engagement was 
renewed. Having been given poor legal advice, the couple falsely stated that they met 
by chance at the festival.
Whether they met by chance or by arrangement had little bearing on the purpose of 
the marriage. Even if  the applicant had always intended to renew contact but failed to 
reveal this in his visitor’s application, the omission is explicable in other terms. He 
did not know how he would be received. He may not have been certain whether he 
wished to revive the engagement. Leaving aside personal reticence, admitting such a 
possibility was likely to cause refusal for absence of intention to leave the UK. It is a 
far leap therefore to suggest that his reason for entering had always been marriage and 
the purpose o f the marriage was settlement in the UK.252
25^  ♦In R v  IAT ex p . Syed Akhtar Hussain, ' the applicant was refused after concealing 
a previous visit to the United Kingdom, found to have been the occasion o f the 
parties’ first meeting. The subsequent account o f the marriage was therefore seen as 
suspect without considering what light the deception cast upon the motive for the 
marriage.
The negative impact o f deception was emphasised by the Court o f Appeal in 
Mohamed Numamd Islam Choudhury v IA T 254 The husband had made some 
misleading statements about the purpose o f his visit and was granted only temporary 
admission. While in the UK, he married the sponsor. Both parties maintained the 
marriage was a love match, but the adjudicator believed that it was a marriage 
arranged before the applicant came to the UK. The applicant was refused on primary
252 Equivocation o f  any kind, although understandable in matters so personal as marriage, was 
sometimes unsympathetically treated. In Sukhinder Singh (5329, reported in Legal Action (November 
1987, pp. 15-16), an applicant who was unsure whether he intended to remain in the UK after marriage 
failed both as a fiance and as a visitor. The case was particularly harsh given that a firm declaration o f  
intent to live in the UK risked a finding o f  ‘primary purpose’. That point was appreciated by Simon 
Brown J in R v  Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p. Rafique [1990] 1mm. A.R. 235 who, adopting the 
approach o f Professor Jackson in an earlier Tribunal case, found that an applicant who was undecided 
as to permanent residence should be treated as applying for settlement.
253 [1989] Imm AR 382.
254 [1990] 1mm AR 211.
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purpose grounds and eventually came before the Court o f Appeal. In the leading
judgement. Dillon LJ said that:
“It is one o f the unfortunate features o f this case that one has the strong 
suspicion that if the truth, as found by the adjudicator, had been candidly 
stated at the outset ... there would have been no difficulty about the grant of 
entry clearance ... But lies were told and persisted in. I cannot say that the 
adjudicator was not entitled to consider that the object o f telling the untruths 
was possibly to cover up that the primary object was a marriage to enable the 
husband to gain entry to the United Kingdom” (at p. 218).
Dillon LJ found “with considerable regret ... because it seems likely that the price the 
parties will have to pay for untruthfulness is so severe” that the appeal should be 
dismissed. In other words, despite a genuine marriage and the birth of a child, the 
court would not interfere with an inference of primary purpose arising principally 
from deception.
Sometimes, deception was treated more dispassionately. In R v  IA T  ex p  Kidbander 
Kaar,255 the applicant had told some lies in a previous visitor's application. In the 
spouse application, the adjudicator disbelieved the applicant as to his desire to live in 
the UK. McCullough J found that the adjudicator was wrong to leap from a finding 
that some of the applicant's statements were untruthful to rejecting the applicant on 
primary purpose. After referring to Sir John Donaldson’s speech in A n m  Kitmar, he 
said, at p. 110:
“ ... it is easy but wrong to treat the fact that a man has lied about the strength 
of his desire to obtain admission to the United Kingdom as evidence that this 
was the primary purpose o f the marriage”.
However, the weight o f the case law did not take such an approach but viewed 
evidence o f dishonesty as grounds for an unfavourable finding on primary purpose. 
The subjective nature o f primary purpose, established earlier by the courts, permitted 
the refusal o f applicants who had failed to demonstrate the qualities demanded of 
those aspiring to belong.
255 [1991] Imm AR 107.
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4.2.4 Deference to the fact-finder
In R v IAT ex p  Nans had Amad Kandiya,256 Simon Brown J said that it was trite law 
that questions of weight (challenges on which basis were described by him in an aside 
as suggesting “intrinsic want of promise”) are for the fact-finding body. Roch J 
reached a similar conclusion in R v IAT e x p  Aurangzeb K h a n 1:>1 The courts, probably 
fearing a flood of applications on this point, did not often intervene.258
The courts were also unwilling to overturn decisions where the decision-maker had 
not referred to all the relevant evidence. Again, it is likely that the courts feared 
encouraging a flood o f applications based on minor omissions but the effect was that 
the courts upheld decisions that stressed points against the applicant while ignoring 
those in their favour. An example is R v IAT ex p  Shivprasad Bhagwandas 
Gondalia 259 before Henry J in the Queen's Bench Division. The parties damaged 
their credibility by falsely claiming a love match and the adjudicator found that the 
applicant was from a poor background and could not marry in India. Thus there was 
“an enormous economic incentive” to make a marriage that could “result in his 
achieving settlement in the United Kingdom”. The court did not question the 
reasoning that, because the applicant could only marry if  he emigrated, emigration 
was the primary purpose o f the marriage. It also declined to take into account that the 
applicant had not previously applied for a passport (when the converse was often held 
against applicants) and that the initiative for the marriage had come from the wife’s 
family. The justification was that, as these matters had been brought before the 
adjudicator, they must have been considered by him.
Similar reasoning may be found in R v IAT ex p  Aftab Hussain 260 Relying on
Kandiya, the High Court found there was no obligation upon the adjudicator to:
“isolate every piece o f evidence and to indicate whether or not he regards it as 
being material. What he must do is look at the evidence as a whole in the way 
that a jury would look at the matter. . (at p.214).
256 [1989] Imm A R 4 9 1.
257 [1989] Imm AR 524.
258 Although it did on occasion; see, for example, ECO, Islamabad v M ohammad Jahangir Hussain 
[1991] Imm AR 476 at 480.
259 [1991] Imm AR 519.
260 [1992] Imm AR 212.
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1l he outcome was that unbalanced decision-making went uncorrected. In this case, 
only fleeting reference was made to two important factors in favour o f the applicant 
while findings as to his economic circumstances were brought into consideration.261
In upholding these decisions, judges showed themselves conscious o f the presumed 
limitations o f the judicial role. Deference to the decision-maker on findings of fact is 
correct to the extent that it acknowledges that the court did not hear the parties or 
observe the interviews. Yet it is arguable that too much restraint results in legal error. 
The weight attached to a finding of fact engages a question of law if the outcome is 
that the wrong legal test or standard o f proof is applied (see Juss 1997:148-9). This 
was a critical issue given the excessive reliance by decision-makers on minor 
discrepancies (see chapter 5) and the way in which a finding as to dishonesty would 
result in an imputation o f primary purpose.
Yet it is not clear that the courts were themselves actively pursuing an anti­
immigration agenda. It is equally plausible that judicial self-restraint enabled them to 
avoid direct confrontation on such a charged issue.
4.2.5 Tradition, love and other reasons for marriage
The requirement to show that the primary motive for the marriage was not 
immigration required applicants to demonstrate that another motive was more 
important. This permitted decision-makers to pass judgement on the likelihood of 
these other factors predominating.
If  parties claimed they were marrying in accordance with custom, any departure 
from perceived tradition could result in rejection by entry clearance officers on 
primary purpose grounds, an issue discussed in chapter 5. The courts relied heavily on 
ECOs’ presumed knowledge o f custom and did not question its claimed inflexibility 
(Powell 1992). This potentially affected all male applicants who were found to have 
apparently deserted the custom o f requiring their wives to join them and who thus 
entered any proceedings at a disadvantage.
The courts treated some o f these cases sympathetically. The Court o f Appeal in 
A n m  Kumar identified the “Catch 22” for applicants. A British-based wife who 
wished to remain in the UK would only marry a man who also wished to live there.
261 The reliance upon stereotypical forms o f  reasoning such as economic background is discussed in 
chapter 5.
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Yet it was “fatally easy" to treat that wish as an admission that coming to the UK was 
the primary purpose o f the marriage. The solution was to consider the evidence as a 
whole:
“What is or was the real, the primary, the basic object o f the exercise in this 
couple agreeing to get married? Was it to live together as man and wife, 
preferably in the United Kingdom, or was it to enable the fiance or husband to 
obtain entry to the United Kingdom, the matrimonial relationship being of 
subsidiary importance?" (at p.455)
In R v IAT ex p. Shameem W ali262 Farquharson J found it “perfectly proper" for a 
sponsor to insist on remaining in the United Kingdom and no adverse inferences 
should be drawn. In R v IAT ex p. Mohammed Khatab , 2 6 j  Henry J criticised an 
adjudication that described a British wom en's insistence on living in the UK where 
she had a job, savings and a home, as a “whim”. However, he did not consider that the 
“unusual feature” o f a husband joining his wife should always be left out o f account.
In 1990, the Court o f Appeal in M ohamed Numamd Islam Chondhnry v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal264 declined to regard as “irrelevant” two assumed facts. 
The first was that Bangladeshi Muslim men would not permit their wives to decide 
the location o f the matrimonial home and the other was that, “in an enormous 
number” o f such marriages, the husband wished to live in the United Kingdom. These 
‘facts’, regularly relied on by entry clearance staff, are discussed in chapter 5.
The harshest decision, in this respect was Swneina M asood  (1992), already 
discussed, which found that there was no intention to live together if  intention was 
conditional upon entry. These decisions legitimated the suspicious approach adopted 
by immigration officers and discussed in chapter 5.
Love matches were also subject to inconsistent treatment. Where decision-makers 
accepted a love match, the parties were better able to show a primary motive other 
than immigration and could succeed. However, applicants who claimed a love match 
were often suspected o f contriving this and failed accordingly. The courts failed to 
acknowledge that conceptions o f  ‘love’ might vary according to culture and 
individual expectation (Powell 1992; Scanned 1993), a problem discussed further in 
chapter 5. In R v IA T  ex p . Manjida Jethva 265 the applicant was a poor labourer who
[1989] Imm AR 86.
263 [1989] Imm AR 3 13.
264 [1990] Imm AR 211.
265 [1990] Imm AR 450.
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could not afford to marry in India, ffe met the sponsor at a circus and the couple said
they had fallen in love almost immediately. The adjudicator was sceptical that a love
match could arise so swiftly and, in the High Court, Popplewell J said:
“Falling in love is a perfectly normal concept which is understood by 
everybody in the world, and I do not imagine that falling in love is any 
different in India than it is in this country; these two people contended that 
they had in fact fallen in love. The adjudicator said that that was how it was 
presented to him, and he did not accept it” (at p. 455).
The failure to recognise that the concept o f ‘love’ is partially culture-dependent also 
featured in Aitrangzeb Khan (1989), discussed above, Roch J supported the 
adjudicator's rejection o f the appellant who, when asked why he wished to go the UK, 
replied “I love her and I want to live there”. The adjudicator commented: “However, 
the appellant did not speak to the sponsor before the engagement, and I have heard 
little in evidence which suggests that he is in fact in love with her” (at p. 527). 
However, by ‘love', the applicant may have meant, not the romantic attachment 
associated with being ‘in love5, but that he was committed to the marriage and his 
responsibilities towards his future w ife's happiness (see chapter 5). As counsel in 
Manjida Jethva unsuccessfully argued, love is a word with many meanings.
The requirement to show that a motive other than immigration was the primary
cause o f the marriage invited decision-makers to assess the likelihood and thus the
rationality o f the stated reasons for marriage. For example, in R v SSHD ex p
Jagdishchandra Jinabhai Prajapati,266 Potts J quoted the adjudicator as saying:
“T ... find difficulty in accepting that less than a year after her divorce was 
finalised' — this is a reference to the w ife’s previous matrimonial history — ‘she 
was prepared to embark on a courtship as speedily as this allegedly was. I 
accept that she wanted to choose her own spouse this time, but it would appear 
more natural to proceed cautiously bearing in mind her previous experience.'” 
(at p. 516).
Potts J upheld the adjudicator’s primary purpose refusal despite a subsequent period 
o f cohabitation and resulting pregnancy. The argument seems thin. An early 
remarriage may have been unwise, but was hardly unnatural and may have been 
entered for any number o f  reasons. As Scannell (1987:6) observed, in relation to 
another case, “(t)he Court o f Appeal seems to have forgotten that Indian people have 
independent sexuality” . This tendency to view applicants only through the prism o f an
256 [1990] Imm AR 513.
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immigration motive and thus to diminish their humanity is a marked characteristic o f 
immigration control throughout the period.
4.2.5 Gender
Assumptions about gender lay at the heart o f primary purpose. Its successful 
application depended upon a belief in the powerlessness and passivity o f the Asian 
woman and the absence o f any right to determine her place o f residence after 
marriage. Yet in the majority o f cases, the focus of discussion was the credibility o f 
the m an's statements as to his motives. The belief that women lacked agency was so 
widespread that it rarely merited mention.
If the aim was to reduce male non-white immigration, the belief was a convenient 
one. Stripping women o f their responsibilities enabled their rights to be also ignored. 
When women did demonstrate a degree o f power, this could be turned against the 
couple. In Swneina Masood ' (1992), already discussed, Glidewell LJ referred to the 
wife having the “whip hand” and relied on this to find that, as the wife was unwilling 
to leave the UK, intention to live together was absent.
In some cases, female agency was acknowledged. One such was Mohammed Saftar 
v SSHD ,267 where Lord Prosser in the House of Session pointed out the importance of 
the sponsor's beliefs about the marriage. He also, uniquely in the cases considered 
here, pointed out that the rules not only granted a right or privilege to the applicant 
but were:
“ ... protecting or preserving for the sponsor, a United Kingdom citizen, the 
ability to marry and live permanently with the man that she wants to marry 
and live with, without being forced to leave the United Kingdom in order to do 
so.” (at p. 10)
A further instance was McCullough J in R v IAT e x p  Kulbander Kanr268 in which he
criticised the adjudicator for failing to take account o f the sponsor’s devotion to the
applicant when determining the primary purpose o f the marriage. He said:
“There can be few young women who are prepared to be married to a man 
whom they believe is primarily marrying them not for themselves but in order 
to obtain entry to the United Kingdom. No doubt some are more easily fooled 
than others, and there are men with such primary purpose who are able to
267 [1992] Imm AR 1.
268 [1991] 1mm AR 107.
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conceal it from the women whom they marry. But the sponsor was young and 
intelligent . . ." (at p. 109).
Lord Prosser also mentioned that the entry clearance officer had found the sponsor “to 
be a lively, attractive, intelligent young lady who answered his questions honestly and 
without guile’' (at p. 4). It seems that an attractive young woman might persuade a 
judge that she was an active participant in the proceedings and that the applicant had 
chosen to marry her for her own merits. Less fortunate sponsors did not have that 
advantage. One adjudicator dismissed a primary purpose appeal (overturned on 
further appeal to the Tribunal), commenting that his impression o f the sponsor was 
that:
“she was a rather unimpressive young woman who left school with no 
qualifications and is o f limited intelligence. Her most striking feature is that 
she wears thick glasses which suggest bad eyesight ... some people might find 
such glasses a discouraging feature but obviously I cannot assess their effect 
on a young Indian man” (Scannell 1993a).
That underlying beliefs about Asian female passivity conveniently reinforced primary 
purpose does not suggest that they were insincerely held but that, being congruent 
with the other major assumption, that non-white male immigration is undesirable, 
they were unlikely to be displaced. It was only in rare cases that female applicants 
were able to persuade judges that they had agency in such matters. These cases 
seemed to occur when women conformed to the judge’s conception o f a how a 
woman with such agency would present. Women who were young and, by the 
decision-maker’s standard, attractive and intelligent were thus predictably more 
fortunate.
4.2.6 Primary purpose case law; discussion
There were some sympathetic decisions on ‘primary purpose’ particularly early in the 
period. For example, A n m  Kumar, Hoque and Singh and other cases enabled some 
applicants to succeed. However, as Sachdeva (1993:144) observes, there was a slowly 
growing tone o f judicial hostility. It was not apparent that the courts were in sympathy 
with primary purpose but, given that it was the law, they became exasperated with 
immigrants who persisted in importuning them. The intense pressure to reinforce 
highly restrictive practices was made explicit only occasionally, but it is probable that
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it was present, at least in the background, throughout the period and accounts for the 
irritable tone adopted on occasion.
The outcome was a series of cases in which, with some exceptions, the 
dispassionate consideration of evidence was displaced by excessive stress on 
unfavourable factors and illogical decisions in which the conclusions reached seemed 
barely justified by the reported facts. These were rationalised by the judicial value of 
respect for the administrative decision-maker and fact-fmder but, as I have argued, 
this respect amounted, at times, to an abdication o f judicial responsibility for ensuring 
that the correct legal test was applied.
A more critical stance by the courts would have exposed the poor fact-finding and 
the impossible position in which primary purpose placed applicants. While this would 
not have, in itself, exceeded the interpretative function o f the courts, it would have 
inevitably created conflict with the government. With some exceptions, the courts 
chose to avoid confrontation on this issue. Their acquiescence suggests that, for the 
most part, the judiciary accepted the central premises upon which policy was founded; 
the urgent necessity o f controlling non-white immigration and the small weight to be 
placed upon the hardship caused by controls. Securing the power to refuse unwanted 
immigrants was a primary aim, trumping the right of female British residents to 
decide where to live after marriage. Belief in the passivity o f  these women made the 
denial o f their autonomy more palatable.
As observed in relation to the non-primary purpose case law, judges did not betray 
personal hostility towards the non-white applicants before them unless these had 
transgressed the perceived boundaries o f good conduct. Nonetheless, interpretations 
of aspects o f primary purpose, intervening devotion and the effect o f deception, had 
the effect o f creating additional unofficial tests o f endurance and probity suggesting 
that aspiring immigrants had to prove themselves worthy o f acceptance.
To avoid a finding o f primary purpose, a couple had to present a narrative that 
matched official expectations as to either a ‘traditional’ or io v e ’ marriage. A love 
marriage had to conform to the pattern familiar in the West. Other types of 
complexity were ignored or discounted as self-serving. It was assumed that 
immigrants were motivated overwhelmingly by an urgent desire to come to the UK. 
As so often, applicants from the subcontinent were defined and confined by their 
status as aspiring immigrant and every action and decision was viewed through that
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prism. All other aspects o f their lives were invisible, the effect being a one­
dimensional and dehumanised portrayal.
4.3 Conclusion
With some exceptions, judges rarely passed open comment on the political issues 
underlying the law. Nonetheless, the outcome o f the cases and the reasoning 
employed suggest that certain attitudes and beliefs were implicitly held.
Most obviously, the necessity for strong controls to prevent non-white immigration 
was rarely challenged even implicitly. This is unsurprising given its overwhelming 
dominance. Thus, in a number o f instances, the courts adopted interpretations o f the 
law that favoured restrictive immigration policies. The legal reasoning upon which 
these were based was sometimes questionable. In a few cases, judges did adopt 
interpretations that assisted the immigrant but these were few in number.
Another universal and unsurprising assumption was that a foreign applicant was an 
‘outsider' whose claims should carry relatively little weight. However, the British- 
based applicant was sometimes also considered to be at least a partial outsider. 
Comparison with the small number o f cases decided before mass non-white 
immigration suggests that non-white applicants and their British-based spouses were 
viewed predominantly as immigrants in a way that did not occur for white applicants 
even when there was disapproval o f the latter's conduct. The lives o f these non-white 
parties tended to be simplified so that complex human actions were explained only in 
immigration terms.
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the status o f human rights law at the time, there was a 
marked absence o f human rights-related discourse in any o f  this case law. 
Applications did not represent the exercise o f a right by a British resident but the 
granting o f a privilege. Such a privilege was extended only to those who acknowledge 
the supremacy o f state power in deciding these matters and was certainly not available 
to those who deceived or misled. In some cases, only those who proved themselves in 
various ways were considered worthy. There was resistance to assisting those who, 
despite extensive residence in the UK, continued to rely on the law or values in their 
country o f origin. The ‘privilege’ o f British residence should be repaid by an 
unequivocal adoption o f British ways. This expectation was not absolute, though. 
Judges did not display a dislike o f the arranged marriage in the manner o f some MPs
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and there was sometimes empathy with the distress caused to these by the exclusion 
of a spouse. However, this kind o f  sympathy was easily displaced.
Judges generally expressed themselves formally and in ways that were consistent 
with their institutional values, rarely commenting on political issues and deferring to 
the fact-finding role o f the primary decision-maker. Decisions were often justified in 
terms o f the principles o f precedent and statutory interpretation. Yet, it has been 
argued throughout this chapter that this was done selectively and in ways that led to 
decisions that largely reflect the values and assumptions discussed here. In doing so, 
courts sometimes adopted an interpretation which, to those unconvinced of the 
urgency o f strict immigration control, was less coherent than the alternative, despite 
employing the conventional discourse o f logic and reasoning. These cases, explored 
in some depth above, support the theoretical points made earlier in this thesis; in 
particular, that the process o f legal reasoning, despite its appearance o f ineluctable 
movement towards a single conclusion, is ultimately based on the same improvable 
(and sometimes tendentious) beliefs, values and assumptions as other forms of 
decision-making. These beliefs, values and assumptions were largely congruent with 
those held within the other institutions discussed in this thesis and their decisions 
supported and enabled the implementation o f policy created elsewhere. This tendency 
was reinforced by specifically judicial values that encouraged the deference identified 
in this chapter.
Chapter 5: entry clearance on the Indian subcontinent between 1969
and 1997
This chapter analyses the behaviour o f decision-makers in the administration of 
immigration control on the sub-continent from 1969, when compulsory entry 
clearance was introduced, until 1997 when the primary purpose rule was abolished. 
Sondhi (1987:18-9) however suggests that the culture and practices described in this 
chapter took root soon after the introduction o f a voluntary system o f entry certificates 
in 1965.
The task o f the entry clearance service was not straightforward. They were obliged 
to apply a bureaucratic system in a largely undocumented society. Decision-makers, 
acting under pressure, had to decide upon matters that were difficult to judge without 
extensive investigation and knowledge, such as the existence o f a relationship for 
which there was no formal record or the compliance o f a marriage with the norms of 
local society. A perusal o f refused applications (see, for example, Runnymede Trust 
1977:37-147) reveals some o f the difficulties they faced. The service also operated in 
a political climate where the reduction of non-white immigration was a paramount 
aim o f immigration control.
While the sub-continent was the focus o f attention, it is not clear that it was the 
largest source o f bogus applications. ‘Marriage rackets’ were regularly reported in the 
British press. The nationalities involved were various and included Algeria, “Arab” 
nations, Cyprus, Egypt, Ghana, India, Iran, Israel, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Poland, Portugal, Turkey, US and “West Africa” .1 Yet, while there was the occasional 
report o f adverse treatment o f other nationalities,2 the overwhelming focus o f public 
discussion practice was on the ‘problem ’ o f South Asian immigration. It was argued, 
in the press and by politicians,3 that pressure to emigrate from poor countries, and 
most especially the Indian sub-continent, led to frequent forgeries and bogus
1 See Appendix A for citations.
2 ‘Britain barred Jamaican clergyman because love letters were too cool.’ Guardian 3rd February 1984, 
‘Love story without a happy ending’ The Guardian 28lh December 1989 (Hong Kong), ‘I had to wait 4 
years before they let me live with my husband. Woman, 11th November 1992 (Philippines), ‘Knickers 
quiz bars wife from Britain’ The Sun 10lh December 1992 (Jordan).
3 See chapter 3 and, for example, ‘How many migrants in the queue?’ Daily Telegraph I0,h January 
1975, ‘FO official accused o f  inquiry influence’ Guardian 26(h November 1985, ‘Immigration: the first 
hurdle’ Daily Telegraph 2nd December 1985.
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applications. The entry clearance service was doing an unpleasant task to the best o f
its abilities. Immigrant groups and some academics, on the other hand, were deeply
critical, judging the service to be discriminatory and unfair. Juss (1997:22) captured
the essence o f the critique when he wrote o f “an internal culture o f deep-rooted doubt
and cynicism”. The CRE (1985:52) found that:
“The procedures ... operate on the basis that few applications, and virtually no 
family cases can be believed without extensive and painstaking cross­
checking. The genuine applicant is faced not with a presumption that he or she 
is genuine, nor with a presumption o f neutrality, but with the requirement in 
effect to persuade the officer that he or she is not presenting a well-prepared 
bogus application” .
It is not the aim o f this chapter to reach a definitive view on such matters as the 
relative levels of abuse. Rather, by reporting the competing claims that were made, its 
objective is to demonstrate that decision-makers almost invariably made choices and 
exercised their discretion in ways that favoured restriction and minimised the chances 
o f an applicant succeeding. The consistency o f practice suggests reliance upon 
commonly held assumptions and beliefs and that countervailing institutional or other 
values were weak or absent.
These assumptions were manifested in the particular ways discussed in this chapter 
and it is arguable that the burden of proof on the applicant frequently went beyond 
that o f the balance o f probabilities (see Runnymede Trust 1977:22-3; Chowdhury 
1982:3). It was persistently argued that these practices were part o f a deliberate 
strategy condoned or even directed by government to control covertly the level o f 
non-white immigration.4
There was much contemporary critical commentary including Runnymede Trust 
(1977), Chowdhury (1982), Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (1985), Sondhi 
(1987), Powell (1992, 1993a and 1993b) and Juss (1997). Defence o f the entry 
clearance service was confined to occasional newspaper articles and political 
speeches. In addition to newspaper and journal reports, the chapter draws upon a 
number o f documents (such as Lyon 1975 and the Hawley Report) now found in the 
archives o f the Runnymede Trust.
4 ‘Immigrant entry “being controlled by stealth’” Guardian l s< November 1983, ‘Black marks for 
Whitehall’ Guardian 9th May 1984, ‘Making racism respectable’ Observer 15th July 1984; see also the 
sections below on delay, medical evidence and primary purpose.
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Contemporaneous to the institution o f compulsory entry clearance was the 
establishment o f  a two-tier appeals system o f adjudicators and Immigration Appeals 
Tribunal (for detail, see Juss 1997:124-5). While this aimed to provide a check against 
poor decision-making, the inability of parties to attend their own appeals made them 
less effective. Juss (1997:125-52; see also Chowdhury 1982:3-4) is critical o f 
appellate bodies' failure to challenge entry clearance practices. Some o f their reported 
attitudes were similar to those observed and criticised in the entry clearance service.5 
This may have been because they shared similar values and assumptions or because, 
lacking expert knowledge o f their own, they relied on entry clearance service claims 
as to local conditions (Chowdhury 1982:60-1). The outcome was that, while the 
appeals process assisted some individuals, it had limited effect upon the daily 
practices o f the entry clearance service.
5.1 Delay
Delay was endemic throughout the period and a source of anger within the Asian 
community.6 Before entry clearance became compulsory in 1969, queues on arrival 
were visible and politically controversial.7 As previously discussed (chapter 3), the 
rationale for compulsory entry clearance was to prevent lengthy waits in an unsuitable 
environment and to ensure immigrants did not incur the expense and disruption of 
emigration only to be refused admission on arrival. However, immigrant groups 
warned that problems at entry clearance posts were inevitable given the staffing
o
levels. Even immigration staff found themselves dismayed, although their principal 
concern was that inexperienced staff would issue too many certificates.9 In response, 
the government increased the staff at High Commissions, but by only ten .10
5 See also ‘Immigrants’ inquisition’ Guardian March 14th 1975, ‘The immigration appeal system needs 
to be made just’ Guardian 23rd April 1980, ‘Immigration adjudicator under fire’ Observer 26th July 
1981, ‘Controls “unfair to legal migrants’” Guardian 1 l lh February 1985. Some applicants did succeed 
upon appeal - 25% o f settlement applications in 1978 according to the Home Office in 1978 (Letter 
from Home Office to Runnymede Trust 1st September 1978, Runnymede Collection).
6 See, for example, JCWI quoted in Juss (1997:59).
7 ‘Asians’ reception “inhumane”’, welfare leader says’ Times 23rd December 1968.
8 ‘Migrant Attack on Callaghan’ Daily Telegraph 3rd May. 1969, ‘New permit rules upset immigrants’ 
Times, 3rd May 1969.
9 ‘Migrant attack on Callaghan’ 3rd May 1969.
10 ‘Give them a proper chance’ Guardian 20th May 1969. However, ECOs at Dacca were increased 
from 5 to 12 in 1974 (Martin 1975:1). In this context, it is interesting to note that, in 1988, the number 
o f staff employed in the UK to investigate and detain illegal entrants and overstayers was doubled 
( ‘Home Office to double number o f  visa staff Guardian 14th November 1988).
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The result was lengthy delays. Even before compulsory entry clearance, applicants 
might wait a year for a decision.11 Two, three or even four-year delays for interview, 
often only the first step in a lengthy process,12 were reported for wives in Bangladesh 
by the mid-1970s,13 while in Pakistan, the queue was 18 months and in Bombay, six 
m onths.14 Pressure started to mount. In 1975, the Court o f Appeal found, in 
P h a m o p ka rxs that the lengthy wait for admission of patriai wives and children was 
unlawful and those applicants were placed in a priority queue. Following intervention 
by the minister for immigration, Alex Lyon in 1975,16 recently married wives and 
those with small children were also given priority.17 The queue for husbands and 
fiances however remained long and it was suggested that this was a deliberate policy 
to limit the number o f husbands admitted after the rule change in 1974.18 Concerns 
were explicitly linked to the fear, discussed in chapter 3, o f an ‘infinite poof of
19immigrants.
Queues for interview were generally somewhat shorter in the 1980s but were still 
between eighteen months and two years in Bangladesh and between six months and a 
year in Pakistan and India (CRE 1985:136). Actual resolution o f an application 
frequently took many years, Sondhi (1987:71) found that, where applications were 
repeatedly refused, the entire process might take ten or fifteen years. The Home 
Office Select Committee found in 1990 that delays remained unacceptable.20
The response to staff shortages and increased numbers was thus to allow queues to 
grow rather than to reduce the time taken to consider applications. It was reported that 
staff at Dhaka, for example, interviewed wives at the rate o f three every two days in 
1974,21 although, by 1975, they reportedly managed two interviews per day (Martin
11 New permit rules upset immigrants’ Times, 3rd May 1969.
12 According to Martin (1975:1), only one case in five at Dacca was, at the time he was writing, settled 
at first interview.
13 ‘Two-year holdup for w ives’ Guardian 28th February 1974, ‘Pledge to help women waiting to join  
husbands’, Guardian 30lh August 1974, ‘Britain to speed up entry o f immigrants’ dependants’ Times 6th 
January 1975.
14 ‘Pledge to help women waiting to join husbands’ Guardian 30th August 1974.
15 R v Secretary o f  State for the Home Department ex p. Phansopkar [1975] 3 All ER 497.
!6 Letter from Alex Lyon 8t!l August 1975, Runnymede Collection.
17 ‘Priority categories for entry clearance applicants in the Indian sub-continent’ JCWI briefing 
February 1977.
18 ‘The Law’s Delays’ Guardian 21s' May 1975.
19 See ‘We must control the numbers o f  immigrants for their own good’ Times 3rd May 1977 in which a 
Conservative MP stated that entry clearance officers operate a “sluice gate quota system” and that 
increasing the number o f  officials would increase the length o f  the queue due to raised expectations.
20 Report on Administrative Delays in the Immigration Department (1989-90 HC 319) para 38.
21 ‘Two-year hold-up for w ives’ Guardian 28th February 1974.
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1975:2). This was rationalised by the need to be vigilant against abuse although a
* ~1Pspokesman “could not give the ratio of fraudulent to genuine claims’'. ~ Alex Lyon 
(1975) pointed out that the standard o f proof did not require all doubt to be eliminated 
so that a more rapid examination was appropriate.2'1 However, it seems likely that, 
save during the brief period when he was minister, delays due to extensive enquiries 
received political support.24
The suspicion that queues were manipulated was a persistent theme. The 
suggestion that long queues were used to delay the entry o f husbands in the 1970s has 
already been alluded to. Lyon (1975) found that the queue at Karachi had been kept 
artificially long to match that at Islamabad and there was suspicion at the sudden 
lengthening o f the queue at Bombay.25 Evans’ (1983:128) argues that queues were a 
form o f concealed rationing o f all applications, although this was denied.26 His 
suggestion however is given credence by a leaked government briefing written in 
1983. The number o f entry clearance officers was described as “the primary 
regulator” o f the numbers o f entrants and that “a system of queues operates to regulate 
the flow o f immigrants ... Provided the queues do not become too long this form of 
administrative regulation can continue”. The briefing went on to say that this policy of 
delay, if  openly acknowledged, would be unlawful unless backed by legislation 
authorising quotas.27
The ‘administrative regulation’ o f numbers through queues continued and, 
following the Abdidctziz decision in 1985, when husbands and fiances became entitled 
to equal treatment, wives and fiancees lost their priority and all spouses and fiances
were placed in a slower queue. Refused applicants making renewed applications were
• 28 put m the final, “dustbin” queue. There were also considerable delays in the appeals
process, so that the hearing might take place between one and six years after first
interview (Runnymede Trust 1977:24). A major factor was the requirement upon the
ECO to draw up an explanatory statement for which there was no time limit (raising
22 ‘Two-year hold-up for w ives’ Guardian 28th February 1974.
23 The impact o f  Lyon’s intervention is discussed later in this chapter.
24 See, for example, David Lane’s comment that unless illegal immigration was drastically reduced, 
there could be no speed-up in the issue o f  entry certificates on the sub-continent (Runneymede Trust 
1974: 6).
25 ‘The Law’s D elays’ Guardian 21st March 1975.
26 ‘Queues used to stem immigration’ Guardian 21st March 1985.
27 Id.
28 ‘Long queues separate families’ JCW1 Bulletin September 1985, ‘Asian wives go to back o f queue’ 
Guardian 3 151 August 1985, ‘Migrants face long delays’ Daily Telegraph 25th July 1985.
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issues also as to their accuracy)." The Home Affairs Committee in 1990 accepted that 
delays were dictated by deliberate Home Office policy (Juss 1997:60), a policy that 
seems to have spanned two decades or more.
Delays gave rise to obvious distress. However, as sponsors had voluntarily left 
their families for many years, further delay was regarded as a minor self-imposed 
hardship; the Hawley Report, for instance, quoted approvingly a comment on the 
'barbaric' nature o f these voluntary separations. Consistent with this was the priority 
given to the recently married in queues for interview.'10 However, even the recently 
married were subject to long delays particularly after 1985. One report (Smith 1984) 
encapsulated the impossible position facing applicants and their sponsors. Faced with 
a two-year wait just for interview, the British wife lived with her husband in 
Bangladesh despite severe health problems and homesickness. The British High 
Commission advised her to return but, leaving aside her wish to be with her husband, 
she feared that doing so would be used against the application when it was eventually 
heard.
5.2 Tax fraud
Bangladeshi applications often encountered particular problems due to the ‘Sylheti tax 
pattenf (CRE 1985:21-5; Juss 1997:77-84). Some early immigrants to the UK, not 
expecting to settle or to call over their families, had claimed income tax allowances 
for non-existent wives and children. Over time, these men returned home and 
established real families whom they then wished to bring to the UK. Unless the tax 
fraud was to be admitted, the prior account had to be reconciled with the true position 
for entry clearance purposes. Previous fictitious wives had to ‘die1 or be ‘divorced’. 
Fictitious children might also ‘die’ or be listed as non-applicants. Alternatively, the 
true wife and children might impersonate the fictional ones or another relative might 
stand in for an invented child. In all instances, an element o f deception was involved 
and aspects o f the claim might be misleading. Divorce or death certificates would be 
absent or faked, wives and children would appear to be younger than claimed and oral 
accounts would be confused or contradictory.
29 See ‘Interviews conducted by entry clearance officers overseas’, paper prepared for submission to 
the Minister o f  State by UK1AS, 29th January 1985 (Runnymede Collection).
30 Joint Council for the Welfare o f  Immigrants briefing paper February 1977 (Runnymede Collection).
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While the ‘Sylheti tax pattern’ caused obvious confusion and difficulty, in 
immigration terms, it was material only if  impersonation led to the entry o f non­
entitled individuals. An internal briefing produced in 1976 by the British High 
Commission at Bangladesh stated as fact that “most” applications were artificially 
constructed to fit a bogus tax pattern and bogus children assumed the identity o f those 
shown in the tax affidavit. This was revised in 1978 to “many” . Indications o f tax 
fraud were said in this briefing to include a wife who does not look her stated age. a 
second wife, an early marriage by the husband, age-estimate discrepancies for the 
children and a sparse family tree.
Thus fears about tax fraud contributed to the style of questioning and consequent 
reliance on ‘discrepancies' described below. However, while many applications did 
include references to non-existent dependants, it seems that most applicants did not 
seek entry clearance for other than their real dependants. The CRE (1985:21-4; see 
also Lai and Wilson 1986:19) foimd that, o f the cases they observed, this was 
suspected in only a few and that, o f wives and children confessed to be bogus up to 
1980, fewer than one in six had been applicants for entry clearance. An investigation 
into ‘tax confessions’ by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office found that only 6.7% 
of these involved false applications for entry. It was improbable, in the context of 
Bangladeshi culture, that a man would seek to present as a wife, a woman to whom he 
was not married (Chowdhury 1982:40; Juss 1997:75, 84).
The problems with tax fraud were, to an extent, o f officials’ own making. 
Difficulties could have been partially avoided had applicants been advised at the 
outset that there would be no contact with the Inland Revenue, no cross-checking for 
consistency with tax forms and no investigation o f possible tax fraud. This was not 
the approach adopted, however, although it is not clear at which level the decisions 
were made since the Hawley Report suggests ECOs favoured a “tax amnesty” . 
Sponsors o f applicants from Bangladesh were required to authorise the Inland 
Revenue to divulge information about their tax affairs (CRE 1985:24). Despite 
apparent initial reluctance by the Inland Revenue,32 later reports suggest that 
information was obtained, the practice being abandoned only after the CRE Report 
was published (Chowdhury 1982:18-9; Hussain 1994:18). Principal applicants were
31 Both briefings are in the Runnymede Collection.
32 ‘Why family cannot have entry permit’ Birmingham Post 11th July 1969. In this instance, entry 
clearance had been refused because the sponsor could not obtain a letter from the Inland Revenue 
showing the dependants for whom he had claimed tax relief.
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also required to list on the application the names o f any children not applying for 
entry clearance. There was thus pressure to ensure that applications were consistent 
with previous tax forms.
The misleading information or inconsistencies that resulted formed the basis of 
detailed investigations and many refusals (Chowdhury 1982:18-9; CRE 1985:21-4). 
Some ECOs disregarded false information that did not represent an attempt to evade 
control (perhaps recording that they did not accept the existence of the non­
applicants). Many however were keen to obtain ‘confessions’ o f tax fraud, concerned 
that non-applicant children might make a later claim for admission or considered that 
the deception cast doubt on the credibility o f the whole application. Applicants would 
be asked for evidence to confirm the claimed history even when ECOs did not doubt 
that the applicants were, in reality, the wife and children o f the sponsor. The CRE 
(1985:37) found that sponsors were frequently threatened with refusal unless they 
made a ‘tax confession’.
The ‘Sylheti tax pattern’ thus provided a rationale for suspicion and exhaustive 
investigation of credentials. Applicants were seen as tainted by the prior dishonesty, 
as lacking credibility and as undeserving by both ECOs and adjudicators (see, for 
example, Juss 1997:82-3; Sondhi 1987:54-5). It also permitted applications from the 
sub-continent to be publicly presented as abusive.33 This was notwithstanding that it is 
likely that, in only a minority o f cases, was there an attempt to bring bogus family 
members to the UK.
5.3 Documentary evidence
In the largely undocumented society from which immigrants came, it was often 
impossible for them to establish their status in ways that were usual in the UK. 
Menski (2000:10-20), for example, describes the absence o f state input and the 
impossibility of ensuring consistent registration o f marriage in India, resulting in lack 
of documentary evidence o f many marriages. Moreover, ‘customary’ marriages, 
whether or not supported by registration, varied enormously so that identifying a valid 
marriage was not straightforward and, indeed, was a matter that the Indian courts 
themselves had difficulty in resolving. According to Powell (1992), customary 
divorces were not recognised by the UK authorities, leading to severe practical
33For press coverage, see ‘Immigrant fraud cases “top 2,600’” Times 16th February 1982, ‘Immigrant 
“confessions’” Times 26lh February 1982.
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problems many years later for some applicants. Providing other evidence o f the 
relationship might also prove problematic. Illiterate people would not communicate 
by letter and remittances were often sent indirectly (Martin 1975:2).
Decision-makers chose to deal with this situation in particular ways. The Muslim 
presumption of marriage appears to have been accorded little weight (see Chowdhury 
1982:43; Pearl and Menski 1998:151). Although posts officially maintained that 
documentation was not essential for a successful application, in reality, an extensive 
array o f documents was expected (Martin 1975:2; CRE 1985:30-1; Lai and Wilson 
1986:14-6; Sondhi 1987:29: Runnymede Trust 1977:9-10). Such demands are likely 
to have caused anxiety, expense and delay.
Yet, while applicants were expected to go to lengths to obtain documents, once 
presented, they were accorded little weight (Sondhi 1987:30-2; CRE 1985:31-2; 
Runnymede Trust 1977:10). One officer at Dhaka was reported as saying that they 
counted neither for nor against an application. The CRE observed no instance where 
documentary evidence was considered sufficient in itself to justify issue o f entry 
clearance although failure to produce supporting documentation often contributed to a 
refusal. Producing an ‘excessive* number o f documents might also lead to suspicion.
Documents were frequently discounted as likely forgeries although allegations of 
fraud were rarely investigated. Instead, refusals frequently referred to the ease with 
which forged documents could be obtained. Thus, in the 58 cases examined by the 
Runnymede Trust, in all cases the documentary evidence was considered insufficient, 
but a specific allegation o f forgery was made in only 32 o f the cases (Runnymede 
Trust 1977:8-11). Internal guidance to ECOs in Pakistan and Bangladesh suggested 
that forgeries were commonplace and that even genuine documents may have been 
obtained by impersonation, a difficult allegation to disprove particularly at a distant 
appeal. The guidance concluded that “(r)elationships can only be established with any 
degree o f accuracy by personal interview and exhaustive cross-checking”. Prepared in 
the mid-1970s, the guidance was still considered reliable in the 1980s (Juss 1997:90, 
106-7).
Martin (1975:3) argues that local documentation was more reliable than ECOs 
believed (although see Chowdhury 1982:15-7). However, some applicants did rely 
either on forged documents or on genuine documents obtained years after the original 
event. In some cases, this was on the advice o f agents, but Chowdhury (1982:20-1) 
argues that ECOs often requested documents during interview that the applicant then
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felt obliged to obtain. These may have contained errors and inconsistencies due to 
misunderstandings or ignorance or because applicants were trying to make documents 
consistent with tax affidavits. While ECOs often concluded that they represented a 
bogus application, this was not necessarily the case (Runnymede Trust 1977:11-3; 
Chowdhury 1982:20-1; Sondhi 1987:20, 32).
Scepticism appears to have been sometimes extreme. Until the Tribunal 
intervened,34 ECOs and adjudicators refused wives if  the date o f marriage remained 
undetermined even if  the fact o f marriage was in no real doubt (Chowdhury 1982:4). 
Documents such as correspondence, remittances, voters' lists, land deeds, school 
records and medical or bank records were described by critics as highly reliable yet 
were not requested by ECOs or, if  produced, were given little weight (Chowdhury 
1982:22-6; Sondhi 1987:34-7, Juss 1997:91-108). Juss also describes instances, both 
at post and on appeal, when doubts about the veracity of individual documents 
resulted in refusal even when, taken together, the evidence overwhelmingly supported 
the existence o f the relationship or when discrepancies at interview, often trivial, were 
used to undermine otherwise consistent documentary evidence. Documents produced 
after an application had been refused were usually disregarded even when forging 
them would have required an improbable degree of skill and sophistication (Sondhi 
1987:33; see also the rejection o f ‘intervening devotion' in Powell, 1993a: 116). By 
contrast, it was alleged that denunciatory letters (even when anonymous) and 
documents that were unfavourable to the applicant’s claim were scrutinised less 
critically (Sondhi 1987:38-9).
Juss (1997:105) argues that scepticism increased over the years. Attitudes seem to 
have gone beyond a cautious approach to disbelief in the integrity o f the entire 
community (Sondhi 1987:30-2). Certainly, the problems that sometimes existed in 
obtaining reliable documentary evidence were used to rationalise the delays, the 
‘discrepancy system’, reliance upon medical examination and other practices 
described here. In other instances, where documents were beyond doubt, ECOs 
applied principles such as domicile (discussed in chapter 4), nationality, 
accommodation and maintenance or the requirement to have met to assert that a 
marriage was not valid or the parties did not fulfil requirements (Sondhi 1987:60-3, 
102-3; Menski 1994:113-4), Where an applicant had previously misrepresented his
34 Bibi Bcirkat TH/36849/78 (1761) unreported.
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position, even strong evidence o f the true situation was treated sceptically, effectively 
punishing the applicant for his prior deception (Hussain 1994:20).
5.4 Interviews
As documentary evidence was considered insufficient on its own, applicants were 
always interviewed (CRE 1985:33) which often involved a long journey in difficult 
conditions. Applicants from Sylhet District, for example, would have to travel to 
Sylhet town using local transport or foot and then undertake a 13-hour train journey to 
Dhaka, often accompanied by small children (CRE 1985:48; Chowdhury 1982:11). 
Many applicants would not previously have travelled so far while women were 
unused even to leaving their own homes (Juss 1997:68-9). Journeys might take place 
during the rainy season when travelling was difficult (and ECOs themselves 
suspended their village visits). Having arrived at the capital, applicants would usually 
stay overnight as they were expected to report at 7am. All o f this involved immense 
cost, potential loss o f income and significant stress.
There was however resistance to the establishment o f local consulates (CRE 
1985:49; Sondhi 1987:21-2). There also seems to have been little priority given to 
minimising discomfort and anxiety. Applicants had to wait long hours in 
uncomfortable conditions. At Dhaka and Islamabad, for example, the waiting room 
was the only part o f the building not to be air-conditioned (Lai and Wilson 1986:11; 
Sondhi 1987:22).
Fatigued and aware o f the importance for the entire family o f a successful outcome 
to this long-awaited interview, applicants found lengthy questioning by an authority 
figure, often the first white male ever encountered, to be intimidating and exhausting 
(Chowdhury 1997:50-1; Juss 1997:69). At the outset, applicants should have been 
asked if  they were tired or unwell and if  they understood the interpreter although this 
did not always occur. Requests for postponement were rare for fear o f further delay 
although it seems that applicants did frequently feel unwell or were unable to 
understand interpreters who were sometimes poorly matched to applicants. 
Translators recruited locally were reported to be incompetent in dialects or local 
languages (the Sylheti language, for instance, is very different to standard Bengali) 
leading to fundamental misunderstandings and, on occasion, to be rude, aggressive or 
even corrupt (Chowdhury 1982:10-2, 56; Powell 1992).
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Given these difficulties and the problems associated with cross-cultural 
communication,'0 it is unsurprising that misunderstandings were frequently reported 
(see, for example, Powell 1993a: 109, 170). ECOs were said to ask questions whose 
answers were unknown to the applicant or were misunderstood by the interviewee 
(Sondhi 1987:22-3; Chowdhury 1982:10-2; Runnymede Trust 1977:14-7). Powell 
(1993a: 109), for example, cites a woman who understood a question about whether 
she was related to her husband prior to marriage as one asking whether she had sexual 
relations with him before the marriage and responded with an indignant negative. 
Adjudicators tended to be dismissive o f appeals arising from such errors despite the 
critical importance o f accurate translation (Sondhi 1987:22-3; Runnymede Trust 
1977:14-7).
It was expected that female applicants would be accompanied by a male relative 
who was also interviewed. Unaccompanied applicants seem to have been regarded 
unfavourably (Sondhi 1987:24). It was usual to interview each family member in turn 
(CRE 1985:35). Juss (1997:63) found that children as young as 5 had been 
interviewed.36 Following adverse comments at Tribunal, interviews o f children under 
14 were officially ended although, in practice, accompanied children over ten were 
still interviewed (CRE 1985:35; Sondhi 1987:23-4).
ECOs usually put questions through the interpreter, failing to address the applicant 
directly and were reported as appearing bored, irritated or, in some instances, 
intimidating. Chowdhury (1982:58-9) found that the interviews he observed were 
“grim”, formal and impersonal. Elsewhere, it was found that interruptions, even for 
personal matters, were frequent but were neither explained nor apologised for. 
Children reported that they were threatened with being thrown out o f the window or 
into the river. One woman reported that disbelieving staff tore up her affidavit in front 
o f her. Parties described how they were so anxious that they gave inaccurate answers 
that they were then too frightened to retract or pruned family trees to avoid prolonging 
the interview (Martin 1975:9; Runnymede Trust 1977:16-7; CRE 1985:36-7).
Powell (1992) found that o f 69 refused applicants in Pakistan, 38 claimed they had 
been treated rudely or harshly and 34 said that they had not been given a proper 
chance to explain themselves. He criticised the reported interviewing style as
35 Ballard, undated, discusses these in relation to the judiciary and many o f  his points are equally apt 
here given the imbalance o f  power.
36 See also CRE 1985:35.
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resembling a cross-examination in which leading questions invited answers that 
would unfairly condemn the applicant. Typical was a series o f reported questions on 
residence that permitted the inference that applicants were acting against religious 
principle in seeking to join their wives. Applicants were not encouraged or even 
permitted to expand on or qualify their answers. In the same work, Powell also reports 
frequent allegations that interviews were wrongly recorded by the ECO and even that 
answers and confessions were fabricated.
Each interviewee was asked to provide a family tree and there would follow 
questions about the family, significant events and the circumstances o f the applicants' 
lives. Taking the family tree was a laborious procedure that the Home Office privately 
acknowledged as being o f little probative value (Lai and Wilson 1986:13). ECOs had 
discretion over the areas o f  questioning and practice was inconsistent. Recall might be 
expected o f events that had occurred years previously such as a sponsor’s visit or a 
wedding as well as matters such as the construction and location o f the family house 
or the characteristics o f the family’s livestock, which might easily be described 
differently by different people.37 Sondhi (1987:45) details an intensive series of 
questions asked by an ECO concerning the order and circumstances o f various 
marriages and births in an extended family. The implications for refusals on 
discrepancy grounds are discussed below.
Applicants might have felt inhibited from revealing, in such a context, personal 
matters such as their feelings for a spouse (Powell 1993a:4) and some reported 
questions were embarrassing (Martin 1975:4). There were several press reports, 
particularly during the early part o f the period, o f personal questions such as use of 
contraception or the colour o f underwear.38 Most o f these involved immigration staff 
in the UK but applicants on the sub-continent also complained o f questions about 
their sex lives.39 Instructions to entry clearance officers issued in 1987 warned against 
such questions, suggesting it was a continuing problem.
Parties had reason to be anxious and might confer or take advice beforehand. 
Evidence that they had been coached or had otherwise prepared would result in a loss 
o f credibility (Sondhi 1987:33). In some cases, parties did tell untruths or partial
37 For example, ‘Interviews conducted by entry clearance officers overseas’, paper prepared for 
submission to the Minister o f  State by UKIAS, 29th January 1985 (Runnymede Collection).
38 ‘Police carry out sex snoop on migrants’ Guardian 22nd April 1977, ‘New ly-w eds’ bloomer’ Daily 
Star 10lh December 1992.
39 ‘Secret immigration guide “biased to refuse entry’” Guardian 21SI March 1984. See also Bhabha et al 
1985:70.
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truths at interview often on the advice o f others, with predictably damaging results. 
This was said to result from the widespread perception that the truth would be 
disbelieved or misinterpreted (see, for example, Powell 1992 and 1993a:332, 380). 
ECOs also used interviews to make a visual assessment of the ages, family likeness 
and general demeanour o f applicants. This permitted ECOs to draw subjective and 
often distressing conclusions about whether an individual was truly a family member 
(see, for example, Sondhi 1987:56-7),
A decision might be made immediately after interview or deferred for a village 
visit, medical examination or a sponsor interview (Sondhi 1987:24). The CRE found 
that the clarifications sought from sponsors were frequently o f a peripheral nature 
(CRE 1985:35-7). Lai and Wilson (1986:14) cited an instance in which the sponsor 
was to be asked why he failed to father a child during a visit to Bangladesh. However, 
such enquiries could cause considerable delay particularly if  the sponsor happened to 
be absent from the UK at the time he was called for interview (Martin 1975:9).
After sponsor interview, Te-interview' o f the applicants might follow (with a 
repeat o f the lengthy and stressful journey) causing further delay. This was often 
several years later involving a different ECO and interpreter. Applicants would be 
expected to explain discrepancies between the answers given at first interview, at the 
sponsor interview and in applications made by other family members (Sondhi 
1987:25).
It is unsurprising that answers at interview were frequently confused or 
inconsistent. When these were later described in an explanatory statement away from 
the context in which they were made and without reference to other more consistent 
answers, they could suggest substantial dishonesty and evasion. It was frequently 
difficult to persuade appellate bodies to overturn refusals based on these contradictory 
answers (Juss 1997:73-4). The Runnymede Trust (1977:27) cites instances where an 
applicant's dishonesty or inaccuracy in one aspect caused the whole application to be 
regarded as discredited on appeal. One adjudicator commented o f an applicant who 
had lied to the ECO: “I f  she is hoist on the petard of her own dishonesty (which 
destroys the whole o f  her credibility) she must not be surprised”.
154
5.5 T h e ‘discrepancy system ’
The interviewing techniques described above supported the so-called ‘discrepancy 
system'. Discrepancies in the answers given to questions would be used to justify 
refusal on the grounds that the parties were not related as claimed. There was 
widespread contemporary criticism of the system (CRE 1985:34-6; Juss 1997:62-7) 
centring not only on the way that interviews were carried out but on the evidential 
weight given to discrepancies.
While interview may have been the only way to assess family relationships on the 
sub-continent, discrepancies formed the basis o f refusal even where other evidence 
supported the relationship (Juss 1997:62-3). O f 58 refusals examined by the 
Runnymede Trust (1977:6-8, 14), 55 were believed by the investigators to be genuine, 
two (involving children, not spouses) fraudulent and one inconclusive. O f these 58, 49 
were refused at least partly due to alleged discrepancies as to domestic circumstances 
and 24 as to the family tree. O f these, 12 were refused on discrepancies alone 
unsupported by other evidence against the relationship while in 19 cases, evidence 
had been taken from children 12 years old or younger (Runnymede Trust 1977:34).
The conduct o f interviews has already been discussed. The Runnymede Trust 
(1977:16-9) and CRE (1985:34) demonstrate how questions might focus on minor 
domestic details, be ambiguous, permit more than one correct answer, ask for 
information that was unknown to one o f the parties or permit different recollections. 
Intimidated by the interview process, applicants gave inaccurate answers rather than 
admit that they could not answer.
As well as extensive interviews, applications were crosschecked with files relating 
to previous applications by family members or sponsors’ declarations in the UK for 
tax or nationality purposes to see these were consistent. Applicants who ‘pruned’ their 
family trees lost credibility (CRE 1985:36; Chowdhury 1982:21; Sondhi 1987:37-8) 
although this was a natural temptation given the potentially catastrophic consequences 
o f error. Applicants who came from small families were treated with disbelief, even 
though Powell (1992) argues that infertility was common. Applicants were advised in 
writing that their application would not proceed further unless an undertaking was 
given that “full” or “complete” details would be given (Martin 1975:8-9).
Village visits were also a source o f possible discrepancies. Sondhi (1987:50-2) is 
critical o f their execution arguing that this was perfunctory and aimed at discrediting
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rather than confirming applications, a criticism also made, in rather more circumspect 
terms, by Webb (1986). A critique o f an unsatisfactory village visit may be found in 
Powell (1993b:20-43). JCWI (1987) was particularly critical o f their execution in 
Bangladesh comparing them to “military operations”. Lai and Wilson (1986:39) 
describe them as “an exercise in neo-colonial administration” and the example they 
cite does seem to have been characterised by an arrogant highhandedness, typified by 
the officials driving a Landrover over newly planted paddy fields (Lai and Wilson 
1986:37-8).
The reliability o f the ‘discrepancy system' is doubtful. One unnamed official 
admitted that, “probably you would get as good results by sticking a pin into a list.”40 
In some cases, the system may have detected a bogus applicant's inadequate 
knowledge o f the claimed family. However, as CRE (1985:38) point out, a bogus 
applicant could be very well-drilled or know the family well while, even leaving aside 
the difficulties in interview discussed above, those genuinely related may suffer 
memory lapses, have varying conceptualisations o f relationships, use different 
terminology or misunderstand peripheral matters. Other possible explanations abound. 
People might be known by a pet name (Sondhi 1987:44, Chowdhury 1982:49) or 
names might take various forms (see, for example, Runnymede Trust 1977:151). 
Elder relatives were often addressed in terms o f the relationship rather than by name 
(Chowdhury 1982:47-9). Parties might be reticent about revealing information 
regarded as shameful, such as a divorce, or give incorrect information for reasons of 
self-interest, ignorance or on the advice o f agents (Runnymede Trust 1977:13, 18-9). 
Matters that an ECO might regard as elementary, such as dates, intervals o f time or 
the sequence o f events, often held little meaning for illiterate people from a culture 
where events are not recorded and birthdays not celebrated. Questions as to schooling 
(when children might only attend a madrasa) or the numbers o f  rooms in a house 
(which might be partitioned or have a partially exposed kitchen) often gave rise to 
different answers. Parties failed to appreciate the importance o f accuracy on these 
matters (Chowdhury 1982:49-56; Juss 1997:67-70).
Examples o f discrepancies used to justify refusals are cited in the literature or 
contemporary reports. Juss (1997:66) reports refusals based on disagreement as to the 
number o f visits, how long the family had owned their buffalo, the location o f a
40 “How science can unite families” New Society 22nd November 1985.
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school, the number o f  children belonging to a relative, the correct full name o f another 
relative and the name o f a party 's barber and tailor. There were reports of 
‘discrepancies' as to how many eggs the chickens laid or the number o f chairs and 
tables in a house.41 Smith (1984) reports a ‘discrepancy' as to the names of the 
sponsor's stepbrothers. The applicant said they were Sadad, Azad and Ahad while the 
sponsor called them Hahdad, Samad and Ahad. In another case, the applicant's son 
who was about twelve but was described as “slow” did not recall the names o f his 
aunts and made an error as to the number of cousins.
Applications might be refused because of one ‘major' discrepancy or an 
accumulation o f minor discrepancies. For an account o f how a multiplicity of minor 
discrepancies can be otherwise explained, see Runnymede Trust (1977:155-62). 
Chowdhury (1982:5; see also Runnymede Trust 1977:21) found that explanatory 
statements only included those parts o f the interview in which discrepancies occurred 
presenting a distorted picture. This was not always well received at appeal. 
Chowdhury (1982:5) quotes an adjudicator's exasperation at “a declining standard of 
objectivity by the Dacca office in assessing the reality or otherwise o f family 
relationships. It seems to me that the search for ‘kitchen sink' discrepancies is 
becoming almost an obsession”. Juss (1997:70-2) also notes that the Tribunal 
sometimes took a critical stance. This was not uniformly the case however (see also 
Juss 1997:73-4 and Runnymede Trust 1977:24-8).
Reliance on discrepancies was defended as being the only reliable way to ascertain 
whether parties were related as claimed. The advent o f DNA testing in the 1980s 
rendered redundant, in most cases, the original stated purpose o f the discrepancy 
system.42 The claim that its true purpose was otherwise is given credence by the 
delays and other hurdles put in the way o f those who could benefit from DNA 
testing,43 and by the seepage o f the use o f discrepancies into other types o f application 
(Lai and W ilson 1986:13).
41 Letter from M. Akram to Home Office 28th June 1978, Runnymede Collection.
42 DNA testing could demonstrate that children were related to their claimed parents substantiating the 
spouse’s as well as the children’s claim. Where there were no children, DNA testing could not assist.
43 ‘Renton disowns DNA test m em o’ Independent 23rd June 1989, ‘Home Office erects further barriers’ 
New Life 23rd June 1989.
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5,6 Medical evidence 1: X-rays
X-rays were frequently used to assess age. This was of some approximate use in the 
case of children (Juss 1997:1 11-2), but X-rays o f adults were o f little evidential value 
even though they were used until 1979 (Juss 1997:117-9; Chowdhury 1982:31-7). 
Juss (1997:118-9), Chowdhury (1982:31-6) and Lai and Wilson (1986:17) cite 
refusals of wives on the basis that X-rays suggested that they were younger than they 
claimed to be. In some cases, the age gap was minimal (37 as against 40 in one case 
cited by Lai and Wilson 1986:17-8). In others, it was more substantial. This may have 
been related to Sylheti tax fraud (so that they were wives but had misstated their ages 
to comply with the prior tax declaration). In others, the disparity was more likely due 
to the very approximate nature o f such estimates particularly given the possible 
effects of malnutrition and an impoverished lifestyle. In some instances, however, not 
only ECOs but adjudicators and the Tribunal preferred such X-ray evidence over 
other forms o f evidence supporting the applicant’s claimed age.
The World Health Organisation condemned the routine use o f X-rays.44 Their 
manner o f administration also caused concern. It was reported that they had been 
carried out by unqualified staff at Heathrow, defended on the grounds that “the 
requirements ... for health screening owe more to the demands o f immigration 
legislation than to the demands o f normal NHS screening programmes”.45 It was also 
reported that pregnant women in Dhaka had been subjected to X-rays that were 
prohibited in the UK other than “in cases o f absolute medical necessity” to avoid 
possible harm to the foetus.46 These were subsequently ended,47 while all X-ray 
examinations ended in 1982 (CRE 1985:40).
5.7  Medical evidence 2: gynaecological examinations
Gynaecological examinations or ‘virginity tests’ first received national attention in 
February 197 9 48 It was reported that a male doctor carried out an intimate internal 
examination o f a fiancee applicant at Heathrow to establish whether she had given
44 ‘Asian emigrants X-rayed by UK officials’ Guardian 8th February 1979, ‘X-ray tests on migrants 
banned’ Guardian 27th February 1979.
45 ‘Heathrow X-ray risk to migrants’ Guardian 9th February 1979.
46 ‘Asian emigrants X-rayed by UK officials’ Guardian 811' February 1979.
47 ‘X-ray tests on migrants banned’ Guardian 27th February 1979.
48 ‘Virginity tests on immigrants at Heathrow’ Guardian 1st February 1979, ‘Medical controls’ N ew  
Society 8th February 1979.
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birth or was pregnant. The Home Office's extraordinary defence was to deny that the 
examination was internal, saying that a “cursory” examination had taken place to 
establish “whether she was, in fact, a bona fide virgin”. They also maintained that the 
woman had the option o f being examined by a female doctor at a local hospital.
The press report led to an international outcry involving immigrant groups,49 race 
equality bodies,50 politicians, press and pressure groups on the sub-continent51 and the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights.52 The Home Secretary immediately 
instructed officials at ports and overseas that these examinations should not occur and 
established the Yellowlees inquiry into the object and nature o f all medical 
examinations. Nonetheless, he maintained that the reported instance was 
“exceptional” .53
This, it soon became apparent, was not the case. Despite official claims that only 
two other such tests had been carried out at Heathrow,54 the Indian Workers 
Association said that it knew o f eight cases there, while doctors at the airport admitted 
that the tests had been carried out for several years.55 The Commission for Racial 
Equality referred to reports o f instructions given in 1969 for gynaecological 
examinations to be stopped.36 The practice was not confined to the UK. Alex Lyon 
revealed that, when he was immigration minister between 1974 and 1976, he had been 
aware o f examinations being carried out “fairly frequently” in Dhaka and that he had 
given instructions to end the practice.57 Lai and Wilson (1986:50) report at least one 
personal examination o f a 14 year-old girl. It was alleged in the Indian Parliament that 
there had been at least 34 instances at the Delhi British High Commission.58 The High 
Commission effectively admitted that this was the case, saying that no specific
49 Medical controls’ New Society 8th February 1979.
5°‘Virginity Testing: Joint Statement by CRE and EOC’ Commission for Racial Equality press release 
CR/9/79 1st February 1979.
51 ‘Virginity tests alleged in India’ Guardian 7th February 1979, "’Fiancee tests” end in India’ Daily 
Telegraph 6Ih February 1979, ‘India talks o f “retaliation” over virginity tests’ Daily Telegraph 5th 
February 1979.
52 United Nations press release HR/718 6th March 1979.
53 Letter from Merlyn Rees, Home Secretaiy, to David Lane, Chairman, Commission for Racial 
Equality 1st March 1979.
54 ‘1 knew about virginity tests, says former Minister’ Guardian 2nd February 1979.
55 ‘Row grows over airport virginity test on Indian woman’ Daily Telegraph 2nd February 1979.
55 Letter from David Lane, Chairman Commission for Racial Equality to Merlyn Rees, Home 
Secretary, 12th February 1979.
57 ‘1 knew about virginity tests, says former Minister’ Guardian 2nd February 1979.
58 “Led” about tests on virgins’ Guardian 21st February 1979.
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instructions to undertake these examinations had been issued to the doctors involved 
who, moreover, had all been female."9
Medical examination without consent is self-evidently unlawful. Consent on Home 
Office headed paper “to a gynaecological examination which may be vaginal if 
necessary’' was obtained from the woman in the Heathrow case,60 who maintained 
that she had been too frightened to refuse, reasonably so, given that refusal “would be 
taken into account" in reaching a decision.61 It was claimed that asking for consent to 
such an examination was not usual practice and it was not known why it happened in 
her case.62 The description o f her psychological state afterwards suggests that consent, 
even if formally obtained, was not freely given ,'64 a supposition given strength by a 
subsequent offer o f compensation by the Home Office.64 Juss’ (1997:110-1) 
description o f the procedure for medical examinations at posts abroad suggests that 
applicants there could not be regarded as having given informed consent to such a 
procedure. It barely needs iteration that, illegality and offensiveness aside, such 
examinations were an unreliable guide to a woman’s status either as a virgin or as a 
fiancee.
After the scandal became public, no staff involved were disciplined,65 while the 
Yellowlees Report assumed that the examinations had ceased, so that the degree of 
official knowledge and collusion remained unexamined. Yet, it is improbable that 
these examinations would have occurred on such a scale without some official 
knowledge if  not sanction. The consent form in the Heathrow case suggests otherwise. 
Moreover, the examinations would have served little purpose unless used in reaching 
decisions. Juss (1997:119-21) refers to Tribunal cases in which reference was made to 
gynaecological examinations and argues that it is “difficult to believe that they [the 
Home Office] were unaware o f what went on” (p.l 19).
59 ‘’’Fiancee tests” end in India’ Daily Telegraph 6th February 1979.
60 ‘Virginity tests on immigrants at Heathrow’ Guardian 1st February 1979.
61 ‘Ordeal has put our wedding at risk’ Daily Telegraph 2nd February 1979.
62 ‘Virginity tests on immigrants at Heathrow’ Guardian 1st February 1979.
63 Her fiance described how she emerged from the ordeal “in tears and trembling” and was 
subsequently barely able to speak and refused to eat or leave the house ( ‘Ordeal has put our wedding at 
risk’ Daily Telegraph 2nd February 1979).
64 ‘Offer o f £500 over airport virginity test’ Times 18th June 1980, ‘Indian woman in virginity test row 
“will reject Home Office cash offer”’ Guardian 19th June 1980, ‘Home Office sued over test o f  
virginity’ Times 1111' February 1982, ‘Virginity Test’ Times 13th July 1982. The offer was rejected and 
legal action was commenced by the husband (it seems the wife may have returned to India) but was 
struck out.
65 Letter from Merlyn Rees, Home Secretary, to David Lane, Chairman, Commission for Racial 
Equality 1st March 1979.
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5.8 The admission of husbands and the primary purpose rule
In 1983, rule changes led to the burden o f proof, including as regards primary 
purpose, being placed upon the applicants. The significance of this was appreciated by 
the entry clearance service. New guidance (available in the Runnymede Collection) 
was issued pointing out that where an application is evenly balanced, the application 
should now be refused. The guidance outlined six areas of questioning to be pursued 
in assessing primary purpose including, most critically, the relevance o f the sponsor’s 
UK residence to the decision to marry. Three examples were given o f hypothetical 
questions that might help clarify the primary purpose issue:
1. If your fiancee did not live in the United Kingdom, would you still go to her 
home to live?
2. If you were not able to live with your fiancee in the United Kingdom, would 
you still marry her?
3. If your family had asked you to marry a local girl, would you have done so?
According to the guidance, a negative response to any o f these would lead to refusal if 
the applicant's “general circumstances or background together indicate that the 
marriage is primarily for immigration purposes". This implicitly sanctioned greater 
scrutiny o f applicants from poor countries. Sondhi (1987:85-8) points out that 
characteristics that would normally be commended, such as eagerness to work or 
remit funds, could now be counted against the applicant.66
Sondhi (1987:82-4) also demonstrates how even affirmative answers to these 
questions could result in refusal. A positive answer to the first question when the 
marriage was otherwise traditional might be considered to lack credibility. If  other 
members o f  the family had complied with ‘tradition', then an immigration motive 
could be ascribed. On the other hand, where other family members had migrated, then 
an immigration motive might equally be assumed. An applicant who claimed he 
would have married the sponsor even if  she did not live in the UK might not be 
believed if  his home circumstances were such that he could not support a wife. An
66 The introduction in 1985 o f  the requirement to show that there will be no recourse to public funds 
complicated this still further as it was feared that arranging a job would lead to an inference o f  primary 
purpose while not having it would cause refusal for reason o f  public funds: ‘A Machiavellian policy’ 
New Society 30m August 1985. The guidance issued in 1987 said that having a job should not be held 
against applicants on primary purpose grounds.
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applicant who answered 'yes' to the third question would be asked about efforts made 
to find a suitable wife at home.
An application would also be refused if the applicant admitted that the primary 
purpose o f the marriage was to gain entry to the UK or if  “the overall tenor" of the 
applicants' answers suggested primary purpose. Sondhi (1987:97) notes the 
“remarkable candour" with which applicants admitted to primary purpose, suggesting 
persistent problems with interpretation or accurate reporting (discussed earlier) 
although the appellate authorities rarely acknowledged this. Some of these 
'adm issions' seemed to have been obtained by leading questions inviting an 
affirmative answer such as “ [h]ave you always, since you were a child, wanted to go 
to the UK?1'.67
Guidance issued in 1987 and reported by Grant (1987) was slightly more guarded. 
It identified eight likely areas o f questioning including the applicants' prospects if he 
remained in his country, previous attempts to settle overseas and the relevance of the 
sponsor’s residence to the marriage. However, it was noted that questions that were 
essentially hypothetical should not be pursued while a purported breach with custom 
was not, o f itself, a reason for refusal (although it presumably was still a factor).
5.9 ‘Tradition’ and ‘custom ’
Despite this slightly more cautious guidance, perceived 'custom ' and 'tradition' were 
often critical factors in applications. Marriages that failed to fit within an ECO's 
template o f a typical marriage could be rejected as ‘primary purpose' marriages.
Elsewhere in this thesis, I have identified the tendency to reduce aspiring 
immigrants to a single dimension, concerned only with emigration and lacking the 
complexity and nuance o f full human beings. This tendency is observable in the 
treatment o f marriage practices. Powell (1992), for example, is critical o f the 
oversimplification o f marriage customs that he encountered in ECO refusals. 
Marriage traditions and rituals on the Asian sub-continent reflect a rich and complex 
heritage and are not reducible to a single set o f inflexible rules. They vary not only by 
country or major religion, but are subject to myriad differences depending on caste, 
class, tribe, family or personal preference. A flavour o f their complexity may be
67 See 'Interviews conducted by entry clearance officers overseas’, paper prepared for submission to 
the Minister o f  State by UK1AS, 29th January 1985 (Runnymede Collection).
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gained from M enski's (2000:24-33) description o f the many possible versions o f the 
Hindu ritual o f saptapadi. Families and individuals attached varying degrees of 
importance to tradition and breaches were commonplace (Powell 1992). Wider social 
changes will inevitably lead to changes in customary practice and Sondhi (1987:101- 
2; see also Ballard 2005:15) argues that ‘tradition' was much less rigid than ECOs 
believed precisely amongst those communities who migrated.
Questions as to custom and tradition provided a potential trap for the unwary 
applicant. In primary purpose cases, applicants would typically be asked whether the 
wedding had conformed to custom as to the arrangements and ceremony. Having 
gained assurances that the marriage was ‘traditional', the ECO would query why, only 
in respect o f the place o f residence, the applicant was breaking with custom by 
moving to join his w ife's family (Sondhi 1987:81, Powell 1993a:22). In practice, and 
despite judicial dicta to the contrary (see A n m  Kumar discussed in chapter 4), the 
simple fact of a spouse application by a male was enough to raise an inference of 
primary purpose (see, for example, Powell 1993a:50).
ECOs referred frequently to the practice o f a wife joining her husband as a 
‘religious’ requirement and asked applicants if  they were ‘good M uslims’ (see, for 
example, Powell 1993a:22, 178). Powell states repeatedly (1990, 1992, 1993a:54, 82, 
125, 170) that the custom was not a rule, had no religious significance and its strength 
could not be deduced from the level o f societal religious feeling.68 Rather, it was a 
flexible custom, breach o f which did not in itself incur disapproval and that might be 
summarised as that a wife will move to her husband’s residence unless there is a good 
reason to do otherwise. It had previously been breached in India due to patterns of 
urbanisation (Shah 1979) and another important reason for its breach was the 
difficulty that British resident women had in adapting to life on the sub-continent 
(Powell 1990). Economic betterment is likely to have played a role. It is usual for a 
married couple to live where their prospects are better and that decision casts little 
light on the motive for the marriage.
Marriages that did not conform in other respects, perhaps because the wife was 
divorced or older were treated sceptically (Sondhi 1987:81). ECOs assumed that a 
divorced woman, if  it were not for her UK residency, would find it very difficult to 
find a husband and the man who married her would do so only on account o f that
68 Note also that Pearl and Menski (1998) do not include such a practice in their extensive survey o f  
Muslim family law.
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residency. The belief was that divorce was rare and a catastrophe particularly for 
women. Menski (2000:47-57, 63-72) demonstrates, with respect to India, that, during 
the period under consideration, while there was resistance to a state-sanctioned system 
o f easy divorce, exit routes from marriage, official and unofficial, were longstanding 
and well used. Muslim divorce law is well established in South Asia (Pearl and 
Menski 1998:292-382). Powell (1992, 1993a: 121 -2; see also, more generally, Ballard 
1990 and Butler 1999:145) argues that, throughout the sub-continent, while divorce 
was a blow, it was by no means an insurmountable one. Divorced women often 
remarried and not only other divorces, widowers or husbands o f lower social standing. 
In particular, women who had suffered at the hands o f a violent or drunken husband 
would be regarded sympathetically. Nonetheless, the UK-based community was 
frequently more rigid in this regard than people on the sub-continent, so that a UK- 
based divorced woman might find it easier to attract a husband from the subcontinent.
ECOs also had firmly held conceptions as to the likely relative ages o f the parties, 
the customary ages for marriage, order o f marriage among siblings and preference for 
cousin marriages (Sondhi 1987:45; Chowdhury 1982:41-42; Powell 1992; Powell 
1993a: 164-6). In all these instances, critics argued that practice was more complex 
and less rigid than ECOs believed (see, in particular, Powell 1992 for an extended 
discussion).
Yet adherence to perceived tradition was sometimes insufficient if  primary purpose 
was suspected due to the absence o f prior emotional involvement or detailed 
knowledge o f the other (Sondhi 1987:88-92; Powell 1993a:16). In this regard, ECOs 
were criticised for failing to appreciate the particular nature o f the spousal relationship 
in an arranged marriage. They were suspicious o f marriages where the parties were o f 
differing educational levels (a characteristic that Ballard 2005:21 regards as more 
probable in Muslim than in Hindu or Sikh marriages). They could not understand how 
an applicant who claimed to love his wife would not be familiar with her day-to-day 
activities, interests or friends. Correspondence might be deemed insufficiently 
affectionate.69
Critics argued that these beliefs mistook the nature o f the South Asian marital 
relationship. Spouses did not necessarily expect to share intellectual or cultural
69 ‘Secret immigration guide “biased to refuse entry”’ Guardian 21s1 March 1984. This tendency was 
not confined to the sub-continent. In one instance, a Jamaican clergyman was refused because his 
letters to his wife were deemed insufficiently affectionate ( ‘Britain barred Jamaican clergyman because 
love letters were too cool.’ Guardian 3rii February 1984).
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interests and daily activities and friendships were not usually matters o f discussion 
between them. They demonstrated the strength o f their feelings through the exercise 
o f their marital duties, expressions o f concern for their health and physical well-being 
and by the husband taking account of his wife’s wishes (see, for example, Powell 
1992 and 1993a:145, 244, 268; Bhabha et al 1985:70).
It was also argued that ECOs’ beliefs in the absolute patriarchy o f Asian society 
misunderstood the nature of gender relations. Thus, where an applicant stated that he 
wished to live in the UK to please his wife, the assertion would be treated with 
incredulity if  there was no evidence o f open affection. ECOs were said to have failed 
to appreciate that notions o f male superiority carried with them, concomitant 
obligations, including consideration of a w ife’s wishes. These gave wives more 
agency than might first appear (Powell 1992, 1993a:82, 179, 244; for a discussion on 
Muslim law in this respect, see Pearl and Menski 1998:177-8, 186-90) despite the 
asymmetry in power (see Siddiqi 2005:290-4 for a discussion in relation to 
Bangladesh).
Applicants who established a love match were at an advantage so far as primary 
purpose was concerned and ECOs enquired closely into such claims. However, they 
assumed a binary divide between a ‘love m atch’ similar to relationships in the West 
on the one hand and an arranged marriage on the other, failing to acknowledge that 
the concept o f love is at least partially culturally determined and that there is no 
inevitable opposition between the two. For example, a love match might be presented 
as an arranged marriage to save face within the wider family or parents might be 
manipulated by ingenious offspring assisted by other relatives. Couples, unfamiliar 
with the extended courtship in the West, would regard an expression o f preference or 
a few minutes spent alone in shy and formal conversation as sufficient to create a 
‘love match’. Parents might engineer a meeting so as to permit their children to 
believe that they had initiated the relationship. Couples would use indirect means o f 
discovering more about the other. Young men might exaggerate and young women 
minimise the length and frequency o f unaccompanied contact for reasons unconnected 
with the hope o f obtaining a visa (Powell 1993a: 125, 331-2, 357).
In none o f these cases would a couple experience the familiarity and intimacy o f a 
typical Western couple and ECOs saw the assertion o f a ‘love m atch’ in the context of 
an arranged marriage as an attempt to deceive them (see, for example, Divided 
Families Campaign 1978:5). Yet many could be credibly described as ‘love matches’
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as well as ‘arranged marriages'. As one failed applicant told Powell (1993a:218), “ ... 
they didn't understand that both things are true — it is an arranged marriage and a love 
match” .
The tone of refusals suggests that ECOs did not accept that, for most, an arranged 
marriage was an accepted and welcome part o f their lives and they expected to 
achieve happiness and fulfilment through it. Powell (1992) argues that, contrary to 
popular Western preconceptions and with some exceptions, parents and children 
perceived little opposition o f interest on the subject o f marriage. While this may have 
been the case for the spouse on the sub-continent, it is less clear that this was always 
so for British-based families (see, for example, Brah 1978, Bhopal 1999, Ballard 1990 
and 2005 and discussion in chapter 6).
ECOs seemed to regard entering an arranged marriage as a grim duty governed by
unchangeable rules, from which romantic expectations or consideration for a w ife’s
feelings must be entirely absent. One explanatory statement (quoted in Powell
1993a:340) expressed this more starkly than most:
“ ... as he [the applicant] had clearly demonstrated (as had his father-in-law) 
that he held strictly traditional views, I considered it pertinent to ask him why 
he was therefore intending to join the sponsor in the United Kingdom. He had 
quite simply explained that, though he could happily withstand the rigours of a 
United Kingdom winter, his sponsor would be unable to cope with the heat of 
a Pakistani summer. Regrettably, I found his contention somewhat 
unbelievable. Additionally, he informed me that all o f the male members of 
his family had previously complied with tradition in that their wives had 
joined them after marriage. Had the appellant succeeded in convincing me that 
his marriage had been motivated by love or even a degree o f mutual affection, 
I would, o f course, have disregarded the customary aspect as being largely 
irrelevant. He had, however, failed to do so. I would therefore respectfully 
submit that, if  one is to expect that the appellant should be granted settlement 
in the United Kingdom on the basis o f a marriage arranged to a girl picked 
entirely because tradition dictated that she was a suitable choice, one must also 
accept that the same traditions should be followed to their logical conclusion”.
ECOs were criticised for a lack o f comprehension o f the complexity and flexibility of 
the arrangements for marriage (Powell 1992; Powell 1993a: 166, 245, 261; for a 
general discussion, see Ballard 1982, 2005). While a male head o f household usually 
undertook formalities, women frequently initiated discussions informally and might 
continue to play a leading role. Children might not be aware o f all the discussions 
particularly informal ones or that other offers had been refused because a particular 
match was desired. A lengthy period o f ‘understanding’ might precede formal
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negotiations, a first match might not proceed or members o f a family might promote 
different candidates, the outcome indicating the site of dominant power. For reasons 
o f family diplomacy, parties might be permitted to believe that their views carried 
greater weight than they did or a ‘love match' might be presented as an arranged 
marriage. An individual's inclination for a match could be gauged indirectly without 
denting a father's ostensible authority.
All o f these could result in ‘discrepancies' as to when and how a match was 
decided (see, for example, Powell 1992, 1993a:377). Meanwhile, failure to 
differentiate between the distinct systems o f ‘dower' or ‘bridewealth' and ‘dowry' led 
to claims that men were ‘buying' a British-based wife (Shah 1979; Ali 1987; on these 
generally, see Pearl 1976; Pearl 1986:30-7; Poulter 1986:40-2 and Pearl and Menski 
1998:178-81). These claims made their way into the British press with predictably
70sensationalist results.
5.10 Emigration as a motive for marriage
By requiring the application to be made abroad, the administrative process created an 
in-built bias towards detecting an emigration motive. Had, as immigrant groups 
requested, the sponsor made the application, the ‘story' would have been the wish o f a 
British resident to be joined by their spouse,71 Instead, the initial tone was determined 
by the applicant’s situation including a wish to emigrate that was an inescapable part 
o f the application but that was, in this way, given immediate prominence.
Critics (for example, Powell 1990 and 1992) argued that the entry clearance 
service exaggerated the importance o f emigration. It is possible that some critics, 
acting within the highly adversarial arena o f entry clearance, tended, in their turn, to 
minimise its impact. It is improbable that such a major phenomenon would not have 
had some effect and commentators such as Ballard (2005:12) suggest that it did. The 
question was not whether emigration was a factor in deciding whom to marry but its 
importance in relation to other reasons. Clearly, this is not a question that can easily
70 ‘Scandal o f  the Brides for Sale’ and ‘Who has caused this heartache?’ Daily Mail 5,1‘ August 1985. 
The reports, which implied such marriages were commonplace, caused an angry reaction within the 
Asian community ( ‘Daily Mail sold out to white prejudice?’ New Life 9th August 1985, ‘Furious 
Asians plan picket o f  Daily M ail’ New Statesman 911* August 1985).
7! This is not an academic point. Appeals frequently succeed because the sponsor, more competent than 
the applicant at negotiating British officialdom, manages to persuade the decision-maker o f their case.
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be retrospectively determined, but it seems likely that the entry clearance service did 
overestimate its role.
While Asian parents might conceive their children's welfare differently to parents 
in the West, they were no less interested in securing it. Writers (for example, CRE 
1978:16-9; Ballard 1982 and 1990) emphasise the corporate nature o f Asian families 
and the expectation that an individual will subordinate individual preference to the 
family’s overall welfare and honour. That does not mean that Asian parents regarded 
their children's happiness as unimportant but that it was best secured through 
supporting and having the continuing protection o f the family. Concern for the 
individual may be compounded by knowledge that their conduct, particularly a girl’s, 
will reflect on the wider family and parents may be anxious to secure matches for 
wayward children (Bhopal 1999). However, a conceptual distinction would not 
necessarily be drawn between the welfare o f the child and that o f the family. There is 
obvious potential for tension particularly when children have been exposed to the 
more individualistic ethos o f Western family life but such tension does not, in itself, 
connote absence o f affection. Thus, except perhaps for a few blinkered individuals, 
few parents would favour a marriage that was only or even mainly for immigration 
purposes while the social importance attached to securing a suitable and lasting union 
also made a casual disposition unlikely.
The impetus towards an international marriage did not originate always on the sub­
continent. While some British-based groups were more likely than others to seek an 
international marriage (Pearl 1986:5; Ballard 2005:13-4), commentators (CRE 
1978:26; Brah 1978; Ballard 1990; Powell 1992; Menski 1999; Ballard 2005) 
describe why families settled in the UK might choose such marriages for their 
children. Parents, anxious lest children abandon their culture and values, saw marriage 
as a way to cement these and to reinforce links with their country and culture of 
origin. They also perceived pressure from the overseas community for an active 
demonstration o f their own continuing adherence to tradition (Poulter 1976:590; 
Butler 1999:145). Children, by contrast, displayed ambivalent and even contradictory 
attitudes towards arranged marriages in general and international arranged marriages 
in particular. Brah writing in 1978 (199-200) found that, while some young people 
adopted aspects o f British mores outside the home and were critical o f traditional 
arrangements, few displayed a firm intention o f defying their parents5 wishes. They 
were not persuaded that the benefits o f choosing their own spouse outweighed the loss
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of familial security and relationships and they were aware o f  the particular pressures 
on non-arranged marriages. Writing twenty years later, Bradby (1999:156) also found 
that women sought to modify rather than undermine the arranged marriage system. 
Wholesale rejection o f the system was thus elusive, although Poulter (1986:26-7) 
reports that while many acknowledged the benefits o f an arranged marriage, they 
were less convinced that it would survive long in Britain. They were also much less 
enthusiastic about marriage to a partner brought directly from the subcontinent (CRE 
1978:28-9). Ballard (1990:18-9 and 2005:13-14) argues that Sikh and Hindu children 
were more likely than Muslims to resist an international marriage and more successful 
at diverting their parents from such a course or at persuading them to look to the 
wider diaspora.
International marriages nonetheless remained common. Apart from the preference 
o f some children to trust their parents’ judgement or to comply with their wishes, 
some British-based young men regarded women raised in the UK as insufficiently 
domesticated and preferred a wife from the subcontinent. As men found wives from 
the subcontinent and elsewhere, British Asian women were forced to face the 
consequences of a growing gender imbalance in the marriage market (Menski 1999). 
British-born women, particularly those at a disadvantage in the marriage market, 
might therefore welcome an international marriage. In promoting international 
marriages, UK-based parents made adjustments to minimise potential difficulties for 
their children, perhaps preferring families with whom they were already familiar or 
conceding their children a prior meeting and a right o f veto. It was thus plausible that, 
irrespective o f any immigration considerations, some UK-based parents would seek 
and their children accept a spouse, including a male spouse, from the sub-continent.
Having decided upon an international marriage, there would be little point entering 
into discussions with families unwilling to contemplate emigration. In terms of 
identifying a suitable spouse, Ballard (1990:9-10) distinguishes between endogamous 
marriages undertaken in Hindus and Sikh communities, on the one hand, and Muslims 
(in his study, those from Mirpur) who would feel bound to offer their children to 
relatives. In the former case, parents could enter into negotiations with any suitable 
family. Ballard (2005:12) describes British families o f Punjabi origin as “besieged” 
by offers including from those o f higher status. Powell (1992) argues however that 
only a relatively small segment o f society was involved. The poor, uneducated or 
feckless had little hope o f making such a match while the wealthy and educated
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usually had no need to emigrate. In Muslim families, on the other hand, obligations o f 
kinship meant that UK-based families usually turned first to members of their own 
family. Failing to do so could have serious implications for family relations.
From the perspective o f those on the subcontinent, emigration might be one o f the 
attractions o f a UK marriage. However, this is not as straightforward as first appears. 
Powell (1992; see also Ballard 1990:12) argues that a man who emigrated was not 
necessarily the primary beneficiary o f his move.72 He exchanged his social networks 
and personal autonomy outside the home for relatively low social status and poorly 
paid unskilled work in the UK. His earnings provided remittances for those left 
behind and domestic appliances that made his w ife's life easier. Fie may well have 
preferred not to join his w ife's family, regarding it as a comparative loss o f status. His 
gains except in terms o f local prestige were less evident.
If emigration benefited his entire family as much as or more than himself, then, 
even discounting, as ECOs did, gains in terms o f personal fulfilment, it is difficult to 
see how an applicant’s primary motive for the marriage could have been emigration. 
It would be more accurate to say that his reason for accepting the match was to please 
or assist his family. ECOs tended to conflate the two motives. Yet, if  the applicant’s 
family is brought into consideration, it becomes even harder to identify a single 
predominant motive. The previous account describes some o f the complexities of the 
arranged marriage, the multiplicity o f interests and the web o f spoken and unspoken 
arrangements that preceded its fulfilment. Emigration may have been a factor but it 
was usually only one amongst many (see, for example, Ballard 2005:12; see also the 
case studies in Powell 1992, 1993a and 1993b). In most cases, it would be hard to 
identify a single dominant reason. Certainly, it would be difficult for the applicant to 
do so with any accuracy in the interview conditions already described. Failure 
however would, in all likelihood, mean refusal on primary purpose grounds.
The issue becomes clearer if  the question o f emigration is separated from that o f 
the arranged marriage. Elsewhere (Wray 2006d), I have suggested that the literature 
on marriage demonstrates that it is not possible to establish a binary divide between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ reasons for marriage. In non-arranged marriages, people may marry 
for ‘love’, but they do not fall in love by chance. They seek out and are attracted to
72 Migration theorists have pointed out the complexity o f  reasons for emigration including family- 
related emigration. Smith (2004), for example, is critical o f  the tendency to reduce motivation to the 
purely economic.
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those whose qualities and circumstances complement and enhance their own. Those 
who are interested in emigrating are likely to be attracted to a spouse who can offer 
that possibility. Yet, the ‘emigration' motive cannot easily be disentangled from the 
other reasons for wishing to marry and, in Western discourse, the specific motivation 
that may underlie mutual attraction is downplayed and rarely specified.
The problem for those in arranged marriages was that, just as in other forms o f 
marriage, emigration may have been a partial motive but they were unable to persuade 
entry clearance officers that other motives existed. These concerned questions of 
family obligation, caste, social or professional status rather than the individual 
characteristics that would normally be cited in non-arranged marriages. However, in 
the absence o f the conventional discourse of romance, these less familiar reasons for 
choosing a partner were either poorly understood or discounted and the immigration 
motive assumed to predominate. As described so often in this thesis, the entry 
clearance officer viewed the applicant only as an aspiring immigrant.
ECOs were thus able to over-apply the primary purpose rule. The rule did not state 
that any immigration motive was fatal. The applicant should fail only if  the 
immigration motive was the primary one. ECOs assumed that a marriage that was not 
a ‘love m atch', and where the husband wished to join the wife, was predominantly 
motivated by immigration.
5.11 The invisible sponsor
If  the applicant was perceived only as an aspiring immigrant, the sponsor was largely 
invisible. In part, this was a function of the process in which, at least until appeal, the 
sponsor was more a bystander than a participant. However, this lack o f presence was 
arguably more than an accidental by-product o f administrative systems. It represents 
part o f a persistent tendency to marginalise British residents and citizens who, by 
conducting their personal lives in unapproved ways, display insufficient regard for the 
need to prove themselves as entirely British and to qualify as full belongers. This was 
particularly true o f women.
There were two major categories o f sponsor in the period under discussion. In 
earlier years, in the system o f family reunification, husbands who had emigrated alone 
wanted their wives and children to jo in  them. In later years, the children o f these 
immigrants, born in the UK or moving there during childhood, grew up and entered
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into international marriages. In this scenario o f family formation, the typical failed 
sponsor in these instances was a young Asian woman whose husband or fiance was 
refused on primary purpose or, in later years, on financial grounds.
In both cases, legislative and administrative measures were used to minimise the 
numbers of non-white immigrants accepted. In both cases, the usual defence was the 
need to detect the presumed large number of bogus applications. The position of the 
sponsor was only occasionally considered but when it was, it was the alien aspect of 
their conduct that was emphasised.
In relation to men who had emigrated for work, I have already described the 
rationalisation given in the Hawley report, that these men had chosen to leave their 
families for many years, in a way described as ‘barbaric' and were therefore 
presumably unconcerned at further separation. Ballard (1990:3) paints a different 
picture. Migrants were torn between their desire to be with their families and the gains 
in these families' material welfare that their UK work permitted. Ballard (1994:16) 
also describes immigrants’ reluctance to reconstitute their families in the alien 
environment o f the UK, a reluctance that was particularly marked amongst 
Bangladeshis. It was only over a period, and at varying paces within the different 
communities, that men accepted that what had started as temporary was now 
permanent and called for their families, only to be refused or delayed by many 
additional years.
There was little official contemplation o f the hardship caused to young female 
sponsors. The belief was that, consistent with tradition, such women should join their 
husbands on the subcontinent. Critics argued that this was often not a practical option 
as, unused to the climate and environment, women frequently endured continuous ill 
health and depression-related complaints (see Powell 1992). In the same work, Powell 
provides a vivid first person account o f a British woman who attempted to live with 
her much-loved husband and his family in Pakistan. She eventually attempted suicide, 
became seriously ill and returned to the UK, but her husband’s application to join her 
was nonetheless refused.
The suffering o f women who remained in the UK without their husbands was 
perhaps even more invisible. Menski (1999) drew attention to increases in reports o f 
psychological and physical ailments. Outside the small sphere o f  critics, arranged 
marriages were discussed principally in terms o f immigration, coercion and 
oppression (see, for example, the comments made by parliamentarians in chapter 3)
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that precluded acknowledging the loneliness and sexual frustration o f the 
‘immigration widows', emotions that Asian women anyway had difficulty 
expressing.7'1 Instead, they were criticised for their “manipulation and selective regard 
o f a tradition’' (Powell 1993a:224; see also at 179-80, 362).
In all instances, the suffering imposed on victims of a restrictive policy was 
minimised or they themselves were held responsible for their distress. The state 
declined to enable British residents or citizens to exercise family life in their own 
country. A recurrent theme in this thesis has been a hierarchy o f deserving marriages, 
this being determined by both the character of the marriage and the extent to which 
the parties are belongers. The parties here suffered the double disadvantage o f having 
entered marriages that were not easily comprehended by the majority population and 
of being, at best, only partial belongers.
This was perhaps predictable in respect o f those who had themselves previously 
emigrated to the UK as children or adults. It is more remarkable in the case o f those 
who had been born in the UK. As indicated in chapters 3 and 4, non-white residents 
were often seen predominantly as immigrants even in the second generation. They 
had to prove that they deserved to enter the privileged category o f ‘belonger*. Non­
white males were the least desirable o f immigrants and the women who married them 
had, by that act, further marginalised themselves.
In choosing correctly, sponsors had to reject ambiguity and ambivalence. Hawley,
defending restrictive policies, described South Asian men as “men o f two worlds” and
the family as having “a foot in both camps” . There were similar criticisms o f female
sponsors. An explanatory statement quoted in Powell (1993a: 224), makes the point
(punctuation added):
“While I accepted that she had been bom in the United Kingdom, had spent 
most o f her life there, might well have preferred to remain there, I considered 
that by entering into an arranged marriage she had shown herself to be 
constrained by the traditional dictates o f her society” .
A woman was either ‘traditional’, entering an arranged marriage and residing on the 
subcontinent or ‘m odem ’, which presumably meant marrying a UK spouse. Like the 
judiciary, ECOs did not view favourably UK residents who attempted to have ‘the 
best o f both w orlds’. It also points up another recurring theme, the reduction of
73 The ‘Immigration W idows’ were a campaigning group established in 1985; ‘She has never seen her 
father’ Observer 6th January 1985.
173
complex individual lives to simplistic categories that permitted their marginalisation 
or exclusion.
5.12 The two-dimensional applicant
In more sympathetic accounts, individuals break the bounds o f these reductionist 
categories. Powell (1993a and 1993b), for example, carried out detailed investigation 
into a number o f refused applicants. His careful interviews and observations 
emphasise these applicants' humanity. For example, he describes their shyness, 
embarrassment, inexperience, blind romanticism and even their giggling. Some o f his 
accounts are deeply moving, such as the deaf and dumb sponsor whose husband was 
refused on primary purpose grounds (Powell 1993a:83-98). The ECO was dismissive, 
believing the sponsor to be an unattractive prospect and that the applicant would 
surely have preferred to marry her younger sister. Investigation by Powell revealed 
that the applicant had been orphaned as a child and had come to live with the 
sponsor’s family. Both had been lonely children and had developed an exceptionally 
close bond using their personal sign language. The sponsor had moved to the UK 
because o f the better facilities there, but the couple were deeply attached and 
distraught at the separation.
If  Powell’s observations bring to mind the empathy and attention to human detail 
o f  good literature, the responses o f ECOs suggest the stereotyping and 
oversimplification o f poor fiction. It will be apparent from the prior commentary that 
ECOs regarded applicants as governed by rigid rules o f conduct, guided by a single 
overwhelming motive and ready to compromise their entire future family life for the 
sake o f emigration. This portrayal lacked the complexity and nuance that are 
characteristically human.
From this reductionism, other judgements followed. Applicants were not regarded 
as capable o f the tangled relationships, uncertainty and ambiguity that are the stuff o f 
human life. An ECO, for instance, could not believe that a poor husband would have 
tolerated an affair between his wife and a wealthy friend who paid money that enabled 
the family to eat (Powell 1993b:63-86),
The earlier reference to fiction is deliberately made in a context in which decision­
m akers’ function was to establish fact. In earlier chapters, I argued for the central 
function o f interpretation in decision-making. That interpretation is based, whether
174
immediately or at several removes, on what the decision-maker ultimately assumes to 
be true about the world. In deciding whether to accept or reject, the decision-maker 
constructs a narrative out o f facts as he perceives them. An administrative decision­
maker does not have the luxury of being able to ponder, as a novelist may, the endless 
permutations o f possible motivation. But it is precisely for this reason that the 
baseline assumptions are so important. It is according to these that the pressing and 
immediate decision will be made.
The reductionist assumptions described here were sometimes applied to an entire
population. Hawley describes Sylhet in the following terms:
‘T he  villagers themselves are quiet, decent farming folk living in a 
countryside which is, at least in November, very beautiful. They produce 
considerable quantities o f rice and seem to live relatively well. Their houses 
are clean and those of the ‘Londonis' ... are usually larger and more 
pretentious than others.”
Hawley, it must be recalled, was an advocate o f strong restrictions on the admission 
of dependants. Elsewhere in his report, he talks o f an emigration ‘industry' and 
widespread forgery. These ‘decent' folk in their ‘clean' homes were unwelcome 
outsiders so far as the UK was concerned. There is even a suggestion that this was for 
their own good; ‘pretentious’ is preferred to ‘comfortable’ or even ‘luxurious’ in 
describing the improved homes o f ‘Londonis’. The tone recalls the paternalistic 
ideology o f colonialism and its representation o f the simple native. The reduction, 
described in this chapter, o f complex human beings to cardboard cutout figures 
desperate to emigrate did not arise as a purely spontaneous response to administrative 
pressures. While it conveniently rationalised the refusal of unwanted immigrants, it 
was also directly connected to the assumptions that had made the immigration o f 
these individuals such an apparently potent threat.
5.13 Conclusion
This thesis argues that decision-makers at all levels have discretion and that, in 
exercising that discretion, they make choices that rely, eventually if  not immediately, 
on assumptions about the nature o f the world. The entry clearance service made 
distinct choices that suggest particular assumptions were held. They defended these 
by asserting certain factual positions described in this chapter and which critics 
disputed. This chapter has not set out to refute or justify definitively the correctness o f
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these positions. It has however argued that the entry clearance service consistently 
interpreted and responded to applicants' claims in ways that minimised the chances o f 
an application succeeding and, in doing so, reduced applicants to diminished human 
beings whose every action was dominated by the desire to emigrate.
It is thus consistent with the administrative practices described here to argue that 
the essential premise o f  decision-making was that immigration from the subcontinent 
must be minimised and that this outweighed the damage caused by the refusal of 
entitled applicants or the manner o f their refusal.74 The imperative was particularly 
strong in the case o f family members due to fear o f an endless chain o f  migration,73 
and entry clearance staff saw themselves as gatekeepers protecting the integrity o f the 
host society.76 The premise that non-white immigration must be minimised thus 
arguably amounted to an informal internal policy. It was applied with remarkable 
consistency and thoroughness throughout the period. The reported approach taken 
towards queues, documentary evidence, interviews, medical examinations, factual 
findings and local customs all converged towards the same end, namely that the 
applicant should be refused if  possible. The CRE (1985:50-1; see also Lai and Wilson 
1986:21) saw material indicating that “in some cases, at least, the prospect o f securing 
refusals of entry clearances would generate greater enthusiasm than that of issuing 
them”. File notes suggested that even where entry clearances were issued, staff did so 
with reluctance. The Hawley Report argued that applying the correct standard of 
proof would reduce job satisfaction amongst entry clearance staff, who would be 
nothing more than “rubber stamps”. Refusal was arguably the unofficial primary 
function o f the service.77
In minimising the number o f successful applications, decision-makers acted as if  
certain other propositions were true. These may be summarised as:
o There was a strong desire on the part o f many people from that region to 
emigrate to the UK;
o This desire was so strong that even life-long decisions such as marriage 
would be determined by it;
74 See ‘Natural selection’ Times Education Supplement 7th June 1985.
75 See, for example. ‘The Law’s Delays’ Guardian 21st March 1975.
76 ‘The bridal path to Britain’ Daily Mail February 28th 1978, ‘Immigration: the first hurdle’ Daily 
Telegraph 2nd December 1985.
77 This was widely alleged at the time; see, for example, ‘The Middle Class Asian Vote’ New  
Statesman 30lh November 1984.
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o Many applicants were willing to forge documents and lie in order to come
to the UK. These forgeries and fabrications might be very elaborate and 
demanded minute examination o f claims; 
o Sponsors, presumably for financial reward or for reasons o f family
obligation, would frequently try to pass others off as their own wife or 
child;
o Errors and inconsistencies in interview were attributable usually to the non­
existence o f  the claimed relationship; 
o South Asian people were governed by a set o f inflexible social customs,
deviation from which was usually the outcome o f a wish to emigrate; 
o Arranged marriages took little account of the perceived welfare o f the
parties and might just as easily be arranged for immigration reasons as for 
any other.
o The parties to an arranged marriage had no feelings o f obligation or
affection towards each other.
The emphasis on fraud and deceit suggests that, as well as the official requirements of 
the rules, entry clearance officers perceived themselves as moral gatekeepers. Non­
white applicants faced the unofficial hurdle o f demonstrating that, despite 
appearances to the contrary, they merited even provisional admission to the club of 
‘belonger’.
Sponsors were less commonly the focus o f specific attention but their claim to live 
in their home with their choice o f spouse carried little weight against the imperative of 
controlling non-white immigration. Even those born or raised in the UK remained 
partial outsiders. Moreover, in marrying and seeking entry for unwanted immigrants, 
they threw into question even their partial status as ‘belongers’. The binary divide 
between the ‘m odem ’ UK and the ‘traditional’ subcontinent did not permit 
ambivalence. British-based women, in particular, were afforded little credibility if  
they claimed to have determined the place o f residence when entering an arranged 
marriage. Female agency was thus confined only to those acting in accordance with 
Western norms, the stereotype o f Asian female oppression and passivity being 
presumed unbreakable.
It was stated above that entry clearance officers acted “as i f ’ the propositions 
described were tine because, if  the dominant priority was the minimisation o f South
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Asian immigration, their adoption could have been self-serving. It is likely that not all 
entry clearance officers believed them to be universally true. The official quoted 
earlier on the reliability of discrepancies suggests that some individuals had a degree 
o f perspective. In recent informal conversations (see chapter 6), several entry 
clearance officers expressed relief that the primary purpose rule no longer applies and 
one longstanding official spoke o f “shame" at earlier practices. The oversimplification 
of applicants' lives may have been partially the outcome o f administrative pressure, a 
question explored at more length in chapter 6. The extreme nature of some refusals 
raises the possibility that decision-makers were seeking to justify what they knew to 
be unjustifiable, the over-use of discrepancies being the most egregious example of 
specious reasoning called in aid of a pre-determined end.
Yet, had the application o f these propositions been utterly incongruent with how 
most decision-makers viewed the world, it is difficult to see how they could have 
been applied so consistently. The interviewing style described earlier suggests a 
degree o f personal commitment, and the CRE (1985:50) reported that file notes 
sometimes betrayed a “contemptuous or dismissive attitude to applicants” . The 
toleration of intimate physical examinations of women from a culture known for its 
emphasis on personal modesty particularly for women suggests contempt for that 
culture projected onto its most vulnerable members. There were frequent allegations 
o f racism throughout the immigration service as a whole.78 Doubtless, some 
applicants on the subcontinent were lacking in honesty or motivated purely by the 
wish to emigrate, and false documents and incorrect information were put forward 
although not necessarily for reasons o f dishonesty. To conclude, as ECOs seemed to, 
that every application therefore required minute dissection suggests a dismal view o f 
that entire society.
The exclusionary logic was circular. 1 have demonstrated in chapter 3 how political 
debate was characterised by extreme anxiety about non-white immigration. Non-white 
immigrants were unwanted because of underlying assumptions o f racial difference 
and superiority. These assumptions were given more specific expression in order to 
rationalise refusal.
There is little evidence that the beliefs discussed here were qualified by other 
values. In the two preceding chapters, the decisions made by the legislature and by
78 ‘Migrant “rackets” protest’ Guardian 9th January 1969, ‘Fool or Liar’ Caribbean Times 7th December 
1984.
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judges were scrutinised. In both cases, it was observed that, while certain assumptions 
could be detected, these were tempered, at least momentarily, by the presence o f other 
values connected with their self-perception as legislators or as judges. In other 
instances, these professed values (for example, humanity or justice) were in direct 
conflict with the immigration policies that they were creating or enforcing. Yet, 
legislators and judges avoided having to confront this lack of congruity because, for 
the most part, the inconsistent acts were performed by the immigration service out of 
sight. Thus, politicians could present the primary purpose rule as an anti-abuse 
measure or judges could avoid challenging unbalanced decision-making by deferring 
to the fact-fmder. These evasions notwithstanding, they were institutions that had to 
explain themselves publicly in terms that would be considered morally acceptable 
both by outsiders and, presumably, by the institution's own members.
The entry clearance service does not appear to have been subject to these 
countervailing pressures. The need to minimise non-white immigration was accepted 
by all three bodies discussed in this chapter, but the entry clearance service did so 
with least equivocation. It adopted modes o f thinking and procedures that suggest a 
strong and unregulated culture. Despite having the fewest formal powers, the service 
was, in practice, the least accountable. This is consistent with the ubiquity o f 
discretion argued for in this thesis and was, it may also be argued, not coincidental. Its 
relative autonomy enabled the unpleasant work o f exclusion to be carried on, without 
compromising more than necessary, the apparent integrity o f the other bodies. The 
means by which an institutional culture may fulfil vital but unofficial purposes was 
discussed in chapter 2 o f this thesis. There was a largely invisible but vital connection 
between the daily prevarication and scepticism displayed by the most junior members 
o f the entry clearance service, the political preoccupations o f legislators and 
government described in chapter 3 and the pattern of judicial decision-making 
identified in chapter 4. This connection consisted o f the values, beliefs and 
assumptions identified in this chapter and which were also, with modifications, 
identified in the preceding chapters. The extent to which they continue to hold is 
going to form the subject o f the analysis in chapter 6.
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Chapter 6: Marriage immigration since 1997
The previous three chapters were concerned with control o f marriage immigration 
from 1962 until 1997. They argued that, while attitudes evolved throughout the period 
and there was some variation between institutions, there was also present a consistent 
strand of shared assumptions that resulted in common patterns o f decision-making. 
This chapter considers the period after 1997 and argues that it has been one of fluidity 
and ambivalence and that this is reflected in the treatment o f marriage immigration by 
the same institutions.
The first section o f this chapter briefly reviews immigration policy generally since 
1997. The following section considers the position o f the communities o f South Asian 
origin who were the main focus o f measures discussed in earlier chapters. Subsequent 
sections consider legislative, judicial and administrative activity in respect of 
marriage immigration since 1997 and contain the evidence o f ambivalence that this 
thesis has identified as a significant element in recent developments in this field.
6.1 The right kind o f immigrant: immigration policy since 1997
In the comparatively lengthy period discussed in the three preceding chapters, the 
dominant policy priority was clearly the reduction o f non-white immigration. 
Marriage was an essential link in the apparently never-ending chain o f migration from 
poor non-white countries particularly the Indian sub-continent. Attempts to break this 
chain absorbed large quantities o f political and administrative effort.
New priorities have emerged since 1997. Government policy has been largely 
directed towards the management o f immigration in a changed global and national 
context. This context includes the presence o f well-established non-white 
communities, the increased movement o f workers, refugees and asylum seekers from 
all parts o f the world, an enlarged European Union, an ageing domestic population 
and labour shortages (see the discussion in Lewis and Neal 2005:424-6). Race 
equality and human rights laws have been extended to immigration control (with 
qualifications)1 and racialised discourse has been rejected at least in part (Flynn
1 Immigration officers may discriminate on grounds o f  nationality or ethnicity if  authorised by a 
minister o f  the Crown (S.19D Race Relations Act 1976). The relationship between race discrimination 
and immigration control merits detailed study following R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport ex
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2005:484; Yuval-Davis et al 2005:521). On the other hand, public anxiety, the 
electoral potential o f far right parties and security concerns have encouraged 
restrictive policies and curbs on the civil liberties of illegal immigrants and asylum 
seekers (see Flynn 2005; Sales 2005; Wolton 2006 and Yuval-Davis et al. 2005). In 
attempting to balance these opposing forces, the government has made strenuous 
efforts to present immigration as a force to be managed for the national benefit, a 
strategy that carries obvious risks.
Since the London bombings in July 2005, there has also been heightened concern 
about cohesion and integration. The government has sought to minimise social 
tensions by encouraging or even forcing integration by immigrants, measures that 
have had significant implications also for longer-established communities and which 
have led to a renewed focus on international arranged marriages.
The benefits o f immigration were given cautious prominence in the early days o f 
the Labour government. Flynn (2005:464) notes that IND policy, as summarised in its 
Annual Reports, switched in 1997 from being “ to restrict severely” immigration to its 
“regulation”. Politicians also began to give voice to this change o f  emphasis.2 There 
followed large increases in immigration for instrumental purposes. While skilled 
workers, innovators and entrepreneurs had privileged status and were encouraged to 
settle, unskilled workers were permitted only temporary entry without family 
members (Flynn 2005:465). At the time o f writing, even these limited opportunities 
are in decline except for nationals o f recent EU Accession States.
Another major priority during this period has been to limit the number of 
successful asylum claims. These have been persistently associated with welfare abuse, 
criminality, terrorism and other security issues (Chakrabarti 2005; Sales 2005:448). 
Numbers of asylum claims have declined since their peak in 2002 (Heath et al. 2005) 
although a major issue has been the government’s inability to remove failed asylum 
seekers (Home Affairs Committee 20061:141). The rise in asylum seekers prompted 
major efforts to reduce the number o f applicants and speed up processes including 
withdrawal of welfare support, an unsuccessful attempt to oust the judicial review 
function o f the courts (discussed in Rawlings 2005) and restrictions on in-country
p. ERRC [2004] UKHL 55(see Wray 2006b: 125 fn 67). Obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 
have sometimes been interpreted conservatively by the UK courts; see the discussion on the judicial 
attitudes later in this chapter.
2 First indications were in a speech ‘UK migration in a global econom y’ by the former Home Office 
minister, Barbara Roche, to a conference organised by the Institute o f  Public Policy Research in 
September 2000. See also Sales (2005:445-6).
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appeals. These have been criticised as failing to differentiate adequately between 
'genuine' claimants and the non-entitled (Hassan 2004; Chakrabarti 2005) and have 
become associated with an authoritarian trend in government. Asylum decision­
making has been criticised in terms that are reminiscent of the critique of the entry 
clearance service made in the previous chapter (see. for example, Amnesty 
International UK 2004; Independent Asylum Commission 2008).
The immigration service has also faced huge administrative problems. Badly 
managed computer systems and rising numbers of applicants caused long delays, 
administrative chaos and loss o f control at least over asylum applications (McKee 
2005:254; Home Affairs Committee 2006.111:190).
These problems combined to create a perceived loss of governmental control. The 
government has fought this impression through constant organisational and regulatory 
reform. Six Acts of Parliament have been passed since 1997. The Immigration Rules 
were amended more than 25 times in just the three years between the start o f 2004 and 
the end o f  2006. There have been numerous White Papers, Consultation Documents 
and reorganisations. Managerialist terminology such as “managed migration”, “five 
year plan” or “new asylum model” has been adopted to describe these programmes of 
regulatory or organisational reform. Despite the frenetic pace o f change, however, 
critics doubt whether the reassertion o f state power is a realisable objective given 
multiple and conflicting internal and external pressures (Flynn 2005).
Nonetheless, the aim remains the “comprehensive management o f  all form s o f  
migration, whether forced or voluntary” and the “reassertion of the capacity for state 
control” (Flynn 2005:464-5; emphasis in the original). The increasingly harsh rhetoric 
and measures against those present without leave reflects the growing predominance 
o f this goal so that it has sometimes trumped even economic benefit as with the 
prohibition on asylum seekers working, even when they have skills in short supply.
Various areas o f immigration policy have been reoriented towards greater state 
control. Switching between categories has been curtailed. Plans for e-borders, 
biometric visas and identity cards are under way and the internal surveillance of 
immigrants has increased. Entry for work is to be decided on a points basis that can be 
more easily adjusted to changing economic requirements. Residence, naturalisation 
and, it is planned, admission itself, depends or will depend upon compliance with 
state-generated criteria for demonstrating sufficient integration.
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Given global inequalities, the new emphasis does not make race irrelevant but it 
has become less prominent (Sales 2005:458). Wealthy non-white entrepreneurs may 
encounter fewer difficulties than before but it is doubtful whether poor migrants who 
are often but not exclusively non-white receive better treatment. Criticism o f decision­
making has not been confined to the asylum system. Muslims from poor countries 
seem to have been particularly disadvantaged in the period after 9/11 (Citizens Advice 
Bureau 2003; Lindsley 2006). Social class is arguably becoming more important in 
immigration control at the partial expense o f race.
Skin colour and national origins however seem still to remain the unspoken 
standard for judging the moral seriousness o f transgression. For instance, a national 
newspaper published a first-hand, humorous account o f an American national 
planning to enter a sham marriage so as to remain in the UK and who was deflected 
only by falling in love at the last moment with another woman (fortunately also 
British).3 The skin colour o f the protagonists is unknown but it is difficult to envisage 
an Asian or African national being uncritically permitted to say that, “I 'd  viewed 
marriage as an administrative hurdle to be cleared on my way to a visa” . Non-white 
immigrants may be less unwelcome than before but they must establish themselves as 
the right kind o f immigrant. Such an expectation extends also to some British 
communities o f immigrant descent. This is discussed in the next section.
6.2 An uneasy belonging: residents of South Asian origin and  
international arranged marriages
Previous chapters argued that some immigrants and even their British-born 
descendants were perceived as permanent outsiders. Others have made similar 
observations (Yuval-Davis et al 2005:529). Those entering international arranged 
marriages are even less likely to become ‘belongers’. This tendency has persisted 
particularly if  ‘belonging' is to be understood as more than the ownership o f formal 
legal rights (Yuval-Davis et al 2005:526-7). The argument made in this thesis, that 
choosing a spouse has always been considered a statement o f allegiance as well as a 
personal choice, remains valid.
The period discussed in the previous chapters ended in June 1997 with the 
abolition o f the primary purpose rule. A Labour government had been elected on a
3 The Guardian Weekend 25th May 2002 p.57.
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wave of popularity after eighteen years of Conservative rule. Removal of primary 
purpose had symbolic as well as practical importance, enabling a clear distinction to 
be made with the outlook of the preceding regime. Asian communities were now well 
established in the second or third generation and were an electoral force particularly 
for Labour MPs. Unusually for a liberalising measure, removal of the rule had been 
promised in the 1997 election manifesto.4
There followed efforts to develop a new paradigm in the conceptualisation of 
integration and citizenship. ‘Citizenship' became a compulsory part o f the state school 
curriculum in 2002. Acquiring indefinite leave to remain or naturalisation now 
requires knowledge o f language and life in the UK and, for those naturalising, 
participation in a citizenship ceremony. From 2008, those entering for work will have 
to demonstrate English language competence. It has recently been proposed that this 
should be extended to spouses and this remains a ‘medium-term' goal even if  the 
government has retreated from implementation for the present (Border and 
Immigration Agency 2007a; UK Border Agency 2008a).
There have been attempts to move away from the racialised discourse o f the past 
while not avoiding controversial questions as to the common values implied by 
citizenship (see, for example, Spencer 1995; Goodhart 2004a and 2004b; Parekh 
2005). This has proved difficult given the mutability o f national identity and the 
absence o f agreed notions o f ‘Britishness' (Parekh 1995; Spencer 1995; Ballard 2002; 
Ascherson 2005), the problems o f separating race, ethnicity and culture (Ballard 
2002), the coded meanings that may be present (Gedalof 2007) and the rise of 
‘cultural fundamentalism' (Kofman et al. 2000:37). The problem has frequently been 
framed as a “crisis o f multiculturalism'' (Lewis and Neal 2005:431), without offering 
an acceptable alternative framework, underscoring for minorities their fragile sense of 
belonging (see Kymlicka and Banting 2006:300-4 for a more extended discussion).
This tendency has been exacerbated by the ‘war on terror', given the Manichean 
division implied by the term (Lewis and Neal 2005:434). Discussion, particularly 
since the London bombings o f July 2005, has become enmeshed in broader debate 
about the continuing reliance by minorities on their own social, cultural, linguistic and 
legal frameworks. The academic literature on pluralism and multiculturalism has long 
investigated and argued about precisely these issues (for example, Goulboume 1991;
4 Labour Party Manifesto 1997 fhttp://www.Iabour-partv.org.uk/manifestos/1997/I997-laboiir- 
manifesto.shtmQ.
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Okin 1997; Jones and Welhengama 2000; Murphy 2000; Yilmaz 2002; Yuval-Davis 
et al 2005:523). Popular discussion has not always been successful in finding 
mutually acceptable terms of debate, causing polarisation and mistrust?
The situation is complex and fluid. Publicly racist discourse is generally now 
unacceptable, arguably representing a substantive shift in attitudes (Goodhart 2005) 
although how far it has disappeared from private speech is debatable. New waves of 
immigration have made older immigrant communities relatively familiar and there has 
been some incorporation o f these longer-standing groups (Ballard 2002; Yuval-Davis 
et al. 2005:521). The growing strength o f the Indian economy has begun to undermine 
the assumption that economic betterment is a one-way journey with reports o f  British 
Asians returning to the subcontinent.6
But this is not the entire story as demonstrated by continuing problems o f poverty, 
unemployment and underachievement among these communities (Samad and Eade 
2002: chapter 2; Peach 2006), the riots in Northern cities in 2001 and the presentation 
o f ‘integration’ issues. In acknowledging the insecurities o f the ethnic British (and 
particularly the English), it is sometimes difficult to avoid legitimising those who see 
race as the paramount determinant o f difference (see, for example, Hildyard’s 2003 
critique o f Rowthorn 2003). Racism has arguably focused on new targets including 
ethnic groups less easily distinguishable by skin colour such as Roma and Travellers 
(ECRI 2004:6), religion (particularly Islam), cultural practices and asylum seekers. 
Commentators (for example, Ballard 2002) have argued that concern at cultural 
difference and calls for integration have replaced visible racial difference as a means 
o f asserting dominance.
Many have pointed out the one-sided nature o f the integration process (Parekh 
2005, Yuval-Davis et al. 2005:527; Gedalof 2007:81). The greatest challenge to 
traditional concepts o f sovereignty and identity is arguably the supra-national force o f 
globalisation which “brings into question the very meaning o f citizenship” (Shaw 
2002:511). Yet responsibility for cohesion and protecting national identity has been 
placed most heavily upon the weakest and most marginalised whose personal lives are 
seen as critical in creating the threat to nationhood (Gedalof 2007:91-2).
5 Typical was the ‘veil debate’ conducted through the press after Cabinet minister, Jack Straw revealed 
in October 2006 that he asked veiled women to remove their niqab during constituency surgeries.
6 ‘Role reversal Brits head to India’ BBC N ews 12th December 2006 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- 
/ l/h i/uk/6171837.stm).
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This focus on the personal lives o f the immigrant and o f those o f immigrant 
descent encourages complacency within the majority population. It is less challenging 
to frame the debate between alien immigrant values and coherent majority values than 
to acknowledge the divisions within British society (as Wolton 2006 argues in relation 
to the political elite). Immigration is perceived (whether correctly or not) to be one 
area in which national sovereignty may still effectively assert itself (Dauvergne 2004), 
while the tendency for minority communities to choose a wider-ranging set of 
allegiances and arenas than are conventionally encompassed within national identity 
may easily be presented as a threat to a cohesion (Vertovec 2001).
Nonetheless, while ‘cultural difference' may rationalise or disguise unequal power 
relations and while responsibility for maintaining or creating a shared national 
identity is unfairly distributed within society, the complexities and problems of ethnic 
identity must also be acknowledged. This critique o f pluralism and multiculturalism 
has been frequently made (Goulbourne 1991; Okin 1999; Bano 2000; Samad and 
Eade 2002:2; Parekh 2005; Yuval-Davis et al. 2005:523-9; Sales 2005:523-4). 
Communities are not “bounded, homogeneous groupings, each fixedly attached to its 
ethnicity and traditions” (Parekh 2000:26). Individuals may define themselves, or be 
defined, in a multiplicity o f ways in addition or in contrast to their ethnicity. Many 
young British people o f South Asian descent identify themselves predominantly as 
Muslims rather than through their ancestral nationality (Samad and Eade 2002:84). 
Gender, family position, age, sexuality, professional status or other characteristics 
may be more significant than, or may intersect with, ethnic origin. Moreover, the 
burden o f maintaining ethnic identity may be unfairly distributed within groups. 
Women frequently perform a critical role in the embodiment, preservation and 
reproduction o f culture (Barot et al. 1999:15). The difficulties raised by this critique 
are exemplified by the ongoing debate on forced marriage, discussed later in this 
chapter.
The rises in immigration discussed earlier have also provoked a complex and 
diverse response (for some o f the competing arguments, see Browne 2002; Rowthorn 
2003; Hildyard 2003;. Rowthorn 2006). In public debate, there have been attempts to 
express reservations about immigration in non-racialised terms (for example, 
Goodhart 2004a and b; Goodhart 2006). These arguments usually centre on the 
compatibility o f needs-based state welfare with mass immigration (Lloyd 2002; 
Gibney 2004: chapter 2; Goodhart 2004a), arguments that long preceded this period
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(see, for example, Freeman 1986; Kymlicka and Banting 2006:286 fn.15) and have 
been contested (Kymlicka and Banting 2006). They can and have been extended to a 
‘diverse' i.e. multi-cultural society (Goodhart 2004a; Klausen 2000; Kymlicka and 
Banting 2006) in a way that resonates with longer-established communities (Goodhart 
200b). In a globalised and multicultural society, questions of cohesion cannot be 
detached from those of immigration.
Against this fluid background, the international arranged marriage, for many years 
the direct target of immigration policy, has received more ambiguous treatment. 
Earlier chapters described how its demise had long been predicted. This has not 
happened. Arranged marriages, domestic and international, remain common in Asian 
(and some other) communities although with wide variations in practice. Many young 
people continue to accept the principle, perceiving ‘love marriages' as at greater risk 
o f breakdown and themselves as less likely, in such an event, to receive family and 
community support (Samad and Eade 2002:41-8). Samad and Eade (2002:30-5) also 
found that, in the Muslim communities they studied, marrying out remains relatively 
unusual. While cousin marriage is declining among the more educated and, to some 
extent, amongst Bangladeshis, it remains common amongst the Pakistani community 
(and may even be increasing, as Shaw 2001 indicates).
Many arranged marriages are international (or transnational, now the preferred 
adjective; see chapter 7 for a discussion). According to Charsley (2006:1169), 
international marriages arranged between British Pakistanis and Pakistani nationals 
have increased and now account for the majority o f marriages in that community. 
Samad and Eade (2002:48-52) quote statistics as high as 75% in some areas and Ann 
Cryer has stated that 80% of marriages by her Muslim constituents are
. 7transcontinental. The perpetuation o f international marriages has been attributed to a 
shortage o f suitable UK candidates due to gender ratios and endogamous marriage 
patterns. Some young men prefer a wife from the sub-continent, believing she will be 
more compliant (Beck-Gemsheim 2007:282) and British women therefore have 
difficulty finding partners. Shaw (2001) observed, in the Pakistani community that 
she studied, a desire to maintain links with the wider family in Pakistan, a feature that 
Beck-Gemsheim (2007:279-80) notes in other communities also. Beck-Gernsheim 
(2007:281-3) also argues that a higher status partner may be available to the UK-
7 HC Hansard 2nd November 2006 col. 165WH.
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based spouse in an international marriage while a British wife may expect to gain 
more power in a marriage where in-laws are at a safe distance and she has the 
advantage of familiarity and language. This however is an expectation that may not be 
realised and, as Samad and Eade (2002:90) found in the communities they 
investigated, young people as a whole are less enthusiastic about international 
marriages than their elders. Beck-Gemsheim (2007:283) argues that some parents, 
too, are beginning to doubt the wisdom o f such matches.
Nonetheless, the persistence o f the international South Asian marriage is reflected 
in the immigration statistics since the abolition o f primary purpose. 8,500 spouses and 
fiance(e)s were admitted from the Indian sub-continent in 1995 (Home Office 2005). 
Following the abolition of primary purpose, admissions rose to 18,100 in 1998 
(Jackson and Chilton 1999) followed by a drop to 14,200 in 1999 (Jackson and 
McGregor 2000) since when it has climbed again to 17,100 in 2005 (Home Office 
2005). The age profile of the Bangladeshi community, in particular, suggests that 
numbers may continue to rise for the foreseeable future (Samad and Eade 2002:108).
For a period, the official response was less hostile than previously but was always 
ambivalent, and it has recently again become more combative. Complacency about 
majority family practices has been challenged by social changes (that started long 
before 1997) including sharp rises in divorce, lone parenting and unmarried 
cohabitation. Berthoud’s (2000) study o f family formation points to the high rate of 
marriage and the relatively low rates o f divorce and separation amongst Asian 
families compared to families o f white or Caribbean descent. Gedalof (2007) reflects 
upon how family life is viewed as a means o f preserving or undermining nationhood. 
While, as she argues and as discussed below, the arranged marriage, particularly the 
international arranged marriage, is perceived principally as a threat in this respect, 
there has been occasional recognition of the ability of Asian families to participate in 
this type o f nation-building (Lewis 2005:550-1; see also the occasional favourable 
newspaper report),8 However, this has been the exception. As Lewis (2005:546-7) 
expresses it:
“While they retain their visibility through their distinctiveness, such 
communities can never symbolically stand for the nation/national, they can 
only provide the terrain upon which the ‘host’ nation can make its claim to 
tolerance, civilisation and indeed modernity itself'.
8 ‘Asians fly the flag for traditional family life’ Guardian December 18th 2000, ‘Arranged marriages 
can work, say couples’ Daily Telegraph 8,h February 2002.
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'M odernity' may conveniently be asserted through distinctions drawn with more 
'backward' communities, removing the Asian family still further from the moral 
centre o f gravity. Forced marriages, in particular, but also 'honour' killings and 
similar violence have received extensive attention during the period. Reporting of 
these emphasises the cultural context and reinforces the widely held suspicion that 
Asian (and particularly Muslim) family practices are inherently oppressive (Samad 
and Eade 2002:99-103). Aspects o f the forced marriage that do not fit within this 
template, for example, the 15% of victims who are male or the range o f  communities 
involved,9 receive less attention.
In relation to this thesis, the forced marriage discussion is particularly relevant. 
Whether, as many believe (see Samad and Eade 2002:99-106), it has been excessively 
emphasised, the issue demands consideration here precisely because o f its salience. In 
the past, the reluctant bride was frequently deployed to justify restrictive immigration 
control including primary purpose by those otherwise unsympathetic to Asian 
communities. Such claims were criticised for their opportunism (Menski 1999:92).
The critique is still made today (see, for example, the opening paragraphs of 
Ballard 2006) while the forced marriage has been recently used to claim immigration 
restrictions are in the interests o f young Asian women (Migration Watch 2004: para 
6) and are a feminist cause (Cryer 2003) although the association between 
immigration and forced marriage is uncertain (Samad and Eade 2002:57-9; Home 
Affairs Committee 20061:77-8, 2006,111:321). It has been alleged that “vulnerable 
adults” with conditions such as depression or schizophrenia have been “manipulated” 
into sponsoring a spouse (Home Affairs Committee 2006111:321). Such abuse is 
possible but it is clearly a delicate question as to whether these individuals truly lack 
capacity to decide for themselves.10
Discussion o f ‘forced m arriage’ frequently elides immigration, cultural and other 
concerns. Ann Cryer MP (Home Affairs Committee 2006.111:231-6), for example,
9 ‘Ministers to get tough on forced marriages’ Times 27th January 2005.
10 The issue o f  marriages involving disabled adults o f  migrant origin is also current in family law; see 
(I) K C  (2) NNC v (1) City o f  Westminster Social and Community Services Department (2) IC  [2008] 
EWCA Civ 198. In that instance, the marriage was valid under Bangladeshi law but not under UK law 
due to the spouse’s mental incapacity. The spouse had UK domicile and the court declined to 
recognise the marriage. However Wall LJ (at para. 44) acknowledged that the family’s intentions were 
not abusive, a point that does not seem to be generally acknowledged in the immigration context even 
where there is capacity.
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cites as problems associated with immigration control, forged documents, forced 
marriages, sham marriages, chain migration, first cousin marriages, lack o f integration 
and educational underachievement. Elsewhere in Europe, these issues have resulted in 
significant immigration restrictions. In Denmark, the minimum age for sponsorship is 
now 24, couples must show that the couple’s connection to Denmark is greater than 
that to any other country and must also meet stringent financial criteria (Razack 
2004:153), measures described as necessary for ensuring the successful integration of 
immigrants.11 Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and Germany have also adopted 
measures that make immigration by young spouses more difficult (Razack 2004:159-
12 II60) although some o f these measures have recently run into difficulty.
Until very recently, the role of British immigration control in intervening in forced 
marriages has been limited although the minimum age for entry and sponsorship were 
raised to 18 in 2003 with limited impact on minority communities.14 Forced marriage 
units have existed at Dhaka and Islamabad for some time, but they are not part o f the 
entry clearance post and are staffed independently. Entry clearance staff observed 
during the field trip described later in this chapter were not pro-active in identifying 
forced marriages.
This looks set to change under the most recent government proposals (UK Border 
Agency 2008a). The minimum age for entry and sponsorship will rise to 21 and 
sponsors will have to declare their intention to marry before leaving the UK. There 
will also be a Code o f Practice to provide guidance where a party to a spouse 
application is perceived as vulnerable to a forced marriage although it is not clear 
whether the government is intending, as originally proposed (Border and Immigration 
Agency 2007a:7), to permit a visa to be refused even in the absence o f direct evidence 
that a marriage is forced. Indicators o f a forced marriage may include significant 
disparities in age, language, education and time spent in the other’s country (Border 
and Immigration Agency 2007a: 7) and family and economic background, mental or 
physical disability or evidence from previous marriages or spousal applications (UK 
Border Agency 2008a: 20). These factors may all apply in non-forced marriages and
!1 Migration News Sheet September 2004, October 2004 and February 2006.
12 See also Migration News Sheet April 2004, January 2006, April 2007 and December 2007 and ILPA 
European Update June 2007.
13 “Dutch court overturns another immigration law”, Radio Netherlands, July 22, 2008: “Danish 
immigration law under fire after EU court ruling”, EUObserver.com, July 29th 2008.
14 According to Samad and Eade (2002:22) fewer than 10% of Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets, one o f  
the largest concentrations in the UK, marry before the age o f 20.
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they increase the scope for subjective and stereotyped decision-making reminiscent of 
earlier eras.
Prior to these recent moves, official initiatives mainly promoted exit from the 
marriage as a solution to the forced marriage (Phillips and Dustin 2004:534). Exit 
alone is increasingly seen as an insufficient solution, because the price paid by the 
victim is so high in terms o f isolation from the community. These recent measures 
and proposals suggest a switch to a regulatory emphasis.
Regulation enables the government to demonstrate it is taking action. However, its 
efficacy is doubtful. The risk is that it may cause resentment and concealment rather 
than changes in attitude. Southall Black Sisters, for example, argue that the rise to 18 
has already resulted in young people being forced into marriage on the sub-continent 
and abandoned until they reach 18, when they may be pregnant or have children 
(Home Affairs Committee 2006.111:334), although the government do not accept that 
this is generally the case (UK Border Agency 2008a: 15). It is also uncertain that 
regulation alone will provide adequate protection for victims. If a complaint is made 
during a confidential interview and a visa refused, families may guess the real reason 
for refusal and victims will be vulnerable to retribution unless they leave the family. 
Regulation does not obviate the problems caused by exit.
Nor does it promote self-regulation or critical self-examination by communities, 
regarded by many critics as the only viable long-term solution. Ballard (2006), for 
example, sees solutions lying in acknowledging the ability o f communities to address 
these problems and in redressing the imbalances o f power within families and 
communities. Phillips and Dustin (2004:545-6) regard dialogue with affected 
communities as essential. The effective involvement o f the immigration service in 
such dialogue is improbable, which may be one reason why there has, until now, been 
caution about its involvement.15
The motives for forced marriages are complex (see Samad and Eade 2002:56-60) 
and are, in part at least, “profoundly affected by a community’s sense o f peril” 
(Razack 2004:151-5), including from immigration control. Members, particularly 
older members, o f  affected communities strongly suspect an immigration motive 
(Samad and Eade 2002:103-4). Increasing involvement by the immigration service 
may well act against long-term resolution.
15 See, for example, Angela Eagle HC Hansard 17th December 2001 col. 86W.
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While these new proposals are therefore o f doubtful efficacy, it is more difficult to 
determine whether they are little more than a pretext for restricting unwanted 
immigration. There is undoubtedly genuine concern at the abuse represented by the 
forced marriage, but it is also clear that some international, non-forced marriages, 
already barely acceptable, are considered a fair, even welcome, sacrifice. The 
boundaries o f debate are blurred. Despite its narrow legal meaning, the concept of the 
forced marriage is an imprecise one. A n-Na’im (2000:3-4). Phillips and Dustin (2004) 
and Ballard (2006) all make the point in varying ways that it represents a culturally 
specific example o f the universal phenomenon of family violence. The cultural 
context includes the conception o f the family as a corporate enterprise in which the 
individual's interests are subordinate to those o f the family. While many parents now 
accept more autonomy by their children, some arranged marriages still involve 
psychological pressure stopping short o f coercion. Such methods are not perceived as 
force by many, particularly older, members o f the South Asian communities (Samad 
and Eade 2002:72). Forced marriages are thus the end of a continuum rather than a 
category o f their own (Siddiqi 2005:290-4).
These blurred outlines mean that the forced marriage does not need to be expressly 
invoked to legitimise otherwise contentious generalisations about immigration. When 
the government called for “a discussion within those communities that continue the 
practice o f arranged marriages as to whether more o f these could be undertaken 
within the settled community here” (Home Office 2002:18), its words would be read 
against a background belief that these marriages are often tainted by coercion. The 
forced marriage functions tacitly as paradigm rather than exception. As already 
suggested, debate about immigration has become enmeshed in debate about culture, 
integration and assimilation and the parameters o f the argument are difficult to define. 
Yuval-Davis et al. (2005:518) observe that much recent immigration through 
marriage has been to those places considered to represent the failure o f 
multiculturalism. The assumption that m inorities5 family life is the arena for insularity 
and abuse becomes part o f the ‘common sense’ background against which policy, 
including immigration policy is formulated.
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6.3 Legislative control o f marriage and immigration since 1997
The preceding discussion highlights ambiguities in attitudes towards immigration, 
settled ethnic minority communities and the arranged marriage. This section argues 
that these ambiguities may be detected also in the legislative treatment o f immigration 
through marriage. In certain respects, the government has put in place controls more 
authoritarian than those under ‘primary purpose'. It has also expressed anxiety at the 
continuation o f the international arranged marriage. Yet, until recently, it has 
generally avoided enacting measures that may be interpreted as specifically targeting 
affected communities. This looks set to change if the most recent proposals are 
enacted.
In July 1998 the government published a White Paper, “Fairer, Faster, Firmer: A 
Modem Approach to Immigration and Asylum'" (Home Office 1998). It was mostly 
concerned with asylum but also referred to “ample evidence to show that large 
numbers o f bogus marriages are being contracted in the UK every year” . It defined a 
‘bogus marriage’ as “one arranged for the sole purpose o f evading statutory 
immigration controls” (para. 11.4). Asked in Parliament to estimate the number of 
‘sham marriages’, the Secretary o f State for Immigration stated that precise figures 
were not readily available but that “(t)he perception o f some agencies most involved 
in tackling this abuse is that it is considerable and widespread”.16
Proposals were limited to giving registrars power to require documentary evidence 
of age, identity and marital status (para. 11.5). The Immigration and Asylum Bill that 
followed went further, also requiring parties to give 15 days notice o f  their marriage 
and attend to give notice personally (now Ss. 160-163 o f the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999). More significantly, registrars were also required under S. 24 to report 
suspected sham marriages to the Home Office, turning a previously informal practice 
into a statutory obligation.
The Bill was referred to a Special Standing Committee in the Commons. The 
Immigration Advisory Service, numerous campaigning groups and backbenchers 
expressed concern at the marriage clauses. The government denied that these 
represented what Diane Abbott described as the “domestication o f the primary
17purpose rule”, emphasising that they were concerned only with detecting sham
16 HC 16th February 1999, col. 657.
17 Immigration and Asylum Bill, Special Standing Committee 17th March 1999.
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1 8 *  ■ • _marriages, which were stated to have increased substantially although firm evidence
was not provided o f their extent. Registrars already reported around 500 marriages per 
year as suspicious.19 Later in the debate, the government referred to 236 arrests for 
offences connected with sham marriages, 118 cautions and charges and 42 
removals.20
The problem was regarded as sufficiently serious to justify further measures that
were potentially divisive and discriminatory. Marriages in the Churches of England
and Wales were exempted, as there was no evidence o f sham marriages in those
churches. A sham marriage was defined as one entered ‘Tor the purpose of avoiding
the effect o f one or more provisions o f United Kingdom immigration law or the
immigration rules", a definition (now found in S. 24) that strongly recalled the
primary purpose rule (Stevens 2001:420). Critics suggested inserting the word “sole"
before “purpose’' reflecting the wording used by the Council o f Ministers in its
21resolution on marriages o f convenience and which would have excluded marriages 
where immigration was only one o f the purposes 22 The government rejected such an 
amendment arguing that it would make the registrar’s task too difficult and defended 
the entire set o f proposals on the grounds that “we have the balance right” .23
Although these new measures had limited impact, they demonstrate that, from this 
early stage, the government, under pressure from backbenchers,24 regarded control of 
this route o f potential immigration as sufficiently important to override other 
professed values. The limited scope o f the measures meant that the values and beliefs 
implied by them were not widely debated. However, as in earlier eras, the relatively 
anodyne measures paved the way for more restrictive laws later.
During this period, the government also sought to rectify some longstanding 
injustices. The White Paper had proposed a concession for immigrant spouses 
suffering domestic violence during their probationary period. This was introduced in
18 G eoff Hoon HC Standing Committee Bill Part 7.
19 G eoff Hoon, HC Standing Committee part 7.
20 Lord Williams o f  Mostyn HL 12th July 1999 col. 143.
21 Council Resolution 97/C 382/01 o f  4 December 1997 (Official Journal C 382 o f 16.12.1997).
22 Immigration Advisory Service memorandum to the Standing Committee 17,h March 1999.
23 Lord Bassam o f  Brighton HL I8tl' October 1999, col. 808. The debates may be found at HC 22nd 
February 1999 cols. 37- 131, House o f  Common Special Standing Committee 17th March 1999, HL 
Hansard 29th June 1999 cols. 176-257, HL Hansard 12th July 1999 cols. 11-164 and HL Hansard 18th 
October 1999 cols. 747-926.
24 See, for example, HL Hansard 21st March 2001, cols. 1422-3, HC Hansard 7th March 2002, col. 
516W.
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1998 and later incorporated into the immigration rules.25 Implementation, however,
has proved problematic as the spouse remains subject to the requirement o f ‘no
recourse to public funds' and, consequently, victims cannot be offered places in
refuges. This has been the subject o f extensive campaigning by Southall Black Sisters
but, while it has provided limited emergency funds, the government has been reluctant
to suspend the public funds requirement (Home Affairs Committee 2006111:333-4),
prioritising the ‘integrity' o f immigration control.
Debate during the passage o f the 1999 Act had avoided adverse commentary on the
arranged marriage. However, a more assertive tone was evident by the time o f the
White Paper, “Secure Borders, Safe Haven'' (Home Office 2002). The Executive
Summary (2002:18) drew attention to the “tradition of families originating from the
sub-continent wanting to bring spouses from arranged marriages to live with them in
the UK”. The succeeding paragraph referred to the “large profits and financial
rewards” obtainable through arranging bogus marriages and went on to say:
“We also believe there is a discussion to be had within those communities that 
continue the practice o f arranged marriages as to whether more o f these could 
be undertaken within the settled community here”.
Many regarded the passage as an unacceptable intrusion into the minorities’ personal 
lives, although it was defended by the combative Home Secretary, David Blunkett.26 
Gedalof (2007:84-8) examines how the White Paper, as a whole, presents certain 
‘alien’ forms o f family life as problematic. This passage and the juxtaposition of 
bogus and arranged marriages are consistent with that. The White Paper went on to 
say that:
“As time goes on, we expect the number of arranged marriages between UK 
children and those living abroad to decline. Instead, parents will seek to 
choose a suitable partner from among their own communities in this country” 
(2002:18).
While succeeding paragraphs reiterated the government’s refusal to acknowledge 
polygamous marriages, its disapproval o f forced marriage and the need to prevent 
sham marriages, new proposals were confined to increasing the probationary period to 
two years and an end to switching from other categories. These were ‘balanced’ by a 
proposal to allow immediate indefinite leave to those who had lived together abroad
23 HC Hansard 24,h June 1998 cols. 1026-30, paras 289A-C HC395.
26 “Blunkett in dash over marriages” Guardian 8th February 2002; see also HC Hansard 24th April 2002 
cols. 376-7 and 411.
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for a lengthy period and relaxation o f the requirements for the admission of unmarried 
partners. There may be detected here the emerging contours o f an acceptable 
‘modern' applicant; not too young, but not necessarily formally married.
The focus on switching indicates the government's determination to control the 
terms of entry. The White Paper (2002:101) states that, in 1999, 76% of those granted 
leave to remain on the basis o f marriage had been admitted for another purpose and 
that 50% of those switching did so within 6 months o f entry although there is no 
evidence cited for the claim that many o f these had lied about their intentions on entry 
or had entered sham marriages. These cases were later described as ‘literally tens of 
thousands' o f applicants, a claim that seems exaggerated.27 The published 
immigration statistics (Mallourides and Turner 2002:3-4) for 2001 show that there 
were 23,080 probationary grants o f leave to remain as a spouse. In 2000, the number 
had been 26,440 but this was attributed to a backlog clearing exercise. If  even 50% of 
these were short-term entrants who switched to marriage, they did not represent tens 
o f thousands in any one year and remained a tiny proportion o f the more than 8 
million non-EEA visitors who entered the UK.
The following paragraph says that in-country switching is “unfair to those 
applicants who follow the correct procedures by applying for entry clearance overseas 
and pay for the appropriate visa” . The final paragraph o f this section (2002:102) 
acknowledges the hardships that result from forcing someone to go abroad for entry 
clearance to re-enter as a spouse, but argues that hardship is less likely in the case of 
short term entrants.
The ban on switching was implemented in 2002.28 While the stated purpose was to 
prevent visitors and short-term entrants entering sham marriages, the measures had a 
severe impact on asylum seekers and illegal entrants who might have spent many 
years in the UK. The genuine nature o f these relationships was not in issue, but they 
were sacrificed to the government5 s need to establish its authority in the immigration 
and, particularly, the asylum arena.
These applicants have been required to return to unstable regions in an effort to 
regularise their position. If the application fails, the government is saved the trouble
27 Lord Rooker, HL Hansard 7th February 2002 col. 752.
28 HC 164.
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of removing them.- There have been reports of victimisation by the authorities after 
returning and that some applicants have gone into hiding. Practical obstacles may 
render visa applications time-consuming, expensive or effectively impossible. New 
passports or exit visas may not be obtainable. If visa facilities are not available, 
applicants may have to travel to neighbouring countries, where they may be refused 
admission or where they have to remain while the application is processed. The delays 
involved may render documentation such as wage slips or bank statements out o f date. 
At the end o f that process, the applicant may be interviewed for only a few minutes 
and the visa granted or refused.
Where visas cannot be obtained, it is usually suggested that the UK resident spouse 
should accompany the spouse to the country o f origin including those that may be 
unsafe or have poor human rights records such as the DRC, Iraq, Iran or 
A fghanistan/0 One woman was told that if  she wished to live with her husband, she 
should return with him to Iran and “submit to the way o f life there” . This would have 
required not only conversion to Islam and conformity to dress codes, but the adoption 
o f Iranian nationality and the loss o f British diplomatic protection. Another woman 
was told that she should accompany her husband to Iraq which, even leaving aside 
obvious issues o f security, would have meant abandoning her son by a previous 
marriage. One woman whose poor health needed constant monitoring and medication, 
who was her disabled parents’ main carer and who had shared residence of her 8 year 
old daughter was told that it would be “reasonable” for her to accompany her husband 
to the DRC (Home Affairs Committee 2006.111:285-8, 346-54). These letters were 
signed by government ministers suggesting government approval (Home Affairs 
Select Committee 2006.111:351). The Home Affairs Select Committee (2006.1:77) 
recommended that applicants should not have to return to a country where the Foreign 
Office advises against all travel, which would have assisted some but not all o f these 
cases.
While clearly unafraid o f restrictive policies, the government at this time refrained 
from acting directly against the international arranged marriage, even if  backbenchers 
sometimes tried to draw them on such a commitment.31 Nonetheless, the government
29 See case studies from the Brides Without Borders campaigning group 
fhttp://www.brides\vithoutborders.org.uk) .
30 See, for example, “Forced to choose ... my husband or my life” Glamour magazine, February 2006, 
pp. 106-11 and HC Hansard 10th October 2005 col. 129.
31 See, for example, HC 8,h February 2002, col. 1241W, HC Hansard 9th May 2002, col. 334W.
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proved itself determined to force the pace on integration through tests on knowledge 
of language and life in the UK as a prerequisite for naturalisation including for
32spouses.
There were three adjournment debates on immigration and forced marriage during 
2003,33 during which it was proposed that the minimum age for both entry and for 
sponsorship should be raised to 21 and that only British citizens should be permitted 
to sponsor.'14 It was assumed that forced marriage is primarily an immigration issuej5 
and forced and sham marriages were conflated.'16 Beverley Hughes, the Immigration 
Minister, in her response emphasised the necessity o f breaking organised rackets but 
she also showed some sympathy towards these proposals' and the minimum age for 
entry and then sponsorship were raised to 18.j8 Raising the minimum age to 2 1 later 
received express government support in the 2005 White Paper Controlling Our 
Borders (Home Office 2005:22) and was also proposed by the Kirkhope Commission 
on Immigration (2004:25-26) established by the Conservative Party. As mentioned 
above, it is now due to be implemented (UK Border Agency 2008a).
The assertion o f state authority over immigration continued with new measures 
against sham marriages in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment o f Claimants etc) 
Bill. These were not signalled in advance. On the contrary, in February 2004, a 
written parliamentary question asked whether it was policy to permit people to marry 
without verification o f their immigration status. Beverley Hughes’ reply cited the 
existing law and efforts against suspicious marriages without referring to plans for
3 0
reform. However, a "Bogus Marriage Task Force” was later established while press 
reports presented ‘sham marriages’ as a growing problem associated with organised 
crime with several high profile convictions.40 One figure given wide publicity and
32 Ss. I and 2 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2002.
33 HC Hansard 19l,t March 2003 cols. 276-9WH, HC Hansard 17lU July 2003 cols. 517-9, HC Hansard 
17th September 2003 cols. 264 -71WH.
34 HC Hansard 19th March 2003 cols. 276-8WH.
35 “ ... I believe the solution to all these problems would be for Asian parents to arrange marriages for 
their sons and daughters within the settled community”, Ami Cryer HC Hansard 17th July 2003 col. 
519.
36 See, for example, HC Hansard 17th September 2003, col. 266WH.
37 HC Hansard 17th September 2003, col. 269WH.
38 HC 164.
39 HC Hansard 23rd February 2004, col. 239W.
40 ‘’T m  asked to conduct many sham weddings” says registrar’, Daily Telegraph, 21st March 2004, 
‘Sham marriages soar as illegal immigrants try to beat curbs” Daily Telegraph 15n June 2004, “Beating 
the sham wedding cheats” BBC News 22nd September 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- 
/2/hi/uk news/3679482,stmk l”Fake marriages network” smashed’ BBC News 22nd September 2004
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quoted in parliament (although not by ministers) was that one in five register office 
marriages in London (or 8,000 marriages per year) were bogus.41 This claim 
originated in a questionnaire to marriage registrars sent by the Superintendent 
Registrar at Brent Register Office, Mark Rimmer. Such evidence might be persuasive 
and some o f the observations reported by registrars suggested possible sham 
marriages.42 The results however were not published, but were described as 
1 impressionistic'43 and findings seem to have been based, partly at least, upon 
subjective judgements as to the probability o f a marriage being genuine when it 
involved a foreign national and other factors such as a large age gap, religious 
differences or language difficulties (Home Affairs Committee 2006.111:225). In the 
absence o f publication, it is impossible to evaluate the claims made in the research.
Another claim, made in a leaked email, was that 15,000 bogus marriages took 
place annually, an assertion however from which politicians distanced themselves 44 
One backbencher claimed that marriage registrars reported 9,000 marriages annually 
as suspicious under S.24 IA A, although the figures quoted below suggest this is an 
exaggeration.45
The outcome was the announcement by the Home Secretary o f plans to restrict the 
ability o f foreign nationals to marry within the UK. Details were sparse but focused 
on requiring couples to give notice o f marriage at a specially designated register 
office. Plans to allow registrars to refuse to carry out ceremonies were also under 
consideration. The plans were to be refined following consultation to “achieve the 
necessary balance between facilitating the vast majority o f genuine applicants and 
protecting the system from abuse.”46
The period for consultation was brief, less than one month, and the resulting 
clauses went much further than those put forward for consultation (Immigration
(http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk news/3678784.stnfi, “25 jailed for bogus marriage scam” The 
Scotsman 18th January 2005, “£ lm  bogus marriage woman jailed” The Scotsman 26th April 2005.
41 Stephen Pound MP HC Hansard 13lh May 2004 col. 563, Baroness Carnegy o f  Lour HL Hansard 15th 
June 2004 col. 693. “Sham marriages soar as illegal immigrants try to beat curbs.” Daily Telegraph 11'1' 
June 2004.
42 For example, money changing hands, the bride kissing the wrong man, the wedding rings not fitting 
or the groom being unable to remember the name o f  the bride (see HC Hansard 13th May 2004 col. 
563).
43 Telephone interview with Mark Rimmer 23rd August 2005.
44 The Home Secretary David Blunkett commented that: “We don't think there are anything like the 
15,000 that have been outlined, but we think there are more than the 3,000 we have been aware of." 
“Blunkett targets sham marriages and bogus courses” (Guardian April 23rd 2004).
45 HC Hansard 13th May 2004 col. 564.
46 FIL 22nd April 2004 WS16.
199
Advisory Service 2004). They were presented as amendments in the House of Lords 
avoiding substantive second-reading debate in the Commons. Restrictions were to be 
placed on all marriages in which one or both parties were subject to immigration 
control except for Church o f England weddings.47 In addition to the requirement to 
give notice at a designated register office, the marriage could not proceed unless the 
non-British party had entry clearance for the purpose of marrying, written permission 
from the Secretary o f State to marry or belonged to a class specified by the Secretary 
o f State.
In arguing for the clauses, the government avoided the tendentious statistics quoted 
above in favour o f more circumspect claims. It relied principally on the increased 
number o f suspicious marriages reported by registrars under S. 24 Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999. In 2001, 756 such reports were received, rising by 2003 to 2,712 
while 2,251 were received in the first half alone o f 2004.48 It is not clear whether the 
rise represented increased numbers o f suspicious marriages or increased reporting nor 
whether suspicion was justified although marriage registrars believed there was 
under-reporting.49 Until April 2004, most reports were not investigated,50 and there 
was no central record o f consequent prosecutions or convictions.51 However, in 2003, 
at least 110 people were arrested and 37 people charged.52 The enforcement effort 
begun in April 2004 resulted in 200 suspected sham marriages being visited, more 
than 100 individuals being arrested and 28 marriages that did not proceed.53 These 
claims however were problematic. If  existing measures, applied more intensively, 
were detecting sham marriages, the rationale for new measures was questionable. The 
number o f reports made in the second half o f 2004 was just only over half those made 
in the first half even though the measures in the 2004 Act were not yet in force.54
In the Lords, Lord Rooker for the government argued for the necessity of 
preventing sham marriages taking place, the unfairness o f queue jum ping and the
47 This is not stated explicitly in the Act but is a consequence o f  its application.
4S HC Hansard 15th June 2004 col. 681.
49 Lord Rooker HL Hansard 15th June 2004,
50 See speech by Humfrey Malins MP HC Hansard 5th July 2005 cols. 261-2.
51 Des Browne Minister o f  State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism) Written Answer 
HC Hansard 8,h March 2005 col. I704W. However, the Minister also stated that there were at least 32 
convictions in London in 2004 SCAH, Minutes o f  Evidence, Tuesday 9th May 2006, question 704).
52 HC Hansard 13th May 2004 col. 567.
53 HC Hansard 15th June 2004 col. 682.
54 HL Hansard 23ld February 2005 col. 1268, HC Hansard 18th April 2006 col. 363W.
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importance o f detecting sham documentation.55 His reasoning lacked coherence. He 
claimed that it was difficult to remove parties after the marriage had taken place.56 
However, the recent no-switching rule already required short-term and illegal entrants 
to leave the UK and submit to entry clearance to gain leave as a spouse. Despite 
claiming to be aimed at detecting sham documentation, those whose documents 
proved genuine would still be unable to marry if  they lacked the necessary 
immigration status. The Joint Committee on Human Rights (“JCHR" 2004:21-4) 
foresaw a possible breach of Articles 12 and 14 ECHR due to the failure to 
discriminate between genuine and bogus marriages and the exemption for the Church 
o f England. There was insufficient time in the Lords debate to respond to their 
concerns causing embarrassment to Lord Rooker in speaking for the government,57 
and it is possible that he was personally unconvinced o f the proposals' merits.58
If the reasoning was unconvincing, it is perhaps because the true motivation was 
not, at first, given prominence. The measures applied to British and EEA nationals 
who wished to marry those subject to immigration control. The impact upon EEA 
nationals was, initially, only briefly mentioned.59 However, when other justifications 
were challenged, the defence switched to prevention of abuse by these.60 In such 
cases, while the government might refuse residence on the grounds that the marriage 
is one o f convenience, this is defined narrowly, powers o f investigation and 
enforcement are limited and the burden of proof remains on the government 
(Macdonald and Webber 2005:286-9). The ability to remain in the UK after marriage 
to an EEA national had started to be described as a ‘loophole'.61 It was stated that 
61% of reports by registrars of suspicious marriages involved a non-British EEA 
national and there were some well-publicised arrests.62 A possible further aim,
55 Lord Rooker for the government HL Hansard 15l!l June 2004, cols. 680-5.
56 HL Hansard 15th June 2004 col. 682.
57 HL Hansard 6,h July 2004 col. 723-4.
58 He conceded that it was unclear whether the rise in the number o f  reports o f  suspicious marriages
was due to increased incidence or increased reporting (HL Hansard 15th June 2004 col. 686). He later 
admitted that he expected a challenge to the measures and that he had been placed “in a position where 
I cannot do my job o f  representing the Government to this House” (HL Hansard 15th July 2004 col. 
724.
59 For example, HL Hansard 15th June 2004 col. 684.
60 See HL Hansard 28th June 2004 col. 70, 6th July 2004 cols 716-7 and 725-6, HC Hansard 12,h July
2004 col. 1219.
61 Des Browne, Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, HC Hansard 13lh May 2004 col. 569, 
“Beating the sham wedding cheats”, BBC News (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/- 
/2/hi/uk news/3 679482 .stnf) 22nd September 2004.
62 HC Hansard 12th July 2004 col. 1219, “Marriage scam for migrants broken” Guardian 23rd 
September 2004, “LCCG Bust Sham Wedding Racket” Interport News 13lh January 2006.
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unmentioned but hinted at in later court proceedings, may have been to minimise the 
possibility o f Article 8 claims succeeding by inhibiting the establishment of family 
life.63
In the Commons, during the third reading, the Minister for Immigration, Des 
Browne, adopted a more robust tone than Lord Rooker, He defended the proposals as 
more efficient than investigation of individual cases.64 Human rights concerns were 
dealt with only cursorily.64 He alluded to the enhanced rights o f those married to a 
non-British EEA national and it was, by now, apparent that curbing these was a major 
motive.
The clauses became Ss. 19-25 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants etc) Act 2004. Unless they have indefinite leave to remain or entered from 
abroad on a fiance or marriage visit visa,66 all those subject to immigration control 
must obtain a certificate o f approval to marry in the UK, costing £135 (later raised to 
£295), creating an estimated income o f £1.6 million annually (Home Affairs 
Committee 2006.111:288) Under the scheme, those without leave, whose leave is about 
to expire or who entered with six months leave or less would be refused unless 
compassionate circumstances (narrowly defined) were present. If, in the opinion of 
the decision-maker, the parties were not free to marry, a certificate would also be 
refused, arguably usurping the role o f the marriage registrar. The refusal template in 
the Immigration Directorate’s Instructions suggests that the burden of proving 
freedom to marry lies with the applicant and it has been suggested that applicants may 
be penalised for a previous misleading statement.67
The measures affected equally those who had complied with immigration law and 
those who had not. Non-EE A parties refused a certificate o f approval had to leave the 
UK and apply to re-enter unless exceptional circumstances applied, confined to 
terminal or long-term illness or inability to travel due to pregnancy.68 Otherwise, 
parties who had been entirely compliant with immigration control for lengthy periods
6 3 1SSHD v Batai and others [2007] EWCA Civ 478 para 13.
64 HC Hansard 12(h July 2004 cols. 1217-18.
65 HC Hansard 12th July 2004 cols. 1223-5.
65 Those who meet the criteria for a fiance visa may apply to remain in the UK after marriage. Those 
applying for a marriage visitor visa must demonstrate intention to leave the UK after the marriage.
67 HL Hansard 15th June 2004 col. 684-5, 22nd June 2004 col. 1380W, correspondence between Brenda 
Hawkyard o f  IND and ILPA in ILPA’s members’ mailing, March and April 2005, IDIs, chapter 1, 
section 15, para. 3 and Annex MM. Ms Hawkyard suggested that ‘evidence’ o f  an existing marriage 
might take the form o f  a previous statement to an entry clearance officer.
68 IDIs, chapter 1, section 15 and annex Nhl.
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could be refused because they applied too late or lacked the necessary form of leave 
(see Home Affairs Committee 2006.111 :285-8).
Although the measures were arguably a response to the more liberal EU regime, 
they could not be wholly successful in that regard as couples where one party is an 
EEA national may marry abroad and then apply for a family permit. However, 
applications for these at entry clearance posts are reportedly now subject to more 
careful scrutiny. Meanwhile, dedicated marriage case working teams are conducting 
an increased number o f interviews with spouses o f EEA nationals.69 In this way, the 
measures support efforts by the UK government, after Akrich, to restrict rights o f 
entry by non-EEA family members to those legally resident in the EU or who meet 
domestic criteria.70 Under current UK regulations,71 non-EEA spouses o f non-British 
EEA nationals may be admitted if  they have a passport and an EEA family permit, a 
residence document or a permanent residence card. While documents issued by other 
member states must be recognised, the UK government will issue a family permit 
only if  the non-EEA national has lawfully resided in another member-state or meets 
the requirements o f the immigration rules. Meanwhile, non-EEA nationals married to 
British nationals exercising Treaty rights are required under the UK regulations to 
have resided with their spouse in an EEA state other than the UK or to meet the 
requirements o f the Immigration Rules. Both these regulations are arguably too 
narrow and may be subject to future challenge, particularly after the ECJ decision in 
M etock12
The severity o f the new rules caused great anger. The failure to distinguish 
between genuine and sham marriages and the favour shown to the Church o f England
recalled previous eras o f discriminatory policy, particularly the primary purpose rule.
73The JCWI immediately announced its intention of making a legal challenge. There 
was official censure also. The views o f the JCHR have been discussed. The 
Independent Race M onitor criticised the A ct’s Race Equality Impact Assessment for 
failing to analyse the unequal impact o f the laws on different nationalities, whether 
they were proportionate or if  the same goal was achievable in other ways (Coussey 
2005:33).
69 Mandie Campbell , Head o f  UKvisas, Home Affairs Committee 11:88 and memorandum submitted 
by IND to Select Committee on Home Affairs, Additional Written Evidence 27th February 2006.
70 SSHD v Akrich Case C -109/01.
71 SI 2006/1003.
72 Metock and others v Minister fo r  Justice, Equality and Law Reform Case C -127/08.
73 “Marriage Registrars Campaign: Help us challenge the new marriage rules”.
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Instead, the Assessment makes a generalised defence, stating that circumvention of 
the Immigration Rules creates “mistrust” and “resentment” . Marriage “has 
increasingly been seen as being used for this end, and has been widely reported in the 
media as such''. Strengthening the procedures “will therefore contribute to better race 
relations in the UK’'.74 It was reported that this sketchy analysis was deliberate, a 
“quick and dirty" assessment being necessary to ensure inclusion o f the clauses in the 
Bill (Home Affairs Committee 2006.11:84).
The compatibility with ECHR of Ss. 19-25 AI(TC)A was later successfully 
challenged injudicial review proceedings in 2006, in the Court o f Appeal in 2007 and 
in the House o f Lords in 2008 (the case law is discussed later in this chapter). At the 
time o f writing, changes consequent on the House o f Lords decision had not yet been 
announced. The UK Border Agency website75 suggests that certificates o f approval 
are still required (for a fee o f £295 which is likely to be unlawfully high).76 Those 
who would have been refused under the original regime must provide extensive 
evidence and are wanted that enforcement action may be taken against applicants who 
have no leave. The evidence required covers areas such as the arrangements for the 
wedding and reception, plans for the future and o f the relationship and must be 
provided in affidavit form. It is possible that the government will seek to render the 
scheme compatible by making modifications (for example, as to the fee) and 
permitting the marriages o f those whose evidence does not suggest a sham marriage.
Until its partial suspension, the new regime had a dramatic effect on the number of 
marriages in certain areas. By June 2005, there were about 60% fewer notices of 
marriage in some London Boroughs and around 25% fewer in areas such as 
Birmingham or Leicester.77 In 2005, the number o f reported suspicious marriages fell 
to 247.78 The number o f marriages celebrated in the UK fell by 10% between 2004 
and 2005 to their lowest level since 1896 and this has been attributed to 
commencement o f the new laws on l bt February 2005.79
74 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment o f  Claimants etc) Bill Race Equality Assessment: N ew  clause.
75 http://www.ind.liomeoffice.gov.uk/visitingtheuk/gettingmarried/certificateofapproval/ accessed on 
25th August 2008.
76 See the comments o f  Lord Bingham in R (On the application o f  Baia't and others v SSHD  [2008] 
UKHL 53 at para. 30.
77 Migration News Sheet June 2005 p.5.
78 Migration N ews Sheet May 2006 p.9.
79 “Marriage rates fall to lowest on record” Press Release, National Statistics, 21s* February 2007.
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Defenders o f the measures argue that the reduction vindicates their claim that 
bogus marriages were widespread.80 This is doubtful given that the rules affected all 
marriages involving non-EEA nationals. There was a surge in marriages before 
implementation, many involving, according to one registrar, “Asian couples who 
legitimately want to marry a partner from abroad5'.81 Entry clearance applications take 
time to organise and process so that a short-term drop in numbers was probable. Entry 
clearance may also be refused for reasons, such as failure to meet financial criteria 
that are unconnected with whether the marriage is genuine. The number o f overseas 
applications by spouses o f EEA nationals has increased since implementation 
suggesting displacement rather than prevention.82 Nonetheless, it is likely that the new 
measures have prevented some sham marriages taking place; the issue is the price 
paid by genuine applicants. It is clear that the judiciary considers that, under the 
original scheme, it was unlawfully high.
In any event, it is clear that the government intends to continue regulating the 
international marriage, although with recent emphasis upon the cultural acceptability 
of certain marriages as the most recent proposals suggest, including those discussed 
above in relation to the forced marriage. Other measures to be implemented include 
extended powers to revoke indefinite leave when marriages are retrospectively found 
to have been coercive and an obligatory commitment by applicants for entry to leam 
English after entry, with the medium term goal being to require some English 
language competence prior to entry (UK Border Agency 2008a). These measures go 
beyond regulating forced marriages and are consistent with the shift in emphasis 
discussed earlier in this chapter away from skin colour alone as a criterion for entry.
They are unmistakably aimed at poorer, less well-educated and less well-integrated
83immigrants, an increasingly common strand in European immigration policy and 
which is also evident in recent proposals as to naturalisation (Border and Immigration 
Agency 2008a and 2008b).
30 See “Tough rules expose scale o f  bogus marriages”, Daily Telegraph 16Ul May 2005.
81 Migration News Sheet June 2005 p.5.
82 In the first three months o f 2006, 51 applications were made from Ghana compared to 9 in the same 
period o f  the previous year (Select Committee 2006111:125).
83 Best known perhaps are the integration requirements o f  the Netherlands although these have been 
subject to international criticism and to successful legal challenge (Human Rights Watch 2008 and 
“Netherlands: Court Rules Pre-Entry Exam Unlawful” at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2Q08/07/17/nether 19386.htm).
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The legislative changes discussed here are consistent with the themes identified in 
the opening section o f this chapter. They betray ambivalence towards ethnic minority 
and immigrant communities. Favour is now based less on race or skin colour and 
more on conformity to cultural and legal norms and, arguably, on considerations of 
social class. Out o f the myriad changes described here, emerge the contours o f an 
acceptable spouse and an acceptable "victim'. An acceptable spouse is not too young, 
is keen to integrate, economically active and is compliant with any hurdles that British 
immigration law may erect. They need not be married or heterosexual. Some 
vulnerable individuals have aroused compassion, notably (and to a limited extent) the 
victims o f domestic violence or forced marriage. However, there is a telling absence 
o f sympathy in other cases, such as for those separated by the rules on switching or 
refusal of a certificate o f approval. Such couples may eventually be reunited, but only 
after considerable hardship, recalling the ordeal by endurance noted in earlier 
chapters. Nor is there regret at the effective prohibition on early international 
marriages within the UK; such marriages are seen as culturally unacceptable (despite 
remaining legal within the UK), raising the possibility o f new forms o f cultural 
discrimination.
Previous chapters suggested an implied hierarchy of acceptable marriages based 
primarily on gender and race. Race and gender still feature although more implicitly 
than before (Gedalof 2007:88-91, for example, analyses the ‘production' o f the 
problematic immigrant woman) but married status and a heterosexual relationship are 
no longer prerequisites, providing an implicit contrast with less ‘modern’ forms o f 
family life such as the arranged marriage. Marriages that do not conform to the 
cultural standards o f majority British society are increasingly regarded with disfavour, 
a tendency noted in previous chapters, but which was muted during the early part of 
the period discussed here. Problematic marriages include very young marriages and 
international arranged marriages, particularly those that result in the entry o f a poorly 
educated non-English speaking and/or related spouse. The distinction between 
‘modernity’ and problematic ‘tradition’ intersects with the other division discussed 
here, o f those who accept the state’s authority and those who do not. Attempts to 
demote the non-compliant include the ban on switching and Ss 19-25 AI(TC)A.
All these measures suggest that those who marry in officially unapproved ways, 
whether sponsor or applicant, may find themselves outside the realm o f inclusion. The 
assumptions and beliefs that shaped the policy described here are not identical to
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those discussed in earlier chapters but the conditional nature o f acceptance and 
belonging remains. While freedom and plurality in personal matters are prioritised for 
the majority settled population (Eekelaar 2006:23-6), there is little sign that the state 
is retreating so far as migrant families are concerned: in fact, the most recent 
developments suggest that the converse is true.
6.4 Judicial decision-making on marriage and immigration since 1997
The previous section argued that legislative control of immigration through marriage 
has, for the last ten years, been dominated by a strong drive towards more government 
control o f immigration. This section considers the judicial response over the same 
period.
Primary purpose, as we saw in chapter 4, generated much case law. Since its 
removal, questions such as intention to live together, domestic violence and third- 
party support have continued to receive some attention. One significant issue, already 
alluded to, has been those who m any (or, more recently, wish to marry) when they 
have no or limited leave. Their position is discussed next, following which the other 
questions are considered.
6.4.1 Refusal of leave to remain as a spouse
6.4.1.1 Introduction: the regulatory framework
The legal framework for these cases has evolved during the period. The power o f 
removal was introduced in S.33 Immigration Act 1971 but only for illegal entrants or 
those refused entry. Other cases were subject to deportation. S. 10 o f the Immigration 
and Asylum Act 1999 extended removal to overstayers, those who breached 
conditions o f leave or who obtained leave by deception.
At the start o f the period, most o f those considered here were liable to deportation 
while, after implementation o f S. 10, they became subject to removal. A  deportation 
order must expire or be lifted before the deportee may apply to re-enter the UK. 
Married life in the UK might be deferred for some years and case law has focused on 
whether it could continue abroad. Those who are removed may apply immediately to 
rejoin the UK-based spouse and the focus switched, after S. 10, to difficulties in 
obtaining entry clearance.
207
Until the Human Rights Act, those resisting removal due to marriage could rely 
only on Home Office policy or the general exercise of discretion. Until 1996, policy 
was contained in DP2/93, which purported to incorporate the U K 's obligations under 
ECHR. This was succeeded by DP3/96, which did not explicitly refer to the ECHR. 
Since implementation o f the Human Rights Act, most applicants have argued their 
claim on Article 8 grounds, although DP3/96 may still sometimes be relevant 
(Clayton 2006:589; see also the recent cases o f AB U and C //,85 both in the Court of 
Appeal).
DP2/93 provided that enforcement action should not normally be initiated if 
marriage pre-dated enforcement action or there was conclusive evidence of a genuine 
and subsisting relationship akin to marriage. Other factors included a spouse of long­
standing residence or who could not otherwise be reasonably expected to live abroad, 
and children by a former relationship if  these had the right of abode and lived with or 
had frequent contact with the resident spouse.
DP3/96 is more restrictive. It does not acknowledge unmarried relationships and 
requires marriages to have pre-dated enforcement action by two years and for it to be 
unreasonable to expect the resident spouse to accompany the deported spouse abroad. 
Marriages that post-date enforcement action should only put an end to action in “the 
most exceptional circumstances”.
The more severe terms o f DP3/96 are one reason that the numbers o f those unable 
to remain in the UK after marriage increased over the period. While, initially, only 
those who were without any valid leave were affected, in 2002, those on short-term 
leave o f less than six months were also prohibited from switching to marriage. Ss. 19- 
25 AI(TC)A attempted to prevent these individuals and those whose leave is about to 
expire from even marrying in the UK, attempts that have been frustrated by the courts 
(see discussion below).
Despite the permutations described here, legal argument has consistently focused 
on the same issues: the extent to which the court will intervene and which 
circumstances will trump the imperatives o f  immigration control.
84 AB (Jamaica) v SSHD  [2007] EWCA Civ 1302.
85 CH (Jamaica) v SSHD  [2007] EWCA Civ 792.
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6.4.1.2 The role of the courts
Prior to implementation o f the Human Rights Act in 2000, applicants refused leave to 
remain in the UK because they did not comply with the immigration rules could have 
recourse only to the policies referred to earlier or to executive discretion. The courts 
were frequently asked to review cases which fell outside the precise terms o f the 
policies, but where discretion might be exercised or where the Secretary of State did 
not accept factual assertions that would bring applicants within the policies. These 
cases were decided according to judicial review principles. ECHR considerations 
might be imported only to the extent permitted by the law as it then stood.86 The 
policies represented the balance struck by government between Article 8 and 
immigration control and could not be disturbed on the grounds that, in themselves,
07
they were not compliant with ECHR.
Cases were rarely decided in favour o f the immigrant because the bar for
intervention was set so high. Provided all relevant factors had been considered, the
decision stood. Hardship was not, without procedural error, enough to suggest
88irrationality. In Gbadegesin, for example, the court found that, provided the interests 
o f the child had received consideration, the court would not interfere with a decision 
that separated parent and child.
Home Office refusals were often formulaic even being described, in one court, as
89an “incantation”. The rationale was the need for consistent treatment. Yet there is 
tension between use o f standard wording and the obligation to demonstrate that all 
factors in a case have been properly taken into account, a tension the courts declined 
to acknowledge.
After commencement o f the HRA, there was extensive debate as to the role o f the 
court in Article 8 cases often played out in marriage cases. In M ahm ood99 a judicial 
review case, Laws LJ in the Court o f Appeal found that, while “anxious scrutiny” was 
demanded, the judicial function required that a “margin o f discretion” be permitted to 
the executive. The court in M ahmood had not taken account o f a contrary approach 
approved by the Court o f Appeal in B .91
86 See R v Secretary o f  State ex p  Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. As regards Article 8 , see the speech o f  
Master o f the Rolls in R v Ministry o f  Defence ex p. Smith [1996] 1 All ER 257 at 263.
87/? v SSHD ex p. Gangadeen and another [1997] EWCA 2799.
88 R v Chief Immigration Officer ex p. Gbadegesin  [1998] EWHC Admin 408.
89 R v SSHD ex p. Otusi [1997] EWHC Admin 1165.
90 R v SSHD ex p. Mahmood [2000] EWCA Civ 315.
91 B v SSHD [2000] Imm AR 478.
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Nonetheless, and despite criticism the following year in the House o f Lords,92 the 
restrictive approach set out in Mahmood was followed in subsequent immigration 
cases, which also failed to determine whether it should be confined only to judicial 
review. The Court o f Appeal in Isiko93 preferred Mahmood and considered itself not 
bound by B as the point in that case had been conceded and not argued. In Samaroo,94 
the Court o f Appeal found that, while scrutiny might be more intense than under 
Wednesbury, it remained a review.
In N om w a,95 the Tribunal distinguished an appeal from a judicial review and found 
that the Tribunal could adopt its own view on proportionality. However, in Edore,96 
the Court o f Appeal distinguished B and reiterated the review function o f the judiciary 
including, in the absence of factual dispute, the adjudicator in an appeal. The Tribunal 
in HP1 found that, only in “a truly exceptional case" would it be right to overturn a 
decision that lay within the Secretary o f State's own assessment o f the range o f 
reasonable responses as manifested by previous decisions.
CW ♦ •In Huang, the Court o f Appeal found that in cases decided under the immigration 
rules, the rules represent the balance between competing interests as decided by the 
Secretary o f State under Article 8. It is for the court (including the adjudicator) to
form its own judgement as to whether a particular case “ is so exceptional on its
particular facts that the imperative of proportionality demands an outcome in the 
appellant's favour notwithstanding that he cannot succeed under the Rules”(Laws LJ 
at para 59).
While adjudicators and the Tribunal now had authority to decide issues o f 
proportionality for themselves, the requirement o f exceptionality meant that 
successful Article 8 claims remained rare. Cases decided prior to Huang  were upheld 
on appeal after H u a n g "
In 2007, the House o f Lords100 upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision that appellate 
bodies should decide questions o f proportionality for themselves but overturned their 
finding that such cases must be exceptional. Their Lordships were critical o f the
92 R v SSHD, ex p  D aly [2001 ] UKHL 26 at para 27.
93 R v SSHD ex p. Isiko [2000]EWCA Civ 346.
94 Samaroo and another v SSHD [2001] EWCA Civ 1139.
95 Noruwa (Proportionality appeal: assessment, not discretionj Nigeria  [2001] UKIAT 00016*.
96 Blessing Edore v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 736.
97 M(Croatia) [2004] UKIAT 00024*.
98 Huang and others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 105.
99 For example, Chikwamba v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 1779.
100 Huang (FC) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11.
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“tendency ...to  complicate and mystify what is not, in principle, a hard task to define, 
however difficult the task is, in practice, to perform” (para. 14). They observed the 
need to balance not only the competing interests of state and individual but of 
individual and society. The individual should not bear consequences that are too 
severe.
They noted that the immigration rules are not the product o f active debate in
parliament “where non-nationals seeking leave to enter or remain are not in any event
represented”. They also referred to the core value, which Article 8 exists to protect:
“Human beings are social animals. They depend on others. Their family, or 
extended family, is the group on which many people most heavily depend, 
socially, emotionally and often financially. There comes a point at which, for 
some, prolonged and unavoidable separation from this group seriously inhibits 
their ability to live full and fulfilling lives" (para. 18).
At the time o f writing, it is too early to know the full effects o f Huang. While the 
return to a focus on the actual requirements of Article 8 is welcome, it is unlikely to 
make a difference in most cases and the Court o f Appeal has emphasised that, in 
normal circumstances, interference in family life will be justified.101 It has remitted 
some cases for rehearing as the wrong test had been applied,102 but in others, 
unfavourable decisions have been upheld as still presenting an insufficiently strong
103claim. The Court o f Appeal however has recently adopted a more nuanced 
approach in interpreting questions such as ‘insurmountable obstacles’ in the light o f 
Huang (see discussion below).104 As regards the Tribunal, Clayton (2007:316) 
suggests that it has not always fully appreciated that the observation that only a few 
cases will succeed under Article 8 is not the same as a test of exceptionality resulting 
in “the practice o f guiding oneself as to outcome by reliance on a prediction". An 
example o f this faulty reasoning may be found in A M m
Finally, the House o f Lords found in Beoku-Betts,m  that the powers to determine 
human rights questions granted to the judiciary under S.84 Nationality, Asylum and 
Immigration Act (formerly contained in S.65 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999) 
permitted the court to take into account the position o f the entire family unit and not
101 LK (Serbia) v SSHD [2007] EWCA 3rd December 2007.
102 For example, J  (Uganda) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 802.
103 For example, R (on the application o f  Bnjar Semanaj) v SSHD [2007] EWHC 1704 (Admin), PM  
(Jamaica) v SSHD  [2007] EWCA Civ 937.
104 LM (DRC) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 325.
105 AM  (3rd party support not perm itted R281 (v)) [2007] UKAIT 00058.
106 Beoku Betts v SSHD [2008] UKHL 39.
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only the appellant. This settles an issue that has been litigated over a long period and 
will, in future, avoid the artificiality o f the appellant's human rights being decided in 
one forum while those of his family members must be decided in separate 
proceedings elsewhere.
6.4.1.3 Living together abroad
This section considers those numerous cases where it was found that the UK resident 
spouse could reasonably join the deported spouse abroad. In these instances, the plight 
o f the spouse or of affected children carried little weight even when these were UK 
nationals and/or faced extreme poverty or destitution.107 In one instance the planned 
deportation o f a stepfather was described by the fam ily's GP as “catastrophic” for the 
children, “who have for the first time in their lives had stability” . The wife and 
children had no prior connection to India. One child had severe asthma and a 
consultant paediatrician was concerned about adequate treatment in rural India. 
However, as the impact upon the children had been considered, the decision to deport 
was upheld.108
The standard formulation was that the couple had to establish ‘insurmountable 
obstacles', a phrase derived from Mcihmood.m  This rapidly became a way to defeat 
almost any claim. In P K ,no for instance, the Tribunal found that it was for the parties 
to establish that there were insurmountable obstacles preventing the UK-resident 
refugee wife from accompanying her husband to the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
In S'S,111 changes in the situation in Sri Lanka meant the Secretary o f State had acted 
lawfully in finding no insurmountable obstacles to the return o f the refugee husband. 
In both instances, the Tribunal denied that their findings required the parties to re- 
litigate their asylum claim. Unsurprisingly, given these findings, a spouse with 
exceptional leave could not rely on this to demonstrate insurmountable obstacles to 
return.112 However, recently, in AB , 1Ij the Court o f Appeal found that, where there is 
reliance upon a third party 's refugee status, the starting point for the Tribunal is that
R v SSHD ex p. Ahmed and Patel [1998] EWHC Admin 453.
103 R v SSHD ex p. Singh [ 1997] EWHC Admin 59.
109 R v SSHD ex p. Mahmood [2000] EWCA Civ 315.
110 PK (Article 8, Return, Marriage-Refugee) Democratic Republic o f  Congo [2002] UKIAT 05220.
111 SS (1LR, Article 8 return) Sri Lanka [2004] UKIAT 00126.
1!2 R (Sri Lanka) [2003] UKIAT 00093, V (DR Congo) [2003] UKIAT 00131, JF (Article 8: 
inconsistency, fam ily members) Angola  [2005] UKIAT 00173.
m  AB (Democratic Republic o f  Congo) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 1422.
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this person cannot reasonably be expected to return to the country o f origin unless 
there is some basis to suppose otherwise.
Moses J, in the Administrative Court,114 found that insurmountable obstacles
required impossibility due to external factors such as refusal by the state to admit the
parties. It was not sufficient to show disruption to the spouse or children. In £7 /.11:1 it
was acknowledged that the appellant’s pregnant wife could not accompany him to
Iraq but this was due to security considerations alone. In all other cases, state
supremacy should prevail:
“All the other factors, language, family and social conditions were factors 
which represent the consequences o f her choice o f husband. They cannot 
impose their choice o f residence upon the United Kingdom for those reasons” .
Rarely, when there was an identifiable flaw in the reasoning, the court intervened. In 
one instance, a psychiatrist reported that forcing the family abroad would aggravate 
the mother-in-law’s heart condition. The Home Office responded that the increased 
stress would not be long lasting. The court quashed the decision as failing to deal 
properly with the medical evidence. The judge however counselled against over­
optimism, warning that the Secretary o f State could take such evidence properly into 
account and still decide to deport.116
By contrast, the Tribunal regularly found that decisions by adjudicators in favour 
o f spouses were outside the range o f reasonable responses.117 In one case, the 
Tribunal agreed that the family could not move to Bangladesh but considered that the 
adjudicator erred in finding the Secretary o f State unreasonable in ordering the 
husband’s deportation, even though the family would not be reunited for at least 3 
years.118
More recently however, and since the House of Lords decision in Huang, the Court 
o f Appeal has adopted a more balanced interpretation. In AB (Ja m a ica )''9 the w ife’s 
prior breach o f immigration control had been minor and rapidly acknowledged while 
the Home Office had acted tardily. The husband was a British national and it was 
disproportionate for him to disrupt his life in order to follow his spouse. While the
114 R (on the application ofSurinder Singhj v IAT and SSHD [2003] EWHC 248.
115 EH (Palestinian -  entry clearance- proportionality) Iraq [2005] UKIAT 00062.
116 R v SSHD ex p. Khaira  ] 1998] EWHC Admin 355.
117 R (Serbia & Montenegro) [2003] UKIAT 00187, F (Jamaica) [2003] UKIAT 00152, J  (Serbia and 
Montenegro) [2003] UKIAT 00151, A (Pakistan)[20Q4] UKIAT 00034.
118 MD (14years not disproportionate) Bangladesh [2004] UKIAT 00208.
119 AB (Jamaica) v SSHD  [2007] EWCA Civ 1302.
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Tribunal subsequently found that the test o f ‘insurmountable obstacles' remained 
extant,120 the Court o f Appeal has, in another recent case, LM  (ZX/?Cj,l21emphasised 
that ‘insurmountable' should not be interpreted literally. It means that it is not realistic 
or reasonable rather than it is not possible for the family to move abroad.
6.4.1.4 “Temporary removal”
From 2000, when most applicants became subject to administrative removal, 
argument shifted to whether the applicant should leave in order to apply for entry 
clearance as a spouse. Two issues have repeatedly presented themselves: when an 
applicant would not come within the immigration rules particularly if  this is due to the 
disruption of removal, and when entry clearance facilities are absent or difficult to 
access in the country o f origin.
The first question received attention in M ahmood.122 It was argued that the 
applicant met all the criteria for entry as a spouse except for valid entry clearance. 
Leaving the UK might result in loss o f his employment and, as a consequence, failure 
o f the entry clearance application. The court found that it would be unfair to other 
more compliant applicants if individuals who breached immigration law were 
permitted to jum p the queue. Article 8 considerations would be brought into account 
during the entry clearance process.
Following Mahmood, the Tribunal found in BS India123 that only in “exceptional 
circumstances” would an Article 8 claim succeed where the possibility o f entry 
clearance exists. Moses J supported this approach in the High Court,124 finding that 
any interference with Article 8 rights arose from the couple's decision to marry 
despite the husband's precarious immigration status rather than from any action of the 
state.
That the application for entry clearance might fail could not be a factor according 
to the Court o f Appeal in Ekinci,125 Simon Brown LJ finding that “(i)t would be a 
bizarre and unsatisfactory result if, the less able the applicant is to satisfy the full 
requirements for entry clearance, the more readily he should be excused the need to 
apply” . This principle was upheld in numerous succeeding cases. Even where the
120 VW and MO (Article S-insurmountable obstacles) Uganda [2008] UKA1T 00021.
121 LM (DRC) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 325.
122 R v SSHD ex p. M ahmood  [2000] EWCA Civ 3 15.
123 [2002] UKIAT 00660.
124 R (on the application ofSurinder Singh) v IAT and SSHD  [2003] EWHC 248.
125 R (on the application o f  Ekinci) v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 765.
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applicant's child was severely disabled, the mother was unable to cope alone and the 
family's sole income would be benefits, the case was insufficiently exceptional to 
waive an application for entry clearance that might not, on the facts, succeed.126 As 
this instance demonstrates, removal o f the main earner might not only make 
compliance with the rules more difficult, but could create new reliance on public 
funds, something immigration control usually seeks to avoid.
Applicants must still leave the UK if there is no entry clearance post in the country
of origin, provided facilities can be accessed in a neighbouring country.127 In
consequence, the Tribunal has become involved in assessing the feasibility and danger
of travel in various troubled locations. For instance, in H C ,m  it was considered
reasonable for the applicant to return to Iraq, obtain travel documents, negotiate
Jordanian border controls and endure the cost and danger o f travelling from Iraq to
Jordan to obtain a visa. There was not established “a reasonable likelihood that the
claimant could not make the journey without adverse consequences or a violation of
his human rights” . A similar view was taken in SA ,129 where the Tribunal held that:
“Although there are extensive dangers, we are not satisfied in the light o f this 
evidence that the dangers are so extensive that it is unreasonable to expect the 
appellant to make the same journey being made regularly by others seeking 
entry clearance.”
Some decisions acknowledged the difficulties. In A M ,lj0 the Tribunal found that the 
impossibility of obtaining entry clearance in Somalia prevented removal o f the 
husband o f a Somalian refugee, given that it would probably result in permanent
* 131separation. In KJ, the Tribunal found that travel within Iraq was too dangerous for a 
Kurd and the parties’ precarious financial position made the cost disproportionate. 
The Tribunal found in SM  Afghanistan132 that, as there was no queue to join, allowing 
Afghan applicants to remain in the UK did not legitimise queue jum ping. In .KfS'f133 
Collins J found that the absence o f entry clearance facilities in Afghanistan, and the 
delay in considering the asylum claim, meant that the claimant could make his
126 LH (Truly exceptional- Ekinci applied) Jamaica [2006] UKIAT 00019.
127 J (Serbia and Montenegro) [2003] UKIAT 00041.
128 HC (Availability o /E n tiy  Clearance Facilities) Iraq [2004] UKIAT 00154.
129 SA (Entiy clearance in Jordan — proportionality) Iraq CG  [2006] UKA1T 0 0 0 11.
130 AM  (Inability to make entry clearance application) Somalia  [2004] UKIAT 00276.
131 KJ (Entiy clearance proportionality) Iraq CG  [2005] UKIAT 00066.
132 SM and others (Entiy clearance, proportionality) Afghanistan GC  [2007] UKAIT 00010.
133 R(S) v SSHD  [2007] EWHC 51 (Admin).
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marriage application in-country. He referred (at para. 203) to the human cost o f such 
decision-making:
“People cannot be expected to put their lives on hold, particularly if  they are 
young. The claimant was when he arrived in genuine need o f  protection and he 
has been condemned to a cruel limbo of worry and uncertainty over his 
future” .
Nonetheless, Huang did not make much immediate material difference to the bulk of 
decision-making as, for example, SM  Iraq™  demonstrates. However, the recent 
House o f Lords decision in Chikwamba,™  should lead to a change o f emphasis at 
least in cases involving children or disproportionate hardship. Lord Scott expressed 
“astonishment” that the case had come so far given the inevitability o f the outcome. 
He was critical o f the failure to acknowledge the particular circumstances of 
applicants:
“ ...policies that involve people cannot be, and should not be allowed to 
become, rigid inflexible rules. The bureaucracy o f which Kafka wrote cannot 
be allowed to take root in this country and the courts must see that it does not” 
(para. 4).
In this instance, a failed Zimbabwean asylum seeker had not been removed due to the 
conditions in Zimbabwe. She married a Zimbabwean refugee in the UK and gave 
birth to a child. After the policy on removals changed, the government argued that she 
should return to Zimbabwe to seek entry clearance as a spouse. Their Lordships found 
this to be disproportionate to the real aim o f the policy (deterring illegal entry) rather 
than the stated intention o f preventing unfair queue jumping. The position here could 
be distinguished from that in Ekinci, 136 where there had been prolonged deception and 
the applicant faced only a brief removal to Germany.
Chikwamba, decided only very shortly before the time o f writing, offers hope that 
future decisions will take account o f all the circumstances o f applicants' lives rather 
than just their immigration status.
6.4.1.5 Delay
Delay by the UK authorities was often argued to make a case ‘exceptional' and 
resulted in some successes before the Tribunal.137 Given the extensive delays in
SM (Entry clearance application in Jordan, proportionality) Iraq CG  [2007] UKA1T 00077.
135 Chikwamba v SSHD [2008] UKHL 40.
136 R (on the application o f  Ekinci) v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 765.
137 G X v SSHD (Kosovo) [2002] UKIAT 03352, M H v SSHD (Pakistan) [2002] UKIAT 04685.
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decision-making, many applicants might rely on family life established while 
awaiting a decision to resist refusal and the issue soon came before the higher courts.
In Shala , 138 the Court o f Appeal found that the four years taken to decide the 
applicant's asylum status made removal after his marriage disproportionate. Had his 
claim been dealt with more promptly, he would have been granted exceptional leave 
to remain, entitling him to make an in-country marriage application.
Later cases distinguished Shala, limiting its potential impact. In N 139 and in K,140 
the Tribunal found that the applicant did not clearly fall into a category that, but for 
the delay, would have been allowed to apply in-country. In other cases, the delay was 
caused, in part, by the applicant's own conduct. In R S,141 the delay was insufficiently 
exceptional, permitting the Home Office to benefit from its own systematic 
inefficiency. In Strbac,]42 the Court o f Appeal held that Shala turned on its own 
particular facts and did not establish a general principle although it accepted in 
Jahaw  that delay should be taken into account.
By contrast, in Abbas ,144 the Court o f Appeal criticised the inefficiency and 
persistent delays o f the Home Office, concurring with the adjudicator that the 
application had been dealt with “in an abject manner” and requesting that formal note 
be taken by the Home Office. Similarly, in Akaeke,145 the Court endorsed the Tribunal 
chair’s description o f the IND’s handling of the application as a “public disgrace” 
which made temporary removal for entry clearance disproportionate. The Court 
distinguished Strbac as, in that case, the claim was based on delay alone; there was no 
separate claim to enter under the rules.
The Court o f Appeal sought to establish some general principles in H B , 1 4 6  It 
emphasised that Shala was concerned with procedural rather than substantive 
questions. The applicant had a claim under the immigration rules and the only 
question was whether he should be required to leave the UK to apply for entry 
clearance. There was no guarantee o f leave if  the other criteria were not met. 
Following Razgar and the Court o f Appeal in Huang, the substantive Article 8
138 Shala v SSHD  [2003] EWCA Civ 233.
139 N (Kenya) [2003] UKIAT 00102.
140 K  (Russia) [2003] UKIAT 00082.
141 RS (Spouse’s pending claim: removal bar?) Sri Lanka [2004] UKIAT 00195.
142 Strbac v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 848.
143 Jaha v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 968.
144 SSHD v Abbas [2005] EWCA Civ 992.
145 SSHD v Akaeke [2005] EWCA Civ 947.
146 HB and others v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1713.
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question was governed by the requirement for exceptionality (although that part o f the 
judgement must now be considered as modified after the House o f Lords decision in 
Huang; see May LJ in R(A) v SSHD147 at para. 30).
l^o
In EB Kosovo, the House o f Lords clarified that the question o f delay affects the 
proportionality o f removal in article 8 claims. By a majority, it also found that delays 
that are “shown to be the result o f a dysfunctional system" (para. 16) reduce the 
weight to be attached to the requirements of a firm and fair immigration control. The 
clarity o f this recent judgement cuts across some o f the complexities in the earlier 
case law.
6.4.2 Intention to live together
In a few cases, the courts have addressed the meaning o f para 281 o f the immigration 
rules requiring that the parties demonstrate that the marriage is subsisting and that the 
parties intend to live together. In Olofimisi,149 Sullivan J found that intention was 
present although the UK settled spouse was unwilling to live elsewhere than in the 
UK, an issue that had previously been decided the other way in Snmeina M asood  (see 
chapter 4).
Not every married couple cohabits all the time. In some unreported cases, the 
Tribunal has shown itself sympathetic to couples separated by economic necessity or 
similar circumstances (Clayton 2006:293-4). The reported cases, however, 
demonstrate little sympathy for unorthodox relationships. Where the husband was in 
prison, intention was found to be absent as cohabitation would have been unlawful in 
the circumstances.150 Where a polygamous husband intended to spend six months of 
the year in the UK with his second wife, intention was also considered to be absent 
even though the couple had a child. The tribunal distinguished this instance from 
others involving periods o f separation because o f the regularity and permanent nature 
o f the polygamous arrangement.151
152In BK, the parties had experienced difficulties in their marriage but now 
intended to cohabit. The Tribunal found that a marriage is subsisting if  it exists in law. 
The requirement to show intention provides the opportunity to investigate whether it
147 [2007] EWCA Civ 655.
148 EB Kosovo v SSHD [2008] UKHL 41.
149 R (on the application o f  Olofimisi) v IAT [2002] EWHC 2106.
150 SB v Entry Clearance Officer, Islamabad  [2002] UKIAT 06623.
151 AB Bangladesh [2004] UKIAT 00314.
152 BK and others v ECO Ankara [2005] UKA1T 00174.
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has substance. However, in the starred determination of the Tribunal held that
this was mistaken and that “subsisting" refers to the present state o f the marriage 
while “intention" looks to the future.
6.4.3 Maintenance, public funds and third party support
In recent years, the courts have been asked to adjudicate on two particular issues 
relevant to marriage and family life: third party support and the disabled sponsor. 
There has been a recent turn towards a restrictive approach.
The government regards reliance on third party support as insufficiently secure and 
credible to ensure long-term financial stability. This assumes a Western model o f the 
nuclear family in which financial responsibility is likely to be undertaken only in 
respect o f very close relatives and ignores the wider-ranging reciprocal obligations 
that exist within extended or “corporate" (Ballard 2008) Asian families. In Arman 
A li,154 Mr Justice Collins found that, given the underlying purpose o f the rules was to 
prevent reliance on public funds, it would breach Article 8 to exclude reliance on third 
party maintenance or accommodation. Following Arman Ali, short-term support for 
spouses was upheld in the starred determination o f Amjad Mahmood}**
The immigration rules were subsequently amended to require children to be 
maintained by and accommodated with the sponsoring relative and the Tribunal in 
A A 156 found that Arman A li could no longer be relied upon in respect o f the rule on 
children, a position upheld “with some regret" (para 20) by the Court o f Appeal in 
M W .151
As regards spouses, the Tribunal inHAi158 distinguished between short-term third 
party support and a long-term commitment, which was regarded as less credible 
“particularly to one who is neither an ascendant nor descendant relative". The 
Tribunal did not exclude it but found that it would require “more detailed and broader 
evidence and enquiry and more thorough assessment”. However, in K A,159 the 
Tribunal found that the wording o f the rule on spouses also precluded all third party 
support. The evidence o f support offered in this case was in any case unsatisfactory.
153 GA ("Subsisting” marriagej Ghana* [2006] UKA1T 00046.
154 £jcp  Arman Ali v SSHD [1999] EWHC Admin 830.
155 A m jad Mahmood v ECO Islamabad [2002] UKIAT 01819.
156 ECO (Dhaka) v AA [2005] UKIAT 00105.
157 M W  (Liberia) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 1376.
158 A K  and others (Long term third party  support) Bangladesh [2006] UKIAT 00069.
159 KA and others (Adequacy o f  maintenance) Pakistan  [2006] UKAIT 00065.
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More reliable evidence was offered in yfiV/160 but the position was affirmed. In this 
case, the Tribunal went on to consider the Article 8 implications, but did so in a way 
that arguably misunderstood the effect o f Hucmg. In A B XbX however, the Tribunal 
found that third party assistance with accommodation is acceptable. The issue of third 
party support was recently aired before the Court of Appeal and a judgement is 
expected shortly (McKee 2008).
The Tribunal has also adopted a restrictive approach to public funds and disabled 
sponsors. Previous case law had found that these sponsors could use their enhanced 
benefits to sponsor a spouse, provided sufficient surplus income was established 
(Clayton 2006:287-8). However, in M K ,]b2 the Tribunal found that disability benefits 
were a recognition o f the disabled person's enhanced needs and did not represent a 
‘bonus' to be spent as she chose. Alongside this rather controlling tone seems to have 
been a fear that additional benefits would eventually be required. In A M ,t63 the 
Tribunal found that these benefits were awarded out of necessity and confirmed that 
they could not be used to sponsor a spouse. When M K  went to the Court o f Appeal,164 
the Court o f Appeal found that a sponsor could rely on disability living allowance to 
sponsor a spouse and the status quo ante seems to have been re-established. In a 
dissenting judgement, Pill LJ hinted that he feared abuse by able-bodied spouses.
6.4.4 Domestic violence
The government recognised that the probationary period for spouses means that 
immigrants might remain in an abusive marriage to avoid removal, particularly if  they 
feared hostility or ostracism in the country o f origin due to the ‘failed’ marriage. A 
concession permitting indefinite leave to be granted if  the marriage ended during the 
probationary period due to domestic violence was, in 2001, incorporated into the 
immigration rules (para 289A HC 395).
Some problems in implementing the provision have already been discussed. 
Another difficulty is that the rule requires an applicant to “produce such evidence as 
may be required by the Secretary o f State” . The Immigration Directorate Instructions 
(IDIs) specify the types o f evidence that should be produced,
160 AM  (3rdparty  support not perm itted R281(v)) [2007] UKAIT 00058.
161 AB (Third party provision o f  accommodation) v ECO Islamabad  [2008] UKAIT 00018.
162 M K (Adequacy o f  m aintenance-disabled sponsor) Somalia [2007] UKIAT 00028.
163 AM  (3,d party support not perm itted  R281(v)) [2007] UKAIT 00058.
164 MK (Somalia) v Entry Clearance Officer [2008] EWCA Civ 1521
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In a series o f cases, the courts were asked to decide whether the list contained in 
the IDIs was exhaustive or whether other forms of evidence might satisfy the rule. 
Two competing values were in play. From the government's perspective, the domestic 
violence provisions represent an exceptional concession whose boundaries must be 
strictly delineated to avoid abuse (see, for example, Ishtiaq) .165 The opposing view is 
that decisions should be made according to the merits not the ability to produce 
evidence in a particular form.
A restrictive view was adopted in some cases,166 but there has been some recent 
flexibility. In JL ,167 the Tribunal found that the evidential requirements contained in 
the IDIs were not binding on them. Parliament would not have permitted one party to 
control an independent tribunal's fact-finding. The outcome was supported by the 
Court o f Appeal in Ishtiaq. It found that the rule should not be construed strictly 
against applicants, but interpreted purposively so as to further the policy o f allowing 
victims to acquire indefinite leave. Even were the IDIs binding, their wording equally 
implies a degree o f flexibility.
Nonetheless, victims o f domestic violence face formidable hurdles. They must 
establish that violence caused the break-up o f the marriage during the probationary 
period. The requirement assumes expectations and knowledge that may be absent in 
immigrant women struggling with language, culture, shame and dependency.
The courts showed some sympathy. In B ,168 the wife left the matrimonial home 
after the husband made an allegation o f assault against her (she was later acquitted on 
the grounds o f self-defence). After divorce and termination o f her leave, but in 
response to continued harassment, she obtained an injunction against the husband. 
The Court o f Appeal accepted that the husband's violence predated the parties’ 
separation and that, while his assault allegation had been the precipitating cause o f the 
separation, it was his prior conduct that had caused the marriage to break down.
On the other hand, in /A ,169 the violence was not reported until after expiry o f the 
wife’s probationary period. She told her GP that she did not report it earlier “because 
o f the Asian culture” and even the sceptical immigration judge accepted that there had 
been “difficulties ...a t a relatively low level” during the probationary period,
165 Ishtiaq v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 386.
166 For example, S (India) [2003] U KIAT00162, R on the application o f  Manpreet Kaur [2004 EWCA 
Civ 818, RH (Para 2S9A/HC395-no discretion) Bangladesh [2006] UKAIT 00043.
167 JL (Domestic violence: evidence and procedure) India [2006] UKAIT 00058.
168 R (on the application ofB) v SSHD  [2002] EWCA Civ 1797.
169 IN (Domestic violence — IDI-policy) Pakistan [2007] UKAIT 00024.
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including al least one incident o f physical and verbal abuse. However, because the 
wife attempted reconciliation and did not finally leave her husband until after more 
abuse, the Tribunal found that the separation was not due to the earlier violence. This 
rigid application o f the criteria ignores victims' vulnerability. In this instance, and 
consistent with his abusive conduct, the husband refused to assist his wife in making 
an application for indefinite leave so that, without a flexible application o f the 
exception, she remained indefinitely subject to removal.
The Court o f Appeal recently found that a woman with two small children who had 
left a violent marriage could not rely 011 Article 8 to remain in the UK although, quite 
obviously, each case would be fact-dependent and it was hinted that an application 
that included the children might have had a better chance of succeeding.170
6.4.5 Developments under Ss. 19-25 AKTQA
The legislative history and nature o f these clauses have already been discussed. There 
have now been three High Court decisions, a Court o f Appeal decision and a recent 
judgement in the House of Lords.
In the first High Court decision,171 Silber J found that measures to prevent sham 
marriages did not breach Article 12 ECHR and that substantial deference is due in 
respect o f restrictions imposed 011 Article 12 rights. He accepted government 
arguments as to the prevalence o f sham marriages particularly among EEA nationals. 
Nonetheless, he found that the statutory scheme breached Articles 12 and 14 as it was 
not rationally connected to the legislative purpose, was disproportionate and 
discriminated by race and nationality. This was due to its inflexibility and the 
effective presumption that certain marriages are sham, the exemption for Church of 
England marriages, the absence o f assessment of the individual relationship and the 
inability o f those affected to make representations.
The judgement is closely worded and extensive consideration is given to the 
arguments put forward by the Secretary o f State and to ECHR case law. Its tone 
suggests anxiety about overstepping the boundaries o f the judicial role. Two 
subsequent judgements by Silber J applied the principles established in the first 
decision to the parties in the case and suggest that this anxiety was, in his subsequent 
view, somewhat realised.
170 NG (Pakistan) v  SSHD 4 ,h December 2007.
171 R (on the application ofB aiai and others) v SSHD [2006] EWHC 823 (Admin).
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It is unsurprising, given the current law, that damages were not awarded. However, 
the reasoning in the damages decision makes it clear that the inconvenience and delay 
caused to applicants would have been permissible had the scheme not been 
discriminatory and disproportionate.172 More surprising is the third judgement by 
Silber J .17'1 This was required because the previous court had not been asked to rule 
specifically on the position of a claimant who was present illegally in the UK. The 
judge found that refusal o f a certificate o f approval to such an applicant was not 
incompatible with the ECHR. His reasoning is not entirely convincing. He found that 
the necessity o f effective immigration control and the particular advantages accruing 
to the spouse o f an EEA national weighed more heavily in the decision as to 
proportionality when illegal entrants were involved. That is arguably so, but the 
scheme still does not distinguish between those entering sham and genuine marriages 
so that, unless it is presumed that all marriages involving illegal entrants are sham, a 
rational connection between the scheme and the problem is not established. The 
discrimination part o f the claim was dismissed because the claimant had chosen a 
register office ceremony, an argument that applied equally to the other claimants 
present legally. This third judgement implies sympathy for the priority awarded by 
government to ensuring that those who have not complied with the rules for entry do 
not benefit from their misconduct. Their transgression excludes them from the careful 
consideration and weighing o f factors that characterise the decisions in respect o f the 
other claimants.
The Court o f A ppeal174 found that Silber J had accorded too much deference to the 
Secretary o f State. The qualifications to Article 12 did not permit interference with 
genuine marriages for the purposes o f immigration control. The protection afforded 
by Article 12 extends to those present illegally although the court suggested that a 
differently constructed scheme might be compatible.
The House o f Lords found unanimously that the scheme breached Article 12 o f the 
ECEIR.175 The distinction in S. 19(1) o f the statute between Church o f England and 
other ceremonies was discriminatory and the declaration o f incompatibility was 
maintained in respect o f that part. The rest o f the scheme could be applied compatibly 
if, where there is no evidence o f a sham marriage, a certificate o f approval is granted
172 R (on the application ofB aia i and others) v SSHD  [2006] EWHC 1035 (Admin).
173 R (on the application o f  Baiai and another) v SSHD [2006] EWHC 1454 (Admin).
174 SSHD v Baiai and others [2007] EWCA Civ 478.
175 R (On the application o f  Baiai and others) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 53.
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and the application o f the scheme (including the fee) does not “unreasonably inhibit" 
the exercise o f the right to marry. The House upheld the reversal by the Court of 
appeal of Silber J ’s third judgement. Immigration status is not material; the only 
lawful consideration is the nature o f the marriage.
6.4.6 Judicial decision-making: discussion
The previous section o f this chapter has argued that, in the period examined here, the 
government has sought primarily to exclude those who undermine state hegemony 
over immigration. In many of the cases discussed here, particularly in the early part o f 
the period, the courts have upheld the exclusion of such spouses regardless o f the 
hardship faced by the UK resident party who may face exile or separation due to their 
choice of spouse. The courts have rarely expressed views as to the conduct of the 
parties and where they have done so, they have as often as not expressed sympathy 
but this was not often reflected in the outcome.
Thus, until recently, they may be criticised for excessive deference and, in 
consequence, a selective approach to the law .176 The maintenance for a long period of 
a ‘review’ function in Article 8 cases and the rigid application o f criteria such as 
‘insurmountable obstacles’ or, prior to Huang, ‘exceptionality’ arguably reflected an 
out-of-date approach to Strasbourg jurisprudence and failed to take account of more 
recent developments (Rogers 2003; Macdonald and Webber 2005:430-1). The refusal 
to give primacy to the interests of children in removal cases is out o f step with recent 
Convention and EU law (Lambert 2006:170). Meanwhile, in decisions relating to 
public funds, domestic violence and the meaning of ‘subsisting’, the courts have often 
(although not always) tended towards enabling restrictive policies to be maintained.
Judicial conservatism in immigration has been widely noted in the past (see the 
discussion in chapter 6). Without a full evaluation of the range o f case law, it is not 
possible to assert that judges have demonstrated more restraint in immigration issues 
than in other areas under the Human Rights Act, although some have suggested the 
possibility (see Clayton 2007:317 and Leigh 2002:276-7 for a critique o f Mahmood 
and Samaroo in relation to other Article 8 cases). It must also be noted that, as 
discussed below, a more assertive stance is currently observable.
176 The term ‘deference’ is used here although it is argued by some to be inapt as it suggests that the 
judiciary is refraining from legitimate intervention; see Dickson (2006:340-1).
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Nonetheless, for a period, many were disappointed by the courts' overall approach 
to deference, arguing that this was mandated neither by the Human Rights Act itself 
nor the ECHR jurisprudence (Edwards 2002; Leigh 2002; Clayton 2004; Ewing 
2004). The legal formulation o f deference, the ‘margin of discretion', is a domestic 
judicial creation and has arguably been applied too broadly and uncritically (Craig 
2001; Edwards 2002).
This self-limiting must be seen in the particular contemporary context. The Human 
Rights Act represented “an unprecedented transfer of political power from the 
executive and legislature to the judiciary" (Ewing 1999) and there was much anxiety 
prior to its enactment at the “serious question o f democratic legitimacy” it posed and 
at the potential politicisation o f the judiciary (Stevens 1999:368-72). Judicial self- 
restraint acknowledges that the legitimacy o f judicial intervention remains contested 
(Nicol 2006) and may bring retaliation as in the failed attempt to impose an ouster 
clause (Rawlings 2005). Judicial reticence has perhaps had more to do with judges' 
“self-limiting institutional norms” (Judge 2004:693) than with attitudes towards 
litigants.
However, Judge (2004:691-2) comments that it is “based upon an idealised 
conception o f parliamentary sovereignty rooted in an acceptance o f the Westminster 
model. Rarely does the reality o f executive dominance and ‘executive' sovereignty 
intrude into this view”. Failing to acknowledge this reality has permitted an 
impoverished view o f democracy to prevail.
Recent case law, however, including some discussed here, suggests a more value- 
driven approach and that the courts, inspired by their human rights jurisdiction and led 
by the House o f Lords, “have begun to see human rights as constitutive o f democracy 
rather than ranged against it” (Fredman 2006:54). The House o f Lords judgement in 
Huang recalls that human rights apply to human beings even if  their presence is 
unsanctioned. There is also the assertion o f a distinct role for the courts in protecting 
those excluded by majoritarian politics. Baiai makes it clear that even illegal 
immigrants have rights. EB Kosovo and Chikwamba demonstrate a readiness to place 
greater weight on the human cost o f immigration control. Beoku-Betts suggests a will 
to give practical effect to human rights. Some recent Court o f Appeal judgements (AB 
Jamaica, L M  (DRC) and Baiai for example) suggest that this new emphasis is having 
an effect on their decision-making although it is currently less visible in Tribunal 
decisions. Fredman (2006:80) has argued that the “UK courts are beginning to
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construct a system o f fundamental values, based on liberty, democracy and equality: 
but so far only the contours o f such values are visible’*. The recent higher court 
decisions discussed here support her contention. Whether, over the long term, the 
courts will better protect those whom immigration control has otherwise stripped of 
rights remains to be seen. Others have previously warned against undue optimism 
(Ewing 2005).
6.5 Administrative decision-making
Chapter 5 offered an extensive critique o f entry clearance decision-making prior to 
1997. It argued that administrative attitudes were congruent with and contributed to 
broader policy aims. This section looks at the position after that period. It does not 
offer a comprehensive analysis o f entry clearance procedures (see Wray 2006b for 
discussion o f these) but considers ECO decision-making in marriage applications on 
the sub-continent. It notes that some decisions emerging from that region still bear the 
characteristics identified in chapter 5, notwithstanding important changes in 
administrative approach and staff attitudes. It is not sufficient to account for this 
minority o f poor decisions by reproducing, in attenuated form, the critique offered in 
chapter 7. Instead, it argues for a more nuanced analysis that acknowledges the 
changed situation since the periods discussed earlier.
6.5.1 Public perception
In chapter 7, it was observed that, o f the three institutions considered in this thesis, the 
entry clearance service was the least accountable. Complaints about its decision­
making and culture o f refusal were widespread. The difficulties faced by the 
Commission for Racial Equality in making their investigation suggest a closed official 
culture.
Criticisms o f the entry clearance process continue to be made. JCWI described
entry clearance decision-making as:
“ ...poor and inconsistent between UK missions, manifesting a lack of 
understanding o f the law, lack o f transparent criteria which can be understood 
by applicants and a reliance on personal value judgements as reasons for entry 
refusal.” (Home Affairs Committee 2006.11:82-6).
Independent M onitors’ Reports have been persistently critical (see, for example, 
Lindsley 2005, 2006) although the latest report notes improvement (Costelloe Baker
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2007:46). In respect o f marriage applications, practitioners have expressed frustration 
at the quality and style o f some refusals (Wray 2006b: 113). Commentators have 
observed an increase in refusals on ‘intention to live together' since the abolition of 
primary purpose and some o f these appear to re-import primary purpose 
considerations. The sub-continent appears to be over-represented in appeals against 
refusals on ‘intention to live together' suggesting continued focus on the South Asian 
arranged marriage (Wray 2006c: 164-5). Stereotyped decision-making has also been 
reported from those entering civil partnerships (Home Affairs Committee 
200611:127).
The type o f decision that causes criticism has been documented elsewhere (Wray 
2006b and 2006c). Reasons for refusal on the grounds o f intention include absence of 
“a realistic commitment” to the marriage or ' ‘o f a strong bond o f affection’'. 
Applicants have been told that the marriage “would not be regarded as a suitable 
match on the sub-continent” . They have also been told that they may “have cynically 
fathered a child” to improve the application. Reliance on discrepancies has not been 
abandoned. Applicants have been refused, in part, because o f differences as to the 
number of telephone calls, the address of the sponsor’s parents, the precise date of 
meeting and the date when the sponsor started to learn the partner’s language, in this 
case Bangla. These raise questions about ECOs’ understanding o f evidential issues.
However, important differences with the past must be noted. Accountability and 
transparency in all areas o f  government have increased including in UKvisas. 
Previously private instructions have been placed on web sites. U ser panels meet 
regularly. ILPA members’ mailings publish correspondence between practitioners and 
the service. Commentators have access to Independent M onitors’ Reports, UKvisas 
Annual Reports, National Audit Office investigations and Select Committee Reports. 
Some o f these are considered and synthesised in Wray (2006b). Other more recent 
documentation is referred to here. The Independent Monitor has noted ECO s’ “open- 
minded responsiveness” and “thirst for good practice development and guidance” 
(Costelloe Baker 2006:8). My field visit discussed below was arranged swiftly and 1 
was treated throughout with courtesy and openness. At one post, I was asked to brief 
senior staff as to my impressions, and was later advised that this had led to some 
changes in practice.
Refusal rates in marriage cases are now significantly lower than under primary 
purpose (Wray 2006c: 164). Making an application is now quicker and easier due to
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outsourcing and the creation o f local offices. While long queues for settlement 
decisions have mostly been eliminated on the subcontinent (Wray 2006b: 115-6), 
those reapplying or with an ‘immigration history' may be subject to a longer wait 
(Home Affairs Committee 2006.111:287). The emphasis on speed has arguably been at 
the expense o f quality (Home Affairs Committee 2006.1:144) but dissatisfaction tends 
to be focused on a minority of poor decisions.
6.5.2 The field study
In January 2 0 0 6 ,1 visited three entry clearance posts on the Indian sub-continent over 
ten days. In total, I interviewed 13 Entry Clearance Officers. 7 Entry Clearance 
Managers, 5 locally appointed staff and 3 senior staff, using semi-structured 
interviews that frequently merged into wide-ranging informal discussions on a range 
o f issues. I observed all aspects o f the decision-making process, including twenty-two 
interviews (not all marriage). I looked at pending appeals at each post and, at one 
post, had meetings with the High Commissioner and Forced Marriage Unit. I spent 
social time, outside working hours, with staff at two posts.
Many interesting points beyond the scope o f this thesis arose out o f my visit and 
these are discussed elsewhere (Wray 2006b). The focus in this section is upon the 
entry clearance officer as a decision-maker in marriage applications.
6.5.3 The entry clearance officer
Only ECOs may issue or refuse a visa. They are supported by administrative staff, 
often locally appointed, and supervised by Entry Clearance Managers although, as 
discussed elsewhere (Wray 2006b:127-8, Costelloe Baker 2007:41, Home Affairs 
Committee 2006.1:40), the adequacy o f supervision and quality control remain live 
issues.
ECOs are civil servants appointed at executive officer level from the Home Office 
or the equivalent grade in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I met some staff 
who were educated beyond the minimum requirements, with graduate or post­
graduate qualifications. I was advised that the FCO has difficulty recruiting sufficient 
volunteers for visa work. The immigration service has recruited widely in recent times 
and senior staff commented that not all new staff seem sufficiently experienced (a 
concern not confined to entry clearance, see Woodfield et al. 2007:vi) and which is 
now being remedied (Home Affairs Committee 2006.11:50).
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Staff seemed tightly knit, often socialising with each other or with other High 
Commission staff. In two posts, accommodation and facilities such as a bar, shop and 
swimming pool were available on the High Commission compound. While not cited 
as a reason for taking the job, staff enjoyed a better lifestyle than they might 
reasonably expect in the UK with cooks, cleaners and drivers. Life seemed relatively 
carefree, with fair amounts of leisure time and disposable income by comparison with 
similarly situated individuals in the UK.
A number o f staff expressed an interest in and sympathy for local culture. I was 
struck,"hrmy informal discussions, by the predominance of socially liberal views and 
the absence of the type o f hostile or contemptuous attitudes towards immigrants that 
might be expected from the account given in chapter 5. It is possible that staff who 
held such views chose not to express them in my presence, but the staff I did talk to 
told me that such officers were a tiny minority.
Relationships between local and UK staff were cordial. However, I did not get the 
impression that UK staff frequently mixed socially with them or with others in the 
local population (see also Home Affairs Committee 2006.1:39). I was advised that 
several ECOs are o f South Asian descent although, except for one who said she was 
posted close to relatives, they were not necessarily matched to their area o f origin.
As well as being somewhat detached from the society in which they work, ECOs 
are removed physically and perhaps psychologically from the UK, even given modern 
forms o f communication and transport. Some ECOs undertake regular postings 
abroad, although these may be interspersed with periods in the UK and this is one of 
the attractions o f the job. Too much should not be extrapolated from a few social 
meetings, but there seemed to be relatively little interest in or discussion o f current 
events in the UK. This detachment may help explain how the entry clearance service, 
in the past, easily adopted an exclusionary culture that was arguably out o f step with 
contemporary values.
During my visit, the debate about terror, immigration and integration, so prominent 
in the UK and discussed earlier in this chapter, seemed o f relatively little interest. 
More significantly, cultural issues that might have local implications such as forced or 
arranged marriages were not o f great concern either. ECOs spoke sympathetically 
abqut the wish o f diasporas to maintain family links and o f local family life and 
marriage arrangements. The official (not an ECO) who ran the forced marriage unit 
that I visited had a sophisticated understanding of the problem, its extent and the
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limits of intervention. She opposed raising the minimum age for sponsorship to 21 
because of the genuine marriages it would affect. It is arguable that the staff I 
encountered were, on average, more knowledgeable about and accepting o f cultural 
difference than the majority UK-based population. While they may not have been 
entirely representative, I was struck by the gap between my expectations, based on the 
literature discussed in chapter 5, and the actuality.
These qualities were reflected in much o f the work I saw ECOs do. 1 observed 
them treat applications pragmatically and humanely, for example, issuing a visa to a 
son, just over-age, when the rest of the immediate family were entering the UK. I saw 
ECOs search an application for evidence that could satisfy them and express regret 
when they had to refuse. One application failed on maintenance, but the sponsor had 
applied for a job with the police. Issuing the refusal, the ECO commented, “I hope he 
gets his job before the appeal”. There was thus some lack o f congruity between the 
outlook and attitudes o f the ECOs I met and the problematic type of decision 
discussed above.
6.5.4 The entry clearance process
Shadowing ECOs gave me some sense of how they experience the work. I sat beside 
them as they processed applications and sat behind them as they conducted 
interviews. They were mostly happy to discuss their reasoning.
Entry clearance is a large-scale administrative process with much emphasis on 
targets, systems and turnover. The emphasis o f internal reform in the past period has 
largely been upon improving efficiency with some welcome results (Wray 2006b: 113) 
although there seems to have been more emphasis recently on quality (Costelloe 
Baker 2007:5-6, 16). However, the drive to efficiency combined with increased 
numbers o f applications (Brodie 2007:147-8) means ECOs may have to process a 
large number o f applications in a short period. Pressure is ameliorated by use o f 
outsourcing to receive applications and of local staff to undertake administrative 
processes. Additional staff may be seconded to cope with seasonal peaks. 
Nonetheless, on a day-to-day basis, the time available to consider an application is 
primarily determined by the number o f applications received (for a further discussion, 
see Wray 2006b:115-7, Home Affairs Committee 2006.1:40-3). Several ECOs 
mentioned that they found the job pressurised.
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Once submitted and processed, all applications are seen by an ECO who decides 
whether to issue or refuse a visa or call for interview. Unofficial rules of practice 
seem to apply. I was told several times that settlement visas would not be refused 
without an interview, unless the ECO believed that the applicant clearly could not 
meet the rules. They did not envisage refusing on ‘intention to live together’ without 
an interview.
Interviews take place some weeks after the initial application and may involve a 
different ECO. Reasons for interview may be noted briefly on the file, but ECOs have 
discretion as to the questions asked. This may lead to deeper inquiry into issues that 
would have been accepted on the paperwork had the applicant not been called for 
interview for another reason. After the interview, the ECO will either issue a visa or 
write and serve a refusal notice. ECOs use standard paragraphs that are adapted to the 
particular case. Some o f the instances o f poor decision-making discussed above were 
due to poor quality standard wording, although I was assured that the worst examples 
I saw were no longer in use.
Administratively, it is easier to issue than to refuse a visa and several ECOs 
commented that, far from there being an institutional bias towards refusal, the 
pressure was to issue (an argument made elsewhere in the immigration system; 
Woodfield at al. 2007:22). I did observe ECOs issue visas where they had some 
doubts, but it was not clear that, taking the standard of proof into account, they were 
wrong to do so.
It is likely that ECOs do not have time to ensure all refusals are well formulated, an 
observation that has been made elsewhere (Wray 2006b: 122; Costelloe Baker 
2006:39-40). Refusals are not always closely tied to the Immigration Rules (Home 
Affairs Committee 20061:37). However, a recent improvement in the quality o f (non­
settlement) refusal notices has been noted (Costelloe Baker (2007:19).
6.5.5 ECOs and the legal system
ECOs were conscious o f the element o f judgement required in their work. When 
asked about the skills and attributes o f a good entry clearance officer, qualities such as 
fairness, open-mindedness and objectivity were mentioned alongside administrative 
skills. However, they did not relate these qualities to the legal requirements o f their 
decision-making and some seemed alienated from the legal system. The Home Affairs
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Committee (2006.1:150) also refers to “a lack o f mutual confidence between front-line 
staff and Immigration Judges” .
Immigration judges were described as failing to understand the reality o f entry 
clearance, o f having a romanticised view o f the sub-continent and o f being over­
persuaded by plausible sponsors,177 while appeal decisions were described as too 
numerous and too inconsistent to offer useful guidance. The main purpose o f studying 
appeals was to learn which phrases judges dislike, so that they may be avoided. ECOs 
told me that they sometimes issued visas because they believed an appeal would 
succeed rather than being personally persuaded o f the application's merits.
This superficial approach may be related to poor understanding o f legal decision­
making. At one post, I was asked what immigration judges look for. I went through a 
marriage application refusal notice explaining the likely objections to particular 
findings. Staff were unused to such reasoning, but were interested in my
I *70
explanations.
ECOs thus aspired to be fair and objective but saw legal standards as exterior to 
and even in tension with such values. They were a hurdle to be negotiated or 
compromised with rather than being integral to and supportive o f their decision­
making. This tendency has been observed elsewhere and was discussed in chapter 2.
Although one interviewed ECO had legal qualifications, most had no formal 
training in law .179 Materials other than the Immigration Rules and the Diplomatic 
Service Procedures were not routinely used or even available. I observed occasional 
significant gaps in knowledge, as when an ECO dealt with an application for children 
to join their UK-resident father without taking account o f the rules applying to 
children joining one parent. It was easy to understand why complex cases might be 
poorly understood and become mired in confusion (for an example, see Menski 2007).
Most ECOs, however, were aware o f the content o f the rules and sought to apply 
them to the best o f their ability. But it was less apparent that they had internalised 
legal values relating to proof and evidence. So, while most whom I asked correctly 
identified and explained the standard o f proof, not all understood that, in practice, it 
requires a visa to be issued even if  there are substantial doubts. One ECO, for
177 Another explanation o f  high success rate when sponsors appear is the frequent absence o f  a Home 
Office representative (around 35% o f  appeals in 2003-4 although the position has since improved: 
Home Affairs Committee 2006.1:248-9).
178 The service is taking steps to provide additional training to ECOs in this area: Wray (2006b: 115).
179 See Wray (2006b: 114) and Home Affairs Committee (2006.1:38-40) for a discussion o f  ECO 
training.
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example, told me that she liked to see “real hard evidence" before issuing. In other 
instances, ECOs expressed a strong preference for certain forms o f evidence, such as 
a local authority property inspection report, although the immigration rules do not 
specify how compliance is to be demonstrated. This arguably imprecise approach to 
evidential questions is critical when combined with the fact-finding role o f ECOs.
6.5.6 ECO fact-finding: documentary evidence and forgery
Fact-finding is central to visa work. To determine whether the evidence presented by 
the applicant shows compliance with the Immigration Rules, the ECOs must draw 
factual inferences from evidence. Evidence may be purely documentary including 
marriage certificates, bank statements, photo albums or phone records. In other cases, 
the applicant may be called for interview. This section discusses the attitudes ECOs 
adopted towards documentary evidence generally. These usually arose out o f the 
requirement to show that the parties are able to maintain and accommodate 
themselves without recourse to public funds. The following section considers how 
ECOs approached the test that is unique to marriage and allied applications: that the 
parties intend to live together.180
Forgery was a major preoccupation at all the posts I visited. ECOs believed that, 
for many living in the region, entry to the UK is highly desirable and that forged 
documents and other types o f fraud are commonplace. During my stay, I saw 
documents that were, on their face, questionable. In one case, the same head had been 
superimposed on several wedding photos. In another, a PAYE slip purported to 
originate from ‘Norwitclv. I was told that forged bank statements are commonplace, 
although I did not see any. I was also shown a website which offers forged 
documentation for sale.
Only a relatively small number o f applications involved clearly forged 
documentation. More frequently, the issue shaded into questions o f evidential value. 
ECOs believed that documents might be forged or might misrepresent the true 
position, for example, wage slips, tenancy agreements, bank statements and used 
phone cards. These are frequently dismissed as o f little evidentiary weight as they 
might be manufactured or manipulated, although they could equally represent the only 
evidence available to the applicant. ECOs became involved in making judgements as
180 All these requirements are found in para. 281 HC 395.
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to the 'credibility' o f certain propositions. For example, one doubted the probability 
of a new immigrant without English being offered the post o f manager in a jewellery 
shop.
At some posts. Risk Assessment Units (discussed further in Wray 2006b: 125) now 
investigate suspect documents, for example, checking that bank statements are 
genuine or phoning employers named in job offers. In other cases, the document may 
be rejected as being o f insufficient evidentiary value without further enquiry although 
unsupported allegations o f forgery should not now occur (Costelloe Baker 2006:27- 
8).
ECOs must therefore judge the probative value o f any document. They must also 
determine the relative priority to be attached to detecting forgery. The ECOs I 
interviewed held a range o f attitudes. Some were pragmatic, recognising that onerous 
evidential requirements encourage the submission o f forged documents in otherwise 
genuine applications (see also Costelloe Baker 2006:27) and that almost any 
document, including those usually considered highly probative, may be forged or 
misleading. For example, a sponsor may take employment for the duration of the 
entry clearance process or local authority housing inspectors may be misinformed 
about the actual number o f people resident. Some also regretted that the immigration 
rules do not acknowledge the support provided by extended Asian families, saying 
that they did not investigate documents too closely if  they were confident that a 
couple would be supported.
On the other hand, some ECOs were more preoccupied with detecting and 
preventing fraud or misleading evidence and felt it important to send a clear message 
o f deterrence. They argued that an applicant refused for these types o f reason could 
either submit genuine documents at appeal or renew their application. Elsewhere 
(Wray 2006b: 122-6), I have offered a critique o f an over-emphasis on fraud, arguing 
that this may lead to the incorrect application o f the standard o f proof and the 
subordination o f other institutional objectives.
6.5.7 ECO fact-finding; ‘intention to live together7
ECOs have also to determine whether parties intend to live together. As with fraud, 
the actual extent o f sham marriages is unknown (Home Affairs Committee 
2006.111:90). ECOs must again make judgements based on their assessment o f the risk 
and the priority they attach to detection. In chapter 5 ,1 described decision-making that
234
seemed to rest on the assumption that nearly all family applications were fraudulent 
and an overwhelming preoccupation with detection of deceit.
This was not the case at the posts I visited. I was told repeatedly that the vast 
majority o f marriages are genuine and that refusals on intention are rare. However, 
they were fairly frequent amongst appealed refusals where they had often been 
combined with other grounds, suggesting that ‘intention' may be used to ‘strengthen' 
a refusal. As with fraud, attitudes varied. Some ECOs took a pragmatic (and arguably 
legally correct) approach. They were aware that they could not detect every possible 
case and were reluctant to clog up the appeals system with doubtful refusals. Others 
were more stringent, arguing that post-entry controls were ineffective. One told me, in 
this context that “we are the gatekeepers”.
When considering intention, ECOs searched for the signifiers o f a bogus marriage, 
relying on their personal template o f a genuine marriage in the region. Suspicions 
might be aroused by characteristics such as a large age gap, disability, a prior divorce 
or, according to some ECOs, a male applicant. Aspects o f the marriage such as hasty 
arrangements, absence of photographs and lack of communication between or 
knowledge o f each other might also be significant, particularly if the marriage was 
otherwise atypical. Thus, an arranged marriage between spouses deemed to be o f 
typical age and relationship received relatively little attention. For example, an ECO 
considering what he regarded as a typical sub-continent marriage application between 
cousins, told me he was unconcerned at the absence of contact between them. In less 
conventional cases, however, evidence o f  the relationship was critical and the subject 
o f lengthy interview.
The basis for beliefs about the appropriate degree of scrutiny was not clear. There 
seemed to be no reliable information as to the incidence and characteristics o f bogus 
marriages on the sub-continent. There have been recent moves towards improving the 
quality o f local information, but this seems to be confined to financial and related 
issues (Wray 2006b: 126-7). I saw ECOs rely on information from local staff who told 
them, for example, that a method o f sending money or a particular marriage ceremony 
were probable. There are dangers which I have discussed elsewhere (Wray 
2006b: 126-7) in such reliance. Most relevantly here, it is not uniformly available and
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may not always be accurate. ECOs also often relied on their own beliefs, some of 
which they articulated for me as they made their decisions. These included that young 
South Asian men seek emigration to the UK, that it is unusual to marry a divorcee, 
that sophisticated urban Indians would have substantial knowledge o f their spouse, 
that a loving couple would happily live anywhere and that adultery “does not happen” 
in traditional Bangladeshi society.
In cases viewed as atypical, the application was not predestined to fail, but ECOs 
were alert to a possible bogus marriage. Applicants would be called for interview and 
expected to give a sufficiently persuasive account of the marriage. This expectation 
was often fulfilled. In interviews, ECOs often seemed pleased and even made 
comments such as “that’s better” when applicants gave the ‘right' answer.
However, some applicants failed to give an account regarded as sufficiently likely 
and refusal followed. I observed only one such instance during my visit. The applicant 
wife (aged 31) had married a man 27 years her senior. Her previous application had 
been refused partly on the grounds that the match would not be considered suitable in 
India. Before the interview, the ECO commented that parents might well consider that 
marriage to an older man in the UK was the best option for a daughter and that the 
previous refusal was reminiscent of primary purpose.
When asked to account for her husband's divorce, the applicant said that the first 
wife had had a boyfriend whereas, in the first application, she had attributed it to the 
parties' inability to have children. She also said that her husband worked in a clothes 
shop, whereas she had previously said he worked in a grocery. There were also 
problems with maintenance and the application was refused on those grounds and on 
intention to live together.
Despite the ECO’s good intentions,. I found the renewed intention refusal also 
weak. JChe applicant maintained that her husband had not previously disclosed the 
boyfriend out o f embarrassment, certainly a credible explanation. The inconsistency 
as to the job was puzzling, but seemed insubstantial to support a conclusion that 
intention to live together was absent. My impression was that this particular omission 
was the only tangible evidence o f more subjective suspicions arising out o f the 
applicant’s off-hand manner and brief answers.
181 At one post, 1 stayed with a friend’s family, prosperous business people. However, the area where 
they lived was described in a local country report as poor and working class.
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This unfavourable impression may be contrasted with a fiancee interview (by a 
different ECO). The applicant had a sister and brother in the UK. No plans had been 
made for the wedding and while she recited the names o f her fiance's employer and 
his immediate family, she knew little else. The ECO issued the visa, in part, because 
of her “straightforward and honest demeanour” . He also commented that he would not 
have issued, had the applicant been male.
Decisions on intention are thus highly subjective and rely upon whether the ECO’s 
personal impression coincides with their conception of how a genuine applicant 
would appear. The risk is that ECOs may misinterpret the behaviour o f the person in 
front o f them, particularly if  they already have negative pre-conceptions. This is 
further illustrated by another interview.
The UK husband was divorced and it was the w ife's first marriage. Before the 
interview, the ECO told me he suspected the husband's bank statements were forged 
as the totals did not tally with the entries. Already suspicious, he found himself 
dissatisfied with the parties' inability to explain the bank statements and with the 
w ife's lack o f familiarity with the grounds o f divorce. He intended to refuse both on 
maintenance (as discounting the bank statements, there was insufficient evidence of 
his finances) and intention to live together. However, a final perusal at the end o f the 
interview revealed that he had misunderstood the statements and they were genuine. 
The ‘intention' point fell away and the visa was issued.
There was sometimes a ritualistic air to questioning. One ECO apparently felt 
obliged to investigate ‘intention’ however improbable the alternative explanation. The 
interview involved an illiterate rural wife with two children who wanted to join her 
husband. The application had been referred for interview on the question of 
accommodation (the husband lived and worked in a hotel). This having been clarified, 
the ECO pursued the question o f intention at length, asking both parties repeatedly 
about the other's interests and hobbies. The couple, used to a subsistence lifestyle, 
were baffled. The ECO became increasingly frustrated and was relieved when he 
established that the husband knew that the wife liked cooking rice and the wife knew 
that the husband ate at the hotel. He then felt able to issue a visa.
In the instances discussed here, it is clear that, in applying the rule on intention, 
ECOs make a series o f  judgem ents as to the probability o f certain things being what 
they are. These judgements will not be consciously articulated 011 each occasion and
237
perhaps correspond to what Woodfield et al. (2007:25) describe as the ‘instinct' felt 
by immigration officers at polls.
The first judgement is the probability o f a particular marriage being sham. This 
depends upon the ECO 's view as to the prevalence and characteristics of sham 
marriages in the locality. The ECO must also decide whether further investigation is 
merited, which may depend on the importance that the ECO attaches to detecting 
suspected bogus marriages and on other organisational factors including pressure of 
work. Having decided to pursue the question o f intention, the ECO must decide 
whether the picture presented o f the marriage conforms to his conception of how a 
genuinely married couple would behave. At all points, evidence will be tested 
according to the ECO 's view as to the evidential burden on the applicant.
This series of judgements explains why decisions can go wrong despite good 
intentions by ECOs. They have little firm evidence to rely on and small calibrations in 
their views may make a significant difference in a few cases. A marriage that is 
atypical is scrutinised more intensely and misinterpretations are necessarily more 
probable. Suspicion as to one aspect o f the application may affect the view taken of 
other aspects. Personal impressions, however misleading, clearly count (as they do 
elsewhere in the immigration system; see Woodfield at al. 2007:20). Experienced and 
skilled ECOs may usually avoid these pitfalls. Others may not.
While this analysis explains how controversial decisions on intention get made, it 
is less clear why they seem to be confined to particular posts. Refusal rates for 
settlement applications in Africa and South Asia are similar at around 20%, but are 
tiny (often less than 0.5%) elsewhere (Wray 2006c: 164). Higher refusal rates in poor 
countries are usually attributed to pressure to emigrate, prevalence o f fraud and 
corruption and lesser ability to meet financial criteria. It is not possible here to 
evaluate the truth o f these assertions. However, refusals on ‘intention to live together’ 
seem to be over-represented on the Indian subcontinent. Wray (2006c: 165) found that 
33 out o f 52 (63.5%) tribunal appeals on intention were from the Indian 
subcontinent,182 although this region accounted for around a third o f all settlement 
applications. More than half o f these appeals were successful. It seems that, as with 
primary purpose, refusals on intention to live together are particularly associated with 
the subcontinent. Yet prejudice and crude stereotyping were largely absent among the
182 The remaining cases were from other poor, often Muslim, countries.
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ECOs I met there, and a plausible explanation for the over-representation must lie 
elsewhere.
It was mentioned earlier that ECOs look for the signifiers o f a bogus marriage. All 
those I met appreciated that the indications usual in a Western relationship might be 
absent. However, they had little other material to rely on. Lacking other tools, they 
fell back upon modes o f investigation inherited through generations o f  ECOs who 
have worked at these posts. This may account for the ritualistic aspect o f questioning 
that I observed. Senior staff did not accept this suggestion, arguing that those who had 
been present during the era o f primary purpose would, by now, have moved on. 
However, when I asked ECOs how they learnt about their job, they often told me that 
it was through observing more experienced colleagues in post (as noted elsewhere in 
the immigration service; Woodfield et al. 2007:23). Elsewhere (Wray 2006b: 120), I 
noted that a few ECOs had adopted an aggressive and confrontational interviewing 
style reminiscent o f that described in chapter 5.
This is consistent with the emphasis placed by management on local knowledge 
(Wray 2006b: 126-7, Brodie 2007:151). The drawback o f this otherwise laudable aim 
is that inaccurate assumptions and inappropriate local practices may be inadvertently 
perpetuated over generations. In this case, while ECOs were not personally hostile to 
the arranged marriage, they were, through their institutional legacy, inclined to a 
particular style o f investigation and refusal in those instances where suspicions were 
aroused.
6.5.8 Administrative practice: discussion
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that all those engaged in the control of 
immigration through marriage have used their powers to reflect and give effect to 
particular assumptions and beliefs. To the extent that these have been held in 
common, they resulted in a degree o f consistency across institutions. This section 
suggests that, so far as entry clearance is concerned, the position has somewhat 
changed. Earlier in this chapter, I identified as a key political priority, a growing drive 
towards conformity on cultural issues. Early marriages, first-cousin marriages and 
other traditionally arranged marriages are increasingly seen as problematic. Yet it is 
precisely these marriages that seem least likely to attract particular scrutiny. There 
remains a residue o f  refusals that are reminiscent o f the attitudes described in chapter 
5. I have argued that they are consequent on the particular issues and legacy o f entry
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clearance on the sub-continent. Unlike the practices discussed in chapter 5, they do 
not represent an attempt to fulfil a specific political objective.
The other major preoccupation discussed in this chapter is that o f compliance. I 
have also argued that an undesirable immigrant is one who does not acknowledge 
state supremacy in immigration matters. There are some indications o f support for this 
perspective at entry clearance level, for example, the longer queues for those who 
have an 4immigration history' and I observed an aggressive interview o f a failed 
asylum seeker who had married and now sought to regularise his position. The 
individual, however, received his v isa.183
In general, however, my observations suggest that, compared to the past, entry 
clearance is not deeply engaged in ensuring the fulfilment o f these priorities in the 
way described in chapter 5. The ECOs I met seemed to have little personal 
commitment towards these aims and management was preoccupied with efficiency 
and quality control.
This preoccupation, and the attitudes that support it are, however, arguably aligned 
at a deeper level with broader political aims. In the past, the over-riding aim of 
immigration control was to minimise non-white immigration, and entry clearance was 
the means chosen to achieve this. The first part o f this chapter described how this has 
changed. Some state-sanctioned immigration is now seen as both inevitable and 
desirable and skin colour is no longer so decisive a factor. Despite anxiety about 
certain practices, there is no desire to alienate minority communities who are 
substantial electoral constituencies. A culture o f refusal a t  entry clearance level acts
r
against the UK’s wider interests in a globalised economy.184 The perception is that the 
introduction o f e-borders, biometric visas and a points system for economic migration 
will reduce the discretionary element o f entry clearance (although less in marriage 
than elsewhere). The Home Affairs Committee (2006.1:152) found that the focus of 
control “can no longer remain so heavily weighted towards initial entry and border 
control” . These considerations may have influenced the managerial culture in which 
ECOs work; certainly, many o f the attitudes I observed were consistent with them.
183 Evidence submitted by Brides Without Borders to the Home Affairs Committee suggests varying 
attitudes to these applicants. Staff conduct at Jordan is described as “wonderful” and at DRC as 
“unacceptable” (Home Affairs Committee 2006.111:346-54).
184 This point was made to me explicitly by the High Commissioner at one o f  the posts I visited. 
Significantly, the Home Affairs Committee persistently refers to applicants as ‘customers’; see, for 
example, 2006.1:155.
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If  the reputation o f entry clearance has started slowly to improve, other areas such 
as asylum decision-making have become the focus for criticism. Most relevantly for 
this thesis, I analysed earlier in this chapter the treatment of couples where one party 
has no status in the UK and faces removal. Rather than disappearing, harsh decision­
making and exclusionary practices may have been displaced to other parts o f the 
immigration system where they are more effective and do less damage. The change in 
attitudes of ECOs between those reported in chapter 5 and those I have described here 
may be less coincidental than first appears. The position may also change again in the 
future, as political priorities turn again in a more exclusionary direction, at least so far 
as certain immigrants or types o f immigrants are concerned. The most recent 
proposals, discussed earlier in this chapter, may spark a reorientation of the entry 
clearance service back towards subjective and stereotyped decision-making in certain 
situations.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to capture the complexity and fluidity o f the past ten years, 
during which control o f marriage immigration has become enmeshed in wider debates 
about integration, cohesion and the limits o f state power. ‘M odern’ forms o f 
relationship such as cohabitating couples and same sex relationships have been 
afforded official recognition in the UK, while the arranged marriage among migrant 
communities has been implicitly associated with the archaic and coercive. Yet, 
despite clear unease at the continuation o f early international arranged marriages, until 
very recently, the government did not act decisively against them, circling repeatedly 
around the issue without daring to strike. The situation is about to change, given 
recent proposals aimed at the forced marriage, but the government has hitherto been 
cautious about introducing measures that may alienate well-established communities. 
To that extent, these communities have achieved a protected status and a status o f 
belonging that eluded them in earlier periods. Nonetheless, the terms o f the current 
forced marriage and ‘integration’ debates make it clear that this is not without 
reservation. Most affected will be poorly educated and less prosperous families of 
migrant origin, establishing a new fault line that may intersect with or even cut across 
older demarcations.
241
If communities of South Asian origin have achieved some limited and provisional 
measure o f inclusion, others have felt the force of exclusionary measures. They are 
targets not specifically because o f their racial or national origins (although the 
prevalence o f certain nationalities may have increased the perception o f threat) but 
because, as illegal entrants, failed asylum seekers or over-stayers, they lack status in 
the UK. There have been substantial efforts made to ensure that these individuals do 
not gain rights through marriage to UK or EAA residents without going through the 
hurdle o f entry clearance. The difficulties they face in doing so represent an ordeal 
unrelated to the quality o f the marriage but which ensures that only those with 
sufficient commitment succeed. Where applicants fail, their UK-resident spouses 
must choose separation or exile. The dismissive manner of their treatment suggests 
that their choice o f spouse has placed into question their own status as belongers 
where this challenges the primacy o f state power. It is only recently that the courts 
have begun to challenge absolute state power over these individuals.
These two themes, the partial and ambivalent incorporation o f minorities and the 
assertion o f state supremacy, may be detected in many of the legislative changes 
described here, which have seen attempts to override human rights and other norms. 
The analysis o f judicial decision-making suggests that, for most o f this period, the 
courts have been unwilling to interfere with these priorities even when government 
power has seemed over-bearing and disproportionate. This seems to be connected to 
wider institutional concerns about the role o f the courts after the Human Rights Act 
perhaps reinforced by the traditional deference o f the courts in immigration matters. 
Recent decisions suggest that the courts are becoming less willing to be complied in 
the exclusion o f certain individuals from the arena of rights and justice because o f 
their immigration status. However, judges are careful to ground their authority for 
doing this in the legal principles o f the ECHR, which they are now mandated to 
observe. Their challenge to government supremacy is set within the traditional 
confines o f judicial authority. It nonetheless represents the making o f particular 
choices within those confines and suggests a lack of congruence between legislative 
and judicial priorities that was largely absent in earlier periods.
In the period discussed in earlier chapters, entry clearance played a vital role in 
ensuring the exclusion o f undesirable spouses. The strategies and techniques 
developed during that era have been analysed in depth in chapter 5, While some 
recent entry clearance decisions are still reminiscent o f this earlier period and have
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contributed to a continuing poor public perception o f the service, the available 
evidence suggests that the service is no longer so deeply engaged in perpetuating an 
exclusionary style o f  decision-making. This is not because harsh decisions are no 
longer made but because, in the light o f the new priorities discussed in this chapter, an 
exclusionary entry clearance service no longer serves the dominant goals o f policy as 
well as it used to. The decisions discussed earlier and highlighted by, among others, 
Brides Without Borders, suggest investigation elsewhere in the immigration service 
may be called for, an investigation that is beyond the scope o f this thesis. It is also a 
position that may change, given the recent attacks on certain types o f marriage 
applicant.
Previous chapters identified a set o f beliefs and assumptions that were held with 
some consistency across three institutions. These were not often articulated, but 
formed part o f the unspoken substrata o f attitudes that enabled a pattern to emerge. It 
is more difficult to identify a constant set o f beliefs in the period discussed in this 
chapter. This ambivalence suggests that a number o f competing and overlapping 
values are now in play. These include a belief in personal freedom, anxiety about 
aspects o f minorities' personal lives and broad acceptance that these minorities are 
now part o f civil society even while the state maintains a role in regulating family 
forms viewed as oppressive or otherwise unsatisfactory.
Similar observations may thus be made about the other major theme: the assertion 
o f state power in immigration matters. This has always been central to immigration 
control and was an unspoken assumption during most o f the period described in 
earlier chapters. The recent period has seen new challenges in immigration, 
demanding new responses. These have been played out in Parliament and in the 
courts, requiring these institutions to act decisively and explicitly on behalf o f the 
state. This has been particularly apparent in the legislative field. Yet, there is also the 
distinct impression o f overkill; if  the state were able to control immigration, it would 
not be necessary to keep legislating on the subject. Furthermore, there is a price for 
“firm’1 immigration control and it is paid not only by the unwanted immigrant, but by 
all members, o f society (for more discussion on this, see Hollifield 2000; Joppke 
1998). The point at which accepting state authority causes irreconcilable conflict with 
other deeply held values will vary by individual and institution, but the account given 
in this chapter suggests that for some, this point has been reached. In particular, some 
o f the House o f  Lords and Court o f Appeal decisions discussed here suggest that it is
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the case for some members of the judiciary (even if, as already acknowledged, they 
derive their authority to challenge the government from powers granted to them by 
the legislature).
The excessive quantity o f legislation and the first stirrings o f judicial resistance 
suggest that the assumption o f state supremacy has become something less powerful, 
a value that must compete with other values. This may be a transitory event provoked 
by an excess o f government zeal. The discussion o f case law in chapter 4 suggests that 
the judiciary also briefly entertained moments o f rebellion during the era o f primary 
purpose without lasting effect. On the other hand, global forces are here to stay while 
the style of judgement in, for example, Huang and Baiai suggests that judges are 
starting to draw inspiration from human rights discourse that may indicate a deeper 
shift in their sense o f their responsibilities.
If, at least momentarily, the unfettered authority of the state has moved from 
assumption to value, this is because o f the growing weight o f competing incongruent 
beliefs. In previous chapters, I identified assumptions about the outsider status of 
immigrants and their spouses, although 1 suggested, that even then, they were not 
unqualified. The changes discussed in this chapter have made it much more difficult 
to distinguish between tbelongers’ and others. That it is not a simple task to identify, 
isolate and exclude strangers has become part o f the background against which 
individuals and institutions work and this is reflected in some o f the ambiguities 
discussed here.
This problem o f identifying the stranger is particularly acute in marriage questions 
where state power reaches deep into individuals5 personal lives. Legal measures have 
had a fraught judicial history in the past ten years suggesting that amongst the values 
competing with the supremacy o f state power is a belief in limits upon its powers in 
this regard. However, the struggle looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
The most recent proposals, discussed earlier in this chapter, including close scrutiny 
o f certain marriages, suggest the state is not yet ready to abandon the assertion o f its 
power in this area.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion - A Stranger in the Home
7.1 Summary o f the thesis
Chapter l introduced the thesis and provided historical context that suggests that some 
o f the attitudes identified in the rest o f the thesis had deep roots. In particular, the long 
struggle over the nationality o f married women supports the argument that marriage 
and national belonging have long been linked especially for women, while aspects of 
the implementation o f the Aliens Act 1905 anticipate later administrative practices. 
Chapter 2 developed the theoretical perspective used in the thesis. It adopted the 
premise that discretion is involved in almost all decision-making, including where 
powers may appear almost unconstrained (such as a legislature) or where discretion 
may be thought to be absent or minimal (such as administrative decisions). It argued 
that there is a common element in all decision-making, which is that the decision­
maker relies, eventually if  not at once, upon values, beliefs and assumptions that 
cannot be proved through deductive reasoning. It also argued that there is no 
incommensurable conflict between the specialised nature o f judicial reasoning and the 
reasoning adopted in other settings. The approach proposed in the chapter is 
consistent with major strands o f jurisprudential thought as well as with the approach 
adopted in other disciplines. There is a spectrum o f decision-making behaviour 
ranging from conscious reflection o f the type described by Dworkin at one end to 
unreflective reliance upon assumptions at the other with most decisions lying 
somewhere along the spectrum. Nonetheless, all decisions rest eventually on taken- 
for-granted assumptions. Where these are held in common there will be congruence in 
decision-making between institutions. The value of the approach is that it permits 
examination not only o f what decisions are made but why they are made in the way 
they are.
Chapter 3 considered decisions made by the legislature between 1962 (when 
immigration from the Commonwealth was first formally regulated) and 1997. At the 
beginning o f  the period, there was a firm commitment to the entry o f wives to join 
their immigrant husbands. Husbands seeking to join wives were always treated more 
conditionally. Over time, this gave way to deep suspicion about claims by both 
husbands and wives, particularly when these originated on the Indian sub-continent.
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Women and children seeking family reunion were dealt with mainly through the 
administrative means discussed in chapter 5 while the primary purpose rule targeted 
husbands and some wives seeking to enter the UK to form new families. The chapter 
identifies beliefs and assumptions about race, immigration, gender relations and 
marriage as well as specific institutional values of Parliament.
Judicial decision-making during the same period was considered in chapter 4. It 
discussed decisions reached not only in the major battlefield o f primary purpose but 
also in other less well-publicised areas including marriages o f convenience, domicile, 
intention to live together and the requirement that the parties have met. While judges 
were cautious in expressing beliefs that supported decision-making and while there 
are suggestions o f judicial ambivalence, doubts were subordinated to judicial 
deference both to legislators and administrative decision-makers. While judges were 
undoubtedly conscious o f the limitations of their role, the chapter argued that not all 
decisions were mandated by existing legal principles and the choices made reveal 
values, beliefs and assumptions similar to those identified in chapter 3.
Chapter 5 contained a detailed investigation into the conduct o f the entry clearance 
service from inception until 1997, a period during which it achieved notoriety for its 
exclusionary decision-making particularly on the Indian sub-continent. Drawing on 
contemporary accounts and newspaper reports, the chapter described a consistent 
pattern o f decision-making that relied upon highly unfavourable assumptions about 
the applicants before them. While such attitudes were to a degree tempered or 
concealed within the other institutions, the entry clearance service worked in a largely 
unregulated environment where countervailing pressures and values were absent. 
Thus, there was not only congruity in the assumptions upon which all institutions 
worked but a degree o f symbiosis also. The work of the entry clearance service, 
largely hidden from view, permitted other institutions to distance themselves from the 
practices necessary to achieve an aim desired by all; the minimisation o f non-white 
immigration.
Chapter 6 considered the position since 1997. It argued that, while the legacy o f 
the era discussed in earlier chapters lingers on, important changes must also be 
acknowledged. There has been partial incorporation o f older immigrant groups and 
they represent an electoral force even while there is concern about integration and 
cohesion. New forms o f immigration and ongoing anxiety about security have led to 
new fears and new measures. Race and racism have become more complex
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phenomena and are not always detectable through an emphasis on skin colour. The 
assertion of state hegemony has been increasingly crudely drawn particularly in 
relation to immigration and security issues. Legislative, judicial and administrative 
decision-making since 1997 reflect these new emphases and the contradictions 
contained within them. The picture has become more complex and difficult to analyse 
coherently.
7.2 Values, beliefs and assumptions
The thesis focuses on beliefs, values and assumptions held by decision-makers in 
relation to marriage immigration. It divides into two unequal segments, one covering 
1962 to 1997 and the other the period after 1997. While it is convenient to divide the 
period in this way, it is also an obvious oversimplification. Attitudes did not alter 
overnight in 1997. Nonetheless, the election o f the Labour government and the 
removal o f ‘primary purpose’ was a pivotal moment o f change.
It would also be inaccurate to claim that the same attitudes prevailed to the same 
extent from 1962 until 1997. While chapters 3, 4 and 5 do identify consistent strands, 
their evolution and fluctuation relative to each other are also brought out. Some 
values, beliefs and assumptions seem to have been consistently held for much o f the 
entire period. Others did not emerge straight away or were modified. Subject to these 
qualifications, however, it is possible to summarise together the findings o f chapters 
3, 4 and 5 and to consider the position after 1997 separately.
7.2.1 Race
Underlying almost all discourse between 1962 and 1997 was the assumption that skin 
colour mattered and that further non-white immigration was highly undesirable. The 
racial aspect o f this was often understated and ‘immigration’ treated as synonymous 
with ‘non-white immigration5. Decisions made by all three institutions considered 
here were predicated on the basis that its minimisation was a priority.
Government figures usually avoided explicitly racial discourse although some were 
more outspoken than others. However, whatever their private beliefs, almost all 
tolerated or encouraged administrative practices that were directed towards the 
exclusion of particular communities. Aspects o f administrative conduct suggest 
attitudes within the entry clearance service went beyond willingness to execute a
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distasteful but necessary task to contempt for these communities and even a wish to 
punish them, including, as the ‘virginity tests' suggest, sexually, for their persistence 
in making illegitimate claims for entry. The judiciary expressed opinions only very 
rarely but decision-making mostly supported exclusionary purposes, particularly as 
the period went on. Although non-white individuals were occasionally treated 
sympathetically, skin colour and national origin were almost always critical defining 
characteristics. For all three institutions, perception o f the threat posed by non-white 
immigrants and their families resulted in their reduction to stereotypes, a flattening of 
their individuality.
In the period after 1997, there was some challenge to these assumptions due to 
increases in immigration including white immigration and the partial integration of 
non-white communities. Signifiers of difference now, it is suggested, centre more on 
culture or religion with some regard for social class. This does not represent an abrupt 
switch. Cultural difference has always intertwined with hostility towards non-white 
immigration, as the distaste for the arranged marriage discussed in earlier chapters 
demonstrates. However, the role played by skin colour alone has arguably diminished 
and certain types o f cultural difference have increased in importance, explaining the 
continued focus upon the arranged marriage.
7.2.2 The arranged marriage
Attitudes towards the arranged marriage intersect with assumptions about race. 
During the period discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the arranged marriage was openly 
seen as inferior to Western models. Many assumed it would die out over time; others 
believed it would continue as a vehicle for immigration. It was widely assumed that 
there was little or no emotional investment in such marriages and that separation 
would cause little hardship. The complexity o f the system, its place in Asian family 
life and the personal commitment o f protagonists towards its fulfilment were barely 
understood.
Recent acknowledgement o f the plurality o f relationships has mostly not extended 
to international arranged marriages. Their perceived inferiority to the liberal Western 
model is largely assumed and the government has made clear its reservations about 
their continuation. While aspects o f such marriages are problematic as the discussion
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of the literature in chapter 6 demonstrates, all familial models have drawbacks and the 
particular critical focus upon arranged marriages suggests other concerns are in play. 
Nonetheless, and perhaps against expectation, the thesis found some disparity 
between this hostility and current entry clearance practice. Provided marriages 
conform to an officer's preconception o f a traditional arranged marriage, they are 
usually prepared to accept it. Refused cases tend to be those perceived as atypical. 
This lack o f congruity arguably reflects ambivalence within society about the extent 
o f justifiable government interference in the personal lives o f well-established 
minorities. It remains to be seen how and whether this will be resolved and a more 
consistent set o f attitudes adopted.
7.2.3 Immigration
If, for much of the period between 1962 and 1997, the non-white character of 
immigration was seen to be its fundamental problem, this was reinforced by many 
other beliefs. Immigration was seen as an accretion o f numbers sharing a limited pot 
of resources and a single one-way journey rather than part o f a pattern of global 
movement. While emigration did not usually feature in accounts, immigration was 
widely perceived as fundamentally disadvantageous for the host society causing 
labour displacement and a drain on social resources. Its benefits, economic and social, 
were rarely if  ever articulated in the UK and the gains were assumed to be purely to 
the immigrant.
Family migration was viewed through the prism o f these beliefs. It posed a 
particular threat because, under the guise o f humanity, it permitted the entry o f new 
workers and established a potentially endless chain o f migration. These beliefs, 
compounded by the attitudes towards race and the arranged marriage just described, 
ensured that potential immigrants were viewed with deep scepticism and abuse was 
assumed to be ubiquitous and endemic.
The benefits o f immigration were better understood after 1997, provided it 
involved the right sort o f immigrant, entering in a state-approved manner. The rise o f 
the ‘sham marriage’ and the treatment o f those without leave who married or have 
sought to marry in the UK reflects this preoccupation. The recent past has seen a 
resurgence o f anxiety about immigration mainly from the eastern fringes o f the EU 
expressed by senior politicians once again in terms o f labour displacement and the
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strain upon social resources. There is a clear degree o f political strategy at play here 
but one which assumes that the public perception o f immigration remains largely 
negative.
7.2.4 Gender
Assumptions about gender have been a major force. This has had several 
manifestations. It was for many years assumed that only men move for work and that 
wives and children were ‘secondary" migrants. Parties who conformed to this 
conventional pattern were treated more favourably than those who did not. The 
families of male alien workers were usually permitted to enter. In the early period o f 
Commonwealth immigration control, married men with families were arguably seen 
as a safer prospect than single (impliedly sexually predatory) men. This is consistent 
with the particular protection offered to wives and children in the 1962 Act, and 
which was not repealed until 1988, although the entry o f family members soon 
became the focus o f administrative measures.
Where husbands sought to join wives, they were assumed to be disguised ‘'primary" 
migrants entering for economic purposes. This assumption was given explicit 
expression in immigration control through the ban on husbands. When overt sex 
discrimination was no longer possible, the primary purpose rule was applied as if 
male immigrants moved primarily for economic reasons.
Also present have been corresponding assumptions about women. In particular, 
they have often been seen as the passive instruments o f the will o f their husbands and 
fathers, their identity subsumed into that o f their male relatives. This was literally the 
case with the rules on married women"s nationality discussed in the introduction, but 
was implicitly so during most o f the period under discussion here, particularly where 
South Asian women were concerned, assumptions about race and gender dovetailing. 
Women who married outsiders lost their British identity and became outsiders 
themselves.
Paradoxically however, women were expected to accept the consequences of 
marriages that had been, it was implied, decided almost without operation o f their 
will, even where this meant leaving the country o f their birth or long term residence. 
In this respect, the assumptions o f decision-makers recall the underlying premise o f 
much nineteenth century fiction; that women make only one significant decision in
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their lives, whom to marry. All else leads lip to or flows from the wisdom of that 
choice.
Attitudes towards gender have changed. Sexually discriminatory rules would have 
been unacceptable in the period after 1997 and not only for legal reasons. The debate 
has become framed in different terms. ‘M odern’ forms o f relationship including 
unmarried and same sex partnerships have been officially acknowledged. ‘Modern' 
marriages, including those where the husband joins the wife, are largely seen as 
normal. Nonetheless, there are implicit parameters o f 'norm ality' that are gender 
determined and relationships that fall outside these are still treated sceptically, as 
chapter 6 demonstrates. Thus men who marry much older women are subject to 
particular doubt (and may now be suspected to be party to a forced marriage). Men 
are also still more likely to be considered as economic migrants particularly if  the 
relationship is not otherwise ‘modern’.
7.2.5 Who belongs?
In this thesis, there has been frequent reference to ‘belongers’ and ‘outsiders’. The 
distinction has been essential in determining who may enjoy family life in the UK on 
their own terms. Decision-making, as analysed in this thesis (and as the literature 
suggests; see Yuval-Davis et al. 2005:526-31), suggests that belonging is a fluctuating 
not a static concept and cannot be determined solely by reference to nationality or 
other formal status. The thesis has argued that non-white residents including nationals 
and those born in the UK are not unqualified ‘belongers’. This status must be earned 
through adoption o f a British identity in certain key respects. Thus, men who rely on 
domicile in the sub-continent to assert legal rights to certain forms o f divorce or 
marriage have been treated unsympathetically. Women who marry ‘wrongly’ and, in 
consequence, wish to import unwanted male immigrants face loss o f belonging in the 
sense that they are unable to enjoy married life in this country. Those who challenge 
state authority in immigration matters, through deceit or circumvention o f the rules, 
are liable to be excluded even where this has no bearing on their claim as a spouse.
Exclusion has never been completely synonymous with skin colour except in 
extreme cases. Nonetheless, the status o f  non-white populations has always been 
contingent and provisional even into the second generation. Since 1997, skin colour 
and ‘belonging’ have become even more decoupled so that some white immigrants
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(notably those from Eastern Europe) have been seen as a threat, while factors such as 
cultural conformity, social class and compliance with state regulation have become 
more critical in determining the belonging status o f the non-white population.
7.2.6 A hierarchy of marriages
It has been noted at various places throughout the thesis that there is an implicit 
hierarchy o f acceptable marriages. The place that a marriage occupies in the hierarchy 
depends partly upon formal legal rules but also, it is submitted, upon how it is 
perceived and the assumptions that are made about it. At the top are those that 
command acceptance in that entry o f the non-resident spouse is virtually assured. At 
the bottom are those where entry is very difficult or even impossible. These marriages 
may be believed to be ‘bogus' because they lack credibility or the non-resident party 
may belong to a category whose entry is considered undesirable. Very often, the two 
reasons are conflated.
Gender, race and class have always been important factors in determining the place 
o f a marriage on the hierarchy. Male entrants married to British-resident women are 
generally placed below women joining British husbands. The measures described in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 ensured that 11011-white applicants, particularly from the sub­
continent, were most frequently refused. After 1997, non-white countries remained 
the major source o f refusals but it is becoming difficult to disentangle issues o f race 
from those o f social class as the maintenance and accommodation requirements mean 
that poor entrants have more difficulty securing entry while the most recent proposals 
are clearly aimed at poor often Muslim immigrants.
Over the period described in this thesis, the role played by various factors in 
determining the hierarchy has fluctuated. At the beginning gender arguably 
predominated over or acted as a proxy for race. By the 1970s, race was the single 
most important factor and this became more explicit as sex discrimination became 
more difficult. In the recent past, there has been more emphasis on the cultural 
conformity o f the marriage, economic self-sufficiency, the degree o f likely integration 
into British society and compliance with state authority in immigration matters.
The hierarchy is strongly connected to the concept o f ‘belonging'. Adjustments 
were sometimes made to reflect subtle but important distinctions or evolution in the 
sense o f who does or does not belong. For instance, the pure sex discrimination
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involved in the ban on husbands needed adjustment as it affected too many white 
British women. The restriction of the right to sponsor to women bom in the UK was a 
subtler device. Primary purpose permitted administrative means to be used to 
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable spouses, especially husbands. More 
recently, the prohibition on the entry o f more than one polygamous spouse and the 
raising of minimum ages for entry and sponsorship suggest cultural concerns have 
started to win out over skin colour as a factor. The ban on switching and Ss. 19-25 
IA(TC)A 2004 have made plain the low ranking o f marriages entered into with illegal 
or short-term migrants who have or who are suspected to have defied the state’s 
authority. Immigrants who are compliant or persistent are more likely to achieve 
eventual acceptance even if they begin with other disadvantages.
7.2.7 State authority and its limits
Another major assumption held throughout the period discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 
was that immigration policy was a matter o f national self-interest and legitimate state 
power. The right to enter or remain in the UK was a privilege to be accorded only to 
those who complied with requirements both official and, it is argued here, unofficial. 
For the most part, this was assumed and did not need iteration. It drew its legitimacy 
from the apparently overwhelming public support for firm immigration control. Since 
1997, the assertion o f state hegemony became ever more emphatic with repeated 
attempts at legislation and other forms o f regulation. Submission to state-generated 
criteria not only in respect o f entry but also in terms o f process has become a vital 
condition for acceptance, even while such compliance has become more difficult 
given almost continuous legal change.
There may be an electoral demand for ‘tough’ immigration controls. But it is also 
true that implicit within many manifestations o f state power are acknowledgements o f 
its limitations. This becomes apparent if  other taken-for-granted assumptions about 
immigration control are brought onto sharper focus. The predominant discourse 
surrounding such controls is that o f abuse. Measures are rationalised by the need to 
prevent fraudulent applications even though the evidence o f actual fraud is often 
contested or exaggerated. This discourse has become so familiar that critics barely 
question its function. Yet it is clearly necessary. The electorate may have a preference
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for a restrictive immigration policy but also require to be convinced that it is justified 
ethically.
Other such prevarications may be observed. Overt racist sentiment was almost 
never expressed by leading political figures despite the racially discriminatory content 
o f much policy. Forced marriages have also been used over many years to support 
restrictive policy whose effects go much wider. Most significantly perhaps, the 
discussion o f the period between 1962 and 1997 suggests that the judiciary and the 
legislature were able to maintain at least a superficial appearance o f fairness by 
refusing to acknowledge the highly discriminatory but mostly covert practices o f the 
entry clearance service. As chapter 6 discusses, the position has changed somewhat 
since 1997 for various reasons and the worst aspects o f decision-making have 
arguably shifted to elsewhere in the immigration service.
The assumption that underlies reliance on this type of argument or conduct is that, 
without it, support for measures would be more equivocal. This does not mean that a 
more honest approach would remove all support for immigration control but there 
might be less comfort and more ambivalence. In other words, as well as wishing for 
firm controls, many individuals acknowledge that claims to enter as a spouse have 
some validity. Governments will often try, for electoral reasons, to reconcile 
restrictive measures with moral rationalisations, but the conflict is almost always there 
if  it is looked for.
Linked to this implicit acknowledgement o f the need to reconcile the irreconcilable 
is the tacit recognition, discussed in chapter 6, that whatever government and the 
electorate might wish to happen, there are limits on what may be achieved, at least if  
other essential values are not to be unacceptably compromised. Commentators have 
criticised the both the necessity, morality and effectiveness o f immigration controls 
and the exclusion o f free movement from formulations of fundamental rights (Carens 
1987; Dummett 2001; Harris 2002; Juss 2006). Over-restrictive immigration controls 
may be incompatible with the values o f a liberal state and impossible to implement 
without interfering excessively in the freedoms o f those entitled to enter and 
remain.183 Yet politicians may feel that they have little choice on the matter. Caught 
up in the race to demonstrate competence in immigration matters, governments 
promise more than they can deliver. The result is endless legislation and
185 As Joppke (1998:292) expresses it, "At the risk o f  stating a tautology, accepting unwanted 
immigration is inherent in the liberalness o f  liberal states".
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organisational reform. This may bring some immediate results but pressure often 
rapidly appears elsewhere in the system necessitating a further round o f changes so 
that, paradoxically, repeated legislation serves only to underline the growing difficulty 
faced by states in preventing unwanted arrivals. At the same time, as discussed in 
chapter 6, the growth in human rights-related case law and discourse has challenged, 
to some degree, the legitimacy of unbridled state power based on majoritarian politics, 
although it remains to be seen whether this will have any lasting or substantive effect.
7.2.8 Institutional values
The thesis has found that the values discussed above were shared across institutions 
for much of the period discussed here. It is plausible that decision-making would also 
be affected by particular institutional values. Yet, once the different functions o f each 
institution are taken into account, it is arguable that institutional factors affected more 
the style than the content o f decisions. This is particularly so in the period between 
1962 and 1997 when there was a strong degree o f congruity in all decision-making. 
Judges, for example, mostly expressed themselves ‘judicially' but, as chapter 4 
discusses, made decisions that supported exclusionary purposes, sometimes at the 
expense o f more coherent legal alternatives. In a few cases, though, such as 
interpretation o f the requirement to have met, decision-making suggested reservations 
about excessive intrusion into personal arrangements, perhaps reflecting institutional 
caution in this area. Parliament rationalised its decisions through its electoral 
mandate, but rarely questioned whether its values extended beyond majoritarian 
politics. It was also able to maintain a formal commitment to family reunification 
knowing that the entry clearance service ensured that unwanted family members were 
refused. The entry clearance service was largely unregulated and had little sense of 
any institutional purpose beyond exclusion. It certainly had an institutional culture but 
it was one that, except for lapses such as ‘virginity tests’, complemented and fulfilled 
political aims.
It was clearly found that the position has become more complex since 1997. 
Parliament has retained its strong commitment to majoritarian politics, tempered only 
marginally, if  at all, by human rights or other countervailing values. As discussed in 
chapter 6, the judiciary has, in some instances, become more assertive, drawing added 
authority from human rights values. The entry clearance service has become less
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enmeshed in the execution o f unofficial policy and more pre-occupied by institutional 
concerns such as efficiency. A local culture is still nonetheless observable on the sub­
continent, possibly inherited through generations o f officials. It seems that the fluidity 
and ambivalence discussed in chapter 6 have provided more opportunity for 
institutions to reflect upon their particular values. Yet, in general, the impact of these 
is less powerful than might have been anticipated at the start o f the thesis.
7.3 Marriage migration: the future
Family migration, including marriage, is now the dominant mode o f legal entry into 
many developed countries (Kofman and Meetoo 2008:1). This is true o f the UK if 
those granted settlement rather than limited leave to enter are counted (although the 
statistics do not include EEA nationals who enter for work or family reasons).186 It is 
also the source o f persistent regulation both in the UK and elsewhere (see chapter 6). 
Chapter 6 considered evidence that international marriages are likely to continue 
amongst the populations o f South Asian origin, particularly those from Bangladesh 
and Pakistan. International arranged marriages also remain common in those 
communities outside the South Asian community who have traditionally practised 
them (Beck-Gernsheim 2007:275-7). Even within communities, including the 
indigenous British population, where international marriages are not the norm, a 
proportion will enter them and this is made more probable by recent immigration and 
increased global travel. Marriage immigration, situated at the controversial 
intersection between private rights and public responsibilities, looks likely to remain a 
live issue for the foreseeable future.
This thesis shows that marriage immigration has been regarded by governments as 
purely an ‘immigration' issue and one that is particularly problematic, because it 
cannot be ‘managed' in the same way as labour migration.187 The invocation of 
marriage and family has always been a potent (if risky) political weapon serving a 
variety o f ends but, in relation to immigration, the emotional significance and
186 In 2006, approximately 145,000 work-permit holders and their dependants were admitted compared 
to just over 47,000 spouses and fiance(e)s and nearly 6,000 dependent children. However, there were 
just under 135,000 grants o f settlement, o f  which 65% were to dependent relatives (Home Office 
2007).
187 The most recent manifestation o f  this was the proposal for pre-entry language testing for spouses, 
which was explicitly linked to its introduction in work-based migration despite the very different 
reasons for entry in each case. As discussed in chapter 6, the government has, for the moment, retreated 
from this proposal although a ‘commitment’ to learning English will be required (Border and 
Immigration Agency 2007b:6; UK Border Agency 2008a:4).
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nurturing function o f marriage have been minimised in favour o f reliance upon its role 
as a cause o f immigration. Family formation or reunion has often been seen as a kind 
o f Trojan horse, the apparently straightforward humanitarian claim to live with one's 
family members carrying less desirable consequences: the importation o f unwanted - 
often male - workers and the recreation on British soil of alien forms o f family life. It 
says much about attitudes towards non-white immigrants that, for many years, their 
family life was seen to be so potent a danger that they could not be permitted to carry 
it on within the UK. Such attitudes, in embryonic form, may be observed in the 
implementation o f the Aliens Act, became even more apparent in the period discussed 
in chapters 3, 4 and 5 and remained important after 1997. Chapter 6, which discusses 
the period since 1997, thus identifies a complex and fluid picture. That fluidity is a 
continuing characteristic, with the latest proposals (raising the age for entry and 
sponsorship to 21 and related measures, as already discussed, and other measures 
affecting the route to naturalisation; UK Border Agency 2008a) awaiting 
implementation as this conclusion is being written.
Recent literature suggests that regulation of the complex ties represented by family 
(including marriage) migration may yet prove elusive. This literature (see Kofman 
2004; Smith 2004 and Kofman and Meetoo 2008 for a discussion) is less parochial 
and more theoretical than conventional government analysis, viewing family 
migration as more than a single discrete act whereby an entire family either relocates 
to or is created in a new location. Recent literature on migration has used the term 
Transnationalism5 because it challenges a state-centred perspective on migration, 
viewing it as a dynamic and multi-stranded process whereby individuals forge and 
sustain connections in both the new and the old state (Levitt 2004:2). These 
connections affect more than the migrant individual and have an impact upon family 
members as well as the wider community in both the country o f origin and the 
country o f destination. Transnational families, according to Bryceson and Vuerola 
(2002:3 quoted in Kofman and Meetoo 2008:3), “live some or most o f their time 
separated from each other, yet hold together, managing to maintain a feeling o f unity 
and collective welfare, despite geographical distance55.
Transnational marriages take many forms: arranged and non-arranged marriages 
within the same ethnic group, marriages between British nationals and individuals 
from abroad encountered in the UK or through foreign travel and marriages between 
individuals from different migrant communities. While these may occur
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predominant!}' in urban areas, recent immigration to rural areas means that it may 
become a feature there. It is no longer sufficient to divide the population into a 
homogenous native community who may occasionally draw in an outsider and 
distinct peripheral groups with links to one country o f origin (Beck-Gernsheim 
2007:274-5).
While many international marriages are not arranged, the international arranged 
marriage remains the most controversial category o f all such marriages. At the same 
time, the extended South Asian family with its international ties o f which marriage 
forms a major strand is a paradigmatic transnational family. The resulting ties may be 
much wider than a simple binary connection between the UK and the country of 
origin. Marriages may be contracted with those who have migrated elsewhere in the 
world forming a complex web o f international links. As chapter 6 demonstrates, the 
international arranged marriage system continues to thrive despite both government 
efforts to disrupt it and evidence o f ambivalence by the young people involved. This 
is arguably because, not despite, o f the distance involved (Beck-Gernsheim 2007: 
277).
Transnationalism creates new motivations, hopes and pressures affecting marriage 
decisions. The motives for entering an international arranged marriage include a 
desire to respect tradition but also encompass more forward looking objectives 
including the cementing o f international family relationships, a renegotiation (not 
always successful) o f Traditional’ gender relations and the possibility o f trading the 
chance o f migration for a higher status spouse than would otherwise be expected 
(Beck-Gemsheim 2007:279-85).
This helps to explain why international arranged marriages persist and are unlikely 
to disappear. The government clearly regards continued intervention in these 
marriages as legitimate. Raising the minimum age for entry and sponsorship to 21 and 
the other related measures discussed in chapter 6 will overwhelmingly affect arranged 
marriages, while having relatively little impact elsewhere. They may have some effect 
on the number and type o f such marriages but there is equally the risk that they will 
reinforce exclusion and defensiveness. It is improbable that they will encourage self­
reflection and organic change, but may result in attempts to circumvent what are seen 
as administrative obstructions. This thesis has demonstrated that the government has 
frequently believed mistakenly that international arranged marriages will decline over 
time and has attempted to accelerate that process through legal restrictions. There is
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no reason to believe that these new policies will be more effective and they may have 
the unintended consequence of increasing rather than reducing divisions.
Given the continued pressure of marriage migration and its decreased distance 
from the mainstream of British life, the government is faced with a dilemma. Some of 
this marriage migration is regarded as highly undesirable, notably arranged marriages 
involving very young or poor immigrants with few skills to assist them in adapting to 
UK life. Concerns about fraud remain a live issue despite the government setbacks 
described in chapter 6. The management o f immigration (or the appearance o f it) is a 
pre-condition for the perception of governmental competence.
Yet, fewer tools are available. Distinctions directly based on nationality or race are 
no longer possible. Broad polices such as that implemented under Ss. 19-25 AI(TC)A 
are liable to successful legal challenge. Measures that affect too many marriages also 
risk electoral unpopularity particularly now that populations o f immigrant descent are 
a significant part o f the electorate. The challenge for the government is to formulate 
non-discriminatory measures that target the undesired immigrant without unduly 
alienating minority communities and parties to other more acceptable marriages. The 
most recent proposals, discussed in chapter 6, rationalised by the forced marriage and 
targeted quite clearly at only a segment o f the population o f immigrant descent, show 
the likely direction of travel. Nonetheless, as recent legal challenges demonstrate, the 
task is likely to be a difficult one.
7.4 Conclusion: back to belonging
Cohesion, integration and the politics o f ‘belonging' have become central concepts in 
political debate over the past period and are now subject to an extensive literature (see 
chapter 6 for discussion o f this; for a summary o f ideas o f ‘belonging', see Yuval- 
Davis et al. 2005). This thesis has argued that the legal boundaries o f marriage 
immigration reflect who is considered able or deserving to belong.
‘Belonging' is a protean concept that may be understood in many different 
dimensions. It is about personal experience and feeling as well as official status 
sanctioned through policy and law. In this thesis, however, the emphasis has been on 
interpreting the decisions o f state institutions in order to understand state-generated 
conceptions of belonging. Decision-makers, it is argued, rely on beliefs, values and 
assumptions that create official and unofficial categories o f  belonging and exclusion.
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Family immigration in general and marriage immigration in particular are 
particularly problematic in creating these categories. In most cases, excluding a 
particular class o f immigrants does not directly impinge upon the 'belonging' o f those 
already within the polity. It may do so indirectly if individuals perceive that those 
similar to themselves are generally rejected. However, there are ways to minimise a 
close identification. For example, race equality legislation was for many years the 
explicit trade-off for race-orientated immigration control. Long-term residents have 
not usually encountered many obstacles to obtaining nationality and formal equality 
for themselves and their children, although the route to settlement and naturalisation 
is becoming more complex. Immigration control may be understood as economically 
necessary rather than as a reaction to an external threat. These techniques have not 
always been successfully applied, but they do provide a form o f discourse that is, on 
the surface, inclusive.
But these rationalisations work less well where family migration is concerned, as 
the UK-based individual is more likely to feel personally implicated in the rejection o f 
a close family member. There may also be a visible contrast between the quality o f 
family life that he or she enjoys and that o f those who are more fortunate. This, on its 
own, may be sufficient to qualify that individual's own sense o f belonging.
The problem is accentuated in the case o f marriage immigration. This is not only 
because marriage or an equivalent relationship may be the necessary core to an 
individuaFs well-being, so that being refused the right to enjoy it in a particular place 
becomes a strong indicator of whether one belongs in that place. It is also because, 
from the point o f view o f both decision-maker and affected individual, marriage 
represents a choice in a way that a blood tie does not. So it is doubly significant as an 
important and personal relationship which is chosen. Whom one chooses is seen as 
telling in terms o f values, culture and allegiances, particularly for women who, as 
previously noted, have special responsibility for morality and culture and are still 
assumed to absorb more than they transmit where these diverge within a relationship.
Where an individual chooses the ‘wrong' spouse, the state must also choose: 
whether to accept into its symbolic heart, a stranger whom it would otherwise wish to 
exclude, or, at least partially, to exclude and make into a stranger, the UK resident. 
The decisions analysed in this thesis suggest that deciding who is to become the 
stranger depends upon what is believed 01* assumed about both parties and the 
marriage.
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Yet, it is not apparent that the state will have the last word. Individuals and 
communities have persistently resisted the imposition of such absolute categories in 
this most personal and complex area o f their lives necessitating, from a state 
perspective, the numerous regulatory changes described in this thesis. It is probable 
that such resistance and the ensuing battles will continue.
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Appendix A
‘Wife with 50 husbands' Daily Express 24th July 1976 
‘Counsellor's advice led to dismissal' Times 26th July 1976 
‘Marriage swindle inquiry urged' Times 26th July 1976 
‘Asian “married sister to beat ban'" Daily Telegraph 4th August 1976 
‘Marriage swindle' Guardian 7th August 1976
‘Pakistani's marriage “not a reason to stay"’ The Times 25lh January 1977 
‘Five held in marriage check' Times 3 1st January 1977 
‘Woman given £50 to “marry" Iranian' Guardian 15th February 1977 
‘Till the Home Office rules do us part’ Sunday Observer 15th January 1978 
‘Mr Fix-it offered us cash to wed immigrants’ Daily Star 26th February 1979 
‘Buy a Bride’ Daily Mail 16th November 1982
‘Freedom for the “bride” who cashed in on marriage’ Daily Mail 13th October 1984
‘Migrant racket in fake bridegrooms revealed’ Daily telegraph 2D1 October 1984
‘Immigrants ‘run marriage racket'” Times 17th March 1989
‘’’Thousands” in immigrant weddings rackets’ Daily Telegraph 17lh March 1989
‘Brides for sale scam mother is ja iled’ Sun, 7lh November 1989
‘Groom for hire nicked at wedding’ News o f the World 24th December 1989
‘Bogus marriage plots uncovered’ The Times 26th February 1990
‘MPs demand action to stop immigration marriage fraud’ The Times 27th February
1990
‘Cops charge three after wedding swoop’ News o f the World 29th April 1990 
‘Curb on fake marriages threatened by EC court’ Daily Telegraph 8lh July 8th 1992 
‘’’Hundreds” in bogus weddings to beat law’ Evening Standard 13th August 1993 
‘M igrants’ Mr Fixit forged a fortune’ Daily Mail 4th February 1995 
‘How yet another illegal migrant beats the system’ Sunday Express 26tl1 February 
1995
‘Council crook runs marriage fix scam’ News o f the World 30th April 1995 
‘Immigrants will face a marriage o f inconvenience’ Daily Mail 5th July 1995 
‘Civil servant “set up weddings for illegal migrants’” Daily Telegraph 7th July 1995
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